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SJC-12154
COMMONWEALTH vs. KERON PIERRE.
Suffolk. May 4, 2020. - December 15, 2020.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1
Homicide. Evidence, Prior misconduct, Testimony before grand jury, Prior inconsistent statement, Impeachment of credibility, Cross-examination, Consciousness of guilt. Witness, Impeachment. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of counsel, Cross-examination by prosecutor.
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on January 12, 2010.
The cases were tried before Jeffrey A. Locke, J.
Alan J. Black for the defendant. Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
GAZIANO, J. On March 29, 2009, Chantal Palmer, Shakora
Gaines, Anthony Peoples and Sharon Headley were sitting in a
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on this case prior to his death. Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her retirement. 2
Nissan vehicle outside an after-hours establishment in Boston
when five men, at least three of whom --the defendant, Devon
Boswell, and Nigel Nichols -- were armed, walked around the
corner of the building and in front of the vehicle. They
approached the driver's side and attempted to converse with the
women. The women did not respond. The defendant asked the
driver for her telephone number. When she said she would not
provide it, he pushed aside another of the men and fired nine
rounds into the vehicle, killing Palmer, Gaines, and Peoples.
Headley, who had been in the front passenger seat, ducked when
the shooting started and later was able to jump from the vehicle
and run behind a parked van where she remained until the men had
gone.
The defendant was indicted on three counts of murder in the
first degree, one count of armed assault with intent to murder,
and unlawful possession of a firearm. He was tried and
convicted of all charges. In this direct appeal, the defendant
claims prejudicial error in the admission of prior bad act
evidence and the substantive use of prior inconsistent grand
jury testimony by one trial witness. The defendant contends as
well that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance
when his trial counsel declined to pursue the use of certain
impeachment evidence against one witness after his initial
objection. In addition, the defendant argues that the 3
prosecutor's impermissible cross-examination of the defendant as
to why he had not returned to the United States to defend
himself from suspicion of having been the shooter violated his
rights under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the
Commonwealth to him. The defendant also asks us to exercise our
extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the
verdict or to grant him a new trial. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the defendant's convictions and decline to
exercise our authority to grant extraordinary relief.
1. Background. We summarize the facts presented to the
jury in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, leaving
particular facts for later discussion as necessary to address
specific arguments.
a. Commonwealth's case. Two witnesses -- Headley, who had
been in the Nissan but escaped uninjured, and Boswell,2 who had
known the defendant for about one year and who formed part of
2 Boswell testified pursuant to a cooperation agreement. In exchange for his testimony, the Commonwealth agreed to dismiss indictments charging Boswell with a nonfatal shooting in Boston that took place in March 2010, a year after the events at issue here.
In addition, Boswell entered into an immunity agreement with Rhode Island authorities to testify in a double homicide. In that case, Nichols was charged with shooting into an occupied vehicle occupied by three people, killing two of them. Rhode Island authorities granted Boswell immunity from prosecution for another nonfatal shooting. 4
the group of five at the victims' vehicle -- gave detailed and
comprehensive testimony about the shooting and its immediate
aftermath. Other partygoers described parts of the events in
less detail but consistent with these descriptions.
The events took place outside an unofficial after-hours
establishment run by a husband and wife from their home in the
Dorchester section of Boston. They hosted parties on Friday and
Saturday evenings in the basement of their home, where they also
sold take-out food. The parties generally continued until about
3 A.M. Guests parked where they could find space in the
residential neighborhood.
In the early morning hours of March 29, 2009, two groups of
guests converged at the house. The first group, which included
Gaines, Palmer, Peoples, Headley, and Terrence Johnson, arrived
in a white Nissan driven by Palmer. The three women and Peoples
had been at a club in Boston where they encountered Johnson, a
close friend of Peoples, and all five decided to go to the
after-hours party. Palmer parked around the corner from the
house, and the occupants of the Nissan walked to the house and
went into the basement. The second group, consisting of the
defendant and two of his friends, Devon Boswell and Nigel
Nichols, arrived at some point after having driven from a club
in Providence. Boswell drove his own vehicle, while Nichols and
the defendant arrived in Nichols's vehicle. The two groups did 5
not interact with each other while they were in the house;
indeed, none of the people in the first group had ever met the
defendant before the night of the shooting.
Gaines, Palmer, Peoples, and Headley left the party
sometime around 4 A.M. As they were getting ready to leave,
they realized that Johnson was no longer with them. They walked
to the Nissan, and Palmer then drove to the front of the house
and stopped in the middle of the street to wait for Johnson.
Headley was in the front passenger's seat, Peoples was in the
rear passenger's seat behind Palmer, and Gaines was seated
behind Headley; Peoples intended to telephone Johnson to come
meet them.
As they pulled up in front of the house, a group of at
least five men, including the defendant, Boswell, and Nichols,
came around the corner from the party and approached the
driver's side of the white Nissan; the defendant was wearing a
sleeveless white T-shirt, and Boswell was wearing a gray
"hoodie." The men, at least three of whom were carrying
firearms (the defendant, Boswell, and Nichols), attempted to
talk to the women. Boswell, who was standing between the front
and rear doors on the driver's side, put his hands on the
Nissan. The defendant was close to and slightly behind Boswell.
The group of men attempted to start a conversation with the
women by asking, "What's good ladies?" or "What's good girls?" 6
The women did not respond. From the rear seat, Peoples told the
men, "They're good, they're straight." The defendant asked
Palmer for her telephone number, but she declined to provide it.
Peoples then asked the men, "Can you please back up off the
car?" When they did not move, he said, "Back the fuck off the
car."
The defendant responded by pushing Boswell out of the way
and saying to Peoples, "What, n--? We're strapped." He then
produced a handgun and pointed it at Peoples for three or four
seconds, while Peoples looked at him. When Peoples turned his
head away, the defendant shot him, then turned the weapon and
fired at Palmer in the front seat. The defendant leaned in and
continued firing, while Boswell ran to his vehicle as the
defendant continued shooting.
When she heard the first shot, Headley ducked; from her
vantage point in the front passenger's seat, she had been able
to see only the shooter's torso. She told police that the
shooter had been wearing a white T-shirt and added that she
could see his arms so the shirt was sleeveless. After the shots
ended, Headley was able to jump out of the vehicle and run for
cover (a parked van), where she stayed a few minutes before
returning to the after-party to get help. She was examined at
the scene and found to be physically unharmed, but when she got 7
to the police station, she discovered that one of the bullets
had passed through her leather jacket, leaving two bullet holes.
The medical examiner later determined that Palmer had
sustained four bullet wounds to her neck and torso, which,
combined, caused her death; Gaines had sustained four bullet
wounds to her torso and her arm, with the wound to her torso
being fatal; and Peoples had sustained five bullet wounds, of
which the wound to his torso was fatal. Most of the injuries
moved from the left to the right sides of the victims' bodies;
all of the shell casings and projectiles found in the vehicle or
next to it had been fired by the same .40 caliber weapon.
On March 30, 2009, the day after the shootings, at the
defendant's request, his fiancée's mother purchased for him an
airline ticket to Trinidad, leaving on April 2 and returning on
April 24, 2009. The defendant had a son in Trinidad, and he
generally visited the country two times a year for three to five
weeks. His fiancée's mother testified that the defendant had
been paying her for the ticket over time, starting in March, for
a planned trip in April. After a while, she realized that the
defendant had not returned as scheduled, although he assured her
during their telephone calls that he would be returning.
Ultimately, the defendant remained in Trinidad until he was
extradited to the United States in 2013 so that he could be
tried in this case. 8
b. Defendant's case. The defendant testified on his own
behalf. He said that he had gone to the after-hours party with
Nichols and Boswell, a party he had attended frequently, and had
arrived after 3 A.M. He had not had a firearm with him, nor had
he been in possession of a firearm on any previous occasion.
The defendant had arrived at the party wearing a black button-
down shirt with a purple pattern, but he had taken it off while
waiting in line to buy food because it had been hot in the
basement and someone named "Yellows" had spilled a drink on it.
The defendant had been wearing a white tank top under his dress
shirt. At some point, Boswell joined the party. He, too, was
wearing a white "body-builder T-shirt."
Once he received his take-out food, the defendant put on
his black shirt and told Nichols he was ready to leave. Nichols
was busy talking to a woman and did not want to leave at that
point. Boswell also remained in the basement. Nichols gave the
defendant his keys, and the defendant left to wait in Nichols's
car. The defendant sat in the vehicle, with the heat on,
listening to music, until Nichols returned approximately fifteen
minutes later. While the two were driving away, Nichols
telephoned Boswell using the defendant's cellular telephone
because his had no charge. Nichols asked Boswell in an agitated
fashion, "What's that all about?", and then "Well, is it
finished?" Despite the defendant's questions and Nichols's 9
evident agitation, Nichols refused to explain the nature of the
problem.
After the defendant had been extradited, Boswell telephoned
him at the jail to explain that Boswell falsely accused him of
being the shooter because Boswell mistakenly had believed that
he could not be extradited from Trinidad. Boswell said that he
had been forced to implicate the defendant in order to get out
of a situation.
2. Discussion. The defendant asserts that errors in
certain of the judge's evidentiary rulings (on the introduction
of prior bad act evidence and the substantive use of a witness's
grand jury testimony); ineffective assistance by defense counsel
because he failed to pursue efforts to introduce specific
impeachment evidence; and improprieties in the prosecutor's
cross-examination of the defendant require a new trial. We do
not agree.
a. Defendant's prior possession of a firearm. The
defendant argues that the judge erred in allowing the
introduction of testimony by two witnesses regarding the
defendant's possession of a firearm on two occasions months
before the shootings during games of cards or dominos. The
prosecutor filed a motion in limine to permit these witnesses to
testify. In one instance, he pointed it at the witness's face
in a "joking" manner. 10
The first witness testified that at a long-standing game of
dominos in October or November of 2008, while sitting at the
table, the defendant was "toying with a gun" and then pointed it
"directly at" her. The witness "got on his case for pointing it
directly at [her], playing around," as did other players. She
described the firearm as "a black handgun" that was not a
revolver. While couched in layman's terms, her description made
clear that she understood the distinction. Immediately
following this testimony, the judge instructed the jury that
they could consider the evidence only to show "the defendant's
access to or familiarity with handguns," and not to show "the
defendant's character or to his propensity to commit crime."
The second witness, who, like the first, had met the
defendant at a game of dominos a few months earlier, testified
that, "[a] couple of months" before the shooting, the defendant
had been playing cards in the kitchen. During the game, the
defendant took out and displayed "a black handgun." Immediately
after this testimony, as well as in the final charge, the judge
gave proper limiting instructions.
The defendant sought to exclude the testimony as improper
propensity evidence. He argued that it would be used only to
show a propensity to commit crimes; it portrayed him as violent
and law-breaking; and that there was no evidence the particular
firearm had been used in the shootings. The judge found that 11
the evidence of the defendant's prior possession of a firearm
"similar in appearance and design to the weapon at issue in this
case" was admissible to demonstrate "the defendant's access to
and familiarity with firearms." The judge determined as well
that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its
potential for unfair prejudice, and therefore allowed the
Commonwealth's motion.
Evidence is not admissible if its purpose is solely "to
show the defendant's bad character or propensity to commit the
charged offense." See Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508,
532 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Snyder, 475 Mass. 445, 456
(2016). Evidence related to prior bad acts may be admissible,
however, for other purposes, including "to show that the
defendant ha[d] the means to commit the crime." See
Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 Mass. 307, 322 (2009), citing
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 448 Mass. 548, 560 (2007).
Evidence regarding a weapon that "could have been used in
the course of a crime is admissible, in the judge's discretion,
even without direct proof that the particular weapon was in fact
used in the commission of the crime." Holley, 478 Mass. at 533,
quoting Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 156 (2014). See
Commonwealth v. Corliss, 470 Mass. 443, 449-450 (2015) (trial
judge properly allowed introduction of evidence of defendant's
access to firearm that could have been used to commit robbery). 12
Evidence of previous possession of a firearm other than the one
used to commit the crime also may be admissible "to show that
the defendant had access to or knowledge of firearms." See
McGee, supra at 157, citing Ridge, 455 Mass. at 322–323.
Nonetheless, "[e]ven if the evidence is relevant to one of
these other purposes, the evidence will not be admitted if its
probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to
the defendant." Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249
(2014). Because the defendant objected at trial, we consider
the introduction of this evidence for abuse of discretion. See
Commonwealth v. Tassinari, 466 Mass. 340, 353 (2013).
The judge determined that the evidence of a firearm that
was "similar in appearance and design to the [murder] weapon"
was admissible to demonstrate "the defendant's access to and
familiarity with firearms." The probative value of this
evidence, he concluded, outweighed its potential for unfair
prejudice. See McGee, 467 Mass. at 157. There was no abuse of
discretion in the judge's decision to allow the introduction of
evidence concerning a weapon that could have been the one used
in the shooting, and to show more generally that the defendant
had access to and familiarity with firearms.
The defendant argues that the evidence had little probative
value because "it was undisputed that the two separate
incidences involving two separate guns involved guns that were 13
not the murder weapon." "Where a weapon definitively could not
have been used in the commission of the crime, [this court has]
generally [has] cautioned against admission of evidence related
to it." Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 122 (2012).
This is because the prejudicial impact on the jury is likely to
outweigh the "tenuous relevancy of evidence of a person's
general acquaintance with weapons." Commonwealth v. Toro, 395
Mass. 354, 358 (1985).
The defendant's characterization of the evidence, however,
overstates its nature. At trial, the prosecutor indeed did
concede that there was no evidence that the weapons the
witnesses saw in the defendant's possession at the dominos games
were the same as the one used in the shootings. That, however,
would not have been the proper test even if the weapon had been
admitted for the purpose of showing access to the means to have
committed the killings. See McGee, 467 Mass. at 156. The
purpose for which the judge allowed the testimony to be admitted
did not depend on which particular weapon or type of weapon had
been in the defendant's possession; the purpose was merely to
show the defendant's knowledge of and access to firearms.
Moreover, while there was no evidence that the firearm that
the two witnesses saw was the murder weapon, equally there was
no evidence that it was not, and, based on the descriptions of
the black firearm that was not a revolver, it could have been 14
the one used in the shootings in this case. Both witnesses
described the weapon the defendant had been holding as black,
and one explained that it was not a revolver. The parties
stipulated that the weapon used in the shootings, which was
introduced in evidence, was a black semiautomatic handgun.
Thus, the weapon the witnesses saw in the defendant's possession
months before the shooting generally matched the description of
the firearm at issue in this case. Contrast Commonwealth v.
Collazo, 481 Mass. 498, 501-502 (2019) (error to permit
admission of evidence that defendant possessed second firearm
that could not have been murder weapon); Commonwealth v. Imbert,
479 Mass. 575, 585 (2018) (error where weapon definitely could
not have been used in commission of offense).
In addition, any risk of unfair prejudice was reduced by
the Commonwealth's limited use of the evidence. The prosecutor
did not dwell on the defendant's handling of the weapon either
during the evidentiary portion of the trial or at closing
argument. The relevant testimony by both witnesses consists of
approximately five transcript pages. Neither the witnesses'
testimony, nor the prosecutor's characterization of the
defendant's behavior while he was displaying the firearm at the
dominos games, suggested that it had been threatening. Rather,
the prosecutor observed that "they saw [the defendant] with a
gun on a prior occasion. Forget it. Forget about the gun on 15
the prior occasion. It's only offered for a limited purpose
anyway."
Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's
decision to allow the introduction of the evidence of the
defendant's possession of a firearm on two prior occasions.
b. Prior inconsistent statements. The defendant contends
that the judge abused his discretion in allowing the
Commonwealth to introduce Johnson's grand jury testimony as
substantive evidence. The defendant argues that introduction of
the grand jury minutes as substantive evidence was error because
the Commonwealth did not establish the necessary prerequisites
for the substantive admission at trial of the prior inconsistent
statement before the grand jury, as set forth in Commonwealth v.
Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 73-74 (1984).
When a witness gives testimony at trial that is
inconsistent with that witness's prior testimony before the
grand jury, the testimony before the grand jury may be admitted
substantively at trial if two conditions are met: (1) "the
witness can be effectively cross-examined as to the accuracy of
the statement," and (2) "the statement was not coerced and was
more than a mere confirmation or denial of an allegation by the
interrogator." Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 466 Mass. 742, 754-
755, cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1125 (2014), quoting Daye, 393 Mass. 16
at 75.3 See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(A) (2020). Prior
inconsistent statements are not limited to instances of direct
and clear contradiction. Rather, prior testimony is
inconsistent if, when, "taken as a whole, either by what it says
or by what it omits to say, [it] affords some indication that
the fact was different from the testimony of the witness." See
Daye, supra at 73 n.16, quoting Commonwealth v. Simmonds, 386
Mass. 234, 242 (1982).
Johnson testified before the grand jury that he had left
the after-hours party in the basement and came around the corner
of the house to see an African-American man in a white
sleeveless shirt shooting into a vehicle, and that sparks were
"flashing" in front of the man while this was happening. When
Johnson was approached about testifying at the defendant's
trial, he requested immunity because a portion of his trial
testimony would be that he had not been truthful before the
grand jury. The Commonwealth, as a result, granted Johnson
immunity for his testimony at the defendant's trial.
3 In Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 75 (1984), this court explained that the Commonwealth must present "other evidence tending to prove the issue . . . presented." In Commonwealth v. Clements, 436 Mass. 190, 193 (2002), however, we clarified that, although the first two requirements concern admissibility, the need for corroborating evidence is relevant to the separate question of the sufficiency of the evidence. 17
On direct examination, Johnson testified that he never saw
the man in the white T-shirt shooting at the vehicle stopped in
the middle of the road. Rather, Johnson explained, his grand
jury testimony actually had been an account of the incident that
had been provided to him by Alvin Leacock,4 which Johnson then
told to a friend. On cross-examination, Johnson testified that
he had lied to the grand jury under pressure, because he was
being threatened with incarceration if he did not explain that
he had seen the man in the white T-shirt shooting into the
vehicle that had been standing in the road. Johnson explained
that police had told him that if he did not tell the grand jury
"what I told my friend," the police "were going to put me in
jail."
