COMMONWEALTH v. RAJIV R., a Juvenile

• Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
• Decided: April 15, 2025
• Docket: SJC-13634
• Status: Published

Opinion

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

COMMONWEALTH vs. RAJIV R., a juvenile

Docket:	SJC-13634
Dates:	November 4, 2024 – April 15, 2025
Present:	Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, Dewar, & Wolohojian, JJ.
County:	Essex
Keywords:	Firearms. Delinquent Child. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Sentence, Findings by judge, Hearsay. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child. Youthful Offender Act. Parent and Child, Testimony by parent against child. Evidence, Testimonial privilege, Photograph, Opinion, Hearsay. Statute, Construction. Witness, Privilege, Police officer. Constitutional Law, Sentence, Vagueness of statute, Cruel and unusual punishment.

      Complaint received and sworn to in the Essex County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on September 21, 2021.

      Indictment found and returned in the Essex County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on October 25, 2021.

      A pretrial motion to exclude testimony was heard by José A. Sánchez, J., and the cases were tried before him.

      The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.

      John P. Warren for the juvenile.

      Jennifer D. Cohen, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

      K. Hayne Barnwell, Claudia Leis Bolgen, & Leon Smith, for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

      DEWAR, J.  A jury found the juvenile delinquent on firearm charges and, after further proceedings, guilty on a youthful offender indictment for one of the offenses.  At the trial, the juvenile was nineteen years old, and the Commonwealth called his mother as a witness against him to testify regarding events that took place when the juvenile was seventeen years old.  On appeal, the juvenile argues that the parent-child witness disqualification statute -- which prohibits testimony by a parent "against the parent's minor child" in proceedings "in which the victim . . . is not a family member and does not reside in the family household," G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth (§ 20, Fourth) -- precluded admission of his mother's testimony against him, even though he was no longer a "minor" at the time of trial.  He also argues that the trial judge committed several errors in admitting other evidence against him, and that his sentence was unlawful and unconstitutional on various grounds.

      We conclude, in agreement with the trial judge's interpretation, that the statutory prohibition of testimony by a parent "against the parent's minor child" in cases not involving a family household victim does not apply once the child has reached the age of eighteen.  G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth.  The judge therefore did not err in admitting the mother's testimony against the juvenile.  With respect to the juvenile's other evidentiary arguments, we discern no prejudicial error, although we conclude that the judge should not have admitted a detective's testimony that a firearm depicted in still images was "identical" to the firearm admitted in evidence, nor two hearsay statements not required to explain the state of police knowledge during the investigation.  Regarding the juvenile's claims of error related to his sentence, we agree only that the judge erred in not issuing written findings explaining the juvenile's sentence as required under G. L. c. 119, § 58, and we conclude that this error did not prejudice the juvenile because of the judge's detailed explanation of the sentence on the record.  We affirm.[1]

      1.  Background.  a.  Commonwealth's case.  The jury could have found the following.  The juvenile lived in a two-family home in Lawrence with his mother and four siblings.  When the juvenile was seventeen years old, his mother became concerned about his possession of a firearm and called a Lawrence police detective to inform him of that concern.  She also told the detective where the firearm could be found.  The detective and other police officers executed a search warrant at the juvenile's home to look for the firearm.  There, the officers found the juvenile and his brother together in a bedroom.  The juvenile was reclined on a bed, and his brother was reclined next to him on a separate sofa bed.  The juvenile and his brother obeyed the officers' order to exit the room.  The officers then observed a firearm protruding from underneath a pillow on which the juvenile had been resting his head.  The firearm was loaded with one round in its chamber and thirty rounds of ammunition in an extended magazine.

      b.  Prior proceedings.  The juvenile was charged in a delinquency complaint with possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding device, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m); and improper storage of a firearm, G. L. c. 140, § 131L.[2]  He was subsequently indicted as a youthful offender with respect to the large capacity feeding device charge.

      Before trial, the juvenile filed a motion seeking to prevent the Commonwealth from calling his mother as a witness, invoking the parent-child witness disqualification statute.  See G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth ("A parent shall not testify against the parent's minor child . . . in a . . . trial of . . . [a] delinquency or youthful offender proceeding . . .").  The juvenile was eighteen years old by this stage in the proceedings, and the Commonwealth opposed the motion on the ground that, because the juvenile was no longer a minor, the statute did not apply.  The motion judge, who also was the trial judge, denied the juvenile's motion.  The judge reasoned that the disqualification by its terms applied only to testimony against a "minor" child, and, if the Legislature had intended that the statute apply more broadly, the Legislature would have included such a provision.

      At the juvenile's trial, the Commonwealth called the juvenile's mother as its first witness.  She answered some preliminary questions but refused to answer after being asked about her communications with the detective.  The judge previously had conducted an in camera hearing with the mother, who was represented by counsel, and determined that her right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not apply to the testimony sought by the Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 504 (1996).  Following a recess during which the mother spoke with her attorney, she persisted in her refusal to answer the question, even after the judge ordered her to do so.  The judge held her in contempt and ordered her remanded to custody.

      The detective's testimony followed the same day.  Over objections by the juvenile that we address in our discussion of the issues, the detective described executing the search warrant at the juvenile's home and locating the firearm underneath the juvenile's pillow.  The Commonwealth introduced the firearm itself in evidence.  The detective then was presented with still images from a music video recording and, over the juvenile's objection, testified that the images depicted a Lawrence-area rapper known to the detective, holding a firearm "identical" to the firearm in evidence.  The detective used the rapper's stage name but did not identify the rapper as the juvenile.

      The following morning, the mother was present in court and stated that she would answer the questions put to her.  She then identified the individual depicted in the still images as her son, the juvenile; described having called the police because she was concerned about her son's possession of a firearm; and, when asked if she had seen her son with a firearm, responded that the firearm was "always in the room."

      The jury returned verdicts finding the juvenile delinquent on all charges and, after a separate trial, to be a youthful offender in connection with the large capacity feeding device charge.  On the youthful offender adjudication, the judge sentenced the juvenile to from six to seven years in State prison, with 590 days of credit for the time he spent in the custody of the Department of Youth Services (DYS) while awaiting disposition.  In addition to bringing the instant appeal, the juvenile appealed from his prison sentence to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.  The Appellate Division modified the sentence to from four to eight years, with 590 days again deemed served.

      2.  Discussion.  a.  Parent-child witness disqualification.  We begin with the juvenile's claim that the judge erred by ruling that the parent-child witness disqualification statute did not apply at his trial because he was then no longer a minor.

