OPINION OF THE COURT
LARSEN,* Justice.
In this appeal, appellees have challenged the constitutionality of certain enforcement/penalty provisions of the Solid Waste Management Act (the Act), Act of July 7, 1980, P.L.380, No. 97 §§ 101-1003, 35 P.S. §§ 6018.101-6018.-1003 (Purdon’s Supp.1986). Specifically, appellees challenge sections 606(a) and 606(b) of the Act, which provide:
(a) Any person, other than a municipal official exercising his official duties, or any municipality who violates any provision of this act, the rules and regulations of the department, or any order of the department, or any term or condition of any permit upon conviction in a summary proceeding, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 and costs and, in default of the payment of such fines and costs, to undergo imprisonment for not more than 30 days.
(b) Any person other than a municipal official exercising his official duties who violates any provision of this act, any rule or regulation of the department, any order of the department, or any term or condition of any permit, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree and, upon conviction, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $1,000 but not more than $25,000 per day for each violation or to imprisonment for a period of not more than one year, or both.
[79] Appellees assert that, because these two provisions “proscribe identical conduct yet provide for vastly different penalties” without guidelines for the prosecutors and agencies charged with enforcing the Act as to when to seek either a summary offense conviction or a misdemeanor of the third degree conviction, the Act creates arbitrary classifications, and “vests unfettered discretion in the prosecutor,” and violates, therefore, the state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process of law and proscriptions against delegation of legislative power to the executive branch of government. We reject these challenges and uphold the constitutionality of the Act.
Following an investigation by the January 25, 1982 multicounty investigating grand-jury convened upon the application of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, appellees were all charged in Erie County with misdemeanors of the third degree under section 606(b), 35 P.S. § 6018.606(b), for violations of the Solid Waste Management Act.1
Appellee Albert E. Fuchs was charged with 9 counts of dumping or permitting the dumping of hazardous wastes on the Albert Fuchs Foundry Sand site in Erie County during the period of September, 1980 through April, 1981 without a permit and contrary to the rules and regulations of the Department of Environmental Resources (DER) in violation of section 401(a), 35 P.S. § 6018.401(a), management of hazardous waste.2 Originally charged with felonies for [80] these violations under section 606(f),3 appellee Fuchs’ charges were reduced to misdemeanors of the third degree under section 606(b) following a preliminary hearing before a District Justice.
The remaining appellees, Parker White Metal Co., Penn Iron & Metal Co., Inc. and Limco, doing business as Liberty Iron and Metal Co., were charged with misdemeanors of the third degree under section 606(b) for illegally transporting solid wastes to a facility (the Fuchs site) that had not obtained a permit from DER, and for dumping solid “residual” and/or “hazardous” wastes without a permit from DER for such dumping, in violation of sections 610(6) and (1) of the Act, 35 P.S. § 6018.610(6) and (l).4
Omnibus pre-trial motions were filed on behalf of all appellees which, inter alia, challenged the constitutionality of the Act. The Court of Common Pleas of Erie County granted all the appellees’ pre-trial motions to dismiss the charges, finding that the challenged provisions of the Act violated Article I, section 26 and Article II, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. That court reasoned:
[81] Since “any violation” under Sections 606(a) and 606(b) is both a summary offense and a misdemeanor of the third degree, the prosecutor is not limited in choosing whether to seek different degrees of punishment for the same acts committed under identical circumstances by similarly situated defendants, and, therefore, the penalty provisions permit discrimination between individuals without a reason legitimately and reasonably related to individual situations. (citation omitted).
This type of discrimination violates Article 1, § 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which forbids discrimination against any person and does not limit impermissible discrimination to that usually characterized as invidious and based on, for example, race or religion, (citation omitted).
Sections 606(a) and 606(b) also violate Article 2, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution in that the choice of a summary offense or of a misdemeanor and the penalties to be imposed are left to prosecutorial choice, which is unlimited. The Constitution provides that the legislature shall enact laws and define what constitutes a crime and shall also set the penalty for any violation of that crime. In instant case this is left to the prosecutor and violates the Constitution, since the legislature cannot delegate its authority to define a crime and/or to set the penalty for the crime.
