Commonwealth v. Norwood

319 A.2d 908, 456 Pa. 330, 1974 Pa. LEXIS 532

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 23, 1974
• Docket: Appeal, 99
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion by

Mb. Justice Nix,

Appellant Wayne Norwood was convicted of possession of narcotic drugs and sentenced to one year probation. The Superior Court affirmed, per curiam, Commonwealth v. Norwood, 221 Pa. Superior Ct. 714, 288 A. 2d 826 (1972), and we granted allocatur.

The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the lower court erred in denying appellant’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence, and in permitting such evidence to be introduced at trial. Appellant claims that the evidence was obtained as the result of a search incident to an unconstitutional arrest, thereby violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

The evidence at the suppression hearing consisted solely of testimony by Officer Carl Jackson, the arresting officer. Officer Jackson stated that, at about 1:30 p.m. on December 10, 1970, he was informed that one Bo Baines would be selling drugs in the 200 block of S. 60th Street, Philadelphia. The informant had given him information on “about three” prior occasions leading to two arrests. Officer Jackson and his partner went to the location in question and observed “five to six Negro males, known to me as users of drugs” from a distance of twenty-five feet. At about 2:00 p.m., they saw Baines walking north on 60th Street toward the group. One of them, the appellant, approached Baines and passed what appeared to be currency to him. Baines moved his hand, which had been cupped, toward the appellant, and the appellant thrust his hand into his pocket.

From these facts, Officer Jackson concluded that a drug transaction had taken place. He approached the appellant, identified himself, and asked the appellant to remove whatever he had put in his pocket. Appellant handed the officer one glazed packet of a white powder later identified as heroin.

In reviewing a warrantless arrest, we must determine whether the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer at the time, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is commiting a crime. Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 262, 293 A. 2d 33 (1972) ; Commonwealth v. Bishop, 425 Pa. 175, 181, 228 A. 2d 661, 664-65 (1967). “The standards applicable to . . . the officer’s probable-cause assessment at the time of the challenged arrest and search are at least as stringent as the standards applied with respect to the magistrate’s assessment.” Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971). See also, Betrand Appeal, 451 Pa. 381, 303 A. 2d 486 (1973) ; Commonwealth v. Garvin, supra.

Appellant primarily challenges the sufficiency of the informant’s tip to the effect that Baines would be selling drugs. We need not decide whether this tip, standing alone, would meet the requirements of Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), because the arresting officer in this case gained additional crucial information from his personal observations prior to the arrest of appellant.¹

The officer saw a group of men whom he had previously encountered in connection with drug violations. He saw a man whom he personally knew to be a drug pusher approach the group. The appellant then engaged in a surreptitious exchange with that pusher, and the pusher fled at the approach of the police. This information strongly reinforces the tip to the effect that the pusher would be in a given place at a given time selling drugs. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Commonwealth v. Frisby, 451 Pa. 16, 19, 301 A. 2d 610 (1973). “Probable cause does not emanate from an antiseptic courtroom, a sterile library or a sacrosanct adytum, nor is it a pristine ‘philosophical concept existing in a vacuum’, but rather it requires a pragmatic analysis of ‘everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ It is viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer on the scene at the time of the arrest guided by his experience and training. It is ‘a plastic concept whose existence depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.’ Because of the kaleidoscopic myriad that goes into the probable cause mix ‘seldom does a decision in one case handily dispose of the next.’ It is however the totality of these facts and circumstances which is the relevant consideration. Viewed singly these factors may not be dispositive, yet when viewed in unison the puzzle may fit.” [Citation omitted.] United States v. Davis, 458 F. 2d 819, 821 (1972). In our view, Officer Jackson had probable cause to believe that a drug sale had occurred. Therefore, the arrest and search incident thereto were legal.

The judgment of sentence is affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice Jones took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

1 In view of this conclusion, we need not decide whether the suppression judge violated the holding of Commonwealth v. Hall, 451 Pa. 201, 302 A.2d 342 (1973) when he curtailed cross-examination concerning the names of those arrested as a result of the informant’s prior tips. The legality of the arrest is not dependent upon the prior reliability of the informant under these facts.