      "We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo."  Commonwealth v. Morris, 492 Mass. 498, 502-503 (2023), quoting Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325, 331 (2021).  "A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result."  Commonwealth v. Vigiani, 488 Mass. 34, 36 (2021), quoting Rahim v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 486 Mass. 544, 547 (2020).  "Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent."  Commonwealth v. Perez Narvaez, 490 Mass. 807, 809 (2022), quoting Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 490 Mass. 398, 405 (2022).  "However, '[w]here there is doubt or ambiguity about the meaning of a statutory provision, the court may turn to extrinsic sources to determine legislative purpose and intent.'"  Perez Narvaez, supra, quoting Cavanagh, supra.

      The statutory provision at issue here is included among other testimonial disqualifications and privileges in G. L. c. 233, § 20.  These "are exceptions to the general duty imposed on all people to testify" (citation omitted).  Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. 590, 594 (2000).  They contravene "the fundamental principle that 'the public . . . has a right to every [person's] evidence,'" id., quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950), and they "diminish the evidence before the court," Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 359 (1983), cert. denied sub nom. Keefe v. Massachusetts, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984).  We therefore construe these disqualifications and privileges narrowly.  Vigiani, 488 Mass. at 38, citing Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 443 Mass. 20, 23-24 (2004).

      The language of § 20, Fourth, is conclusively clear and unambiguous as to the question before us.  The provision consists of three clauses, the first delineating the scope of the parent-child disqualification, the second defining the term "parent," and the third addressing the category of cases involving a family household victim, which otherwise are excluded from the scope of the disqualification:

"[(1)] A parent shall not testify against the parent's minor child and a minor child shall not testify against the child's parent in a proceeding before an inquest, grand jury, trial of an indictment or complaint or any other criminal, delinquency or youthful offender proceeding in which the victim in the proceeding is not a family member and does not reside in the family household; [(2)] provided, however, that for the purposes of this clause, 'parent' shall mean the biological or adoptive parent, stepparent, legal guardian or other person who has the right to act in loco parentis for the child; [(3)] provided further, that in a case in which the victim is a family member and resides in the family household, the parent shall not testify as to any communication with the minor child that was for the purpose of seeking advice regarding the child's legal rights."

G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth.  The statute thus provides that, in cases not involving a family household victim, "[a] parent shall not testify against the parent's minor child" in certain proceedings, including "delinquency or youthful offender proceeding[s]."  Id.  Although § 20, Fourth, does not itself define "minor," the General Laws elsewhere provide that, in construing statutes, "'[m]inor' shall mean any person under eighteen years of age" unless -- as no one contends is true here -- "a contrary intention clearly appears."  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-eighth.  Accordingly, under § 20, Fourth, in the specified proceedings not involving a family household victim, a parent "shall not testify against" the parent's child under the age of eighteen.  We therefore agree with the judge that, under the statute's plain terms, this witness disqualification does not apply at a proceeding where a parent's child is no longer under the age of eighteen.  "To conclude otherwise would improperly extend the statute's application," Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 443 Mass. at 24, by excluding testimony against a child who is not, as the statute requires, a "parent's minor child," G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth.

      Resisting this conclusion, the juvenile first argues that the statute is ambiguous regarding the moment with respect to which the child's status as a minor should be assessed.  He contends that the fact that the disqualification also applies to other stages of the proceeding, including "before an inquest[ or] grand jury," suggests that the Legislature intended the disqualification to apply throughout the entirety of Juvenile Court proceedings, regardless of whether the juvenile reaches the age of majority.  Such a construction would comport, he notes, with the Juvenile Court's continuing jurisdiction over pending cases under G. L. c. 119, § 72, even after a juvenile reaches age eighteen.  And he further contends that the final clause of § 20, Fourth -- stating that, even with respect to cases involving a family household victim, where the disqualification generally does not apply, "the parent shall not testify as to any communication with the minor child that was for the purpose of seeking advice regarding the child's legal rights" -- shows that the disqualification is intended to provide lasting protection to the substance of a minor child's communications.

      We discern no such ambiguity in the statute.  The fact that the Legislature specified an array of proceedings in which the disqualification would apply does not render ambiguous the scope of the disqualification itself, which the Legislature limited to testimony against a "minor" child.  Indeed, in specifying the proceedings in which the disqualification would apply, the Legislature could have, but did not, provide that the disqualification would apply to all testimony by a parent against a child in Juvenile Court proceedings,[3] or all testimony against the parent's child in proceedings concerning offenses allegedly committed by the child as a minor.  Instead, the witness disqualification hinges on the child's age.

      Nor does the statute's final clause create an ambiguity.  The Legislature chose not to extend the parent-child witness disqualification to cases involving family household victims, evidently concluding that doing so would too greatly "diminish the evidence before the court" in such cases.  Three Juveniles, 390 Mass. at 359.  Yet, consistent with this court's previous observation that compelling a parent to testify over a child's objection may in certain circumstances "raise serious issues regarding the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to counsel," Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. at 599 n.15, the Legislature did exclude, in family household victim cases, testimony "as to any communication with the minor child that was for the purpose of seeking advice regarding the child's legal rights," G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth.[4]  This choice by the Legislature to protect certain communications otherwise falling within an exception to witness disqualification does not create an ambiguity in the disqualification itself.  Rather, it shows that, where the Legislature intends to protect the substance of communications, "it knows how to do so."  Doe v. Board of Registration in Med., 485 Mass. 554, 562 (2020), quoting Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 481 Mass. 529, 536 (2019).  See also Vigiani, 488 Mass. at 41, quoting Simmons v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Boston Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 448 Mass. 57, 65 (2006) ("where the Legislature has employed specific language in one portion of a statute, but not in another, the language will not be implied where it is absent").  For cases not involving a family household victim, instead of enacting a privilege protecting some or all of a minor child's communications, the Legislature created a witness disqualification, limited to a parent's testimony "against the parent's minor child."  G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth.

      And we do not agree with the juvenile's further contentions that we should not accept the statute's plain meaning because doing so would frustrate the Legislature's purpose or produce illogical results.  He argues that this interpretation of the statute "disincentivizes parents from intervening and offering guidance when their minor child misbehaves" and "deters parents from appropriately guiding their court-involved children through the juvenile court system"; creates an incentive for the Commonwealth to delay indictment or trial past a child's eighteenth birthday to secure a parent's testimony; and leads to an incongruity because a parent may be disqualified from testifying at an earlier stage of a case before being required to testify once the child is no longer a minor, a turning point the juvenile characterizes as "an arbitrary criterion."  In a similar vein, the dissent observes that a parent's testimony against a child, or even the possibility of such testimony, may fray familial bonds at a time when such bonds may be especially important, including for children who have reached the age of eighteen.

