Opinion by
Ehodios, P. J.,
This is an appeal by defendant in a surety of the peace proceeding heard in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Westmoreland County. Defendant was adjudged guilty.
The prosecution was under the Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, §6, 19 PS §23, which provides: “If any person shall threaten the person of another to wound, kill or destroy him, or do him any harm in person or estate, and the person threatened shall appear before a justice of the peace, and attest, on oath or affirmation, that he believes that by such threatening he is in danger of being hurt in body or estate, such person so threatening as aforesaid shall be bound over, with one sufficient surety, to appear at the next sessions, according to law, and in the meantime to be of his good behavior, and keep the peace towards all citizens of this commonwealth. . . ,”1
The present prosecution was instituted on information before a justice of the peace of Westmoreland County by J. H. Millstein, and defendant was arrested [442]*442in Pittsburgh, Allegheny County. He was charged with threatening to take the life of J. H. Millstein and putting the latter in fear. The threats were made by defendant over the long distance telephone from Pittsburgh to Millstein, at Jeannette, Westmoreland County, on June 27, 1957. A preliminary hearing was held before the justice of the peace in Westmoreland County, and defendant was held for the Court of Quarter Sessions of Westmoreland County.
At the hearing in the court below defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the court, alleging that if any offense had been committed it was not committed in Westmoreland County but in the County of Allegheny. His motions to dismiss for want of an indictment and for the refusal of a jury trial were also overruled.
The court below, after hearing, adjudged defendant guilty and directed that he pay the costs of prosecution and enter bond in the sum of $25,000 to keep the peace towards all mankind and especially towards J. H. Millstein. Pending disposition of the appeal this Court reduced the bond to $2,000.
Neither the sufficiency of the threats nor the procedure before the justice of the peace is questioned on this appeal.
However, defendant contends that the action of the court below must be reversed, and reiterates the reasons: (1) He was not indicted by a grand jury; (2) he was not afforded a jury trial; and (3) the Court of Quarter Sessions of Westmoreland County did not have jurisdiction.
We find no merit in the argument that an indictment by a grand jury was a prerequisite and essential to due process. The offense of surety of the peace has never been an indictable offense. The purpose of the statutory enactments has been to prevent the commis[443]*443sion of a more serious crime. To accomplish this objective, time is of the essence in processing the action, The Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, §32, 17 PS §361, relating to the jurisdiction of courts of quarter sessions contains the following provision: “IV. To continue, or discharge the recognizance and obligations of persons bound to keep the peace, or to be of good behavior, taken as aforesaid, or certified into such court by any justice of the peace of such county, and to inquire of, hear and determine, in the manner hitherto practiced and allowed, all complaints which shall be found thereon.”
The Act of April 27, 1909, P. L. 260, §1, 19 PS §27, prescribes the expeditious procedure to be followed: “Where a magistrate, alderman, or justice of the peace hearing any surety of the peace or desertion case shall determine to return the same to the court of quarter sessions, such return, instead of being made to the next court of quarter sessions, shall be filed immediately with the clerk of said court; and the judge or judges of the said court of quarter sessions may, whenever the said court is in session, and it is convenient, dispose of the said complaint.”
The Act of March 18, 1909, P. L. 42, §§1-3, 19 PS §§24-26, relates to the hearing to be held by a justice of the peace before whom such case is instituted and the findings required prior to returning the case to the court of quarter sessions.
It is obvious that the court of quarter sessions, upon the return by a justice of the peace in surety of the peace cases, may proceed on the complaint without an indictment and make disposition without a trial by jury. The Acts quoted empower a judge of the court of quarter sessions to hear, determine, and dispose of such complaints. See Com. v. Cano, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 524, 128 A. 2d 358, affirmed 389 Pa. 639, [444]*444133 A. 2d 800, relative to indictable offenses and procedure by information.
There was no violation of article I, §6 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania which provides that “Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate.” Defendant was not charged with an offense that was indictable or triable by jury at common law; the offense is defined by statute, and the procedure is prescribed. See Com. v. Wesley, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 566, 572, 91 A. 2d 298. See, also, Herz v. Hamilton, 198 Iowa 154, 197 N. W. 53; Ex parte Way, 56 Cal. App. 2d 814, 133 P. 2d 637.
