NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-1035
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
WILLIAM A. KNOWLES.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury trial in District Court, the defendant was
convicted of leaving the scene of property damage, in violation
of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a).1 On appeal, the defendant claims
that (1) the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence
from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was the operator of the vehicle that caused the damage, (2) the
prosecutor erred by making improper comments in his opening
statement and closing argument and by failing to correct a
witness, and (3) the jury instruction on circumstantial evidence
was inadequate. We affirm.
1The defendant also was found responsible for a marked lane violation under G. L. c. 89, § 4A. Background. We recite the facts in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore,
378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). On May 9, 2020, at approximately
5 A.M., Samuel Johnson was at home watching television when he
heard a loud crash. He looked out his front door, which faces
the road, and saw that a car had collided with a minivan that
was parked on the street. Johnson described the color of the
car as dark blue or black and noticed the passenger side was
"smashed up." The car appeared to be dragging something and had
a flat tire on the front passenger side. Johnson stated that
the car stalled, and he watched as the operator restarted it and
drove off.
Soon thereafter, several Salisbury police officers arrived
at the scene of the accident. They observed that the minivan
had "pretty significant" damage to its driver's side rear corner
and noticed black or blue debris on the ground. Meanwhile, one
officer, Jayson Davis, had passed a dark-colored sedan, in a
parking lot "kind of by itself, just with its lights on, and
running" as he drove to the scene. The color of the debris
prompted Officer Davis to return to the parking lot to
investigate. Officer Davis estimated that he arrived at the
parking lot approximately twenty minutes after the accident and
five minutes after he first observed the car, which was still in
the parking lot with the engine running. As he approached the
2 vehicle, Officer Davis observed that the front end of the car
had "pretty serious damage." He testified that the front tire
on the passenger side of the car was flat, the entire front
fender on the passenger side was missing, and the hood was
damaged.2 There were two people in the car: a man, later
identified as the defendant, was sitting in the driver's seat,
and a woman was in the passenger's seat. The defendant was
bleeding from "what appeared to be a fresh injury on the bridge
of his nose," and there were drops of blood and a bloody tissue
found on the driver's side of the center console. Officer Davis
asked the defendant about the damage to the car, to which the
defendant responded that he was just sitting in it and did not
notice anything. The defendant claimed to have seen the car as
he was walking down the road and had gotten in to get warm.
When asked about the identity of the owner of the car, the
defendant initially replied, "You ran the plate, you tell me,"
before stating that he did not know who owned the vehicle. The
defendant then suggested the vehicle was owned by a cousin. The
woman in the passenger seat "said she had just randomly been
dropped off in the area, and also just happened to meet [the
defendant] in that area and [got] in the vehicle." Ultimately,
2 In addition, pieces of a fog light and a front fender found at the scene of the accident appeared to have come from the car.
3 the defendant and the woman were permitted to leave the area.
Before they departed, the police informed the defendant that,
pending further investigation, he may receive a citation in the
mail, to which the defendant said, "Fine -- good luck proving I
was driving."
Later, after police left and as the vehicle was being
towed, the defendant and the woman returned to the parking lot
and confronted the tow truck driver. The two argued and swore
at the driver which prompted her to call the police; however,
the defendant and the woman left before the police arrived. The
police ultimately determined that the vehicle was registered to
Rayenold Perkins, the defendant's cousin. Perkins testified
that he did not give the defendant permission to borrow the
vehicle and that neither he nor his daughter drove the car on
the day of the accident.
Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. In order to
sustain a conviction of leaving the scene of property damage,
the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant "(1) while
operating a motor vehicle, (2) caused damage to another person's
property, and (3) knowing [he] caused such damage, (4) did not
stop and make known [his] 'name, residence, and register number
of [his] motor vehicle.'" Commonwealth v. Martin, 98 Mass. App.
Ct. 727, 732 n.9 (2020), quoting G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). The
defendant contends that the Commonwealth failed to meet its
4 burden because there was no evidence that anyone saw him
operating the vehicle that caused the damage. In addition, he
argues that the presence of a second person in the car renders
the inference that he was the operator at the time of the
accident unreasonable.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, "any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Latimore,
378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). As the defendant acknowledges, the
Commonwealth was not required to present direct evidence of
operation to meet its burden of proof. See Commonwealth v.
