NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-466
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
RANDY CAMPBELL.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of
involuntary manslaughter, G. L. c. 265, § 13, motor vehicle
homicide by negligent operation, G. L. c. 90, § 24G (b), and
negligent operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90,
§ 24 (2) (a). 1 The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence of wanton and reckless conduct. He also maintains that
the convictions of motor vehicle homicide and negligent
operation are duplicative of the manslaughter conviction, which
the Commonwealth concedes. We affirm the conviction of
manslaughter and reverse the other two convictions.
1 The defendant was acquitted of three other charges. Background. The charges in this case arose from a crash
caused by the defendant's speeding down a highway and slamming
into a stopped Volkswagen SUV at eighty-six miles per hour. The
force of the impact drove the Volkswagen off the road and into a
tree, killing the front-seat passenger.
The crash happened on Route 3 northbound on a clear, sunny,
Sunday morning in July. Traffic was moving at seventy to
seventy-five miles per hour in a sixty mile-per-hour zone until
a lane closure brought traffic to a dead stop before former exit
12. An emergency highway repair caused the back-up.
Other drivers and passengers safely stopped their vehicles
before encountering the lines of stopped cars. Exit 12 was
located on a rise in the road and drivers described seeing the
line of stopped cars as they approached. A collision analysis
and reconstruction expert testified that "the roadway was, it
should have a nice line -- it should be a line of sight for that
distance. So you should be able to see traffic slowing down in
that area." After the victim's daughter brought her Volkswagen
to a safe stop, she could clearly see, behind her, the
defendant's car barreling down on them.
The defendant drove into this traffic jam at eighty-six
miles per hour. He never braked. After slamming into the
Volkswagen and driving it off the road, the defendant's car
smashed into the minivan that had been safely stopped in front
2 of the Volkswagen. Neither weather nor mechanical concerns were
an issue. One witness, who was going seventy miles per hour in
the left lane, testified that before the crash, the defendant
passed him on the right, gave him the middle finger, and then
the defendant's car moved slightly toward the witness's lane
before it "jerked" back into the right lane. As the defendant
continued overtaking other drivers, this witness twice saw him
gesture to other drivers with the middle finger.
The defendant complained of injuries at the scene and was
taken to a hospital where, as part of the trauma protocol, his
blood was drawn. The resulting toxicology report showed the
presence of opioids (fentanyl, methadone, oxycodone) as well as
marijuana in the defendant's blood. Opioids are central nervous
system depressants that can cause dizziness or drowsiness,
confusion, impaired judgment, and a decrease in coordination or
motor skills. The jury also heard that, although the defendant
suffered a broken collarbone and complex fractures in his lower
spine, he was walking at the scene, displaying behavior that the
treating doctor found unusual. The treating doctor explained
that the opioids found in the defendant's blood can control
pain, rendering a patient's ability to describe pain less
reliable. Marijuana may also render a person's ability to
describe pain less reliable.
3 Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of evidence. We "must view
the evidence presented at trial, together with reasonable
inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth to determine whether any rational jury could have
found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 482 Mass. 741, 744 (2019). In so
doing, we bear in mind that guilt may be established by
circumstantial evidence "and that the inferences a jury may draw
from the evidence 'need only be reasonable and possible and need
not be necessary or inescapable.'" Commonwealth v. Linton, 456
Mass. 534, 544 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass.
770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007).
"Involuntary manslaughter arises where death is caused by
wanton or reckless conduct -- that is, 'intentional conduct that
create[s] a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will
result to another person.'" Commonwealth v. Njuguna, 495 Mass.
770, 781 (2025), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 494 Mass. 288,
297 (2024). The defendant need only "inten[d] to engage in the
wanton or reckless conduct itself," and need not "inten[d] to
cause the specific harm." Njuguna, supra. The Commonwealth may
prove intent "either subjectively, based on the defendant's
specific knowledge, or objectively, based on what a reasonable
person should have known in the circumstances." Id. "Conduct
is a proximate cause of death if the conduct, 'by the natural
4 and continuous sequence of events, causes the death and without
which the death would not have occurred.'" Commonwealth v.
Carlson, 447 Mass. 79, 83 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v.
Rosado, 434 Mass. 197, 202, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 963 (2001).
When the defendant crashed into the back of the victim's
Volkswagen, he was driving eighty-six miles per hour in a sixty-
mile-per-hour zone. The defendant's driving was not merely
fast, but excessively fast, aggressive, and intimidating. In
the moments leading up to the collision, the defendant was
passing other vehicles on the right while gesturing obscenely at
them, and "jerking between lanes." He repeatedly reached an arm
out of the vehicle while extending his middle finger. During at
least some of the time, he had his left foot up on the
dashboard.
