OPINION BY
STEVENS, J.:
¶ 1 Appellant, Keith Tiffany, appeals a judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County. We affirm.
¶ 2 On May 18, 2004, police found Appellant, who was 44 years old at the time, swimming naked in a quarry with three males, ages 19, 15 and 13. Appellant admitted that he had been taking nude photographs of the group, and police seized the camera. Following Appellant’s arrest, three search warrants were issued to permit the seizure and forensic analysis of a laptop computer and disks from Appellant’s truck, the forensic analysis of the camera seized at the scene, and the search of Appellant’s house.1
¶ 3 Appellant was subsequently charged with sexual abuse of children,2 possession of instruments of crime,3 indecent exposure,4 corruption of minors,5 defiant trespass,6 unlawful contact with minors,7 and open lewdness8. Prior to trial, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, including a motion to suppress, alleging lack of probable cause to support the search warrants. Following a suppression hearing, the motion was denied, and a two-day bench trial followed.
¶ 4 On June 1, 2005, Appellant was convicted of 228 counts of sexual abuse of children, one count of possessing instruments. of crime, one count of open lewdness, two counts of corruption of minors, one count of defiant trespass, and two counts of unlawful contact with minors. He was subsequently sentenced on October 7, 2005, and filed this timely appeal on November 3, 2005.9 Appellant has complied with a court order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal.
¶ 5 Appellant raises five allegations of error on appeal. He first asserts that the trial court should have granted his suppression motion on the grounds that the affidavit of probable cause supporting the search warrants in question lacked sufficient facts and circumstances within the four corners of the application. Appellant’s brief at 11. We review this claim under the following principles.
It is well settled that the admissibility of evidence is solely within the discretion of [506]*506the trial court and will be reversed only if the trial court has abused its discretion. This Court has explained:
Our standard of review when addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of suppression is whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from these facts are correct. When reviewing the rulings of a suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may-reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Messersmith, 860 A.2d 1078, 1094 (Pa.Super.2004) (citations omitted).
When reviewing whether a search warrant was sufficiently supported by probable cause, we employ the “totality of the circumstances” analysis of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921 (1985) (adopting the “totality of circumstances” test in Pennsylvania). The “totality of the circumstances” test has been summarized as follows:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
Gray, 503 A.2d at 925, quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-239, 103 S.Ct. at 2332.
Commonwealth v. Ceriani, 411 Pa.Super. 96, 600 A.2d 1282, 1283-1284 (1991). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 203(B).10
¶ 6 At the time the “Applications for Search Warrant and Authorization” in question here were completed, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 206 required that:
Each application for a search warrant shall be supported by written affidavit(s) signed and sworn to or affirmed before an issuing authority, which affidavit(s) shall:
(1) state the name and department, agency, or address of the affiant;
(2) identify specifically the items or property to be searched for and seized;
(3) name or describe with particularity the person or place to be searched;
(4) identify the owner, occupant, or possessor of the place to be searched;
(5) specify or describe the crime which has been or is being committed;
(6) set forth specifically the facts and circumstances which form the basis for the affiant’s conclusion that there is probable cause to believe that the items or property identified are evidence or the fruit of a crime, or are contraband, or are or otherwise unlawfully possessed or subject to seizure, and that these items or property are located on the [507]*507particular person or at the particular place described.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 206, amended March 1, 2000, effective April 1, 2001.11
¶ 7 Here, the Applications for Search Warrants pertaining to Appellant’s home and vehicle stated the name and agency of the affiant; specifically identified the places to be searched, and the owner of those areas; and the crimes alleged (18 Pa.C.S. § 631212 with regard to Appellant’s home, and 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3127,13 6318,14 6301,15 5901 16 and 3503 17 [508]*508with regard to Appellant’s vehicle). The accompanying affidavits of probable cause specified the items to be searched for and seized,18 and specifically set forth the facts and circumstances which formed the basis of the affiant’s conclusion that probable cause existed to seize the items. Similarly, the Application for Search Warrant pertaining to Appellant’ camera stated the name and agency of the affiant; specified the items to be searched for and seized (in this case, data); specifically identified that the camera and 3 compact discs would be the locations searched; identified Appellant as the owner of camera and disks; specified the crimes alleged (18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3127, 6318, 6301, 5901 and 3503); and specifically set forth the facts and circumstances which formed the basis of the affi-ant’s conclusion that probable cause existed to seize the items.19
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OPINION BY
STEVENS, J.:
¶ 1 Appellant, Keith Tiffany, appeals a judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County. We affirm.