Beltrandi, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 196, 199 (2016). It is well
settled that "[p]roof of operation of a motor vehicle may 'rest
entirely on circumstantial evidence.'" Commonwealth v.
Petersen, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 52 (2006), quoting Commonwealth
v. Cromwell, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 436, 438 (2002). "A web of
convincing proof can be made up of inferences that are probable,
not necessary" (citation omitted). Beltrandi, supra.
Here, the relevant circumstantial evidence that established
the defendant was the operator of the car included the
following: (1) police encountered the defendant in the driver's
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-1035
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
WILLIAM A. KNOWLES.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury trial in District Court, the defendant was
convicted of leaving the scene of property damage, in violation
of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a).1 On appeal, the defendant claims
that (1) the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence
from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was the operator of the vehicle that caused the damage, (2) the
prosecutor erred by making improper comments in his opening
statement and closing argument and by failing to correct a
witness, and (3) the jury instruction on circumstantial evidence
was inadequate. We affirm.
1The defendant also was found responsible for a marked lane violation under G. L. c. 89, § 4A. Background. We recite the facts in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore,
378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). On May 9, 2020, at approximately
5 A.M., Samuel Johnson was at home watching television when he
heard a loud crash. He looked out his front door, which faces
the road, and saw that a car had collided with a minivan that
was parked on the street. Johnson described the color of the
car as dark blue or black and noticed the passenger side was
"smashed up." The car appeared to be dragging something and had
a flat tire on the front passenger side. Johnson stated that
the car stalled, and he watched as the operator restarted it and
drove off.
Soon thereafter, several Salisbury police officers arrived
at the scene of the accident. They observed that the minivan
had "pretty significant" damage to its driver's side rear corner
and noticed black or blue debris on the ground. Meanwhile, one
officer, Jayson Davis, had passed a dark-colored sedan, in a
parking lot "kind of by itself, just with its lights on, and
running" as he drove to the scene. The color of the debris
prompted Officer Davis to return to the parking lot to
investigate. Officer Davis estimated that he arrived at the
parking lot approximately twenty minutes after the accident and
five minutes after he first observed the car, which was still in
the parking lot with the engine running. As he approached the
2 vehicle, Officer Davis observed that the front end of the car
had "pretty serious damage." He testified that the front tire
on the passenger side of the car was flat, the entire front
fender on the passenger side was missing, and the hood was
damaged.2 There were two people in the car: a man, later
identified as the defendant, was sitting in the driver's seat,
and a woman was in the passenger's seat. The defendant was
bleeding from "what appeared to be a fresh injury on the bridge
of his nose," and there were drops of blood and a bloody tissue
found on the driver's side of the center console. Officer Davis
asked the defendant about the damage to the car, to which the
defendant responded that he was just sitting in it and did not
notice anything. The defendant claimed to have seen the car as
he was walking down the road and had gotten in to get warm.
When asked about the identity of the owner of the car, the
defendant initially replied, "You ran the plate, you tell me,"
before stating that he did not know who owned the vehicle. The
defendant then suggested the vehicle was owned by a cousin. The
woman in the passenger seat "said she had just randomly been
dropped off in the area, and also just happened to meet [the
defendant] in that area and [got] in the vehicle." Ultimately,
2 In addition, pieces of a fog light and a front fender found at the scene of the accident appeared to have come from the car.
3 the defendant and the woman were permitted to leave the area.
Before they departed, the police informed the defendant that,
pending further investigation, he may receive a citation in the
mail, to which the defendant said, "Fine -- good luck proving I
was driving."
Later, after police left and as the vehicle was being
towed, the defendant and the woman returned to the parking lot
and confronted the tow truck driver. The two argued and swore
at the driver which prompted her to call the police; however,
the defendant and the woman left before the police arrived. The
police ultimately determined that the vehicle was registered to
Rayenold Perkins, the defendant's cousin. Perkins testified
that he did not give the defendant permission to borrow the
vehicle and that neither he nor his daughter drove the car on
the day of the accident.
Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. In order to
sustain a conviction of leaving the scene of property damage,
the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant "(1) while
operating a motor vehicle, (2) caused damage to another person's
property, and (3) knowing [he] caused such damage, (4) did not
stop and make known [his] 'name, residence, and register number
of [his] motor vehicle.'" Commonwealth v. Martin, 98 Mass. App.