The trial evidence supported a conclusion that it was
possible both to see the build-up of stopped cars and to stop
safely, yet the defendant never braked. See Commonwealth v.
Rand, 363 Mass. 554, 562 (1973). Neither road conditions nor
vehicle conditions factored in the crash. Although the jury did
not find the defendant guilty of any of the impaired operation
charges, they were nonetheless entitled to consider evidence
that he had opioids in his system and exhibited a pain tolerance
consistent with opioid and marijuana use.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-466
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
RANDY CAMPBELL.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of
involuntary manslaughter, G. L. c. 265, § 13, motor vehicle
homicide by negligent operation, G. L. c. 90, § 24G (b), and
negligent operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90,
§ 24 (2) (a). 1 The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence of wanton and reckless conduct. He also maintains that
the convictions of motor vehicle homicide and negligent
operation are duplicative of the manslaughter conviction, which
the Commonwealth concedes. We affirm the conviction of
manslaughter and reverse the other two convictions.
1 The defendant was acquitted of three other charges. Background. The charges in this case arose from a crash
caused by the defendant's speeding down a highway and slamming
into a stopped Volkswagen SUV at eighty-six miles per hour. The
force of the impact drove the Volkswagen off the road and into a
tree, killing the front-seat passenger.
The crash happened on Route 3 northbound on a clear, sunny,
Sunday morning in July. Traffic was moving at seventy to
seventy-five miles per hour in a sixty mile-per-hour zone until
a lane closure brought traffic to a dead stop before former exit
12. An emergency highway repair caused the back-up.
Other drivers and passengers safely stopped their vehicles
before encountering the lines of stopped cars. Exit 12 was
located on a rise in the road and drivers described seeing the
line of stopped cars as they approached. A collision analysis
and reconstruction expert testified that "the roadway was, it
should have a nice line -- it should be a line of sight for that
distance. So you should be able to see traffic slowing down in
that area." After the victim's daughter brought her Volkswagen
to a safe stop, she could clearly see, behind her, the
defendant's car barreling down on them.
The defendant drove into this traffic jam at eighty-six
miles per hour. He never braked. After slamming into the
Volkswagen and driving it off the road, the defendant's car
smashed into the minivan that had been safely stopped in front
2 of the Volkswagen. Neither weather nor mechanical concerns were
an issue. One witness, who was going seventy miles per hour in
the left lane, testified that before the crash, the defendant
passed him on the right, gave him the middle finger, and then
the defendant's car moved slightly toward the witness's lane
before it "jerked" back into the right lane. As the defendant
continued overtaking other drivers, this witness twice saw him
gesture to other drivers with the middle finger.
The defendant complained of injuries at the scene and was
taken to a hospital where, as part of the trauma protocol, his
blood was drawn. The resulting toxicology report showed the
presence of opioids (fentanyl, methadone, oxycodone) as well as
marijuana in the defendant's blood. Opioids are central nervous
system depressants that can cause dizziness or drowsiness,
confusion, impaired judgment, and a decrease in coordination or
motor skills. The jury also heard that, although the defendant
suffered a broken collarbone and complex fractures in his lower
spine, he was walking at the scene, displaying behavior that the
treating doctor found unusual. The treating doctor explained
that the opioids found in the defendant's blood can control
pain, rendering a patient's ability to describe pain less
reliable. Marijuana may also render a person's ability to
describe pain less reliable.
3 Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of evidence. We "must view
the evidence presented at trial, together with reasonable
inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth to determine whether any rational jury could have
found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 482 Mass. 741, 744 (2019). In so
doing, we bear in mind that guilt may be established by
circumstantial evidence "and that the inferences a jury may draw
from the evidence 'need only be reasonable and possible and need
not be necessary or inescapable.'" Commonwealth v. Linton, 456
Mass. 534, 544 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass.
770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007).
"Involuntary manslaughter arises where death is caused by
wanton or reckless conduct -- that is, 'intentional conduct that
create[s] a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will
result to another person.'" Commonwealth v. Njuguna, 495 Mass.