Opinion of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County granting appellees’ motion to dismiss charges, August 29, 1984 at 4-5. The Attorney General, for the Commonwealth, has appealed from that court’s determination and order.5
[82]
Presumption of Constitutionality
There is, of course, a strong and fundamental presumption that the legislature has acted within constitutional bounds. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 58-60, 454 A.2d 937, 959 (1983), cert. denied 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983); American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner, 510 Pa. 430, 509 A.2d 838, 849 (1986); Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 247, 470 A.2d 1339, 1340 (1983). Consequently, one challenging the constitutionality of a legislative enactment bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that it clearly, plainly and palpably violates some specific mandate or prohibition of the constitution. Id. Snider v. Thornburgh, 496 Pa. 159, 166, 436 A.2d 593, 596 (1981).
In considering the constitutionality of the Solid Waste Management Act, we must also bear in mind that it was enacted to implement the will of the people as expressed in Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides:
Natural resources and the public estate
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
Adopted May 18, 1971.
See section 102(10) of the Act, 35 P.S. § 6018.102(10) (“it is the purpose of this act to ... implement Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution____”).
With these general standards to guide us and keenly aware of our role as one of the trustees of the public estate, we turn to appellees’ specific constitutional challenges. Equal Protection
Appellees argue that sections 606(a) and 606(b) of the Act impose “different degrees of punishment for identical statu[83] tory violations,” and so create arbitrary and unreasonable classifications between similarly situated persons without rational basis. Brief for Appellees at 9-10. This argument is based upon the guarantee of equal protection of the laws of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution6 and upon Article I, section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.7
This Court is, of course, at liberty to “interpret our Constitution in a more generous manner than the federal courts” have interpreted the Constitution of the United States, and we have done so in the past. Fischer v. Department of Public Welfare (DPW), 509 Pa. 293, 305, 502 A.2d 114 (1985) and cases cited therein. In the equal protection area, however, we have chosen to be guided by the standards and analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court and have adopted those standards and analysis in interpreting and applying Article I, section 26 of our Constitution.8 Fischer v. DPW, supra, 509 Pa. at 310, 502 A.2d at 123-124; James v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), 505 Pa. 137, 144-45, 477 A.2d 1302, 1305 (1984); Astemborski v. Susmarski, 502 Pa. 409, 412, 466 A.2d 1018 (1983).
[84] The equal protection analytical framework was described by this Court in James v. SEPTA, supra, wherein we stated:
[T]here are three different types of classifications calling for three different standards of judicial review. The first type — classifications implicating neither suspect classes nor fundamental rights — will be sustained if it meets a “rational basis” test____ In the second type of cases, where a suspect classification has been made or a fundamental right has been burdened, another standard of review is applied: that of strict scrutiny____ Finally, in the third type of cases, if “important,” though not fundamental rights are affected by the classification, or if “sensitive” classifications have been made, the United States Supreme Court has employed what may be called an intermediate standard of review, or a heightened standard of review____ There are, in summary, three standards of review applicable to an equal protection case, and the applicability of one rather than another will depend upon the type of right which is affected by the classification.
505 Pa. at 145, 477 A.2d at 1306 (citations omitted) (Larsen, J. dissenting as to application of this standard); Fischer v. DPW, supra, 509 Pa. at 306-307, 502 A.2d at 121.
However, before we analyze a statute to determine whether it violates equal protection principles, we must first ask a threshold question.
As appellees correctly note, the “starting point of equal protection analysis is a determination of whether the State has created a classification for the unequal distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens.” Brief for Appellees at 9 (emphasis added). The short and sufficient answer to appellees’ equal protection challenge is that sections 606(a) and 606(b) of the Act do not create any classifications. These provisions, on their face, apply equally and across the board to any and all potential violators of the substantive provisions of the Act. Section 606 sets forth a wide range of criminal penalties for violators of the Act, [85] ranging from summary offenses (with fines of $100-$1000 and imprisonment of not more than thirty days) to felonies of the first degree (with fines of $10,000-$50,000 per day per violation and imprisonment of two to twenty years). Sections 606(a) and 606(b) provide that a person or municipality who “violates any provision of this act, the rules and regulations of the department [DER], or any order of the department, or any term or condition of any permit” may, upon conviction, be found guilty of either a summary offense or a misdemeanor of the third degree, but, on their face, these provisions create no classifications. The provisions lie dormant unless and until a prosecutor or agency activates one or the other. Thus the Act does not, on its face, carve out classifications or single out any distinct class of persons for unequal treatment, but by its terms applies equally to all.