¶ 2 On May 18, 2004, police found Appellant, who was 44 years old at the time, swimming naked in a quarry with three males, ages 19, 15 and 13. Appellant admitted that he had been taking nude photographs of the group, and police seized the camera. Following Appellant’s arrest, three search warrants were issued to permit the seizure and forensic analysis of a laptop computer and disks from Appellant’s truck, the forensic analysis of the camera seized at the scene, and the search of Appellant’s house.1
¶ 3 Appellant was subsequently charged with sexual abuse of children,2 possession of instruments of crime,3 indecent exposure,4 corruption of minors,5 defiant trespass,6 unlawful contact with minors,7 and open lewdness8. Prior to trial, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, including a motion to suppress, alleging lack of probable cause to support the search warrants. Following a suppression hearing, the motion was denied, and a two-day bench trial followed.
¶ 4 On June 1, 2005, Appellant was convicted of 228 counts of sexual abuse of children, one count of possessing instruments. of crime, one count of open lewdness, two counts of corruption of minors, one count of defiant trespass, and two counts of unlawful contact with minors. He was subsequently sentenced on October 7, 2005, and filed this timely appeal on November 3, 2005.9 Appellant has complied with a court order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal.
¶ 5 Appellant raises five allegations of error on appeal. He first asserts that the trial court should have granted his suppression motion on the grounds that the affidavit of probable cause supporting the search warrants in question lacked sufficient facts and circumstances within the four corners of the application. Appellant’s brief at 11. We review this claim under the following principles.
It is well settled that the admissibility of evidence is solely within the discretion of [506]*506the trial court and will be reversed only if the trial court has abused its discretion. This Court has explained:
Our standard of review when addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of suppression is whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from these facts are correct. When reviewing the rulings of a suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may-reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Messersmith, 860 A.2d 1078, 1094 (Pa.Super.2004) (citations omitted).
When reviewing whether a search warrant was sufficiently supported by probable cause, we employ the “totality of the circumstances” analysis of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921 (1985) (adopting the “totality of circumstances” test in Pennsylvania). The “totality of the circumstances” test has been summarized as follows:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
Gray, 503 A.2d at 925, quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-239, 103 S.Ct. at 2332.
Commonwealth v. Ceriani, 411 Pa.Super. 96, 600 A.2d 1282, 1283-1284 (1991). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 203(B).10
¶ 6 At the time the “Applications for Search Warrant and Authorization” in question here were completed, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 206 required that:
Each application for a search warrant shall be supported by written affidavit(s) signed and sworn to or affirmed before an issuing authority, which affidavit(s) shall:
(1) state the name and department, agency, or address of the affiant;
(2) identify specifically the items or property to be searched for and seized;
(3) name or describe with particularity the person or place to be searched;
(4) identify the owner, occupant, or possessor of the place to be searched;
(5) specify or describe the crime which has been or is being committed;
(6) set forth specifically the facts and circumstances which form the basis for the affiant’s conclusion that there is probable cause to believe that the items or property identified are evidence or the fruit of a crime, or are contraband, or are or otherwise unlawfully possessed or subject to seizure, and that these items or property are located on the [507]*507particular person or at the particular place described.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 206, amended March 1, 2000, effective April 1, 2001.11