Ct. 727, 732 n.9 (2020), quoting G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). The
defendant contends that the Commonwealth failed to meet its
4 burden because there was no evidence that anyone saw him
operating the vehicle that caused the damage. In addition, he
argues that the presence of a second person in the car renders
the inference that he was the operator at the time of the
accident unreasonable.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, "any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Latimore,
378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). As the defendant acknowledges, the
Commonwealth was not required to present direct evidence of
operation to meet its burden of proof. See Commonwealth v.
Beltrandi, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 196, 199 (2016). It is well
settled that "[p]roof of operation of a motor vehicle may 'rest
entirely on circumstantial evidence.'" Commonwealth v.
Petersen, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 52 (2006), quoting Commonwealth
v. Cromwell, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 436, 438 (2002). "A web of
convincing proof can be made up of inferences that are probable,
not necessary" (citation omitted). Beltrandi, supra.
Here, the relevant circumstantial evidence that established
the defendant was the operator of the car included the
following: (1) police encountered the defendant in the driver's
seat of the vehicle, which had sustained damage consistent with
5 a collision, twenty minutes after the accident; (2) the
defendant was bleeding from his nose, and police observed blood
on the driver's side of the center console; (3) the defendant
gave an implausible explanation to police as to why he was in
the car; and (4) the defendant had a relationship (cousin) with
the registered owner of the vehicle. This evidence was
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was the operator of the car at the time of the accident. See
Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 402 (2003) (jury could
reasonably infer that defendant's fresh cuts and abrasions were
consistent with accident and his operation of vehicle);
Beltrandi, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 201 n.6 (reasonable to infer
defendant's operation of vehicle based on officer testimony that
defendant was in driver's seat when officer approached car);
Commonwealth v. Doyle, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 786, 789 (1981) (jury
reasonably could have interpreted defendant's evasive and
conflicting statements as attempt to mislead police and escape
responsibility).
Furthermore, the presence of another person in the car did
not detract from the Commonwealth's evidence. The Commonwealth
was not required to prove that the defendant "had the exclusive
opportunity to commit the crime" (citation omitted). Petersen,
67 Mass. App. Ct. at 53. While it was possible that the woman
had been driving the car, it was both reasonable and permissible
6 for the jury to infer that the defendant was the operator of the
vehicle. See Beltrandi, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 202 (evidence on
operation was sufficient despite conflicting inferences on
identity of driver). See also Platt, 440 Mass. at 403, quoting
Commonwealth v. Swartz, 343 Mass. 709, 713 (1962) ("inference of
defendant's guilt from all circumstances, 'while not compelling,
was at least permissible'").
2. Alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The defendant raises
multiple claims of prosecutorial misconduct, contending that the
Commonwealth made improper comments during both his opening
statement and closing argument and failed to correct portions of
Johnson's testimony. As the defendant did not object to any of
the challenged remarks, our review is limited to determining
whether there was error and, if so, whether the error created a
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth
v. McDermott, 493 Mass. 403, 410 (2024); Commonwealth v.
Boyajian, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 866, 868 (2007).
a. Opening statement. The defendant argues that the
prosecutor misstated the evidence in his opening remarks by (1)
referring to the vehicle that caused the damage as "the
defendant's car,"3 and (2) using male pronouns throughout his
3 Specifically, the prosecutor mentioned damage on "the defendant's car" or "his car," and stated that on the scene, police observed that "the defendant's engine brake lights turned off" (emphasis added).
7 opening argument.4 "[O]pening remarks must be judged in light of
the entire [statement], the judge's instructions to the jury,
and the evidence actually introduced in trial" (quotation and
citation omitted). Boyajian, 68 Mass. App. Ct. at 869.
Although the prosecutor occasionally referred to the
vehicle as "the defendant's car" or "his car," he also informed
the jury that Perkins was its registered owner. In fact,
Perkins testified to that effect in the Commonwealth's case-in-
chief. In addition, to the extent that the jury might infer
from the prosecutor's use of male pronouns that Johnson saw a
man driving the car, any such inference was dispelled when
Johnson testified that he did not see the driver and could not
determine the driver's gender. Lastly, the judge instructed the
jury that the parties' opening remarks were not evidence at the
beginning of the trial, before closing arguments, and again
during the jury charge. In light of these circumstances, we are
confident that the challenged remarks did not create a
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth
v. Miles, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 216, 221 (1999) (where misstatement
4 In his opening statement, the prosecutor said: "[Johnson] saw a car that was backing out from crashing into . . . a minivan; and as he was backing out, he then sped off in the same direction as he hit the car in. While doing so, he observed the operator of that vehicle to have a flat tire as he was leaving the scene." (Emphasis added.)