      We acknowledge that the "well-recognized goal of protecting the parent-child relationship," Vigiani, 488 Mass. at 41, would be furthered to a greater extent by the interpretation urged by the juvenile and the dissent, and that the prospect of a parent testifying against the parent's own child remains a wrenching one even after the child reaches the age of eighteen.  But "the decision whether to create [a] privilege necessarily depends on balancing vital, yet competing, social policies," including "the interest in the ascertainment of truth and the just resolution of cases."  Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. at 597-598.  The Legislature engaged in such balancing when it last amended the statute in 2018, see St. 2018, c. 69, § 111, broadening it from an earlier form that had contained no disqualification whatsoever of a parent's testimony against a minor child and instead had disqualified only "[a]n unemancipated, minor child, living with a parent" from testifying against the parent, G. L. c. 233, § 20, as amended through St. 1986, c. 145.  While the dissent observes that nothing in the extrinsic legislative history of the 2018 amendment demonstrates that the Legislature considered the specific question before us today, the terms of an unambiguous statute are conclusive evidence of the Legislature's intent, see Perez Narvaez, 490 Mass. at 809 -- here, an intent to limit the disqualification's scope to testimony against a parent's "minor" child.  And, given the privileges and obligations in our society that turn on reaching the age of majority,[5] as well as the need for "line drawing" in defining a testimonial privilege, see Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, supra at 598, the Legislature's choice to end the disqualification when a child reaches the age of eighteen is not arbitrary.

      The judge thus did not err in concluding that, because the juvenile was no longer a "minor child," the parent-child disqualification in G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth, did not disqualify the juvenile's mother from testifying at his trial.

      b.  Evidentiary objections.  The juvenile challenges the admission in evidence of four portions of the testimony of the detective who spoke with the juvenile's mother and was present at the search that revealed the firearm.  We review a judge's evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion, "'a clear error of judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (citation omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  Because the juvenile objected to the detective's testimony in each challenged respect, we review any error for prejudice.  See Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass. 455, 475-476 (2022).  "An error is not prejudicial only if the Commonwealth can show with fair assurance . . . that the judgment was not substantially swayed by it."  Id. at 476, quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 484 Mass. 634, 647 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1519 (2021).

      i.  Lay opinion testimony.  The juvenile argues that the judge erred by admitting the detective's identification of a person appearing in two still images as a rapper known to the detective and the detective's opinion that a firearm depicted in the images was "identical" to the firearm found with the juvenile and entered in evidence.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that any error in admitting the identification of the rapper was not prejudicial, and that, while the judge erred in allowing in evidence the detective's opinion that the firearms were "identical," that error also was not prejudicial.

      "A lay opinion . . . is admissible only where it is '(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness; (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.'"  Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 541 (2013), quoting Mass. G. Evid. § 701 (2013).  "Making a determination of the identity of a person from a photograph or video image is an expression of an opinion."  Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 429 (2019).  "A lay witness is permitted to identify an individual depicted in a video recording or photograph if that testimony would assist the jurors in making their own independent identification."  Id., citing Mass. G. Evid. § 701 (2018).  "The general rule is that a witness's opinion concerning the identity of a person depicted in a . . . photograph is admissible if there is some basis for concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly identify the [person] from the photograph than is the jury."  Pina, supra at 429-430, quoting Commonwealth v. Vacher, 469 Mass. 425, 441 (2014).  "Put another way, such testimony is admissible . . . when the witness possesses sufficient relevant familiarity with the [person] that the jury cannot also possess" (citation omitted).  Pina, supra at 430.

      We discern no prejudicial error in the judge's decision to admit the testimony that the individual in the images was a Lawrence-area rapper known to the detective.  The detective testified that he was an "avid rap follower" and was particularly familiar with music produced by youths in Lawrence.  He further testified that he had seen "a music video from an individual" with a particular stage name, and that he would recognize a still image from that music video.  Only after establishing this foundation did the Commonwealth show the detective two still images from a music video and elicit testimony that the images depicted "a rapper that goes by" the particular stage name.  The detective's testimony regarding his familiarity with youth rappers in Lawrence and with the music video from which the still images were taken both authenticated the images and informed the jury of the Lawrence-area origin of the images.  See Pina, 481 Mass. at 429-430.  While the juvenile argues that this testimony nevertheless lacked relevance to the case because the detective was not permitted himself to identify the juvenile in the images, no prejudice resulted from any error in admitting the testimony, because the juvenile's mother later identified the juvenile in the same images.

      We next consider the detective's testimony regarding the firearm.  After identifying the individual in the still images as a Lawrence-area rapper with whom he was familiar, the detective went on to state that "[h]e's holding a firearm . . . [w]hich is identical to the firearm" admitted in evidence.  The judge erred in allowing this testimony over the juvenile's objection.  Lay witness identifications of an object, like lay witness opinions generally, are admissible only if the lay witness's testimony will assist the jury in making their own identification of the object.  See Grier, 490 Mass. at 476; Commonwealth v. Thomas, 476 Mass. 451, 465-466 (2017) (no abuse of discretion in suppressing witness's identification of firearm where "her description of the firearm provided no detail that would suggest that she could identify anything more than its type").  In summarily asserting that the firearms were "identical," the detective did not impart the kind of detailed information based on training and experience with firearms that could assist a jury in its own comparison between a firearm depicted in a still image and a firearm admitted in evidence.  This lay opinion testimony therefore should not have been admitted.  See Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 476 (2019), quoting United States v. Vázquez-Rivera, 665 F.3d 351, 361 (1st Cir. 2011) (testimony identifying defendant in video based on evidence available to jury "usurped the jury's role instead of being helpful to it").

      The error does not warrant reversal in the circumstances of this case, however.  The jury were capable of independently comparing the images with the firearm in evidence, and, accordingly, the prosecutor's closing argument invited the jury to make their own comparison and did not refer to the detective's improper assertion that the firearms were identical.  And the jury were unlikely to be "substantially swayed" by the detective's assertion in the context of the other evidence in the case (citation omitted).  Grier, 490 Mass. at 476.  That evidence included testimony that the firearm was found in a bedroom under a pillow on which the juvenile was resting his head; that the juvenile's mother had called the police because she was concerned about the juvenile's possession of a firearm and disclosed where the firearm could be found; and that, in the juvenile's mother's words, the firearm was "always in the room."  We therefore discern no prejudice from the error.[6]

      ii.  Hearsay to establish state of police knowledge.  The juvenile also challenges two statements made by the detective when testifying about the search of the juvenile's home, contending that each should have been excluded for lack of foundation and as inadmissible hearsay.  First, after testifying that he had executed a search warrant to look for a firearm and being asked about the individual targeted by the warrant, the detective testified, "It was a firearm that was allegedly in [the] possession of [the juvenile]."  The juvenile contends that, because the Commonwealth did not establish a foundation for the statement based in the detective's personal knowledge, it was "backdoor hearsay" repeating the juvenile's mother's out-of-court statements to the detective.  Second, the detective testified that, after the juvenile's mother admitted the officers to the residence, she "directed [the officers] to [the juvenile's] bedroom."  The juvenile argues that this statement, too, was admitted improperly without foundation and conveyed an implicit statement from the mother that the bedroom was the juvenile's -- an important piece of evidence, the juvenile contends, because the juvenile lived in the home with four siblings and the Commonwealth presented no other evidence that linked the bedroom to the juvenile, such as identification or other belongings in the bedroom.  We agree with the juvenile that these two statements by the detective exceeded the bounds of hearsay admissible to show the state of police knowledge, but we discern no prejudice to the juvenile from the errors.

      "We have permitted the use of carefully circumscribed extrajudicial statements in criminal trials to explain the state of police knowledge."  Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 376 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Rosario, 430 Mass. 505, 508 (1999).  "[A]n arresting or investigating officer should not be put in the false position of seeming just to have happened upon the scene; he should be allowed some explanation of his presence and conduct."  Sullivan, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Cohen, 412 Mass. 375, 393 (1992).  "Hearsay testimony to explain the reasons for police action, however, carries a high probability of misuse, because a witness may relate historical aspects of the case, replete with hearsay statements in the form of complaints and reports, even when not necessary to show state of police knowledge" (quotations omitted).  Sullivan, supra, quoting Rosario, supra at 509.  Such testimony, therefore, "is admissible only if the testimony is based on the police officer's own knowledge, and is limited to the facts required to establish the officer's state of knowledge, and the police action or state of police knowledge is relevant to an issue in the case."  Sullivan, supra.

      We agree with the juvenile that, with respect to both challenged statements, the detective's testimony was admitted improperly, because the hearsay was not "limited to the facts required to establish the officer's state of knowledge."  Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 376.  While it was proper for the detective to give some explanation of how he came to be present in the juvenile's home and observe the firearm there, such an explanation did not require the detective's testimony that someone had alleged that the juvenile possessed a firearm, nor that the juvenile's mother had "directed" police to "[the juvenile's] bedroom," in which the firearm subsequently was found.  See Rosario, 430 Mass. at 509-510.  It would have sufficed to explain that he was present at the juvenile's home to execute a search warrant and searched the home consistent with the warrant.

      We do not agree, however, that the improper admission of this hearsay prejudiced the juvenile in the circumstances of this case.  With respect to the detective's testimony repeating an allegation from an unnamed person that the juvenile possessed a firearm, any prejudice from that statement was obviated once the mother testified based on her own personal knowledge that she had contacted the police because she was concerned about the juvenile's possession of a firearm.  The substance of the out-of-court allegation was therefore "independently before the jury."  Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 377.  Similarly, the detective's testimony to the effect that the mother had directed police to the juvenile's room "likely had only a slight effect on the jury," if any.  Grier, 490 Mass. at 478.  The mother herself testified that the firearm was "always in the room," and police found the firearm under a pillow on which the juvenile was resting his head.  Thus, while improper, admission of this hearsay embedded in the detective's testimony does not amount to prejudicial error here.

      c.  Sentencing.  The juvenile also challenges his sentence on a number of grounds.  "Our review is limited to whether the juvenile's sentence was unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful, and such questions of law are subject to de novo review."  Commonwealth v. Yasir Y., 494 Mass. 432, 437 (2024).  We discern no basis for disturbing the sentence.

      First, the juvenile requests a remand to the Juvenile Court for resentencing on the ground that the judge failed to make written findings as required by G. L. c. 119, § 58 (§ 58).  Section 58 provides that a judge may sentence a juvenile adjudicated on a youthful offender indictment to "a sentence provided by law," but requires that the judge "shall make a written finding, stating . . . reasons therefor, that the present and long-term public safety would be best protected by" such a sentence.  While we agree with the juvenile that the judge erred in failing to issue written findings, that error did not prejudice the juvenile because the judge gave a detailed explanation of the reasons for the juvenile's sentence on the record at his sentencing.  We therefore decline to remand the case for resentencing on this basis.  Cf. Fay v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 498, 504-505 (1980) (due process satisfied by extensive oral findings).[7]

      Second, the juvenile argues that § 58's requirement that a judge consider whether an adult sentence for a youthful offender would "best protect[]" the "present and long-term public safety" is unconstitutionally vague.  "A law is void for vagueness if persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application . . . or if it subjects people to an unascertainable standard."  Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 479 Mass. 527, 538, cert. denied, 586 U.S. 876 (2018), quoting Chief of Police of Worcester v. Holden, 470 Mass. 845, 854 (2015).  "[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand."  Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 522 (1986), quoting United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975).  And, "even when the outer boundaries of a law are imprecise, such imprecision does not permit a facial attack on the entire law by one whose conduct falls squarely within the hard core of the [law's] proscriptions, particularly if greater specificity in the law is impractical" (quotations and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 734 (1977).

      We long have recognized that, while G. L. c. 119, § 53, requires that juveniles before the Juvenile Court must "as far as practicable . . . be treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance," § 58 reflects "the Legislature's obvious intent to increase the penalties for children who offend firearms laws," Commonwealth v. Connor C., 432 Mass. 635, 645 (2000).  The Legislature has determined that "terms of incarceration, sometimes lengthy, be served in State prisons by some children found to imperil the public safety."  Id. at 642.  And § 58 mandates that, at the required hearing "to determine the sentence by which the present and long-term public safety would be best protected," a judge "shall consider" a list of factors, including, among others, "the nature, circumstances and seriousness of the offense"; "the youthful offender's court and delinquency records"; "the success or lack of success of any past treatment or delinquency dispositions regarding the youthful offender"; "and the likelihood of avoiding future criminal conduct."  G. L. c. 119, § 58, fourth par.