We are of the opinion that the court below had jurisdiction of this statutory offense. The obvious elements are: (1) The making of the threat (2) to a person and (3) putting him in fear or danger of being hurt. Ordinarily the offense is committed in the actual presence of the victim. But it is possible, as the court below found, that the victim may be threatened and put in fear by a defendant speaking over the telephone from miles away. See Com. v. Cushard, 184 Pa. Superior Ct. 193, 132 A. 2d 366, which so holds. In such a situation the offense is completed when, after the threat is made by defendant, it is communicated to the victim who is thereby put in fear. It follows that the offense is completed at the place where the victim hears the threat and is put in fear, and jurisdiction rests where the offense is thus committed. If the offense is not completed until the victim is put in fear, then it is committed at the place where he is put in fear. The mere making of the threat does not necessarily constitute the offense. For example, if defendant in the present case made the threats into the telephone after he had been inadvertently and unknowingly cut off, the offense could not then be said to have been committed. When defend[445]*445ant spoke the threats in Allegheny County into the telephone he chose this mechanical means to communicate the threats to the victim in Westmoreland County. It was in the latter jurisdiction that the threats were communicated to and heard by the victim; being thus put in fear, the offense was thereby completed. Defendant set the threat in motion and he followed it to the place where it resulted in the commission of the offense.
The situation is analogous to the making of an offer for a contract. The offer must be communicated to the offeree before it may be effective and accepted; the mere making of the offer is not effective. See Linn v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, 392 Pa. 58, 139 A. 2d 638. The case of United States v. Thayer, 209 U. S. 39, 28 S. Ct. 426, 52 L. Ed. 673, is illustrative.
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Opinion by
Ehodios, P. J.,
This is an appeal by defendant in a surety of the peace proceeding heard in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Westmoreland County. Defendant was adjudged guilty.
The prosecution was under the Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, §6, 19 PS §23, which provides: “If any person shall threaten the person of another to wound, kill or destroy him, or do him any harm in person or estate, and the person threatened shall appear before a justice of the peace, and attest, on oath or affirmation, that he believes that by such threatening he is in danger of being hurt in body or estate, such person so threatening as aforesaid shall be bound over, with one sufficient surety, to appear at the next sessions, according to law, and in the meantime to be of his good behavior, and keep the peace towards all citizens of this commonwealth. . . ,”1
The present prosecution was instituted on information before a justice of the peace of Westmoreland County by J. H. Millstein, and defendant was arrested [442]*442in Pittsburgh, Allegheny County. He was charged with threatening to take the life of J. H. Millstein and putting the latter in fear. The threats were made by defendant over the long distance telephone from Pittsburgh to Millstein, at Jeannette, Westmoreland County, on June 27, 1957. A preliminary hearing was held before the justice of the peace in Westmoreland County, and defendant was held for the Court of Quarter Sessions of Westmoreland County.
At the hearing in the court below defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the court, alleging that if any offense had been committed it was not committed in Westmoreland County but in the County of Allegheny. His motions to dismiss for want of an indictment and for the refusal of a jury trial were also overruled.
The court below, after hearing, adjudged defendant guilty and directed that he pay the costs of prosecution and enter bond in the sum of $25,000 to keep the peace towards all mankind and especially towards J. H. Millstein. Pending disposition of the appeal this Court reduced the bond to $2,000.
Neither the sufficiency of the threats nor the procedure before the justice of the peace is questioned on this appeal.
However, defendant contends that the action of the court below must be reversed, and reiterates the reasons: (1) He was not indicted by a grand jury; (2) he was not afforded a jury trial; and (3) the Court of Quarter Sessions of Westmoreland County did not have jurisdiction.
We find no merit in the argument that an indictment by a grand jury was a prerequisite and essential to due process. The offense of surety of the peace has never been an indictable offense. The purpose of the statutory enactments has been to prevent the commis[443]*443sion of a more serious crime. To accomplish this objective, time is of the essence in processing the action, The Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, §32, 17 PS §361, relating to the jurisdiction of courts of quarter sessions contains the following provision: “IV. To continue, or discharge the recognizance and obligations of persons bound to keep the peace, or to be of good behavior, taken as aforesaid, or certified into such court by any justice of the peace of such county, and to inquire of, hear and determine, in the manner hitherto practiced and allowed, all complaints which shall be found thereon.”
The Act of April 27, 1909, P. L. 260, §1, 19 PS §27, prescribes the expeditious procedure to be followed: “Where a magistrate, alderman, or justice of the peace hearing any surety of the peace or desertion case shall determine to return the same to the court of quarter sessions, such return, instead of being made to the next court of quarter sessions, shall be filed immediately with the clerk of said court; and the judge or judges of the said court of quarter sessions may, whenever the said court is in session, and it is convenient, dispose of the said complaint.”
