Compañia de los Ferrocarriles v. Benedicto

11 P.R. Fed. 97
CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedDecember 20, 1918
DocketNo. 1002
StatusPublished

This text of 11 P.R. Fed. 97 (Compañia de los Ferrocarriles v. Benedicto) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Compañia de los Ferrocarriles v. Benedicto, 11 P.R. Fed. 97 (prd 1918).

Opinion

HamxltoN, Judge,

delivered the following opinion:

1. There is no doubt'that a sovereign, whether state or territorial, has the right to tax all property within its limits, no matter by whom owned, unless exempted by law. Porto Pico, is a quasi sovereignty, and from its position has in some respects been granted greater powers than usually conferred upon the continental territories of the United States. Whether it be regarded as having these powers as a separate entity, or as exercising them as the delegate and representative of the sovereign, the United States, is not material. Among these powers is that of taxation,. and the power" is essential to the existence of this or any other sovereign. No unnecessary interference should be had with this power, not only because it may involve suit against a sovereign, but because no matter against whom the suit is directed it affects the public government itself. The general rule is that it is far better for an individual to suffer and pursue statutory remedies for reimbursement than for the very government itself to be tied up for the lack of means to operate its agencies. This result may not follow from a particular suit, but if a suit is permitted there is no limit to the suits which may follow. The local government is maintained by .taxation and no question can be made of this right so long as it does not transcend the powers granted by the Organic Act. Equality in bearing the just burden of government is the cornerstone of Anglo-Saxon liberty. Moog v. Randolph, 77 Ala. 602. Says Chief Justice Lowrie: “There is nothing poetical about tax laws; wherever they find property they claim a contribution for its protection.” Finley v. Philadelphia, 32 Pa. 381. To the same effect are Catlin v. Hill, 21 Vt. 152, and People ex rel. Hoyt v. Tax & A. Comrs. 23 N. Y. 238. Tax power is plenary except so far as it is limited [102]*102by the 'Constitution. Birmingham v. Klein, 89 Ala. 461, 8 L.R.A. 369, 7 So. 386. Everything is under the jurisdiction and taxing power of a state which exists by its authority or is introduced by its permission. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 429, 4 L. ed. 607. The taxing power is limited to what is within the jurisdiction of the state. St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co. 11 Wall. 423, 429, 20 L. ed. 192, 194; State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 319, 21 L. ed. 179, 186; Delaware R. Tax, 18 Wall. 206, 229, 21 L. ed. 888, 895. It has been held that a life tenant must pay taxes during his tenancy. Washburn, Real Prop. 112, § 28.

2. The term of the operating contract and of the tax exemption was originally for the same period of twenty-five years, and this may account for there being no mention of taxation in the operating contract. The exemption as enacted is for the Compañia de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico, their successors and assigns, and it may be a question whether the American Bailroacl Company is not pro hac vice -an assign, under this provision. There was, it is true, no assignment'of the franchise, but there certainly has been an assignment of the operation of the railroad. If the Compañia were operating the railroad, there could be no serious question that everything connected with the operation would be exempt. If, for reasons good to itself, the Compañia prefers to have an agent operate the railroad, why is not the same thing true in favor of that agent? It would be difficult to class the American Bailroad Company except as cither an agent or part-assignee of the Compañia. It is quite true that exemptions from taxation are strictly construed. Dauphin & L. Streets R. Co. v. Kennerly, 74 Ala. 583. It has been forcibly said by Mr. Justice Black [103]*103that there can be no doubtful franchise, that is, if there is a doubt it will be resolved in favor of the public.

This question, however, does not arise at present, for this is not a claim by the American Railroad Company of Porto Eico of an exemption. It may well be that the American Railroad Company of Porto Eico owns property which under a different system, or for different reasons, is subject to taxation, while that of the original Compañía, plaintiff herein, is-not. The contract itself may be- such property, if the situs can be considered to be in Porto Eico; for in the case, for instance, of bonds, the tax situs may be different from the domicil of the owner. State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 324, 21 L. ed. 179, 188; Catlin v. Hill, 21 Vt. 158. It of course, on 'the other hand, may be true that commercial securities, being negotiable instruments, are in a different category from personal contracts like the one at bar. Mercer County v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83, 17 L. ed. 548. The general rule is that the' state in which the personal property is actually situated affects that property by its laws. Story. Conf. L. §§ 18, 550; United States v. Erie R. Co. 106 U. S. 327, 27 L. ed. 151, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 223. On the other hand it has been held 'that a debt exists at the situs of the creditor’s residence and may be taxed there. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 25 L. ed. 558.

Whatever may be true in this regard, however, is not necessarily involved in the case at bar. The American Eailroad Company is a separate entity, making its own return, and entitled to pursue its own remedies. The plaintiff herein can only complain if property belonging to it is seized or threatened for a tax which is not due by the plaintiff itself.

3. The method of taxation has differed in different countries [104]*104anti at different times. In Spain much was regulated by special royal decrees, but the Anglo-American system contemplates separate steps generally taken by different officials, although in Porto Pico the whole seems to bo under the treasurer as head of the revenue department. (1) There is the assessment, based upon the return of the taxpayer, which, however, is subject to revision. The assessment is very important. Cooley, Taxn. 352. (2) The levy of the rate of taxes upon

the different classes of property, which must be uniform within each class; and (3) the collection after a warrant has issued to the tax collector. Since the American occupation Porto Rico lias adopted for local purposes the American system, although centralized under one official. It is the duty of the treasurer’s office to revise assessments and to assess escapes. Pol. Code, §§ 286, 287. All property not exempted from taxation shall be assessed and taxed, Political Code, § 290 (as amended), as follows: “That all property not expressly exempted from taxation shall be assessed and taxed. Por the purposes of the assessment and collection of taxes, real property shall be deemed to be synonymous with immovables as defined in §§ 333, 33i and 335 of the Civil Code: Provided, however, that machinery, vessels, instruments or implements not fixed to the building or soil shall not be deemed to be real property. Personal property shall include such machinery, vessels, instruments or implements not fixed to the building or soil, live stock, money, whether in the possession of the owner thereof or held by or on deposit with some other person or institution, bonds, stocks, certificates in unincorporated syndicates or partnerships, patent-rights, trademarks, franchises, concessions and all other matters and things capable of private ownership and not in-[105]

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Related

M'culloch v. State of Maryland
17 U.S. 316 (Supreme Court, 1819)
Mercer County v. Hacket
68 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1864)
St. Louis v. Ferry Co.
78 U.S. 423 (Supreme Court, 1871)
Taylor v. Secor
92 U.S. 575 (Supreme Court, 1876)
Kirtland v. Hotchkiss
100 U.S. 491 (Supreme Court, 1879)
National Bank v. Kimball
103 U.S. 732 (Supreme Court, 1881)
United States v. Erie Railway Co.
106 U.S. 327 (Supreme Court, 1882)
Finley v. City of Philadelphia
32 Pa. 381 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1859)
Dauphin & LaFayette Streets Railway Co. v. Kennerly
74 Ala. 583 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1883)
Moog v. Randolph
77 Ala. 597 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1884)
Mayor of Birmingham v. Klein
89 Ala. 461 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1889)
Catlin v. Hull
21 Vt. 152 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1849)
Barnard v. Hoyt
63 Ill. 341 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1872)
Folkerts v. Power
3 N.W. 857 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1879)

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Bluebook (online)
11 P.R. Fed. 97, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/compania-de-los-ferrocarriles-v-benedicto-prd-1918.