OPINION BY
COLVILLE, J.:
This case is an appeal from the order designating Appellant a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.4. He contends that, because the aforesaid statute requires SVP assessments to be conducted before sentencing, [1214]*1214the court in this case erred by having his assessment done after he was sentenced. He also contends the evidence was insufficient to support the SVP designation. We affirm the order.
After pleading guilty to various sex offenses, Appellant proceeded to sentencing in May 2009. Before he was sentenced, however, he executed a form in which he acknowledged understanding the law requires that SVP assessments take place before sentencing. In that same form, Appellant waived that requirement. Appellant was then sentenced.
In addition to the fact that Appellant affirmatively waived the requirement that the SVP assessment be conducted before sentencing, he filed no post-sentence motion complaining that he was sentenced before his SVP assessment. He also filed no appeal at that time.
Appellant was later assessed by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”). In February 2010, the court held an SVP hearing. During the SVP hearing, Appellant lodged no objection to the assessment being held after sentencing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court imposed the SVP designation. After the SVP hearing, Appellant did not file any motion complaining that the SVP process had occurred after he was sentenced. Appellant then filed this appeal. The Commonwealth claims Appellant waived any complaint about the sequence of his sentencing and SVP assessment.
Appellant’s first point is that the statutory language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.4(a) indicates the SVP assessment is to be conducted after conviction but before sentencing. This assertion is true enough, but the fact that a statute, like the SVP statute, requires things to be done in a certain way or a certain order does not mean that the requirement cannot be waived. There is always a rule, statute, constitutional right, or other legal requirement at issue when a party claims waiver. Indeed, if there were no rules, statutes, constitutional rights, or other legal requirements, there would never be a question of whether those requirements were waived. Thus, the fact that the statute sets forth a sequence of events does not mean that Appellant could not have waived the required sequence.
Indeed, the law is quite plain that any number of statutory or other rights and requirements may be waived. Commonwealth v. Mallory, 596 Pa. 172, 941 A.2d 686, 697 (2008); Commonwealth v. Byrne, 833 A.2d 729, 734-35 (Pa.Super.2003). In this case, it is clear that Appellant waived his claim that the statutory language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.4(a) prohibited the sequence in which his sentencing and SVP process took place. Having waived his claim, he is not now entitled to relief. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
We note Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Baird, 856 A.2d 114 (Pa.Super.2004). We agree that, in Baird, this Court did hold that the SVP statute requires an assessment before sentencing. Id. at 118. However, this holding was merely a statement of what the statute requires. The holding had nothing whatsoever to do with waiver because waiver was not an issue in Baird. Moreover, the appellant in that case (the Commonwealth) did preserve its claim by objecting at sentencing to the trial court’s decision to sentence the defendant before the SVP assessment and determination. Id. at 115. In the present case, Appellant made no such objection.
Appellant also argues the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its May 2009 sentencing order by classifying him as an SVP in February 2010. On this point, he cites 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505, the statute allowing a court to modify or rescind an order within thirty days of its [1215]*1215entry as long as no appeal has been taken. He contends the court lost jurisdiction to alter or modify its sentence by entering the SVP order because more than thirty days had passed after he was sentenced.
Appellant’s reliance on Section 5505 is misplaced. An SVP determination is a collateral consequence of a conviction and is not a sentence. Commonwealth v. Leidig, 598 Pa. 211, 956 A.2d 399, 404-05 (2008). That being the case, the SVP order could not possibly be a modification or rescission of the sentencing order. The sentencing order was one thing; the SVP order was another. Because the SVP order did not modify the sentence, Section 5505 — which limits a court’s ability to modify its orders — is not applicable.
Appellant next claims the evidence was insufficient to support the SVP determination. This claim, too, fails. Our standard for reviewing a sufficiency challenge to an SVP determination is the following:
We do not weigh the evidence presented to the sentencing court and do not make credibility determinations. Instead, we view all the evidence and its reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth. We will disturb an SVP designation only if the Commonwealth did not present clear and convincing evidence to enable the court to find each element required by the SVP statutes.
Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 382 (Pa.Super.2008).