Any equal protection problem with arbitrary classifications can therefore arise only upon enforcement of the Act when the prosecutor or agency chooses to prosecute a violator under one or the other section. But that is a different issue than whether the Act creates classifications that may deny equal protection of the laws — that is an issue of “selective enforcement” by the prosecutor/agency. The United States Supreme Court addressed this precise issue in United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979), and unanimously held that an act which contained two separate penalty provisions proscribing identical conduct does not violate equal protection principles.
Presented in Batchelder were two overlapping provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Omnibus Act). Although not identical in every respect, both provisions prohibited convicted felons from receiving firearms, and each authorized different maximum penalties. The United States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the statutes (1) offended due process and equal protection interests by affording excessive prosecutorial discretion, (2) were void for vagueness, or (3) constituted an [86] impermissible delegation of congressional authority. That Court found no constitutional infirmities:
Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ assertions, a prosecutor’s discretion to choose between [the two pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Act] is not “unfettered.” Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is, of course, subject to constitutional restraints.9 And a decision to proceed under [one provision rather than another] does not empower the Government to predetermine ultimate criminal sanctions. Rather, it merely enables the sentencing judge to impose a longer prison sentence than [one provision] would permit and precludes him from imposing the greater fine authorized by [that provision]. More importantly, there is no appreciable difference between the discretion a prosecutor exercises when deciding whether to charge under one of two statutes with different elements and the discretion he exercises when choosing one of two statutes with identical elements. In the former situation, once he determines that the proof will support conviction under either statute, his decision is indistinguishable from the one he faces in the latter context. The prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties available upon conviction, but this fact, standing alone, does not give rise to a violation of the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause. (Citations omitted.) Just as a defendant has no constitutional right to elect which of two applicable federal statutes shall be the basis of his indictment and prosecution, neither is he entitled to choose the penalty scheme under which he will be sentenced.
Id. at 124-25, 99 S.Ct. at 2204-05.
We quite agree with the United States Supreme Court that there is no equal protection infirmity in an act merely because it allows the prosecutor or enforcing agency [87] to choose between two different penalty provisions for similar unlawful conduct and that the mere possibility that a prosecutor might selectively enforce the provisions of an act for improper motives does not invalidate that act. In Commonwealth v. Wade, 485 Pa. 453, 402 A.2d 1360 (1979), Justice O’Brien addressed an argument that the Juvenile Act denied equal protection because
the statute allows for significant prosecutorial discretion in determining whether to charge a youthful offender with either murder or unlawful killing, thus allowing a prosecutor to invoke the jurisdiction of either criminal or juvenile court.
As the United States Supreme Court stated, however in Queenside Hills Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 84-5, 66 S.Ct. 850, 852, 90 L.Ed. 1096 (1946): “... The ... lack of equal protection is found in the actual existence of an invidious discrimination, not in the mere possibility that there will be like or similar cases which will be treated more leniently.” (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Instantly, appellant is able to point to no actual discrimination, and as such, his equal protection claim based on possibilities must fail. See also Commonwealth v. Lewis, 443 Pa. 305, 279 A.2d 26 (1971).
Id., 485 Pa. at 464, 402 A.2d at 1365.9
So too in the instant case, appellees have not contended that the Office of the Attorney General has practiced actual discrimination against them, nor have they pointed to any similarly situated others who were singled out for more lenient treatment.
