Commonwealth v. Timko

380 A.2d 861, 251 Pa. Super. 442, 1977 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2962

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 2, 1977
• Docket: 807
• Status: Published

Opinions

CERCONE, Judge:

In March of 1975 appellant was tried non-jury on charges of possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, carrying a concealed weapon without a license, and disorderly conduct. At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case a demurrer was sustained to the disorderly conduct charge. Appellant was subsequently acquitted of the delivery charge and found guilty of possession of marijuana and carrying a concealed weapon. Following post-verdict motions, however, judgment was arrested on the weapon’s violation. From the imposition of a sentence of one year’s probation, this appeal ensued.

In the early evening of September 16, 1974, Officer Phillip Williams of the Williamsport Police Force was driving his cruiser in the southbound lane of Packer Street approaching the intersection of Packer and Market Streets. As he neared the intersection Officer Williams observed the appellant, who was operating a Volkswagen van, attempting to turn his vehicle from Market Street into the northbound lane of Packer Street. In making the turn appellant almost struck an automobile in the southbound lane of Packer Street directly in front of Officer Williams’ cruiser. Appellant managed to bring his vehicle back into the proper lane momentarily, but then again drifted across the center line, this time almost hitting Officer Williams’ cruiser. As he passed by the cruiser, appellant looked out his open window and made an obscene gesture to Officer Williams. The officer then turned his vehicle around and pursued appellant with the intention of arresting him for reckless driving. The pursuit ended only moments later when appellant attempted to park his vehicle. In maneuvering the van into a parking space appellant struck the cars parked immediately in front of and to the rear of his vehicle. When Officer Williams approached the van on foot, appellant rolled up his window and locked himself inside. The officer’s request for appellant’s license and owner’s registration was met with an obscene refusal. In the course of this exchange Officer Williams observed several boxes of shotgun shells in the van and decided to call for assistance. When several other officers arrived, appellant greeted them with more profanity and persisted in refusing to exit his vehicle. Shortly there-, after appellant started the van’s engine and attempted to pull out of the parking space. While appellant was trying to pull away, Officer Jett was attempting to pry open one of the van’s doors with a tire iron. As Officer Jett was working on the door, appellant looked at him and then reached towards a brown leather bag that was lying on the rear seat. At this point, Officer Jett, being fully aware of the shell boxes, used the tire iron to break the door window on the driver’s side of the van. The officers then unlocked the door and pulled appellant out of the van. While appellant was being frisked outside the van,¹ Officer Jett seized and opened the zippered leather valise. The search revealed two packages of marijuana² and a loaded revolver.

Appellant’s sole contention is that the contents of the leather valise should have been suppressed as the product of an illegal search and seizure. We disagree.

In determining whether a particular search will withstand constitutional scrutiny it must be realized that “[t]he ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2527, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). It is also true and fundamental that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate,, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Instantly, the Commonwealth has advanced two alternative theories in support of the warrantless seizure and search of the valise. Since we conclude that the evidence was admissible under the “plain view” doctrine, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), we need not address the applicability of any other possible theory.³

In Coolidge, 403 U.S. 464-473, 91 S.Ct. 2022, the Supreme Court discussed at length the “plain view” exception. The Court summarized the doctrine as follows:

“What the ‘plain view’ cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification— whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.” 403 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 2038.

In the case at bar, Officer Williams clearly had the right to stop appellant’s vehicle once he determined it was being operated in a reckless manner. See Commonwealth v. Barkley, 234 Pa.Super. 503, 341 A.2d 192 (1975). Consequently, Officer Williams and his fellow police officers had a “prior justification” for looking inside the van while they were attempting to persuade the appellant to exit the van and produce his license and ownership registration. See Commonwealth v. Tatro, 223 Pa.Super. 278, 297 A.2d 139 (1972); Commonwealth v. Clelland, 227 Pa.Super. 384, 323 A.2d 60 (1974). Furthermore, there is no indication that appellant was stopped because Officer Williams suspected that the vehicle was being used to transport a weapon or contraband. Thus, the officer’s observation of the leather bag was “inadvertent.” Coolidge, supra. Finally, since appellant reached for the bag during the course of his resisting arrest, the officer’s seizure of the bag was based upon a reasonable belief that the bag, or its contents, were either evidence or an instrumentality of the crime of resisting arrest. Hence, at the time they seized the bag it was “immediately apparent to the police that they [had] evidence before them.” Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 2038.

The only remaining question is whether the police were entitled to open the bag, after having legally seized it, to examine its contents without first obtaining a warrant. Once again, we are inclined to agree with the Commonwealth that.the warrantless search was reasonable. First, the Supreme Court has held that containers seized from the person of an arrestee may be legally opened and inspected without obtaining a warrant. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973). Similarly, this court has held in analogous cases that such a warrantless inspection is reasonable. Commonwealth v. Whitner, 241 Pa.Super. 316, 361 A.2d 414 (1976); Commonwealth v. Spriggs, 224 Pa.Super. 76, 302 A.2d 442 (1973). In Spriggs this court pertinently observed:

“There is no logical limitation upon the right of police discovering a container upon the appellant that may contain a weapon or contraband to search the container’s contents and seize such evidence incident to a lawful arrest.” Id. 224 Pa.Super. at 79, 302 A.2d at 443.

It is of no consequence whether the container’s seizure occurred as a result of a search incident to a legal arrest, or whether the container’s seizure occurred because it was both evidence of a crime and in plain view. Once it had been legally seized it could be legally inspected. Indeed, under the facts in the instant case the police had more cause to believe the bag contained a weapon or contraband than the police had in either Robinson, Gustafson or Spriggs. A fortiori, the court below did not err in refusing to suppress the evidentiary use of its contents.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of sentence is affirmed.

JACOBS, J., concurs in the result. SPAETH, J., files a dissenting opinion in which HOFFMAN, J., joins.

1 . The record is not entirely clear as to whether appellant was handcuffed at this juncture. In any event, it is certain that appellant was in the custody of at least two police officers while he was standing alongside of the van.

2 . Subsequent analysis established the total weight of the marijuana to be 545 grams.

3 . Although the court below held the contraband was admissible on the grounds that it was seized incident to appellant’s arrest, it is well settled that where the judgment of the lower court is correct it can be affirmed on appeal regardless of the rationale employed by the lower court to sustain its action. Commonwealth v. Whitehouse, 222 Pa.Super. 127, 292 A.2d 469 (1972).