¶ 7 Here, the Applications for Search Warrants pertaining to Appellant’s home and vehicle stated the name and agency of the affiant; specifically identified the places to be searched, and the owner of those areas; and the crimes alleged (18 Pa.C.S. § 631212 with regard to Appellant’s home, and 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3127,13 6318,14 6301,15 5901 16 and 3503 17 [508]*508with regard to Appellant’s vehicle). The accompanying affidavits of probable cause specified the items to be searched for and seized,18 and specifically set forth the facts and circumstances which formed the basis of the affiant’s conclusion that probable cause existed to seize the items. Similarly, the Application for Search Warrant pertaining to Appellant’ camera stated the name and agency of the affiant; specified the items to be searched for and seized (in this case, data); specifically identified that the camera and 3 compact discs would be the locations searched; identified Appellant as the owner of camera and disks; specified the crimes alleged (18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3127, 6318, 6301, 5901 and 3503); and specifically set forth the facts and circumstances which formed the basis of the affi-ant’s conclusion that probable cause existed to seize the items.19
¶ 8 Appellant does not specifically assert how the above requirements have not been met. Instead, he claims that:
The deficiencies in the four corners of each search warrant affidavit is [sic] highlighted by the testimony of affiant Martin McDonough,[20] who testified as follows:
1. There was no definition of what constitutes child pornography,
2. Detective mistakenly believed that the mere existence of a nude picture constituted child pornography under the Criminal Code,
3. There was no description of any of the photographs aside from saying that they were nude or naked pictures of people who could be under the age of 18,
4. There is no reference in the affidavit of probable cause to any photographs containing minors engaging in sexual acts or simulated sexual acts,
5. At the time any of the search warrants had been prepared, no one had viewed any alleged photographs.
6. The interviews contained in the affidavit, or admitted from the affidavit, revealed that there was no sexual activity that had occurred,
7. Keith Tiffany, the Appellant, is a missionary. .
Appellant’s brief at 14. Appellant then asserts that “the foregoing establishes that the limited facts presented in the search warrant, as well as the omissions from the search warrant, clearly show a lack of probable cause that any specific crime may have occurred.” Id.21 Appellant provides [509]*509case citation for various legal principles underlying the search warrant process, but cites to no cases specifically supporting his claim that the process was not followed here. Indeed, his argument seems to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, not the existence of the required probable cause for issuing the warrants in question.
¶ 9 Following our review of the record, and the thorough explanation provided in the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) Opinion, we find that Appellant has failed to meet his burden of proving that his suppression motion was erroneously denied. See Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion filed 12/21/05 at 10-12,22
[510]*510¶ 10 Appellant next asserts that in order for there to be sufficient evidence to support his convictions for indecent exposure and open lewdness, the Commonwealth was required to establish . that someone was actually affronted or alarmed. Appellant’s brief at 16-17. Appellant asserts that the testimony introduced at trial failed to prove the “necessary element of causing affront or alarm,” and argues that at best, the evidence showed a “consensual encounter.” Id. at 17. Appellant provides no case or statutory citation to support this allegation. In addition, he recounts the events which led to his arrest in a light clearly more favorable to his claim of innocence than to the Commonwealth’s successful showing of guilt.
¶ 11 We do not view the facts in such a light. It is without question that when addressing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must view the facts in a light favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner. Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz, 911 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa.Super.2006). Here, when -viewed in the correct light, the facts reveal that Appellant, a 44 year old man, encouraged a 19 year old, a 15 year- old and a 13 year old to swim naked with him in an area accessible to the public, and then photographed them naked, with the admitted intention of showing the photographs to others.