Were we to accept appellees’ argument that the Act does operate to create distinct classifications of defendants faced with disparate treatment (summary offense versus misdemeanor of the third degree) for similar conduct, we would still decline to find the Act violative of equal protection guarantees. Such “classification” would not affect [88] with particularity a “suspect” or a “sensitive” class, nor does it implicate “fundamental” or “important” interests.10 Accordingly, we would evaluate the “classification” under the traditional “rational basis” test. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344, 347, 466 A.2d 613, 614-15 (1983); Commonwealth v. Wade, 485 Pa. 453, 462-64, 402 A.2d 1360 (1979). Thus we analyze the “classification created” by sections 606(a) and 606(b) “to determine whether it is reasonable, not arbitrary, and rests upon a difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” Snider v. Thornburgh, 496 Pa. 159, 168, 436 A.2d 593 (1981); Fischer v. DPW, supra at 509 Pa. 310-311, 502 A.2d 123; Commonwealth v. Wade, supra, 485 Pa. 462, 402 A.2d 1360.
To determine the object of the legislation in the instant case, we need look no further than section 102 of the Act which sets forth the findings of the General Assembly and its declaration of policy. 35 P.S. § 6018.102. That section provides, in relevant portion:
The Legislature hereby determines, declares and finds that, since improper and inadequate solid waste practices create public health hazards, environmental pollution, and economic loss, and cause irreparable harm to the public health, safety and welfare, it is the purpose of this act to:
(1) establish and maintain a cooperative State and local program of planning and technical and financial assistance for comprehensive solid waste management;
(3) require permits for the operation of municipal and residual waste processing and disposal systems, licenses for the transportation of hazardous waste and permits for hazardous waste storage, treatment and disposal;
[89] (4) protect the public health, safety and welfare from the short and long term dangers of transportion, processing, treatment, storage, and disposal of all wastes;
(5) provide a flexible and effective means to implement and enforce the provisions of this act;
j-s ■*: s[s $ :js H*
(9) provide a mechanism to establish hazardous waste facility sites;
(10) implement Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution....
As section 102(5) makes clear, a major objective of the Act, which the legislature deemed necessary to implement Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and to prevent irreparable harm to the public health, safety and welfare and to avoid environmental pollution and economic loss, is to “provide a flexible and effective means to implement and enforce the provisions of this act.” This flexibility in the enforcement mechanism is a critical component of the Act which grants powers of enforcement to the DER and to the county health departments and municipalities. See sections 104, 106, 202, 35 P.S. §§ 6018.104, 106, 202. The terms and tenor of Article VI, Enforcement and Remedies, illustrates that the legislature intended to weave as much flexibility as possible into the enforcement provisions of the Act. 35 P.S. §§ 6018.601-.617. Those provisions provide a wide range of civil and equitable remedies and mechanisms in addition to criminal sanctions that are available to DER, county health departments and municipalities. Moreover, the various remedies are expressly declared to be “additional and cumulative remedies ... and nothing contained in this act shall in any way abridge or alter rights of action or remedies now or hereafter existing in equity, or under the common law or statutory law, criminal or civil....” 35 P.S. § 6018.607.
It cannot be disputed that the object of this legislation— the protection of the public health, safety and welfare from the potential dangers of solid waste disposal and the implementation of Article I, section 27 — is a salutary and legit[90] imate object. The flexibility in enforcement procedures manifested throughout the Act, in Article VI generally and sections 606(a) and 606(b) specifically, bear a fair and substantial relation to that legitimate, indeed compelling, state interest. The range of specific variations of conduct prohibited by the Act is enormous and not amenable to rigid statutory classification, and it would be unreasonable to expect the legislature to have been able to identify every imaginable type of unlawful solid waste disposal and assign a carefully calibrated penalty to each. The legislature’s response to the complexity of the problem was to create a range of civil, criminal and equitable penalties and mechanisms for the proscribed conduct and to entrust the administration of the criminal provisions of the statute to the prosecutors, i.e., the DER, county health departments and municipalities. In so doing, the legislature conferred upon the prosecutor discretion neither greater nor different than that already routinely exercised in the enforcement of other statutes imposing criminal sanctions. The election between charging a summary offense or a misdemeanor involves the exercise of no more discretion than the decision to prosecute a felony or not lodge any charges at all. As noted by the Court in Batchelder, the latter is a decision commonly made by prosecutors without legislative or judicial constraints.
