BROSKY, Judge:
Commencing January 30, 1978, appellant was tried on charges of rape1 and statutory rape.2 A mistrial was declared when the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict and a new trial was held in April, 1978. At the conclusion of the second trial, appellant was convicted of rape and a direct appeal followed. Subsequently, appellant filed a pro se P.C.H.A.3 petition raising the claim that he had received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. The petition was denied following a hearing at which appellant was represented by court appointed counsel. Before us are the consolidated appeals from the judgment of sentence and denial of the P.C.H.A. petition. Because we find counsel to have been ineffective, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Appellant, who is black, was tried on charges stemming from the rape of a young black girl. Under such circumstances, where defendant and victim are members of the same race, racial prejudice would not normally be at issue. Appellant contends, however, that the prosecution made [449]*449attempts to arouse prejudicial feelings in the jury by pointing out to them appellant’s wife, who is white.
Appellant’s argument before us is that at the first trial the prosecutor improperly drew attention to his wife and that this should have put his attorney on notice that he might point her out at the second trial. Armed with this knowledge, he contends that counsel should either have filed a motion in limine to prohibit such an identification, requested that the voir dire questions probe the jurors’ racial prejudices, or objected to the identification when it was made at the second trial and moved for a mistrial. Trial counsel took no action.
In assessing the merits of appellant’s claim, we are guided by the following principles.
We must first determine whether the claim abandoned by counsel is of arguable merit. Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977). Even if the claim is of arguable merit, counsel will not be found ineffective unless we conclude that the alternatives not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the tactics actually utilized. Id., 472 Pa. at 277, 278, 372 A.2d at 695-6.
Finally, counsel will be found to have been effective as soon as it is determined that his decision had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
With these principles in mind, we turn to appellant’s claim which stems from the following facts.
Mr. Taliaferro testified at both trials and was cross-examined by the prosecutor each time. The prosecuting attorney was the same at the trials. During the first trial, the prosecutor asked the following questions of appellant:
Q. How tall are you, sir?
A. I’m approximately 6'7".
[450]*450Q. You heard the police officer indicate that the description he received from Lisa Simms was that it was a black male, approximately 6'7", medium Afro?
A. Yes, I did hear that.
Q. You’re married with one child. How old is your child?
A. She’ll be three in February.
Q. Where were you married?
A. Well, basically it’s a common law agreement until this thing gets over with and then, you know, we’ll have to go to the court as far as that goes.
Q. So there’s never really been any formal ceremony, anything of that nature?
A. Not really, no, sir.
Q. Is that your wife there in the back of the court room in the second row?
A. Yes, sir, with the—I guess it’s a purple sweater she’s got on.
Q. What’s her name?
A. Jeannie.
Q. Does she go by her name or your name?
A. She goes by her name, basically.
Q. How about your daughter?
A. She’s still carrying her mother’s name.
Shortly after this exchange, the prosecutor asked appellant where he was living at the time the crime was committed. Appellant named the locality in which he resided and the prosecutor then queried: “Were you living with your woman in the back of the court room, or with your mother?”
At the second trial, the prosecutor cross-examined appellant as to his account of his whereabouts at the time the crime was committed. Appellant testified that he was in Buffalo, New York, where he had driven in a car owned by his mother.
The cross-examination continued:
Q. Where were you living at the time?
[451]*451A. I was living with my mother.
Q. Is this your wife in the back of the courtroom in the green pants and orange sweater?
A. Yes, sir, it is.
Q. And that’s your common law wife? You never had a ceremony with her or anything like that?
A. Well, we were planning on having one now but being as I’m here I can’t very well have that. But we were— we are common law.
Q. How long have you been living with her before February 28th?
A. Well, off and on I’d say for the last five years.
Q. And you have a child?
A. Yes, sir.
The Commonwealth argues that any objection to the cross-examination at the second trial (which is the only trial under our consideration) would have been frivolous and that counsel therefore cannot be found ineffective due to his inaction. It is the Commonwealth’s contention that the prosecutor pointed out appellant’s wife to suggest to the jury that appellant and his wife had a close relationship. Presumably, such an inference as to their relationship would weaken the credibility of appellant who had testified that immediately subsequent to the date of the crime, he had gone to Buffalo to seek employment and had left town without notifying his wife. The Commonwealth argues that it sought on cross-examination to show that the departure constituted flight and to that end, wanted to explore the closeness of the relationship between appellant and his wife.4
Appellant’s first trial took place 11 months after the crime was committed; the second was held 14 months after the incident. We question whether the appearance of appel[452]*452lant’s wife at trial in 1978 is probative of the nature of their relationship in February, 1977. Her mere presence itself says nothing about the relationship even at the time of trial; it certainly provides no clue as to how appellant and his wife were getting along over a year earlier.
