Commonwealth v. Schork

356 A.2d 355, 467 Pa. 248, 1976 Pa. LEXIS 571
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 17, 1976
Docket430
StatusPublished
Cited by39 cases

This text of 356 A.2d 355 (Commonwealth v. Schork) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Schork, 356 A.2d 355, 467 Pa. 248, 1976 Pa. LEXIS 571 (Pa. 1976).

Opinions

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

This is a companion case to Commonwealth v. Minor, 467 Pa.-, 356 A.2d 346 (1975).

Appellee was arrested and indicted on four bills, each charging burglary, larceny and receiving stolen goods. He pled guilty to three of these bills.

On appeal to the Superior Court appellee argued that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered because the elements of the charges to which he pled guilty were not explained to him. The Superior Court, in an unanimous opinion which relied on [250]*250pre-Ingram1 law,2 agreed, and reversed his conviction, remanding for a new trial. This Court granted the Commonwealth’s petition for appeal.3 We affirm the Superi- or Court, relying on Minor, supra.

The basis for reversal is well-stated by the Superior Court:

“The record shows the following, inter alia, in the colloquy at the guilty plea hearing:
Defense counsel: Do you understand you are in court and you are charged with four counts of burglary?
Defendant: Yes.
Defense counsel: Do you understand, also three of those burglaries occurred in 1972 and one of them is alleged to have occurred in 1973? The one that is alleged to have occurred this year is charged in Bill No. 1552 of July Sessions, 1973. The three burglaries alleged to have occurred in 1972 were Bills 1549, 1550 and 1551 of July Sessions, 1973; do you understand that?
Defendant: Yes.
Defense counsel: You have indicated to me you are willing to enter a plea of guilty to certain of the charges here today; is that correct ?
Defendant: Yes.
Defense counsel: I have told you, and will tell you now, in return for your plea of guilty to three of the bills, the bills alleging crimes that occurred in 1972, the District Attorney agreed to move to npl. [251]*251pros, or discharge the remaining bill, 1552, which alleges a crime which occurred this year; do you understand that?
Defendant: Yes.
Defense counsel: You understand the charge of burglary carries a maximum sentence of 10 to 20 years on each of the individual charges ?
Defendant: Yes.
By the Court: I take it you are pleading guilty because you have reviewed the charges against you and the facts as you know them, and you feel you are guilty of these three burglaries?
Defendant: Yes.

The above quoted sections of the colloquy are all those which this Court finds could arguably be cited as revealing any explanation of the nature of the charges to the appellant before his guilty pleas. Of course, at the time of these pleas, an on-the-record colloquy was required. Boykin v. Alabama, [395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)]; Commonwealth v. Godfrey, [434 Pa. 532, 254 A.2d 923 (1969)]; Commonwealth v. Belgrave, [445 Pa. 311, 285 A.2d 448 (1971)].

“The record shows that the indictments on which all three pleas were based include charges of burglary, larceny and receiving stolen goods. While larceny and receiving stolen goods were purportedly included among the charges to which the appellant plead guilty, the record shows that solely charges of burglary were mentioned in the colloquy. Further, as is readily ascertainable from the sections of the colloquy quoted above, the questions and answers of record fall far short of a demonstration that appellant understood the nature of the factual basis or legal basis of charges [252]*252against him even measured by pre-Ingram standards, in effect at the time of this plea; . . .We are constrained to hold that the guilty pleas in question are invalid and the convictions must be reversed.” 4

Order affirmed.

POMEROY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which EAGEN, J., joins. JONES, C. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this opinion.

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Bluebook (online)
356 A.2d 355, 467 Pa. 248, 1976 Pa. LEXIS 571, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-schork-pa-1976.