It is clear, therefore, that any classification created by sections 606(a) and 606(b) of the Act has a rational basis and bears a fair and substantial relation to legitimate objects of the legislation, and does not violate equal protection principles. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, supra and Commonwealth v. Wade, supra (“We do not believe the classification is arbitrary and further believe that the classification bears a rational relationship to the objectives espoused by the Juvenile Act.”). The lower court erred, therefore, in declaring sections 606(a) and 606(b) unconstitutional under Article I, § 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
[91]
Due Process
Appellees also assert that the Act, in allowing the prosecutors “unfettered discretion” in choosing between the significantly different penalties provided in sections 606(a) and 606(b) without sufficient guidelines, violates their rights to due process of the laws because of excessive prosecutorial discretion and vagueness.11 We disagree.
In rejecting a due process/void for vagueness challenge to Pennsylvania’s “new drunk driving law,” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(4), in Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 470 A.2d 1339 (1983), we stated:
The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed. 935 (1974). “As generally stated, the void-for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, [357], 103 S.Ct. 1855, [1858] 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983). The principle aspect of the doctrine is the requirement that legislation establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement for, without such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute might permit “a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predictions.” Id. at [358], 103 S.Ct. at 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d at 909 quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). In Commonwealth v. DeFrancesco, 481 Pa. 595, 393 A.2d 321 (1978), this Court applied the above principles to uphold a disorderly conduct/refusal to dis[92] perse statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5502, against a due process/vagueness challenge, and identified the “root of the vagueness doctrine” as a
“rough idea of fairness. It is not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.... ”
481 Pa. at 608, 393 A.2d 321 quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1957, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972).
Similarly in Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 467 Pa. 1, 354 A.2d 244 (1976), we held that a penal statute “must give reasonable notice of the conduct which it proscribes to a person charged with violating its interdiction.” 467 Pa. at 5, 354 A.2d 244. However, statutes alleged to be vague are not “to be tested against paradigms of draftmanship. Rather, the requirements of due process are satisfied if the statute in question contains reasonable standards to guide the prospective conduct.” Id., 467 Pa. at 6, 354 A.2d 244.
Id., 504 Pa. at 251-52, 470 A.2d at 1342-43.
The United States Supreme Court in Batchelder similarly stated:
[V]ague sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute. (Citations omitted).
The provisions in issue here, however, unambiguously specify the activity proscribed and the penalties available upon conviction. ... That this particular conduct may violate both Titles does not detract from the notice afforded by each. Although the statutes create uncertainty as to which crime may be charged and therefore what penalties may be imposed, they do so to no greater extent than would a single statute authorizing various alternative punishments. So long as overlapping [93] criminal provisions clearly define the conduct prohibited and the punishment authorized, the notice requirements of the Due Process Clause are satisfied.
442 U.S. at 123, 99 S.Ct. at 2204 (emphasis added).
We adopt this reasoning of Batchelder regarding the clear notice provided by the Act by a single statute unambiguously identifying the conduct proscribed and the range of penalties available upon conviction. Indeed, this Court has consistently upheld, against due process challenges, the authority of a prosecutor to choose between procedures and sentencing alternatives. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, supra (acknowledging legitimacy of prosecutor’s discretion as to whether to charge first degree murder and whether to seek death penalty); Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 25, 494 A.2d 354, 361-62 (1985) aff'd sub nom — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (defendant has no right to particular sentence within the range authorized by statute, and prosecutor’s discretion as to whether to invoke the mandatory sentencing procedure under 42 Pa.C. S.A. § 9712 is legitimate; “We perceive no distinction between such an exercise of discretion and the prosecutorial discretion exercised at any other stage of the criminal prosecution.”); Brunwasser v. Fields, 487 Pa. 283, 409 A.2d 352 (1979) (upholding prosecutor’s discretion as to whether to seek forfeiture or prosecution of candidate or public official under the Election Code); Commonwealth v. Wade, supra (upholding prosecutor’s discretion as to whether to prosecute defendant in a juvenile proceeding or as an adult offender).