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BROSKY, Judge:
Commencing January 30, 1978, appellant was tried on charges of rape1 and statutory rape.2 A mistrial was declared when the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict and a new trial was held in April, 1978. At the conclusion of the second trial, appellant was convicted of rape and a direct appeal followed. Subsequently, appellant filed a pro se P.C.H.A.3 petition raising the claim that he had received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. The petition was denied following a hearing at which appellant was represented by court appointed counsel. Before us are the consolidated appeals from the judgment of sentence and denial of the P.C.H.A. petition. Because we find counsel to have been ineffective, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Appellant, who is black, was tried on charges stemming from the rape of a young black girl. Under such circumstances, where defendant and victim are members of the same race, racial prejudice would not normally be at issue. Appellant contends, however, that the prosecution made [449]*449attempts to arouse prejudicial feelings in the jury by pointing out to them appellant’s wife, who is white.
Appellant’s argument before us is that at the first trial the prosecutor improperly drew attention to his wife and that this should have put his attorney on notice that he might point her out at the second trial. Armed with this knowledge, he contends that counsel should either have filed a motion in limine to prohibit such an identification, requested that the voir dire questions probe the jurors’ racial prejudices, or objected to the identification when it was made at the second trial and moved for a mistrial. Trial counsel took no action.
In assessing the merits of appellant’s claim, we are guided by the following principles.
We must first determine whether the claim abandoned by counsel is of arguable merit. Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977). Even if the claim is of arguable merit, counsel will not be found ineffective unless we conclude that the alternatives not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the tactics actually utilized. Id., 472 Pa. at 277, 278, 372 A.2d at 695-6.
Finally, counsel will be found to have been effective as soon as it is determined that his decision had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
With these principles in mind, we turn to appellant’s claim which stems from the following facts.
Mr. Taliaferro testified at both trials and was cross-examined by the prosecutor each time. The prosecuting attorney was the same at the trials. During the first trial, the prosecutor asked the following questions of appellant:
Q. How tall are you, sir?
A. I’m approximately 6'7".
[450]*450Q. You heard the police officer indicate that the description he received from Lisa Simms was that it was a black male, approximately 6'7", medium Afro?
A. Yes, I did hear that.
Q. You’re married with one child. How old is your child?
A. She’ll be three in February.
Q. Where were you married?
A. Well, basically it’s a common law agreement until this thing gets over with and then, you know, we’ll have to go to the court as far as that goes.
Q. So there’s never really been any formal ceremony, anything of that nature?
A. Not really, no, sir.
Q. Is that your wife there in the back of the court room in the second row?
A. Yes, sir, with the—I guess it’s a purple sweater she’s got on.
Q. What’s her name?
A. Jeannie.
Q. Does she go by her name or your name?
A. She goes by her name, basically.
Q. How about your daughter?
A. She’s still carrying her mother’s name.
Shortly after this exchange, the prosecutor asked appellant where he was living at the time the crime was committed. Appellant named the locality in which he resided and the prosecutor then queried: “Were you living with your woman in the back of the court room, or with your mother?”
At the second trial, the prosecutor cross-examined appellant as to his account of his whereabouts at the time the crime was committed. Appellant testified that he was in Buffalo, New York, where he had driven in a car owned by his mother.
The cross-examination continued:
Q. Where were you living at the time?
[451]*451A. I was living with my mother.
Q. Is this your wife in the back of the courtroom in the green pants and orange sweater?
A. Yes, sir, it is.
Q. And that’s your common law wife? You never had a ceremony with her or anything like that?
A. Well, we were planning on having one now but being as I’m here I can’t very well have that. But we were— we are common law.