8 was insignificant in context of entire argument, judge
instructed that arguments were not evidence, and Commonwealth's
case was strong, prosecutor's erroneous statement did not
require reversal).
b. Closing argument. The defendant makes a similar
argument with respect to the prosecutor's closing argument, that
is, the prosecutor improperly suggested that the defendant owned
the vehicle that caused the damage.5 He also asserts that the
prosecutor improperly characterized his behavior toward the tow
truck driver as "harass[ment],"6 despite a sustained objection to
the tow truck driver's description of his conduct as such.7 "To
determine whether an alleged error in closing argument created a
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, we consider
whether the defendant objected; whether the judge's instructions
mitigated the error, if any; whether the remarks went to the
heart of the matter or touched upon only a collateral issue; and
5 For instance, the prosecutor stated that "it would be close to impossible not to notice the extent of this type of damage to your own car," and referred to "the trail of debris leading [police] right to his vehicle" (emphasis added).
6 The prosecutor asked, "[I]f [the defendant] had just gotten in a random car in order to warm up and was suspected hitting a vehicle and fleeing the scene, why would he harass the tow truck driver . . . while she was trying to tow the vehicle from the parking lot?"
7 While the prosecutor also said in his opening remarks that the defendant "harassed" the tow truck driver, the defendant has not challenged this statement on appeal.
9 whether the remarks possibly made a difference in the jury's
conclusions." Boyajian, 68 Mass. App. Ct. at 869.
We are not persuaded that the prosecutor improperly implied
that the defendant owned the vehicle. Even if we were to assume
otherwise, viewed in context and in light of the judge's
instructions, the challenged remarks did not create a
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Miles, 46
Mass. App. Ct. at 221.
Furthermore, we do not agree that the prosecutor erred when
he characterized the defendant's behavior toward the tow truck
driver as "harass[ment]." "Prosecutors are entitled to marshal
evidence and suggest inferences that the jury may draw from it.
The inferences suggested by the prosecutor need only be
reasonable and possible and need not be necessary or
inescapable." (Quotation and citation omitted.) Commonwealth v.
Dinkins, 415 Mass. 715, 725 (1993). Here, the prosecutor's
comment that the defendant "harass[ed]" the tow truck driver was
a fair inference based on testimony from the tow truck driver
that the defendant "confront[ed]" her and was "very rude,
swearing [and], very belligerent."
c. Johnson's testimony. The defendant alleges that the
prosecutor's failure to correct Johnson's repeated use of male
pronouns during his direct examination in reference to the
driver of the vehicle that caused the damage to the minivan
10 created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.8 While a
prosecutor may not present testimony he knows is false or allow
false evidence to go uncorrected, "[m]inor inconsistencies do
not [necessarily] constitute falsities . . . and they may be
highlighted through cross-examination or rebuttal evidence."
Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 494 Mass. 288, 302 (2024), quoting
Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 491 (2014). Much like the
prosecutor's reference to a male driver when he previewed
Johnson's testimony in opening remarks, discussed supra, the
comments Johnson made regarding the identity of the driver were
minor, and any prejudice was thoroughly mitigated by defense
counsel's cross-examination.9
3. Jury instruction on circumstantial evidence. The
defendant argues that the judge's instruction on circumstantial
evidence was incomplete and, as a result, lowered the
Commonwealth's burden of proof. There was no objection and
8 As an example, Johnson testified that he saw "a car that had hit a van out in front of the house, and he drove off" (emphasis added). Additionally, when asked about what happened after the collision, Johnson testified that "the car was stopped. The guy started it again, and drove off . . . [w]hen he got in the accident, the car must have stalled, and then he started it again and drove off" (emphasis added).
9 The defendant also argues that counsel provided him with ineffective assistance when he failed to object to these alleged errors. In light of our conclusion that there was no reversible error, it follows that this argument fails.