770, 781 (2025), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 494 Mass. 288,
297 (2024). The defendant need only "inten[d] to engage in the
wanton or reckless conduct itself," and need not "inten[d] to
cause the specific harm." Njuguna, supra. The Commonwealth may
prove intent "either subjectively, based on the defendant's
specific knowledge, or objectively, based on what a reasonable
person should have known in the circumstances." Id. "Conduct
is a proximate cause of death if the conduct, 'by the natural
4 and continuous sequence of events, causes the death and without
which the death would not have occurred.'" Commonwealth v.
Carlson, 447 Mass. 79, 83 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v.
Rosado, 434 Mass. 197, 202, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 963 (2001).
When the defendant crashed into the back of the victim's
Volkswagen, he was driving eighty-six miles per hour in a sixty-
mile-per-hour zone. The defendant's driving was not merely
fast, but excessively fast, aggressive, and intimidating. In
the moments leading up to the collision, the defendant was
passing other vehicles on the right while gesturing obscenely at
them, and "jerking between lanes." He repeatedly reached an arm
out of the vehicle while extending his middle finger. During at
least some of the time, he had his left foot up on the
dashboard.
The trial evidence supported a conclusion that it was
possible both to see the build-up of stopped cars and to stop
safely, yet the defendant never braked. See Commonwealth v.
Rand, 363 Mass. 554, 562 (1973). Neither road conditions nor
vehicle conditions factored in the crash. Although the jury did
not find the defendant guilty of any of the impaired operation
charges, they were nonetheless entitled to consider evidence
that he had opioids in his system and exhibited a pain tolerance
consistent with opioid and marijuana use. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Guaman, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 36, 41 (2016). Viewed
5 in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence
supported the conclusion that the victim's death was part of a
"natural and continuous sequence of events" flowing from the
defendant's behavior. Carlson, 447 Mass. at 83, quoting Rosado,
434 Mass. at 202. See Njuguna, 495 Mass. at 782-783 (traveling
at excessive speed, tailgating, weaving between lanes, and
attempting to pass vehicles in dangerous manner may constitute
wanton or reckless conduct sufficient for manslaughter
conviction); Commonwealth v. DeSimone, 349 Mass. 770, 770-771
(1965) (weaving through traffic, tailgating, and hazardous
passing may constitute wanton or reckless conduct sufficient for
manslaughter conviction).
2. Duplicative convictions. The defendant asserts, and
the Commonwealth concedes, that convictions of motor vehicle
homicide by negligent operation and of negligent operation are
duplicative of a conviction of involuntary manslaughter. Having
conducted an independent examination of the issue, see
Commonwealth v. Poirier, 458 Mass. 1014, 1015 (2010), we agree.
See Njuguna, 495 Mass. at 771; Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass.
387, 394-395 (1981). Because we uphold the defendant's
conviction of involuntary manslaughter, we reverse the other two
convictions.
3. Sentencing. The Commonwealth requests that we remand
the case for resentencing on the defendant's sole remaining
6 conviction. The Commonwealth maintains that a sentence of from
twelve to fourteen years should be imposed so as to permit a
comprehensive, thoughtful sentencing package like the one
imposed by the judge after trial, and suggests that this
approach would not violate the principles of double jeopardy.
"When faced on appeal with two convictions that are
duplicative of each other, appellate courts have generally
considered it 'appropriate' to vacate the conviction on the
offense with fewer elements and 'to affirm the conviction on the
more serious offense' without remand to the trial court"
(citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Rivas, 466 Mass. 184, 189
(2013). While we agree with the Commonwealth's characterization
of the care with which the judge considered and imposed the
original sentences, we discern no reason to depart from the
usual remedy of vacating the convictions and sentences on the
lesser offenses and affirming on the greater offense. See
Jones, 382 Mass. at 395, citing Commonwealth v. White (No. 2),
365 Mass. 307, 311 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1111 (1975);
Kuklis v. Commonwealth, 361 Mass. 302, 309 (1972). Of course,
nothing we say here limits the trial judge's authority to
reconsider the sentence pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P.
29 (a) (2), as appearing in 489 Mass. 1503 (2022) (revise and
revoke following rescript of appellate court).
7 Conclusion. On indictment no. 2183CR00045-001, charging
motor vehicle homicide by negligent operation, the judgment is
vacated, the verdict is set aside, and the indictment is to be
dismissed. On indictment no. 2183CR00045-005, charging
negligent operation of a motor vehicle, the judgment is vacated,
the verdict is set aside, and the indictment is to be dismissed.
On indictment no. 2183CR00045-003, charging involuntary
manslaughter, the judgment is affirmed.
So ordered.
By the Court (Hershfang, Hodgens & Smyth, JJ. 2),
Clerk
Entered: December 17, 2025.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.