      Here, in light of the judge's findings at the juvenile's sentencing, we need not explore any imprecision in the "outer boundaries" of the standard under § 58, see Orlando, 371 Mass. at 734, because the judge's findings place the juvenile's sentence well within the bounds of the statute's terms requiring the judge to consider whether an adult sentence would best protect present and long-term public safety.  The judge found that the juvenile, by then age nineteen, had been committed to DYS custody on nine prior occasions.  The judge reviewed twenty-seven incident reports involving the juvenile, including at least three instances of violence against other DYS residents and at least three instances of escape from DYS custody.  On the basis of the juvenile's record, the judge found that the juvenile had "failed to comply with any service that has been provided to him," and that he was "not appropriate for a subsequent recommitment to [DYS]."  In these circumstances, we conclude that the juvenile's vagueness challenge fails, because he falls squarely within the category of offenders for whom a judge may conclude that an adult sentence would "best protect[]" the "present and long-term public safety," G. L. c. 119, § 58, fourth par.  See Orlando, supra.

      Third, and finally, the juvenile argues that his sentence was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.  "To reach the level of cruel and unusual, the punishment must be so disproportionate to the crime that it 'shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.'"  Commonwealth v. Sharma, 488 Mass. 85, 89 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. LaPlante, 482 Mass. 399, 403 (2019).  "Because the Legislature has broad discretion in prescribing penalties for criminal offenses, the [juvenile] has the burden of proving disproportionality."  Sharma, supra, citing Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 497 (1981).  To decide whether the juvenile has met this burden, this court has adopted a "tripartite analysis" comprising "(1) an inquiry into the nature of the offense and the offender in light of the degree of harm to society, (2) a comparison between the sentence imposed here and punishments prescribed for the commission of more serious crimes in the Commonwealth, and (3) a comparison of the challenged penalty with the penalties prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions" (quotations and citations omitted).  Sharma, supra.  For juveniles, "this analysis is 'supplemented with the greater weight given to a juvenile defendant's age.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 684 (2017).

      The juvenile attempts to carry his burden of proving disproportionality mainly by emphasizing the length of his sentence compared to the sentences of others for the same offense in Massachusetts.  He observes that his sentence of from four to eight years approaches the ten-year maximum sentence under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m); that his sentence exceeded the upper range of two to three years under the adult Advisory Sentencing Guidelines updated in 2019 by the Massachusetts Sentencing Commission; and that it exceeded by a similar amount the median lower and upper range sentences imposed on adults convicted under the statute in the Superior Court in 2018 according to data compiled by the Massachusetts Sentencing Commission.  Citing Commonwealth v. Mattis, 493 Mass. 216, 237 (2024), he compares the upper end of his sentence with the fifteen years a twenty year old convicted of murder prior to August 2, 2012, must serve before parole eligibility and notes that State prison sentences of any length are relatively rare for juveniles adjudicated as youthful offenders.  Finally, he asserts in a single sentence that his sentence also was disproportionate because of his age and record as well as the nature of the offense, nonviolent gun possession at his home.

      The juvenile has not carried his burden of showing that his sentence of from four to eight years, with credit for 590 days spent in DYS custody, is constitutionally disproportionate.  Possession of a large capacity feeding device is a serious offense for which the Legislature has prescribed mandatory minimum sentences, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m), and here police found the extended magazine loaded with thirty rounds of ammunition and attached to a firearm with a chambered round.  The juvenile does not identify any error in the judge's statement of reasons detailing the juvenile's lengthy prior record, discussed supra.  The juvenile's comparisons to the Advisory Sentencing Guidelines and average sentences imposed do not account for his particular characteristics; his sentence permits the possibility of parole far sooner than any juvenile's sentence for murder in the first degree, the only other offense he identifies by way of comparison; and he has not directed this court to any basis for concluding that his sentence diverges from sentences for analogous offenses in other jurisdictions.  Even considering the juvenile's age at the time of the offense, we conclude that the sentence is not "so disproportionate to the crime that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity" in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Commonwealth v. Concepcion, 487 Mass. 77, 86, cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 408 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. LaPlante, 482 Mass. at 403.

      3.  Conclusion.  We hold that the parent-child witness disqualification applicable in proceedings "in which the victim . . . is not a family member and does not reside in the family household" under G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth, does not disqualify a parent from testifying against a child when that child is not a minor at the time of the testimony.  The judge therefore did not err in admitting the testimony of the juvenile's mother.  Although the judge did err in admitting a detective's lay opinion that images of a firearm were "identical" to the firearm admitted in evidence and hearsay that was not required to establish the state of the officer's knowledge during the search that yielded the firearm, these errors did not prejudice the juvenile.  And although the judge erred by failing to issue written findings pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 58, that error also did not prejudice the juvenile.  We otherwise discern no error.  Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile's delinquency and youthful offender adjudications and decline to vacate his sentence.

So ordered.

      KAFKER, J. (dissenting, with whom Budd, C.J., and Wendlandt, J., join).  I respectfully dissent.  The Legislature created the parent-child disqualification to protect the familial bond when minor children are accused of criminal activity.  The Legislature concluded that such children need guidance and assistance from their parents and recognized that the parent-child bond is under particular stress when a child finds himself in criminal trouble.  The Legislature thus enacted G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth (§ 20, Fourth), prohibiting parents from testifying against their children.

      The difficult question presented in this case is whether, after a child turns eighteen, a parent may be required to testify against her child -- at great cost to the parent-child bond -- concerning conduct and conversations that occurred when the child was still a minor.  Although the charged criminal activity in such cases takes place before the child turns eighteen, and the resulting parental assistance and guidance at issue is provided before the child turns eighteen, and is thus the very assistance and guidance the Legislature intended to encourage and protect, the court nonetheless concludes that such testimony may be required because the child has since turned eighteen and is no longer a "minor child" at the time of the parent's testimony.  The court so concludes despite recognizing that the potential for such testimony will surely put heavy pressure on the parent-child bond at the moment the child is most in need of parental support and guidance.  I do not believe that is what the Legislature intended in § 20, Fourth.

      "Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is 'to effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it.'"  Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 118 (2018), quoting Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014).  "To that end, we begin with the statutory language. . . .  We also consider the 'cause of [the statute's] enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.'"  Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass 789, 793 (2019), quoting Adoption of Daisy, 460 Mass. 72, 76-77 (2011).  Indeed, "[i]t is a well-established canon of statutory construction that a strictly literal reading of a statute should not be adopted if the result will be to thwart or hamper the accomplishment of the statute's obvious purpose, and if another construction which would avoid this undesirable result is possible" (citation omitted).  Reade v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 472 Mass. 573, 578 (2015), cert. denied, 578 U.S. 946 (2016).  When I consider the statutory language, the cause of the enactment, the mischief to be remedied, and the main object to be accomplished, I conclude that the disqualification does not vanish the moment the child turns eighteen.