In Commonwealth v. Lutz, 508 Pa. 297, 495 A.2d 928 (1985), this Court upheld the prosecutor’s discretion to decide whether or not to recommend a defendant who has been charged with drunken driving for the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program stating:
[T]he decision to submit the case for ARD rests in the sound discretion of the district attorney, and absent an abuse of that discretion involving some criteria for admission to ARD wholly, patently and without doubt un[94] related, to the protection of society and/or the likelihood of a person’s success in rehabilitation, such as race, religion or other such obviously prohibited considerations, the attorney for the Commonwealth must be free to submit a case or not submit it for ARD consideration based on his view of what is most beneficial for society and the offender. Compare Shade v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 394 F.Supp. 1237, 1242 (M.D.Pa.1975), citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962).
Id. at 508 Pa. 310, 495 A.2d 934-35.
In light of the foregoing principles, it should be obvious that sections 606(a) and 606(b) of the Act do not offend due process in allowing the prosecutor or agency to choose between ranges of penalties nor in failing to provide precise standards narrowing the prosecutorial discretion to so choose. Appellees were fully informed by the terms of the Act of exactly what conduct was proscribed as well as the full range of civil, criminal and equitable remedies and penalties to which they might be subjected for violating a substantive provision of the Act. It is of no constitutional significance that appellees were not advised in advance as to which of the two applicable penalty ranges the prosecutor or agency would choose to prosecute them under for their violations (alleged) of the Act, for a defendant has no right to a particular sentence within the range authorized by statute. Commonwealth v. Wright, supra; United States v. Batchelder, supra. Moreover, while sections 606(a) and 606(b) of the Act authorize the prosecutor or agency to choose from between two possible ranges of penalties, conviction and punishment is not automatic. The prosecutor or agency must prove its case to the satisfaction of the judge, jury or district justice in order to obtain a conviction for either a summary offense or a misdemeanor. Following conviction, the sentencing authority, not the prosecutor or agency, must set the sentence within the ranges established by either section 606(a) (fine of $100-$1000, and imprisonment of not more than thirty days) or section 606(b) [95] (fine of $l,000-$25,000, and imprisonment of not more than one year).
We hold therefore that the decision of whether to prosecute an alleged offender under sections 606(a) or 606(b) is a matter legitimately committed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor or agency charged with enforcement of the Act, that the Act provides clear notice to all as to the conduct proscribed and the possible penalties for its violation, and that it does not offend due process.
Improper Delegation of Legislative Powers
The lower court also held that sections 606(a) and 606(b) violated Article II, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.12 That court reasoned that the legislature improperly delegated its authority to define “what constitutes a crime” and to “set the penalty for the crime.” Lower court slip op. at 5.
From what we have stated in the preceding sections, it is apparent that the legislature has delegated none of its authority to the prosecutors and agencies. Quite to the contrary, the Act specifically and unambiguously establishes “what constitutes a crime,” and specifically and unambiguously establishes the full range of penalties possible for commission of those crimes. That the legislature has allowed the prosecutor some discretion and much flexibility in choosing from among the full panoply of civil, criminal and equitable remedies does not delegate any of the legislative power or function to the executive branch.
The Commonwealth Court has correctly rejected a “non-delegation” challenge to those portions of the Act delegating enforcement authority to the counties, holding:
Although Article I, section I of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit delegation of the legislative function, the legislature may [96] confer authority and discretion upon another body in connection with the execution of a law. Where the legislature sets primary standards, it may impose the duty to carry out the legislative policy on another governmental unit____ However, such a grant of authority “must contain adequate standards to guide and restrain the exercise of the delegated administrative function. In determining whether adequate standards have been established, we are not limited to the letter of the law. We must look, as well, to the underlying purpose of the statute and to its reasonable effect.” ...
Chambers Development Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, ex rel. Allegheny County Health Department, 81 Pa.Cmwlth. 622, 474 A.2d 728, 731-32 (1984) (citations omitted). That court concluded that the Act was quite specific both as to the policies sought to be advanced and as to its administration and enforcement and so concluded that the Act did not delegate legislative powers and authority to the prosecutors. That holding was squarely in line with this Court’s decisions under Article II, section 1 wherein legislative enactments were challenged as improper delegations of legislative authority. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cherney, 454 Pa. 285, 289-90, 312 A.2d 38 (1973) and Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 10-12, 331 A.2d 198 (1975). As the United States Supreme Court has stated, the “provisions of the Omnibus Act at issue plainly demarcaté the range of penalties that prosecutors and judges may seek and impose. In light of that specificity, the power that [the legislature] has delegated to those officials is no broader than the authority they routinely exercise in enforcing the criminal laws.” United States v. Batchelder, supra at 442 U.S. 126, 99 S.Ct. at 2205.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the legislature has not improperly delegated its authority under Article II, section 1, and we reverse the trial court’s decision to the contrary.