The Act of March 18, 1909, P. L. 42, §§1-3, 19 PS §§24-26, relates to the hearing to be held by a justice of the peace before whom such case is instituted and the findings required prior to returning the case to the court of quarter sessions.
It is obvious that the court of quarter sessions, upon the return by a justice of the peace in surety of the peace cases, may proceed on the complaint without an indictment and make disposition without a trial by jury. The Acts quoted empower a judge of the court of quarter sessions to hear, determine, and dispose of such complaints. See Com. v. Cano, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 524, 128 A. 2d 358, affirmed 389 Pa. 639, [444]*444133 A. 2d 800, relative to indictable offenses and procedure by information.
There was no violation of article I, §6 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania which provides that “Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate.” Defendant was not charged with an offense that was indictable or triable by jury at common law; the offense is defined by statute, and the procedure is prescribed. See Com. v. Wesley, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 566, 572, 91 A. 2d 298. See, also, Herz v. Hamilton, 198 Iowa 154, 197 N. W. 53; Ex parte Way, 56 Cal. App. 2d 814, 133 P. 2d 637.
We are of the opinion that the court below had jurisdiction of this statutory offense. The obvious elements are: (1) The making of the threat (2) to a person and (3) putting him in fear or danger of being hurt. Ordinarily the offense is committed in the actual presence of the victim. But it is possible, as the court below found, that the victim may be threatened and put in fear by a defendant speaking over the telephone from miles away. See Com. v. Cushard, 184 Pa. Superior Ct. 193, 132 A. 2d 366, which so holds. In such a situation the offense is completed when, after the threat is made by defendant, it is communicated to the victim who is thereby put in fear. It follows that the offense is completed at the place where the victim hears the threat and is put in fear, and jurisdiction rests where the offense is thus committed. If the offense is not completed until the victim is put in fear, then it is committed at the place where he is put in fear. The mere making of the threat does not necessarily constitute the offense. For example, if defendant in the present case made the threats into the telephone after he had been inadvertently and unknowingly cut off, the offense could not then be said to have been committed. When defend[445]*445ant spoke the threats in Allegheny County into the telephone he chose this mechanical means to communicate the threats to the victim in Westmoreland County. It was in the latter jurisdiction that the threats were communicated to and heard by the victim; being thus put in fear, the offense was thereby completed. Defendant set the threat in motion and he followed it to the place where it resulted in the commission of the offense.
The situation is analogous to the making of an offer for a contract. The offer must be communicated to the offeree before it may be effective and accepted; the mere making of the offer is not effective. See Linn v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, 392 Pa. 58, 139 A. 2d 638. The case of United States v. Thayer, 209 U. S. 39, 28 S. Ct. 426, 52 L. Ed. 673, is illustrative. There defendant was indicted under a statute which made it a crime to solicit a contribution for political purposes from a United States employe in a post office building. Defendant, who never was in the building, mailed letters of solicitation to employes at the post office where the letters were delivered and read. The issue was whether the solicitation took place in the post office building. The United States Supreme Court held that it did, saying (page 43 of 209 U.S., page 675 of 52 L. Ed.) : “The solicitation was made at some time, somewhere. The time determines the place. It was not complete when the letter was dropped into the post. If the letter had miscarried or had been burned, the defendant would not have accomplished a solicitation. The court below was misled by cases in which, upon an indictment for obtaining money by false pretenses, the crime was held to have been committed at the place where drafts were put into the post by the defrauded person. Com. v. Wood, 142 Mass. 459, 462, 8 N. E. 432: Reg. v. Jones. 4 Cox. [446]*446C.C. 198. But these stand on the analogy of the acceptance by mail of an offer, and throw no light. A relation already existed between the parties, and it is because of that relation that posting the letter made the transaction complete. . . . Here a relation was to be established, just as there is at the first stage of a contract when an offer is to be made. Whether or not . . . nothing less than bringing the offer to the actual consciousness of the person addressed would do . . . certainly putting a letter into a postoffice is neither an offer nor a solicitation. ‘An offer is nothing until it is communicated to the party to whom it is made/ Thomson v. James, 9 Sc. Sess. Cas. 2d series, 1, 10, 15. Therefore, we repeat, until after the letter had entered the building, the offense was not complete; but, when it had been read, the case was not affected by the nature of the intended means by which it was put into the hands of the person addressed/
The bond heretofore entered by defendant in the sum of $52,000 shall remain in effect for a period of one year from the date hereof. As so modified, the order and the sentence of the court below are affirmed.