      The first clause of § 20, Fourth, provides that "[a] parent shall not testify against the parent's minor child . . . in a proceeding before an inquest, grand jury, trial of an indictment or complaint or any other criminal, delinquency or youthful offender proceeding in which the victim in the proceeding is not a family member and does not reside in the family household."  G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth.  So long as the child is a minor at the time of the alleged criminal activity and at the time of the proceeding, the statute is simple to apply:  the parent "shall not testify against the parent's minor child."  If the child turns eighteen at some point before or during the proceedings, however, the statute becomes markedly less clear.[1]  Under the first clause, the disqualification could be read to apply to any proceeding that occurs before the child turns eighteen, but not to any proceeding that occurs after the child turns eighteen, even within the same case.  The court adopts this reading even though both the alleged criminal conduct and any parental assistance and guidance provided in response, the sanctity of which the Legislature sought to protect, take place when the child is a minor before the child turns eighteen.  That the disqualification would apply to earlier but not later proceedings in the same case is irreconcilable with the Legislature's desire to protect the parent-child relationship and to foster parental guidance and advice, especially at a critical juncture of the minor child's life.  The disqualification would be dependent upon court schedules, backlogs, other delays unrelated to the purpose of the privilege itself, or appellate remands or reversals.[2]

      The problem with the court's interpretation of the first clause of § 20, Fourth, becomes even more pronounced when we consider it in light of the final clause of § 20, Fourth, which provides that "in a case in which the victim is a family member and resides in the family household, the parent shall not testify as to any communication with the minor child that was for the purpose of seeking advice regarding the child's legal rights."  G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth.  Again, the question is raised:  If the conversation concerning the child's legal rights took place when the child was under eighteen, but the child is now over eighteen, does the disqualification apply?  It depends on whether we determine the child's minority at the time of the confidential conversation or at the time of the proceeding at which the parent would testify about the conversation.  If the disqualification does apply -- that is, if we consider only whether the child was a minor at the time of the conversation at issue -- then communications for the purpose of seeking legal advice may be protected after the child turns eighteen under the final clause but not the first.  This is a peculiar result because the first clause, which applies when the victim is not a family member, otherwise provides much more expansive testimonial protection, not limited to communications about legal rights, or indeed limited to communications at all.  It is by no means apparent that the Legislature intended to protect communications between a parent and a child for the purpose of seeking legal advice when the victim is another family member but not communications for the purpose of seeking legal advice when the victim is not a family member.  The communications took place in both contexts when the child was a minor.  The only difference is the age of the child at the time of the testimony.  The court's interpretation, however, seems to support this illogical result.

      The court, apparently recognizing the difficulty of interpretation on this issue and the ambiguity of the language, declines to resolve it.  Instead, it states:

"Nor does the statute's final clause create an ambiguity.  The Legislature chose not to extend the parent-child witness disqualification to cases involving family household victims, evidently concluding that doing so would too greatly 'diminish the evidence before the court' in such cases.  [Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 359 (1983), cert. denied sub nom. Keefe v. Massachusetts, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984)].  Yet, consistent with this court's previous observation that compelling a parent to testify over a child's objection may in certain circumstances 'raise serious issues regarding the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to counsel,' Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, [430 Mass. 590, 599 n.15 (2000)], the Legislature did exclude, in family household victim cases, testimony 'as to any communication with the minor child that was for the purpose of seeking advice regarding the child's legal rights,' G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth."

Ante at    .

      The court's reasoning cannot withstand scrutiny.  Even if we assume arguendo that the Legislature was aware of and intended to address dicta from our previous decisions, warning of potential constitutional issues that might arise if a parent is forced to testify against a child about legal advice, it does not follow that the Legislature would choose to address those potential constitutional concerns only in the scenario where the victim is a household member, leaving the statute exposed to possible constitutional challenge in the case where the victim is not a household member and the then child is now an adult.  The construction I propose avoids this irrational result, concluding that communications between a parent and a child for the purposes of seeking legal advice are protected when the victim is not a family and household member as well as when the victim is a family and household member, even when the then child is now an adult.

      Indeed, the interpretation I propose respects the over-all structure and purpose of § 20, Fourth, and avoids the problems created by the court's reading.  To summarize, it is apparent from the structure of § 20, Fourth, that the Legislature posited two types of disqualification when it comes to parents testifying against their child.  The first applies to the situation where the victim is not a family member, and the second applies where the victim is a family member.  It is significant, in this regard, that in the latter situation, where the parent may be torn between supporting a child who committed a crime and a child who is a victim, and the testimony regarding what occurred between family members may be critical to the prosecution's case, the disqualification is limited to a parent's testimony regarding communications concerning the child's legal rights.  This encourages a child to seek advice from a parent and for the parent to provide guidance on this narrow but important topic by protecting that communication regardless as to whether the parent's testimony is sought after the child is no longer a minor.  At the same time, the Legislature determined not to protect any other interactions between the parent and the child, presumably because where the victim is herself a family member, the parent may be differently positioned, may have provided support and guidance to the victim, and may be a key witness to the events at issue.

      In the former scenario, where the victim is not a family member, however, the parental bond is not subject to divided loyalty, the parent's testimony is also less likely to be as critical to proving the case against the child, and therefore the disqualification is not so narrowly tailored; it covers all interactions between the child and the parent, including communications regarding legal advice.  It is not at all apparent that the Legislature intended that this more fulsome disqualification would vanish when the child turns eighteen.

      Nonetheless, the court concludes that the text of the first clause, construed narrowly, is "conclusively clear" and bars all testimony against a parent's minor child only when that child is still a minor at the time of testimony.  Ante at    .  In my view, for the reasons discussed above, the statutory text is far less clear than the court contends when read as a whole.  See Commonwealth v. Vigiani, 488 Mass. 34, 36, 40 (2021) ("When construing a statute, [which in this case was the parental disqualification provision,] we look first and foremost to the language of the statute as a whole. . . .  Even clear statutory language is not read in isolation" [quotation and citation omitted]).  Given these ambiguities, I turn to the legislative history for further assistance, particularly in resolving the difficult question of what the Legislature intended to do about testimony by parents regarding their interactions with their children while the children were minors, but whose children have turned eighteen by the time of the proceeding at issue.  See Makis M. v. Commonwealth, 494 Mass. 23, 30 (2024) ("Where the meaning of statutory language is ambiguous, we turn to the legislative history to determine the Legislature's intent").  See also Vigiani, supra at 41 (considering legislative history when interpreting parental disqualification provision).