¶ 12 We find that evidence of such behavior is sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions. As we noted previously, a person commits indecent exposure if that person “exposes his or her genitals in any public place or in any place where there are present other persons under circumstances in which he or she knows or should know that this conduct is likely to offend, affront or alarm.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3127(a) (emphasis added).23 Similarly, Section 5901, pertaining to open lewdness, directs that “[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the third degree if he does any lewd act which he knows is likely to be observed by others who would be affronted or alarmed.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5901 (emphasis added).24 “Lewd” acts involve [511]*511“sexuality or nudity in public.” Commonwealth v. Fenton, 750 A.2d 863, 866 (Pa.Super.2000). Section 5901 pertains to conduct that: “1) involves public nudity or public sexuality, and 2) represents such a gross departure from accepted community standards as to rise to the level of criminal liability.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 394 Pa.Super. 90, 574 A.2d 1161, (1990).25 Appellant is incorrect that the Commonwealth was required to prove that “affront or alarm” was actually caused. For the purposes of Section 3127, it is sufficient for the Commonwealth to show that Appellant knew or should have known that his conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm. Commonwealth v. King, 290 Pa.Super. 563, 434 A.2d 1294, 1299 (1981) (emphasis added).26 We have no difficulty in finding that the Commonwealth met this burden. Likewise, we find that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to show that Appellant knew his actions in swimming nude with minors in an area accessible to the public, and securing photographic evidence of such actions was “likely to be observed by others who would be affronted or alarmed” as is contemplated by Section 5901.27 As such, this claim provides no relief on appeal.28
¶ 13 Appellant next contends that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence that the nude photographs in question were possessed for purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification, thus failing to establish one of the elements of the offenses defined at 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312 Sexual Abuse of Children. Appellant’s brief at 19-20. As we noted above, Section 6312(d) provides that:
Any person who knowingly possesses or controls any book, magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape computer depiction or other material depicting a child under the age of 18 years [512]*512engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such act is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
18 Pa.C.S.A. 6312(d). Section Subsection 6312(a) defines “prohibited sexual act” to include “lewd exhibition of the genitals or nudity if such nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person who might view such depiction.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(a) (emphasis added). Here, the crux of Appellant’s argument is that the photographs did not depict prohibited sexual acts because they were possessed for a legitimate missionary purpose and the Commonwealth failed to prove that they were shown, shared or otherwise used for sexual stimulation or gratification. Appellant’s brief at 19-20.29
¶ 14 Here, the trial court disagreed, explaining as follows:
In the present case, this Court personally examined each of the 273 photos in which Appellant and the young males are shown in various settings, completely nude. These photos depicting young boys with their genitals exposed and smiling in provocative poses with a nude defendant near them were taken for the sole purpose of the sexual stimulation and gratification of the viewer, Keith Tiffany. Common sense and human experience dictates no other interpretation. There is no other logical or rational conclusion.
Opinion filed 12/21/05 at 15. It was well within the responsibility of the trial court to make the determination that the photographs in question were not taken for any of the legitimate purposes contemplated by Section 6312(f), and we will not disturb that finding. Commonwealth v. Savich, 716 A.2d 1251, 1256 (Pa.Super.1998). In reaching this determination, the trial court was clearly not required to believe any of the testimony suggesting that Appellant took the 273 photos for “missionary purposes.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 778 A.2d 1215, 1219 (Pa.Super.2001).
¶ 15 In addition to assailing the evidence to support his convictions, Appellant challenges the trial court’s decision to sentence him above the range suggested by the sentencing guidelines. Our review of the record, however, reveals that Appellant has waived this argument.
¶ 16 In his court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant asserted that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him above the guideline range without placing on the record “sufficient valid reasons” for such deviation. Rule 1925(b) statement filed 11/16/05 at 2. Appellant failed to carry this allegation forward to his appellate brief, however. Instead, the brief challenges his sentence on the grounds that the trial court (1) based its departure from the guidelines on factors that were already contemplated by the guidelines, (2) engaged in speculation, (3) ignored mitigating factors, (4) ignored the findings of the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board, and (5) failed to “adequately take into consideration the unique facts and circumstances of this case.” Appellant’s brief at 24-25. Because these allegations were not included in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement, they have been waived for purposes of appeal. Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306(1998). Because the claim that the trial court failed to state the reasons for sentencing on the record was not supported [513]*513by any argument in the brief, it too has been waived. Pa.R.A.P. 2116; Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 331 n. 5, 781 A.2d 94, 98 n. 5 (2001).
¶ 17 For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of sentence is affirmed.
¶ 18 Affirmed.
¶ 19 JOYCE, J„ FILES A CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION.