SPAETH, President Judge:
This is an appeal from judgment of sentence for criminal attempt (escape) and possession of implements of escape. Appellant’s principal argument is that his trial counsel was ineffective. Appellant gave two inculpatory statements. Since it is undisputed that the first statement was obtained without informing appellant of his Miranda rights,1 it is apparent that had trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the first statement, the motion would have had to have been granted. Appellant argues that had trial counsel filed a motion to suppress his second statement, that motion too would have had to have been granted because the second statement was tainted by the illegally obtained first statement. Since this argument has arguable merit, we remand for a hearing on whether trial counsel had any reasonable basis for not filing any motion to suppress.
[33]*33-l-
On July 26, 1981, appellant, an inmate at the Dauphin County prison, was interrogated by John Hrabovsky, who was employed at the prison as an investigator, in connection with an attempted escape from the prison. Appellant, who was without counsel and was not informed of his Miranda rights, implicated himself by stating that when his girlfriend, Carolyn Duke, had visited him at the prison the day before, she brought him a wristband containing hacksaw blades; he also stated that his girlfriend did not know the contents of the wristband. N.T. 90.
After learning of appellant’s statement, Kenneth Barbush, a criminal investigator for the Dauphin County district attorney’s office, conducted an investigation, and on July 29, 1984, Mr. Barbush, with Mr. Hrabovsky present, interrogated appellant. N.T. 62. After informing appellant of his Miranda rights, Mr. Barbush told appellant that he was investigating Ms. Duke’s role in the attempted escape, and that she might be prosecuted. N.T. 62-63. Appellant then reiterated his statement of July 26th, that Ms. Duke had brought him the wristband but did not know that it contained hacksaw blades. N.T. 63.
Trial counsel made no motion to suppress appellant’s statement, and appellate counsel now argues that because of this failure, trial counsel was ineffective. To evaluate this argument we must determine whether the motion to suppress would have had arguable merit. If the motion would have had arguable merit, then we must remand for a hearing on whether counsel’s decision not to file the motion had any reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant’s interests. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
Appellant argues that had a motion to suppress been filed, the first statement would have been suppressed because “[i]t is clear [from the testimony of Mr. Hrabovsky himself] that appellant was questioned ... without first being given his Miranda warnings.” Brief for Appellant at 15. And next, appellant argues that had a motion to [34]*34suppress been filed, the second statement would also have been suppressed, for either of two reasons: because it was rendered involuntary by the circumstances under which it was given, i.e., while appellant was in prison, and accompanied by the threat to prosecute his girlfriend, id. at 16-17; and because “although preceded by Miranda warnings [it] was never-the-less [sic ] inadmissible as the product of the exploitation of the prior illegal statement”, id. at 17-19.
The principles underlying appellant’s argument are long-settled. Where an accused, like appellant, makes two inculpatory statements, the first without, and the second with, Miranda warnings, the Commonwealth must establish that the second statement was not the exploitation of the first. This means that the Commonwealth must establish that the second statement was obtained in circumstances sufficiently distinguishable from the circumstances in which the first statement was obtained to purge it of the first statement’s taint. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Commonwealth v. Chacko, 500 Pa. 571, 459 A.2d 311 (1983); Commonwealth v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 283 A.2d 285 (1971); Commonwealth v. Banks, 429 Pa. 53, 239 A.2d 416 (1968). To determine whether the second statement was purged of the first statement’s taint, all of the circumstances in which the two statements were made must be examined. If that examination discloses that the Commonwealth has not sustained its burden of establishing that there was no taint, the second statement, as well as the first, must be suppressed. Commonwealth v. Marabel, supra, Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968).
Commonwealth v. Marabel, supra, is illustrative of the examination that a court must make in determining whether the Commonwealth has established that a second statement was not tainted by an illegally obtained first statement. There the Supreme Court found that the Commonwealth had established no taint. The case is especially striking when compared with the present case. In almost every respect, the evidence that enabled the Commonwealth to [35]*35sustain its burden in Marabel was contradicted by the evidence here. Thus: In Marabel the accused said nothing inculpatory in the first statement, Commonwealth v. Marabel, supra, 445 Pa. at 445, 283 A.2d at 290; here, appellant admitted in his first statement that his girlfriend had given him the hacksaw blades used in the attempted escape. In Marabel the accused was not in custody between interrogations, id., 445 Pa. at 446, 283 A.2d at 290; here, appellant was in prison. In Marabel the accused made no inculpatory statement until after being informed of his Miranda rights, id., 445 Pa. at 446-447, 283 A.2d at 290-291; here, as Mr. Hrabovsky himself testified, appellant made his first, inculpatory, statement without having been informed of his Miranda rights. In Marabel two persons had given statements that incriminated the accused, and it was the confrontation with these two statements that caused the accused to confess, not the first, tainted, statement. Here, although another prisoner had given a statement implicating appellant, the evidence suggests that it was the fact that appellant had “let the cat out of the bag” in his first statement, in combination with the threat to prosecute appellant’s girlfriend, that led to the second statement.
In short, while in Marabel the evidence showed that the accused had made the second statement freely and without any compulsion deriving from the first statement, here the evidence tends to show precisely the opposite. As the United States Supreme Court has stated in United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947):
[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed.
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SPAETH, President Judge:
This is an appeal from judgment of sentence for criminal attempt (escape) and possession of implements of escape. Appellant’s principal argument is that his trial counsel was ineffective. Appellant gave two inculpatory statements. Since it is undisputed that the first statement was obtained without informing appellant of his Miranda rights,1 it is apparent that had trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the first statement, the motion would have had to have been granted. Appellant argues that had trial counsel filed a motion to suppress his second statement, that motion too would have had to have been granted because the second statement was tainted by the illegally obtained first statement. Since this argument has arguable merit, we remand for a hearing on whether trial counsel had any reasonable basis for not filing any motion to suppress.
[33]*33-l-
On July 26, 1981, appellant, an inmate at the Dauphin County prison, was interrogated by John Hrabovsky, who was employed at the prison as an investigator, in connection with an attempted escape from the prison. Appellant, who was without counsel and was not informed of his Miranda rights, implicated himself by stating that when his girlfriend, Carolyn Duke, had visited him at the prison the day before, she brought him a wristband containing hacksaw blades; he also stated that his girlfriend did not know the contents of the wristband. N.T. 90.
After learning of appellant’s statement, Kenneth Barbush, a criminal investigator for the Dauphin County district attorney’s office, conducted an investigation, and on July 29, 1984, Mr. Barbush, with Mr. Hrabovsky present, interrogated appellant. N.T. 62. After informing appellant of his Miranda rights, Mr. Barbush told appellant that he was investigating Ms. Duke’s role in the attempted escape, and that she might be prosecuted. N.T. 62-63. Appellant then reiterated his statement of July 26th, that Ms. Duke had brought him the wristband but did not know that it contained hacksaw blades. N.T. 63.
Trial counsel made no motion to suppress appellant’s statement, and appellate counsel now argues that because of this failure, trial counsel was ineffective. To evaluate this argument we must determine whether the motion to suppress would have had arguable merit. If the motion would have had arguable merit, then we must remand for a hearing on whether counsel’s decision not to file the motion had any reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant’s interests. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
Appellant argues that had a motion to suppress been filed, the first statement would have been suppressed because “[i]t is clear [from the testimony of Mr. Hrabovsky himself] that appellant was questioned ... without first being given his Miranda warnings.” Brief for Appellant at 15. And next, appellant argues that had a motion to [34]*34suppress been filed, the second statement would also have been suppressed, for either of two reasons: because it was rendered involuntary by the circumstances under which it was given, i.e., while appellant was in prison, and accompanied by the threat to prosecute his girlfriend, id. at 16-17; and because “although preceded by Miranda warnings [it] was never-the-less [sic ] inadmissible as the product of the exploitation of the prior illegal statement”, id. at 17-19.
The principles underlying appellant’s argument are long-settled. Where an accused, like appellant, makes two inculpatory statements, the first without, and the second with, Miranda warnings, the Commonwealth must establish that the second statement was not the exploitation of the first. This means that the Commonwealth must establish that the second statement was obtained in circumstances sufficiently distinguishable from the circumstances in which the first statement was obtained to purge it of the first statement’s taint. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Commonwealth v. Chacko, 500 Pa. 571, 459 A.2d 311 (1983); Commonwealth v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 283 A.2d 285 (1971); Commonwealth v. Banks, 429 Pa. 53, 239 A.2d 416 (1968). To determine whether the second statement was purged of the first statement’s taint, all of the circumstances in which the two statements were made must be examined. If that examination discloses that the Commonwealth has not sustained its burden of establishing that there was no taint, the second statement, as well as the first, must be suppressed. Commonwealth v. Marabel, supra, Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968).
Commonwealth v. Marabel, supra, is illustrative of the examination that a court must make in determining whether the Commonwealth has established that a second statement was not tainted by an illegally obtained first statement. There the Supreme Court found that the Commonwealth had established no taint. The case is especially striking when compared with the present case. In almost every respect, the evidence that enabled the Commonwealth to [35]*35sustain its burden in Marabel was contradicted by the evidence here. Thus: In Marabel the accused said nothing inculpatory in the first statement, Commonwealth v. Marabel, supra, 445 Pa. at 445, 283 A.2d at 290; here, appellant admitted in his first statement that his girlfriend had given him the hacksaw blades used in the attempted escape. In Marabel the accused was not in custody between interrogations, id., 445 Pa. at 446, 283 A.2d at 290; here, appellant was in prison. In Marabel the accused made no inculpatory statement until after being informed of his Miranda rights, id., 445 Pa. at 446-447, 283 A.2d at 290-291; here, as Mr. Hrabovsky himself testified, appellant made his first, inculpatory, statement without having been informed of his Miranda rights. In Marabel two persons had given statements that incriminated the accused, and it was the confrontation with these two statements that caused the accused to confess, not the first, tainted, statement. Here, although another prisoner had given a statement implicating appellant, the evidence suggests that it was the fact that appellant had “let the cat out of the bag” in his first statement, in combination with the threat to prosecute appellant’s girlfriend, that led to the second statement.
In short, while in Marabel the evidence showed that the accused had made the second statement freely and without any compulsion deriving from the first statement, here the evidence tends to show precisely the opposite. As the United States Supreme Court has stated in United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947):
[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a later confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the first.
Id. at 540, 67 S.Ct. at 1398.
Accord: Commonwealth v. Ware, 438 Pa. 517, 265 A.2d 790 (1970) (recital of Miranda warnings near end of interro[36]*36gation, after oral confession obtained, did not purge taint of illegal interrogation). See also Annot. 80 A.L.R.2d 1428 (1960) (collecting cases deciding whether threats to prosecute relative rendered statement involuntary).
Given the record before us, we are hard put to imagine why appellant’s trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress appellant’s statements — the first as illegally obtained, and the second as the exploitation, or fruit, of the first. Arguably, we should simply find counsel ineffective now, and vacate the judgment of sentence and order a new trial. However, counsel may have had some reasonable basis for his failure, and the better course, we have concluded, is to remand for an ineffectiveness hearing.
-2-
Appellant also argues that if this case is not remanded for an ineffectiveness hearing, then the judgment should be vacated and a new trial ordered because of trial errors. One of the errors assigned is that the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to use the illegally obtained first statement to impeach appellant.
It is apparent that the trial court was led into its assumption that appellant’s second statement was admissible, and from that assumption into permitting use of the first statement, because appellant’s trial counsel had filed no motion to suppress the statements. As already stated, we must remand this case for a hearing on why trial counsel filed no motion to suppress. It seems at least possible, if not likely, that the hearing will result, first, in trial counsel being found ineffective, and second, in new counsel’s motion to suppress both statements being granted, and a new trial being ordered. In these circumstances, we do not reach appellant’s argument that at the trial that has been held the trial court erred in permitting him to be impeached by his prior statement.2
[37]*37Remanded for a hearing on whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress appellant’s statements. Jurisdiction relinquished.
GRILLO, J., files a dissenting opinion.