      Here, the intent of the Legislature is quite informative.  The Legislature specifically recognized that children who commit crimes need the assistance and guidance of their parents and that the parent-child bond must be protected, particularly under these difficult circumstances.  Numerous statements by bill sponsors and legislative leaders emphasize these twin aims in the consideration and passage of the parent-child disqualification.  See DeCosta-Klipa, Should Parents Be Forbidden from Testifying against Their Children?, Boston.com (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2018/04/

24/should-parents-be-forbidden-from-testifying-against-their-children [https://perma.cc/4HMT-2VTY] (Senator Cynthia Creem, long-time proponent of disqualification and sponsor of this legislation, explained that if parent could later testify against child in court, "a child isn't going to be willing to confide in their parent"); Landry, Juvenile Justice Reform in the Criminal Justice Package (June 14, 2018), https://

willbrownsberger.com/juvenile-justice-reform (according to website of Senator Will Brownsberger, Senate's chief negotiator on final criminal justice reform bill, provision was "designed to encourage children to go to their parents when they find themselves in [legal] trouble without fear that what they tell their parents will be used against them" [emphasis added]); Miller, Mass. Legislature Reveals Final Criminal Justice Package, Boston Globe, Mar. 23, 2018 (quoting House majority leader as stating, in reference to amended § 20, Fourth, "You start pitting family members against each other, no matter how dysfunctional the family, I think you've ruined that family forever"); Miller, Bill Would Bar Parents' Testimony Against Their Kids in Nearly All Cases, Boston Globe, Oct. 12, 2017 (statement by chair of Senate Committee on Ways and Means that "[i]f parents can be compelled to testify against a child, this severely limits a parent's ability to help their child" [emphasis added]).  See also Vigiani, 488 Mass. at 41 n.7 (relying on this same legislative history).  Cf. Hearing before Joint Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 16, 2015) https://malegislature.gov/Events/Hearings/Detail/2232 (statement of Sen. Karen Spilka) (regarding similar bill she proposed in 2015-2016 legislative session:  "Children . . . often and should rely on their parents for guidance, help, and access to other resources and a parent's ability to help can be significantly limited if the parents are forced to testify regarding these conversations" [emphasis added]).[3]

      It is clear, then, that the Legislature understood parents to be an indispensable source of support and trust for children who find themselves in trouble, and that such support requires ongoing protection in court.  Preserving the parent-child bond in these circumstances is at the heart of the legislative history.  See Vigiani, 488 Mass. at 41 n.7 ("Legislative history confirms that protecting the parent-child relationship is the purpose the Legislature had in mind when it last amended § 20, Fourth, in 2018").  The importance of that parent-child bond in these circumstances has also been eloquently described by courts as follows: 

"It would be difficult to think of a situation which more strikingly embodies the intimate and confidential relationship which exists among family members than that in which a troubled young person, perhaps beset with remorse and guilt, turns for counsel and guidance to his mother and father.  There is nothing more natural, more consistent with our concept of the parental role, than that a child may rely on his parents for help and advice.  Shall it be said to those parents, 'Listen to your son at the risk of being compelled to testify about his confidences?'"  (Citation omitted.)

People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 715 (N.Y. County Ct. 1979), cited generally in Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. at 595 n.9.

      There is also nothing in the legislative history suggesting that the Legislature concluded that, once the child turns eighteen, such testimony is now permissible and appropriate.  The proceedings concern what the child did while a minor, and the testimony draws on the guidance, assistance, and other activity undertaken by the parent while the child was a minor -- matters of central concern to the Legislature, as explained above.  The disqualification was also designed to protect the parent-child bond, a bond the Legislature considered critical to the child's care and rehabilitation.  See Vigiani, 488 Mass. at 41.  "To read this statute without such cause in mind would disregard the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished by the statute, and would run afoul of the Legislature's intent" (quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Perez Narvaez, 490 Mass. 807, 813-814 (2022).

      The alarming consequences of allowing such testimony once the child turns eighteen are also on stark display in the case at bar.  Worried about one of her sons, the mother proactively called the police to alert them to the presence of a gun in the family home.  She acted to protect her child, whose conduct had become alarming; she tried to guide him, even though it placed her son in legal jeopardy.  When she was called to the stand at her son's trial, she answered some initial questions about her children and admitted that she called the police on the date in question, but refused to testify about her conversation with the police.  In response, the judge held her in contempt and announced he would "hold [her] day-to-day, and bring [her] back every day until [she] compl[ied] with the Court's order."  As a result, the mother was held in contempt and kept in jail overnight.[4]  She was brought into court the next morning in handcuffs and only then agreed to testify, at which point she identified her son in a still image from a music video recording and in still images of a person holding a gun.[5]  When she was asked to identify the person in the video recording, she said doing so was "a tough decision to make" before ultimately identifying her son.  After the mother left the witness stand, she was consoled while crying by a family friend in the audience.  This is precisely the kind of wrenching choice and awful stress on the family bond that the testimonial disqualification was designed to avoid.  See Vigiani, 488 Mass. at 41 (discussing legislative history).  See also Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d at 715 (discussing how requiring such testimony, and holding parent in contempt if parent refuses, may "undermine public trust in our system of justice" [citation omitted]).

      Requiring such testimony, and the severe burden it places on the parent-child bond, also appears to undermine the ultimate rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system.  As we have repeatedly emphasized, "the goal of the juvenile system of justice [is] 'to act in the best interests of children by encouraging and helping them to become law-abiding and productive members of society, and not to label and treat them as criminals.'"  Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 466 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Connor C., 432 Mass. 635, 646 (2000).  As explained above, the Legislature concluded that children need to be able to seek and receive their parents' guidance and support during troubled times, including discussing the details of their misconduct.[6]  If testimony about such interactions can be compelled in court, parents and children will be pitted against each other, further fraying the family bonds necessary to assist children in their rehabilitation.  Those family bonds and children's need for rehabilitative support do not suddenly terminate when the child turns eighteen.  At that point, rehabilitation is often only just beginning.

      Basing the disqualification on the age of the child at the time of the proceeding as opposed to the time of the criminal activity also runs counter to the juvenile justice scheme more broadly, which grants young people the rights of minors for conduct committed as a minor, even if they have since turned eighteen.  See G. L. c. 119, § 72 (a) ("[T]he juvenile court department shall continue to have jurisdiction over children who attain their eighteenth birthday pending final adjudication of their cases . . . or for any other proceeding arising out of their cases. . . .  If a child commits an offense prior to his eighteenth birthday, and is not apprehended until between such child's eighteenth and nineteenth birthday, the court shall deal with such child in the same manner as if he has not attained his eighteenth birthday, and all provisions and rights applicable to a child under [eighteen] shall apply to such child" [emphasis added]).[7]

      In sum, the purpose of the statute is to protect the ability of parents to serve as a source of guidance and support for their children at the moment their children find themselves in trouble with the law and, in so doing, to preserve the parent-child bond, a bond that is critical not only to the care of the child during these times but in the child's ongoing rehabilitation as well.  Protecting these conversations and interactions while the child is under eighteen but then requiring parents to testify regarding such interactions and any associated conduct after the child turns eighteen, thereby pitting the parent against the child, would undermine the fundamental purposes of the disqualification and the rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile justice system.  I discern no such intention when I consider the statutory language as a whole, the legislative history, the mischief to be remedied, and the main objective of the legislation.