In declaring sections 606(a) and 606(b) of the Solid Waste Management Act unconstitutional, the lower court has giv[97] en little, if any, consideration to the strong and fundamental presumption of constitutionality that must attend judicial review of a legislative enactment. That presumption is further strengthened in this case by the explicit purpose of the Act to implement Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, a remarkable document expressing our citizens’ entitlement and “right to clean air, pure water, and — to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.” The courts of this Commonwealth, as part of a co-equal branch of government, serve as “trustees” of “Pennsylvania’s public natural resources,” no less than do the executive and legislative branches of government.
The legislature has enacted a comprehensive, flexible and effective piece of legislation in the Solid Waste Management Act, designed to protect the people and the environment from “improper and inadequate solid waste practices [which create] public health hazards, environmental pollution, and economic loss, and cause irreparable harm to the public health, safety and welfare____” Section 102, 35 P.S. § 6018.102. The legislature has reposed in the executive branch (DER, county health departments and municipalities) broad powers of and responsibilities for enforcement and has given the prosecutors a vast array of legal mechanisms with which to battle the tide of pollution and environmental catastrophe that has accompanied man’s “progress” toward a highly mechanized, industrial and disposable society. And, the legislature has instructed the courts that the “terms and provisions of [the Solid Waste Management Act] are to be liberally construed, so as to best achieve and effectuate the goals and purposes hereof.” Section 901, 35 P.S. § 6018.901. As one of the trustees of the public estate and this Commonwealth’s natural resources, we share the duty and obligation to protect and foster the environmental well-being of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Failure to act with vigilance “so as best to achieve and effectuate the goals and purposes” of the Solid Waste Management Act would be detrimental to the public health, safety and [98] welfare, and would be a breach of the public trust. Therefore, we uphold the validity of sections 606(a) and 606(b) of the Act and the authority of the Office of the Attorney General to prosecute appellees for misdemeanors of the third degree for their alleged violation of that Act. Remaining Issues
In their omnibus pre-trial motions, appellees also sought dismissal of the charges on the alternate grounds that the January 25, 1982 multi-county investigating grand jury was not authorized to investigate alleged illegal dumping of solid waste within Erie County, and that the Act was unconstitutional for imposing criminal liability without criminal intent or “mens rea.” The lower court did not address or resolve these issues, given its dismissal of the charges for the reasons discussed above.13
Appellees’ reiterate these arguments on appeal, asking this Court to affirm the lower court on either of these two alternate bases. The Commonwealth has filed an “Application For Relief: Motion to Strike,” asking this Court to strike appellees’ second and third arguments concerning these issues. While we see no need to formally grant the Commonwealth’s Motion to Strike, we agree with the Commonwealth that it would be premature to decide these issues at this time and that it is necessary to remand these matters for resolution in the lower court. We note, however, that the Commonwealth may, indeed, attempt at trial to establish criminal intent and that the lower court will be guided in its determination of the requisite degree of culpability by the terms of the Act and by chapter 3 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 301-315, Culpability.14
[99] For the foregoing reasons:
The order of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County entered August 29, 1984 at Nos. 437, 452, 455 and 494 of 1984 is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion; and
The Commonwealth’s “Application For Relief: Motion to Strike” is denied.
Additionally, we grant the Commonwealth’s “Application For Discontinuance Regarding Parker White Metal Co. Only,” pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. Rules 123 and 1973.15
It is so ordered.
FLAHERTY and McDERMOTT, JJ., join this opinion.
HUTCHINSON, J., joins this opinion except for that portion of the opinion discussing an intermediate equal protection standard of review, and he also files a concurring opinion.
ZAPPALA, J., concurs in the result.
PAPADAKOS, J., files a dissenting opinion, joined by NIX, C.J.