11 therefore our review is limited to determining whether there was
error, and if so, whether the error created a substantial risk
of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Silvelo, 486
Mass. 13, 17 (2020). "In considering whether a [jury] charge
lowers the criminal standard of proof, we consider the charge,
taken as a whole, and assess the possible impact of [an] alleged
error on the deliberations of a reasonable juror, i.e., whether
a reasonable juror could have used the instruction incorrectly."
Commonwealth v. Silva, 482 Mass. 275, 288 (2019), quoting
Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 27 (1996). There was no
error.
The judge instructed the jury largely in accordance with
the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District
Court, Instruction 2.240 (direct and circumstantial evidence)
(2009).10 However, the judge omitted the following language from
the model instruction:
10 The judge instructed as follows:
"Now, there are two types of evidence which you may use to determine the facts of a case, direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. You have direct evidence where a witness testifies directly about the fact that is to be proved based on what the witness claims to have seen or heard or felt with their own senses, and the only question is 'Do I believe the witness?'
"You have circumstantial evidence where the witness cannot testify directly about the fact that is to be proved, but you are presented with evidence of other facts,
12 "In a chain of circumstantial evidence, it is not required that every one of your inferences and conclusions be inevitable, but it is required that each of them be reasonable, that they all be consistent with one another, and that together they establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
"If the Commonwealth's case is based solely on circumstantial evidence, you may find the defendant guilty only if those circumstances are conclusive enough to leave you with a moral certainty, a clear and settled belief, that the defendant is guilty and that there is no other
and you are then asked to draw reasonable inferences from them about the fact that is to be proved.
"An inference is a permissible deduction that you may make from evidence that you have accepted as believable. Inferences are things that you do every day, little steps in reasoning in which you take some known information, apply your experience in life to it, and then draw a conclusion. You may draw an inference even if it is not necessary or inescapable, so long as it is reasonable and warranted by the evidence, and all the evidence and reasonable inferences in the case together prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
"Let me give you an example of inferences and circumstantial evidence. Your daughter might tell you one morning that she sees the letter carrier at your mailbox. That is direct evidence that the letter carrier has been to your house. On the other hand, she might tell you only that she sees mail in the mailbox. That is circumstantial evidence that the letter carrier has been there. No one has seen the letter carrier, but you can reasonably infer that the letter carrier has been there since this is mail in the mailbox. The law allows either type of proof in a criminal trial.
"There are two things to keep in mind about circumstantial evidence. The first one is that you may draw inferences and conclusions only from facts that have been proved to you. The second rule is that any inferences or conclusions which you draw must be reasonable and natural, based on your common sense and experience of life."
13 reasonable explanation of the facts as proven. The evidence must not only be consistent with the defendant's guilt, it must be inconsistent with his . . . innocence.
"Whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, the Commonwealth must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt from all the evidence in the case."
Instruction 2.240. The defendant claims the judge erred and
that the omission was particularly prejudicial in light of the
judge's supplemental instruction on leaving the scene of an
accident involving property damage.11
The judge had "considerable discretion in framing jury
instructions, both in determining the precise phraseology used
and the appropriate degree of elaboration" (citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Alden, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 438, 444 (2018). The
judge properly instructed the jurors on the difference between
direct and circumstantial evidence, the jury's right to draw
reasonable inferences, and the Commonwealth's burden to prove
the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v.
Newell, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 119, 131 (2002) (no error when judge
failed to inform jury that proof must be beyond reasonable doubt
11Here, the judge quoted the model instructions nearly verbatim and said, "[Y]ou may find the defendant was the operator of a motor vehicle even if no witness saw that person driving the vehicle if there is enough circumstantial evidence to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the vehicle was operated, and that the defendant and no one else was the operator of that vehicle." See Instruction 5.180 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court, supplemental instruction 3 (circumstantial evidence of operation) (revised 2017).
14 when using circumstantial evidence because instructions were
"adequately balanced" by explanations on Commonwealth's burden
of proof, circumstantial evidence, and jury's right to draw
inferences). Furthermore, the judge's supplemental instruction
was an accurate statement of the law and consistent with the
other instructions provided. Taken as a whole, the instructions
did not lower the standard of proof or confuse the jury.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Singh & Hershfang, JJ.12),
Clerk
Entered: February 20, 2025.
12 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.