Having reviewed the record and the trial court’s opinion in light of the foregoing standard, we find the evidence was sufficient to support the SVP designation. In doing so, we adopt the following portions of the trial court’s opinion:
... Megan’s Law II provides that the trial court shall “determine whether the Commonwealth has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a[n] [SVP].” Commonwealth v. Askew, 907 A.2d 624 (Pa.Super.2006) (internal citation omitted). Furthermore,
The determination of a[n] [individual]’s SVP status may only be made following an assessment by the [SOAB] and hearing before the trial court. In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a[n] [SVP].
Commonwealth v. Krouse, 799 A.2d 835 (Pa.Super.2002) (en banc), appeal denied, [573 Pa. 671] 821 A.2d 586 (2003). The Superior Court further stated that it would reverse a trial court’s determination of SVP status only if the Commonwealth did not present clear and convincing evidence sufficient to enable the trial court to determine that each element of the statute had been satisfied. Id.
To deem and individual a[n] SVP, the Commonwealth must first show that he has been convicted of a sexually violent offense as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.1. Askew, 907 A.2d 624 (Pa.Super.2006).
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OPINION BY
COLVILLE, J.:
This case is an appeal from the order designating Appellant a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.4. He contends that, because the aforesaid statute requires SVP assessments to be conducted before sentencing, [1214]*1214the court in this case erred by having his assessment done after he was sentenced. He also contends the evidence was insufficient to support the SVP designation. We affirm the order.
After pleading guilty to various sex offenses, Appellant proceeded to sentencing in May 2009. Before he was sentenced, however, he executed a form in which he acknowledged understanding the law requires that SVP assessments take place before sentencing. In that same form, Appellant waived that requirement. Appellant was then sentenced.
In addition to the fact that Appellant affirmatively waived the requirement that the SVP assessment be conducted before sentencing, he filed no post-sentence motion complaining that he was sentenced before his SVP assessment. He also filed no appeal at that time.
Appellant was later assessed by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”). In February 2010, the court held an SVP hearing. During the SVP hearing, Appellant lodged no objection to the assessment being held after sentencing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court imposed the SVP designation. After the SVP hearing, Appellant did not file any motion complaining that the SVP process had occurred after he was sentenced. Appellant then filed this appeal. The Commonwealth claims Appellant waived any complaint about the sequence of his sentencing and SVP assessment.
Appellant’s first point is that the statutory language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.4(a) indicates the SVP assessment is to be conducted after conviction but before sentencing. This assertion is true enough, but the fact that a statute, like the SVP statute, requires things to be done in a certain way or a certain order does not mean that the requirement cannot be waived. There is always a rule, statute, constitutional right, or other legal requirement at issue when a party claims waiver. Indeed, if there were no rules, statutes, constitutional rights, or other legal requirements, there would never be a question of whether those requirements were waived. Thus, the fact that the statute sets forth a sequence of events does not mean that Appellant could not have waived the required sequence.
Indeed, the law is quite plain that any number of statutory or other rights and requirements may be waived. Commonwealth v. Mallory, 596 Pa. 172, 941 A.2d 686, 697 (2008); Commonwealth v. Byrne, 833 A.2d 729, 734-35 (Pa.Super.2003). In this case, it is clear that Appellant waived his claim that the statutory language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.4(a) prohibited the sequence in which his sentencing and SVP process took place. Having waived his claim, he is not now entitled to relief. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
We note Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Baird, 856 A.2d 114 (Pa.Super.2004). We agree that, in Baird, this Court did hold that the SVP statute requires an assessment before sentencing. Id. at 118. However, this holding was merely a statement of what the statute requires. The holding had nothing whatsoever to do with waiver because waiver was not an issue in Baird. Moreover, the appellant in that case (the Commonwealth) did preserve its claim by objecting at sentencing to the trial court’s decision to sentence the defendant before the SVP assessment and determination. Id. at 115. In the present case, Appellant made no such objection.
Appellant also argues the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its May 2009 sentencing order by classifying him as an SVP in February 2010. On this point, he cites 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505, the statute allowing a court to modify or rescind an order within thirty days of its [1215]*1215entry as long as no appeal has been taken. He contends the court lost jurisdiction to alter or modify its sentence by entering the SVP order because more than thirty days had passed after he was sentenced.
