Commonwealth v. Woodson

375 A.2d 375, 248 Pa. Super. 545, 1977 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2055

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 29, 1977
• Docket: 1731
• Status: Published

Opinions

PRICE, Judge:

The complaint in the instant case was filed on May 23, 1974. The Commonwealth was therefore required by Pa.R. Crim.P. 1100(a)(1)¹ to bring the appellant to trial within 270 days. Trial, however, commenced on April 29, 1975, well after the expiration of the mandatory period. The appellant thus contends that his right to a speedy trial under Rule 1100 was violated. We agree with this contention.

On February 3, 1975, the lower court granted the Commonwealth an extension of time predicated upon the Commonwealth’s assertion that the appellant was “at large” and therefore unavailable for trial.² The lower court found that the appellant could not be brought to trial within the prescribed period despite the due diligence of the Commonwealth. On March 21, 1975, however, the lower court rescinded its order due to the Commonwealth’s admission that the appellant was not a fugitive, but was in fact incarcerated in the Montgomery County Prison, where he had been since August 27, 1974. Thus, the record clearly shows that the Commonwealth did not proceed with due diligence in bringing the appellant to trial and was not therefore entitled to an extension of time for trial. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c).³

The Commonwealth contends that the delay in the instant case was attributable solely to the judiciary since the case could not be reached because of an overloaded court docket. Even though the Commonwealth may be granted an extension of time for trial because of judicial delay, e. g., Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa. 214, 364 A.2d 1345 (1976), the Commonwealth must still demonstrate that trial could not be commenced within the prescribed 'f)eriod despite its due diligence. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c). Here, the record conclusively establishes that internal disarray, irrespective of available courtroom space, prevented the Commonwealth from bringing the appellant to trial. Once we conclude from the record that the Commonwealth has not acted diligently, then we must dismiss the Commonwealth’s petition to extend as invalid.

The judgment of sentence is reversed, and the appellant is discharged.

VAN der VOORT, J., files a dissenting opinion.

1 . Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(a)(1) provides that: “Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant after June 30, 1973 but before July 1, 1974 shall commence no later than two hundred seventy (270) days from the date on which the complaint is filed.”

2 . The lower court issued the following order:

“AND NOW, this 3d day of February, 1975, the District Attorney, having filed a timely Petition for Extension of Time for Commencing Trial pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(e) [sic] and it further appearing that the defendant remains at large and that a Bench Warrant was issued for his arrest on the 12th day of August, 1974, which has prevented trial from having commenced within the prescribed period despite due diligence by the Commonwealth, the prayer of the Commonwealth’s Petition is granted and trial is to be held no later than One Hundred-Twenty (120) days from the date the defendant is apprehended on the Bench Warrant.”

3 . Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c) provides, in pertinent part, that:

“At any time prior to the expiration of the period for commencement of trial, the attorney for the Commonwealth may apply to the court for an order extending the time for commencement of trial.

Such application shall be granted only if trial cannot be commenced within the prescribed period despite due diligence by the Commonwealth.”