Q. How long have you been living with her before February 28th?
A. Well, off and on I’d say for the last five years.
Q. And you have a child?
A. Yes, sir.
The Commonwealth argues that any objection to the cross-examination at the second trial (which is the only trial under our consideration) would have been frivolous and that counsel therefore cannot be found ineffective due to his inaction. It is the Commonwealth’s contention that the prosecutor pointed out appellant’s wife to suggest to the jury that appellant and his wife had a close relationship. Presumably, such an inference as to their relationship would weaken the credibility of appellant who had testified that immediately subsequent to the date of the crime, he had gone to Buffalo to seek employment and had left town without notifying his wife. The Commonwealth argues that it sought on cross-examination to show that the departure constituted flight and to that end, wanted to explore the closeness of the relationship between appellant and his wife.4
Appellant’s first trial took place 11 months after the crime was committed; the second was held 14 months after the incident. We question whether the appearance of appel[452]*452lant’s wife at trial in 1978 is probative of the nature of their relationship in February, 1977. Her mere presence itself says nothing about the relationship even at the time of trial; it certainly provides no clue as to how appellant and his wife were getting along over a year earlier.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth’s stated purpose in eliciting the subject cross-examination testimony was to cast doubt on appellant’s claim that he had gone to Buffalo to search for work without telling his wife. However, the prosecutor also inquired of appellant as to the terms of his marriage, that is, whether it was common law or had been formalized by a ceremony. Even now, the Commonwealth makes no argument that such information was in any way relevant to their case.5
More important, however, than the irrelevance of the subject cross-examination, is the prejudicial impact which it may have had on the jury. In Commonwealth v. Long, 258 Pa.Super. 312, 319, 392 A.2d 810, 813 (1978), this court wrote:
The test for this type of comment, as for all improper remarks, is whether the unavoidable effect of the prosecutor’s language would be to prejudice the jury forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, so that they could not weigh the evidence and render a true verdict.
Id., 258 Pa.Super. at 319, 392 A.2d at 813.
The fact that the prosecutor twice delved into the question of appellant’s common law marriage and twice had appellant identify his wife indicates unmistakeably that his course was consciously chosen. There can be no doubt that in our society today there are those in whom interracial relationships arouse extreme prejudicial feelings. The prosecutor has a responsibility “not to be vindictive or attempt [453]*453in any manner to influence the jury by arousing their prejudices.” Long, supra.
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted by our Supreme Court on February 27, 1974, forbids a lawyer from asking any questions for which a reasonable basis does not exist on relevancy grounds. The Code states:
DR 7-106. Trial Conduct
(A) ...
(B) ...
(C) In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
(1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case or that will not be supported by admissible evidence.
(2) Ask any question that he has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case and that is intended to degrade a witness or other person.
In like vein, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Second Edition, 1980, in Chapter 3, The Prosecution Function, sets forth:
Standard 3-5.7. Examination of witnesses
(a) The interrogation of all witnesses should be conducted fairly, objectively, and with due regard for the dignity and legitimate privacy of the witness, and without seeking to intimidate or humiliate the witness unnecessarily. Proper cross-examination can be conducted without violating rules of decorum.
Appellant’s trial counsel should have objected to the prosecutor’s introduction of irrelevant evidence which he must have known could be embarrassing and prejudicial to appellant and would divert the jury’s attention away from their duty of weighing the evidence impartially. See Long, supra.
As our Supreme Court said in Commonwealth v. Tirado, 473 Pa. 468, 472, 473, 375 A.2d 336, 338 (1977),
It is central to our concept of a fair trial that the jury must decide the case on the basis of properly presented [454]*454factual issues, and that extraneous and irrelevant matters should be avoided. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 456 Pa. 265, 318 A.2d 737 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hirsch, 455 Pa. 522, 317 A.2d 305 (1974). Appeals to racial or religious prejudice are especially incompatible with the concept of a fair trial because of the likelihood that reason will be dethroned and that bias and emotion will reign.
See also Commonwealth v. Peay, 369 Pa. 72, 85 A.2d 425 (1951) (Stern, J. Concurring).
If the objection came after appellant had responded to the questions and identified his wife, a motion for mistrial would have been in order.
Counsel should have at least raised such an objection, if not as appellate counsel urges, made a motion in limine to prohibit such cross-examination. Counsel was on notice following the first trial that the prosecutor had appealed to the possible racial prejudice of the jurors and he could have tried to prevent such tactics at the second trial.
We are not willing to say, however, that counsel should have sought special voir dire to explore racial prejudice. Except for the improper reference to appellant’s wife, this was a racially neutral case. Voir dire need not have included such questions. See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981).
Having concluded that counsel was ineffective in not at least having made objection to the prosecutor’s tactics, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
ROWLEY, J., concurs in result.
POPOVICH, J., files dissenting opinion.
HESTER, J., joins dissenting opinion by POPOVICH, J.
McEWEN, J., concurs in dissenting opinion by POPO-VICH, J.