Appellant’s reliance on Section 5505 is misplaced. An SVP determination is a collateral consequence of a conviction and is not a sentence. Commonwealth v. Leidig, 598 Pa. 211, 956 A.2d 399, 404-05 (2008). That being the case, the SVP order could not possibly be a modification or rescission of the sentencing order. The sentencing order was one thing; the SVP order was another. Because the SVP order did not modify the sentence, Section 5505 — which limits a court’s ability to modify its orders — is not applicable.
Appellant next claims the evidence was insufficient to support the SVP determination. This claim, too, fails. Our standard for reviewing a sufficiency challenge to an SVP determination is the following:
We do not weigh the evidence presented to the sentencing court and do not make credibility determinations. Instead, we view all the evidence and its reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth. We will disturb an SVP designation only if the Commonwealth did not present clear and convincing evidence to enable the court to find each element required by the SVP statutes.
Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 382 (Pa.Super.2008).
Having reviewed the record and the trial court’s opinion in light of the foregoing standard, we find the evidence was sufficient to support the SVP designation. In doing so, we adopt the following portions of the trial court’s opinion:
... Megan’s Law II provides that the trial court shall “determine whether the Commonwealth has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a[n] [SVP].” Commonwealth v. Askew, 907 A.2d 624 (Pa.Super.2006) (internal citation omitted). Furthermore,
The determination of a[n] [individual]’s SVP status may only be made following an assessment by the [SOAB] and hearing before the trial court. In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a[n] [SVP].
Commonwealth v. Krouse, 799 A.2d 835 (Pa.Super.2002) (en banc), appeal denied, [573 Pa. 671] 821 A.2d 586 (2003). The Superior Court further stated that it would reverse a trial court’s determination of SVP status only if the Commonwealth did not present clear and convincing evidence sufficient to enable the trial court to determine that each element of the statute had been satisfied. Id.
To deem and individual a[n] SVP, the Commonwealth must first show that he has been convicted of a sexually violent offense as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.1. Askew, 907 A.2d 624 (Pa.Super.2006). Secondly, the Commonwealth must show that the individual has a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes [him] likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses. Id. In Accordance with Megan’s Law, the following factors should be considered:
(1) Facts of the current offense, including:
(i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.
(ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense.
(iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.
(iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.
[1216]*1216(v) Age of the victim.
(vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the individual during the commission of the crime.
(vii) The mental capacity of the victim.
(2) Prior offense history, including:
(i) The individual’s prior criminal record.
(ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences.
(iii) Whether the individual participated in available programs for sexual offenders.
(3) Characteristics of the individual, including:
(i) Age of the individual.
(ii) Use of illegal drugs by the individual.
(iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental abnormality.
(iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the individual’s conduct.
(4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.4(b).
[Appellant’s first contention ... is that the determination that [he] had a mental abnormality was unfounded. Under Megan’s Law “mental abnormality” is defined as:
[CJongenital or acquired condition of a person that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes that person to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a menace to the health and safety of other persons.
Pa.C.S.A. § 9792. [Appellant] claims that [testimony from the Commonwealth’s expert, Dr. Pass,] regarding the [Appellant's diagnosis of pedophilia was inadequate because the doctor did not explain the “ample evidence” used to make the determination. (SVP Hearing, p. 11). However, in his Sexual Offender Assessment dated June 27, 2099, (hereinafter “S.O.A.”), p. 3, Dr. Pass explained the factors necessary to meet the classification for pedophilia.
This diagnostic classification [pedophilia] requires a behavioral manifestation over the course of at least 6 months of sexualized conduct, fantasies or urges with a pre-pubescent child or children. The behaviors, fantasies or urges cause clinically significant distress or impairment in important areas of functioning. Lastly, this disorder requires that the [individual] must be at least 16 years of age and at least 5 years older than the child or children who have been victimized by the behavior.
(S.O.A., p. 3). He further wrote, “in this regard, it is noted that Appellant engaged in illegal sexual conduct with his adopted daughter beginning at the age when she was 9 years old, progressing forward for approximately 4 years and 4 months.” (S.O.A., p. 3). Dr. Pass testified that pedophilia is a sexual identity and sexual behavior disorder, which falls into the classification of mental abnormality. (SVP Hearing, p. 11).