The defendant argues that Johnson could not be cross-
examined effectively because Johnson did not remember the
underlying events, and also did not remember testifying before
the grand jury.5 "When the witness at trial has no recollection
4 At the time, Leacock's father was dating Johnson's aunt, and Johnson described Leacock as his "cousin."
5 Although counsel raised this issue at trial, this does not appear to be a case where the judge found that the witness was feigning a lack of memory of the underlying events. See Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 481 Mass. 641, 660–661 (2019); Commonwealth v. Andrade, 481 Mass. 139, 142 (2018). The record on this point is somewhat confusing. The prosecutor initially asked for a finding of loss of memory. When the prosecutor showed Johnson his grand jury testimony, however, Johnson, while asserting that he did not remember his testimony before the 18
of the events to which the statement [before the grand jury]
relates, [the] requirement of an opportunity for meaningful
cross-examination is not met." Commonwealth v. McGhee, 472
Mass. 405, 422 (2015), quoting Daye, 393 Mass. at 73. The
defendant overstates Johnson's lack of memory about that night.
Certainly, there are places in the testimony where Johnson's
recollection is uncertain, and where he made broad statements
such as, "I don't remember that night." Johnson was clear,
however, on the key points for effective cross-examination: his
reasons for having lied to the grand jury and his statement that
he did not see what he claimed to have seen.
Moreover, during his trial testimony, Johnson also
testified to important details about the night of the shooting.
He said, inter alia, that Palmer had picked him up and they had
driven to the after-hours party in her white vehicle. At the
party, Johnson became separated from Peoples and the three
women, and Leacock came to get him from the basement. Johnson
testified that he and Leacock were walking toward the front of
the house and saw a group of people standing around the white
vehicle; the driver's side was closer to the party house. None
grand jury, agreed that he must have said what was written in the transcript; the prosecutor then indicated that he was satisfied with the testimony. Because Johnson effectively had adopted his grand jury testimony, the prosecutor stopped pursuing any finding as to a loss of memory. 19
of the people standing near the automobile was wearing a
sleeveless white T-shirt. Johnson testified that he then heard
gunshots and ran behind the house with Leacock.
While case law is scant concerning the question of just how
detailed a recollection of the underlying events a witness must
retain in order effectively to be cross-examined, Johnson's
testimony certainly does not evince "no recollection." See
Daye, 393 Mass. at 73. More importantly, Johnson's trial
testimony was sufficient to delineate what Johnson had been able
to see on the night of the shooting, as well as the accuracy of
Johnson's grand jury testimony. See id. (opportunity for
effective cross-examination existed where witness "testified as
to the circumstances of his presence at the scene of the
shooting and as to the accuracy of his statement to the grand
jury"). Thus, it was not only possible that Johnson
theoretically could have been effectively cross-examined; the
transcript shows that counsel actually did so.
The second Daye criterion that must be established is that
the prior inconsistent statement be "'that of the witness,
rather than the interrogator,' i.e., the statement must not be
coerced." Commonwealth v. Stewart, 454 Mass. 527, 533 (2009),
quoting Daye, 393 Mass. at 74-75. The judge reviewed the grand
jury transcripts and determined that the Commonwealth had met
this requirement. The judge explained, 20
"I find that the manner of questioning and the answers given by Mr. Johnson, the manner in which he testified, are such that the Commonwealth would be permitted under the principles of Commonwealth v. Daye to make use of the grand jury testimony. . . . I find that the information given was not merely the response to either suggestive or leading questioning as to critical events, but rather the questions put to Mr. Johnson appear fairly open-ended, allowing the witness to provide his version of what he had done and observed."
The defendant does not dispute the judge's finding. Thus, the
defendant's claim that Johnson's grand jury testimony was that
of the interrogator is unavailing.
Moreover, the issue of coercion was not raised prior to the
judge's ruling that Johnson's grand jury testimony was
admissible substantively. On cross-examination, Johnson
asserted that police had threated to put him in jail if he did
not testify to the version of events supplied by Leacock. The
defendant did not ask the judge to reconsider his ruling in
light of this testimony concerning coercion. See Commonwealth
v. McDonagh, 480 Mass. 131, 137-138 (2018) (counsel was required
to raise basis for objection in order to bring asserted error to
judge's attention). The judge, therefore, was deprived of an
opportunity to assess the validity of Johnson's claim that his
grand jury testimony had been the product of police coercion.
See Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 293-294 (2002).
In any event, Johnson's grand jury testimony that the
shooter had been wearing a white sleeveless T-shirt could not 21
have caused prejudice for the defendant, regardless of its
admissibility. It was cumulative of Headley's and Boswell's
testimony concerning the shooter's clothing. Johnson did not
otherwise recognize or identify the defendant as the person in
the white shirt. The testimony also effectively was cast into
doubt on cross-examination, where Johnson said repeatedly that
his grand jury testimony had been a coerced lie.
c. Failure to impeach witness concerning pending criminal
charges. Leacock testified before the grand jury that, towards
the end of the after-hours party, as Palmer, Peoples, Headley,
and Gaines were waiting in their vehicle, Leacock went back down
to the basement to retrieve Johnson and bring him to his
friends. Leacock testified that, immediately before he heard
the shots fired, he saw a man in a white shirt standing near the
vehicle. Leacock did not see the man actively shooting, and did
not notice whether the white shirt had sleeves. On cross-
examination, Leacock testified that many people at the party had
been wearing white T-shirts.
Well after his grand jury testimony, Leacock was indicted
on charges of money laundering and conspiracy to defraud the
United States in conjunction with an incident in which he tried
to bring $400,000 into the United States, undeclared, through
Logan Airport. Before Leacock was to testify at the defendant's
trial, the Commonwealth moved to exclude any evidence of this 22
indictment for impeachment purposes. The prosecutor noted that
Leacock would not be testifying under any agreement with the
Commonwealth and had not been offered any promises, rewards, or
inducements for his testimony. While the judge initially
appeared to agree with the Commonwealth, he then mused that it
could be appropriate to allow impeachment with the then-pending
money laundering charges to show that Leacock "might feel that
he might obtain some sort of benefit [from the Federal
government] as a result of testifying favorably . . . ." See
McGhee, 472 Mass. at 424-425 (evidence of pending criminal
charges is admissible for impeachment purposes within trial
judge's discretion in order to demonstrate witness's bias or
motive to curry favor with government).
Defense counsel stated that, as long as Leacock's testimony
at trial was consistent with his grand jury testimony, counsel
would not raise the issue of the Federal prosecution. Defense
counsel did not attempt to impeach Leacock with the implication
that, by his testimony, he might be attempting to obtain a
favorable result in his Federal case. Counsel also did not ask
the judge to reconsider his ruling on impeachment, despite the
judge's previous reservation of a decision on the question.
There is no suggestion that Leacock's trial testimony was
inconsistent with his grand jury testimony; to the contrary, the
record indicates that, at trial, both the defendant and the 23
Commonwealth were satisfied with Leacock's testimony and viewed
it as consistent with his grand jury testimony.
The defendant claims generally that the preceding events
violated his rights to confront the witnesses against him under
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; it is
unclear whether, in his view, it was the action of the judge,
his counsel, or some combination that infringed upon that right.
Although the particular legal basis upon which the defendant
intended to rely is unclear, all of the conceivable bases are
unavailing.
The decisions the defendant cites in support of his
arguments are inapposite because, in each, the judge made a
definitive ruling that limited or eliminated the defendant's
right to cross-examine. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 310-
313, 317-320 (1974) (judge barred cross-examination on juvenile
witness's probation status); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
401, 406-407 (1965) (full deprivation of right to cross-examine
absent witness where previous testimony of that witness, which
had not been subject to cross-examination, had been introduced);
Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 693-694 (1931)
(prejudicial error to preclude cross-examination showing witness
was incarcerated and therefore could have motive to curry
favor). Here, by contrast, the judge ultimately did not rule on
trial counsel's initial opposition, which counsel in any event 24
did not pursue when Leacock's testimony was introduced. For
this reason, the defendant's claim properly sounds as one for
ineffective assistance of counsel, either for precipitously
withdrawing the objection, or for not cross-examining Leacock
about his then-pending Federal case.
When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in a case subject to review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E,
we review for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of
justice. See Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 62 (2018).
"Impeachment of a witness is, by its very nature, fraught with a
host of strategic considerations, to which [this court] will,
even on § 33E review, still show deference" (citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Moore, 480 Mass. 799, 815 (2018).
Here, Leacock's testimony was of limited value to the
Commonwealth, particularly because he did not claim to have seen
the shooting, nor could he state whether the shirt the shooter
had been wearing had had sleeves. Leacock also testified,
contrary to the Commonwealth's theory, that many other
individuals also had been wearing white T-shirts that night.
Any effectiveness from using the pending Federal charges to
impeach Leacock would have been substantially undercut by the
fact that Leacock testified before the grand jury months prior
to his arrest on Federal charges, and Leacock's testimony at
trial was entirely consistent with his grand jury testimony. 25
Nothing in the record suggests Leacock's testimony was given in
order to curry favor with Federal or State officials. Further,
there is no indication that, had Leacock's testimony not been
before the jury, its absence would have had any impact on their
thinking. In sum, there was no substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice from counsel's decision not to attempt to
impeach Leacock with his prior grand jury testimony.
d. Prearrest silence. The defendant argues that certain
of the prosecutor's questions during cross-examination of the
defendant, as well as the prosecutor's discussion of those
answers in closing argument, resulted in a substantial
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
During cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecutor
asked three separate times why the defendant had not returned to
the United States in order to clear his name once he learned
from the Internet or direct telephone calls from friends about
the stories that were circulating regarding his purported
involvement in the shootings.
The Commonwealth concedes that these questions, and the
exploitation of them in closing argument, was error and should
not have been allowed. As the Commonwealth argues, however, the
error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage
of justice. 26
The prosecutor asked a series of questions designed to
imply that the defendant remained in Trinidad, despite his
awareness that he was being investigated in relation to the
shootings, due to consciousness of guilt. The questioning
implied that the defendant had had an obligation to "clear his
name."
There were several particularly problematic questions.
First, the prosecutor asked, "[Y]ou decided that you were going
to stay in Trinidad and not come back and clear your name?" He
then asked, "You said that you were being accused on the
Internet of doing this thing [in Boston]. Did you do anything
while you were there [in Trinidad] to clear your name?"
Unprompted by defense counsel, the judge, sua sponte, gave a
limiting instruction. The judge explained,
"a person accused of a crime has no burden of disproving that crime in any way. . . . [Y]ou may consider the questions put to [the defendant] by [the prosecutor] in this regard of doing something or not doing anything insofar as you assess the credibility of this particular witness's testimony, but not as implying that there is any affirmative obligation on [the defendant's] part to have to do anything."
A defendant's decision not to speak with police, or not to
comply with a police request for an interview, may not be used
as substantive evidence of consciousness of guilt. See
Commonwealth v. Conkey, 430 Mass. 139, 141 (1999), S.C., 443
Mass. 60 (2004) and 452 Mass. 1022 (2008) ("evidence of a 27
defendant's refusal to comply with a police request may not be
admitted because in so refusing a defendant furnishes evidence
against himself, and admission of that evidence would violate
art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights]").
Therefore, insofar as the judge instructed that the jury could
not consider the defendant's purported failure to "clear his
name" as evidence of consciousness of guilt, or as any other
type of substantive evidence, the first part of the instruction
was correct. The second part of the instruction, however, was
erroneous, further compounding the error.
If a defendant chooses to testify at trial, the defendant's
prearrest silence may be used, in certain circumstances, for
impeachment purposes. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,
239 (1980). See also Commonwealth v. Gardner, 479 Mass. 764,
768-769 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54,
59 (1982). "[I]mpeachment of a defendant with the fact of his
pre-arrest silence should be approached with caution, and,
wherever it is undertaken, it should be prefaced by a proper
demonstration that it was 'natural' to expect the defendant to
speak in the circumstances." Gardner, supra at 770, quoting
Nickerson, supra at 62.
In Gardner, 479 Mass. at 767-768, the defendant testified
that he met the victim in order to complete a drug transaction,
but a fight broke out and the defendant killed the victim in 28
self-defense. We concluded that it would not have been natural
for the defendant to contact the police, as doing so would have
furnished evidence against him regarding the victim's death and
regarding various other crimes. See id. at 772. See also
Commonwealth v. Niemic, 472 Mass. 665, 673 (2015), S.C., 483
Mass. 571 (2019) (defendant, who claimed self-defense at trial,
would not naturally have contacted police prior to arrest).
Conversely, in Commonwealth v. Barnoski, 418 Mass. 523, 534
(1994), the defendant testified that his friend had been shot by
the friend's son, that the son then threatened the defendant's
wife, and that, when the defendant intervened, the gun went off,
hitting the son. We held that it would have been natural for
the defendant to contact the police to get help for the father,
who had not yet died. See id. at 536-537.
Here, the defendant argues that it would not have been
natural for him to contact the police to give his side of the
story. The defendant asserts that he "had reasons for not
coming home, such as exercising his right to a full and fair
extradition proceeding under the law." The Commonwealth
concedes this point. Unlike in Barnoski, 418 Mass. at 534,
there was no immediate danger to another that could have created
an incentive to contact the police to get help. Therefore, the
introduction of the testimony as impeachment evidence was an
abuse of discretion, and the instruction that the jury could 29
consider that testimony for impeachment purposes was error. See
Gardner, 479 Mass. at 772; Niemic, 472 Mass. at 673. Because
the defendant did not object at trial, we review for a
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
The Commonwealth maintains, by contrast, that there was no
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice for two
reasons. First, the judge's instruction cured any error. As
stated, however, the instruction only foreclosed the use of the
testimony as substantive evidence of guilt. The instruction
specifically told the jury that they could use the testimony to
assess the defendant's credibility, precisely the use prohibited
by Gardner, 479 Mass. at 772; Niemic, 472 Mass. at 673; and
Nickerson, 386 Mass. at 60.
The Commonwealth notes that the impermissible questioning
was wrapped up in a longer thread of questioning regarding the
defendant's trip to Trinidad. The mother of the defendant's
fiancée purchased a plane ticket to Trinidad for the defendant
on the day after the shootings, and he flew there three days
later. The defendant did not use the return ticket some weeks
later, and he remained in Trinidad until his arrest and
extradition. This line of questioning was proper evidence of
consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass.
291, 309-310 (2014). The erroneous questioning regarding the
defendant's failure to "clear his name" was to some extent 30
cumulative of the properly admitted evidence that the defendant
fled, arguably to avoid apprehension. See Commonwealth v.
Thompson, 431 Mass. 108, 117, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 864 (2000)
(improper impeachment based on prearrest silence did not create
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice partly because
evidence was cumulative with other, properly admitted evidence).
Another factor, not raised by the parties, weighs against
ordering a new trial on this ground. In his direct examination,
prior to the impermissible questioning at issue, the defendant
testified that, shortly after his arrival in Trinidad, a Boston
police detective telephoned him. The detective informed the
defendant that he was "wanted in Boston for a triple murder,"
and asked the defendant when he was returning from Trinidad.
The defendant testified that this was the first time he had
heard about the accusations, and it took him by surprise.
Therefore, the basic, impermissible point made by the prosecutor
regarding the defendant's nonexistent obligation to clear his
name had been raised obliquely by the defendant himself.
Considering the strength of the evidence against the
defendant, we conclude that these impermissible comments by the
prosecutor did not create a substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice. See Thompson, 431 Mass. at 116-117
(testimony that defendant looked at floor for thirty seconds
without speaking, after being told that his wife was dead, was 31
error, but did not create substantial likelihood of miscarriage
of justice; "this testimony was a brief event in the course of a
long trial, cumulative of other evidence that the defendant
acted in a manner inconsistent with the behavior of an innocent
person, and there was substantial evidence against the
defendant" [quotations and citation omitted]); Commonwealth v.
Springer, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 469, 478 (2000) (no substantial risk
of miscarriage of justice in case of murder in second degree,
where impermissible reference "was a vague and fleeting comment"
[citation omitted]).
e. Burden shifting. The defendant also contends that the
line of questioning about clearing his name constituted
impermissible burden shifting. All of the cases he cites in
support of this proposition, however, involve an assertion or an
implication by a prosecutor that a defendant failed to meet a
purported burden at trial. See Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass.
792, 805 (1996) (defendant argued that judge's charge created
"risk that jurors [would] evaluate the evidence with a burden on
the defendant"); Commonwealth v. Amirault, 404 Mass. 221, 240
(1989) (prosecutor argued that "[the defendant] was unable to
point to one single thing in the whole world that would account
for why all these children and parents have turned against
him"); Commonwealth v. Matos, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 352 (2019)
("prosecutor impermissibly argued that key elements and facts 32
supporting the prosecution's case were undisputed"). See also
United States v. Glover, 558 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2009)
(prosecutor, discussing evidence, stated, "Does it make sense?
Or turn the question the other way: Is there anything that
doesn't make sense" [emphasis in original]).
Here, by contrast, there was no such implication. Rather,
the prosecutor implied that the defendant had had an obligation
prior to arrest to clear his name. To the extent that the
prosecutor's comments implied that the defendant had any burden
at trial, there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage
of justice, because the judge immediately and unequivocally
instructed the jury that the defendant had no burden.
f. Relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. We have carefully
reviewed the record, pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278,
§ 33E, and discern no reason to order a new trial or to reduce
the degrees of guilt.
Judgments affirmed.