      For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

footnotes

[1] We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Citizens for Juvenile Justice.

[2] The juvenile also was charged with carrying a loaded firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), and possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a).  These charges were dismissed prior to trial.

[3] The dissent emphasizes that, under G. L. c. 119, § 72 (a), when a child reaches his eighteenth birthday during Juvenile Court proceedings, "the court shall deal with such child in the same manner as if he has not attained his eighteenth birthday."  This general provision, last amended in 2014, see St. 2014, c. 165, § 153, does not supersede the more specific terms of § 20, Fourth, which, in language first enacted in 2018, see St. 2018, c. 69, § 111, expressly contemplates the disqualification's use in delinquency and youthful offender proceedings but nevertheless limits the disqualification to testimony against a "minor" child.  See Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 Mass. 600, 610, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 968 (2012), quoting Doe v. Attorney Gen. (No. 1), 425 Mass. 210, 215-216 (1997) ("Where two statutory provisions conflict, 'we have stated that the more specific provision, particularly where it has been enacted subsequent to a more general rule, applies over the general rule'").

[4] We need not and do not express a view on the question whether this provision applicable in cases involving a family household victim applies after a child reaches the age of majority.  Nor need we consider the admissibility in cases not involving a family household victim, where the child is no longer a minor at the time of trial, of communications between a parent and minor child for the purpose of seeking advice regarding the child's legal rights, because no such communications are at issue here.

[5] See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 59-61 (1981) (registration for military draft); Sharon v. Newton, 437 Mass. 99, 101 n.4 (2002) (ratification of contracts made when minor); Hershkoff v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Worcester, 366 Mass. 570, 575 (1974) (right to vote).

[6] Thus discerning no prejudice from the admission of the disputed lay opinion testimony regarding the firearm and still images, we need not reach the juvenile's further argument that the judge should have conducted a voir dire examination of the detective prior to admitting the testimony.

[7] For related reasons, we reject the juvenile's argument that the judge abused his discretion by declining to grant a continuance prior to sentencing.  In denying the continuance, the judge noted that this case had been pending for two and one-half years, and that the juvenile had had a sentencing hearing in this same case before the same judge just two months prior; at the earlier sentencing hearing, the juvenile withdrew a tendered plea because the judge, after making detailed oral findings, stated that he would impose a sentence of from five to six years, with credit for 526 days served.  The juvenile contends that a continuance of his sentencing following the jury's verdict was required nonetheless so that he could gather updated DYS records to supplement the 2022 presentence investigation report and Statewide sentencing data.  Given the judge's statement of reasons and the fact that the same judge had held a sentencing hearing in this same case just two months prior, we discern no abuse of discretion in the denial of a continuance.

footnotes for dissenting

[1] In the instant case, the delinquency complaint issued in September of 2021, when the juvenile was seventeen years of age, and the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent in May of 2023.

[2] Time standards dictate that cases should be disposed of within six months for those ending in a bench trial (180 days), or eight months (240 days) for those ending in a jury trial.  See Juvenile Court Standing Order 2-18 (2018).  In fiscal year 2024, 57.7 percent of disposed cases were disposed of within those time periods.  See Executive Office of the Trial Court, Case Flow Metrics Report:  Fiscal Year 2024, at 7 (Oct. 2024).  In fiscal year 2023, 57.2 percent were disposed of within those time periods, and in fiscal year 2022, 57.4 percent.  See Executive Office of the Trial Court, Case Flow Metrics Report:  Fiscal Year 2023, at 7 (Oct. 2023); Executive Office of the Trial Court, Case Flow Metrics Report:  Fiscal Year 2022, at 6 (Oct. 2022).

[3] The court focuses on the fraying of the parent-child bond at the moment of the parent's testimony, which comes at great cost to the parent's relationship with the child.  However, these statements from legislators offer strong evidence that their concern was not just about protecting the parent-child bond from the burden of testimony –- it was about protecting the sanctity of that bond when the child is vulnerable and in criminal trouble and seeks parental guidance, all of which occur when the child is under eighteen.  As demonstrated by the legislative history quoted above, the Legislature also specifically recognized that assistance while the minor was in trouble would be negatively affected by requiring later testimony about such assistance.

[4] The single mother was thereby separated from her five children, notwithstanding arguments by her counsel that she had no criminal record and presented no risk to public safety.

[5] The mother was shaken by the experience and asked the judge the next morning whether the fact that she had been fingerprinted at the jail would have an impact on her job-hunting prospects.

[6] The Legislature has provided for parental involvement at every stage of the juvenile justice process.  For example, when children are summoned before the court, "a summons shall be issued to at least one of its parents."  G. L. c. 119, § 55.  And children are not permitted to waive their rights without participation of a parent or parental figure.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 119, § 55A (waiver of jury trial "shall not be received unless the child is represented by counsel or has filed, through his parent or guardian, a written waiver of counsel"); Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. at 599 n.15, citing Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 134–135 (1983) ("juvenile entitled to 'meaningful consultation' with interested adult before waiver of rights is effective").  The statutory scheme governing juvenile proceedings thereby recognizes that children need to consult with parents and parental figures to navigate the justice system –- indeed, the statutory scheme insists upon it.  See Farber, Do You Swear to Tell the Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth against Your Child?, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 551, 569 (Winter 2010) ("Parents are the conduits through which professionals will be retained to assist their child.  Accurate and truthful information from the child better equips the parents to seek the appropriate services. . . .  In conferring with professionals such as lawyers, doctors, and therapists, children are not particularly good self-reporters -- they tend to omit details and their descriptions lack detail [particularly legally relevant information]").

[7] If a minor child commits an offense but is not apprehended until he is nineteen years old or above, the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction to hold a "transfer hearing," in which "a Juvenile Court judge . . . determine[s] whether probable cause exist[s] and, if so, whether the public interest would be served best by prosecuting the individual as an adult in the District Court, or by discharging the individual."  Ulla U. v. Commonwealth, 485 Mass. 219, 220 (2020), citing G. L. c. 119, § 72A; Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 473 Mass. 164, 172 (2015); Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 646 & n.11 (2013).