Based upon the S.O.A. completed by Dr. Pass, he correctly concluded that ... [Appellant] is classified as a pedophile, which is a mental abnormality. This claim lacks merit because Dr. Pass testified at the SVP Hearing that there was ample evidence to support pedophilia ... and that pedophilia falls into the classification of mental abnormality.
[Appellant’s ... [position is also] that there was no evidence presented to indicate that the offenses involved displayed [1217]*1217unusual cruelty and also that there was no evidence presented that [Appellant] exceeded them means necessary to achieve the offense as evidenced by the lack of force, threats, or weapons. In the S.O.A., Dr. Pass wrote, “[TJhere is no scientific assignment of weighted values determining that one or all of the Megan’s Law assessment factors are more or less important. A[n] [individual] may meet the classification criteria for a sexually violent predator with one or all of the factors.” (S.O.A., p. 2). According to [42] Pa.C.SA. § 9795(4), an assessment shall include an examination of the list of factors described above. It is not necessary for the offense to display unusual cruelty, nor is it necessary to show that offender exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense. [Appellant also asserts] that the designation of [him] as a violent predator was inappropriate because he had no prior criminal history and there was only one victim. It is not necessary for an offender to have a prior criminal history, or for the offense to include more than on victim. These factors are simply to be considered in the determination of an offender’s sexually violent predator status-Askew, 907 A.2d [at 629-30]. Thus, this claim lacks merit. Next, ... [Appellant] contends that the offenses against the victim were situational because he lived with the victim and served as a father figure. He argues that the offenses were opportunistic, not predatoiy. The Megan’s Law statute defines predatory behavior as “an act directed at a stranger or at a person with whom a relationship has been initiated, established, maintained or promoted in whole or in part in order to facilitate or support victimization” 42 Pa.C.SA. § 9792. [Appellant] states that the relationship with his adopted daughter existed wholly independent of any sexual misconduct. [Appellant] also maintains that he was the victim’s adopted father, and the relationship was not initiated for a sexual purpose. However, the statute does not require that a relationship be initiated for a sexual purpose.
[Appellant] engaged in illegal sexual conduct with his adopted daughter when she was age nine (9), and continued for approximately four (4) years and four (4) months. (S.O.A., p. 3). Dr. Pass testified that, although the relationship was probably not established just to exploit the victim, [Appellant] served in a role of adoptive father until he made a conscious decision to engage in deviant sexual conduct. (SVP Hearing, p. 9). The relationship became one of sexual exploitation, which continued for more than four years. This supports the factor that [Appellant] in fact looked at and utilized the relationship with his adoptive daughter in an exploitive manner. (SVP Hearing, p. 9). In his S.O.A., Dr. Pass addresses the issue of predatory behavior, concluding, “... [Appellant] did engage in acts directed at the victim with whom a relationship had been initiated, maintained, established, maintained or promoted in whole or in part in order to facilitate or support victimization.” (S.O.A., p. 4).
Therefore, [Appellant’s claim that the prolonged period of abuse was opportunistic, not predatory, is unfounded based on the expert findings of Dr. Pass’ testimony and assessment with regards to ... [Appellant],
[Appellant’s ... [position is also] that there was acceptance of responsibility through a guilty plea. In defense counsel’s closing at the SVP Hearing, counsel stated, “[E]ven Dr. Pass agrees that people who plead guilty to or are convicted of committing crimes against their own children, sexual crimes that is, are less likely to reoffend.” (SVP Hear[1218]*1218ing, p. 16). However, this claim completely lacks merit because it was not established in either the SVP Hearing or Dr. Pass’ S.O.A.
;Ji ‡ * # # *
Based upon the foregoing evidence, it is clear that the Commonwealth met its burden of proving that [Appellant] was a[n][SVP] by clear and convincing evidence.
Trial Court Opinion, 08/13/10, at 3-10 (internal footnotes omitted).
In light of our foregoing discussion, Appellant’s claims lack merit and we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Order affirmed.
Judge BOWES joins the Majority Opinion and files a Concurring Opinion.
Judge LAZARUS files a Dissenting Opinion.