Commonwealth v. Miller

130 A.3d 1, 2015 Pa. Super. 241, 2015 Pa. Super. LEXIS 756, 2015 WL 7421385
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedNovember 20, 2015
Docket467 EDA 2015
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 130 A.3d 1 (Commonwealth v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Miller, 130 A.3d 1, 2015 Pa. Super. 241, 2015 Pa. Super. LEXIS 756, 2015 WL 7421385 (Pa. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

OPINION BY OTT, J.:

Frederick H. Miller appeals the judgment of sentence imposed December 8, 2014, in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court conducted a bench trial that same day, and found Miller guilty of possession of a small amount of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. 1 Miller was sentenced to a term of. six months’ probation for the possession of paraphernalia charge and a $300 fine of the possession of marijuana charge. He raises one issue on appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment of sentence on that charge, and remand for resentencing.

*2 The facts underlying Miller’s , arrest and conviction were summarized by the trial court as follows: ■

Officer William McCollum is a police officer with the Yeadon Borough Police Department and has been so' employed for ’ ten to twelve years. Sergeant Thomas Reynolds has been employed with the Yeadon Borough Police Department for twenty-eight years. On April 10, 2014, at approximately 12:14 p.m., Officer McCollum was on duty and had the occasion to respond to the’ area of Darnell Avenue and Yeadon Avenue, in Yeadon, Delaware County for a call of drug activity around two parked vehicles. Sergeant Reynolds was also on duty and responded to the same call in a separate vehicle, arriving around 'the same time as Officer McCollum.
Upon arrival, Officer McCollum and Sergeant Reynolds saw three males outside of a vehicle and another male sitting in the driver seat of the second vehicle. [Miller] 'was standing outside on the passenger side of one of the vehicles, namely a black Dodge Charger. As the officers approached the males, there was a strong odor of burnt marijuana fin the area around both vehicles and the males. After smelling the marijuana, all' three males standing outside the vehicles, including [Miller], were detained. The male inside the second-vehicle, last name of Washington, was asked to- step out and was also detained.
The officers asked if anyone had marijuana or any other narcotics on their person. All of the males responded in the negative. Officer McCollum asked for consent to search the vehicles, which were both rentals. The individuals who rented the vehicles signed the consent to search forms. While searching the black Dodge Charger, Officer McCollum located a partially burnt cigar between the driver’s seat and the center console. Officer McCollum broke part of the cigarette wrapping open and the contents were field tested.1
1The suspected marijuana was later sent and tested in the laboratory. The laboratory report was stipulated to by counsel for both parties and entered into evidence [at trial].
Once Officer McCollum realized it was a marijuana cigarette, he relayed this information to Sergeant Reynolds. After receiving this information, Sergeant Reynolds informed the driver of the vehicle that he was under arrest, at which time [Miller] stated: “No. Those drags are mine.” Sergeant Reynolds asked “Are you sure they’re your drugs?” [Miller] responded, “Yes.” [Sergeant Reynolds testified that Miller then stated “he didn’t want to see the driver get in any trouble because the driver was on probation or parole.”] At this point, Sergeant Reynolds told [Miller] he was under arrest for possession.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/2015, at 1-2 (record citations omitted).

Miller was charged with one count of possession of a small amount of. marijuana and one count of possession of drag paraphernalia. His case proceeded to a non-jury trial on December 8, 2014. After the trial court found him guilty of both charges, he was immediately sentenced to a term of six months’ probation for the paraphernalia charge and a $300 fine for the simple possession charge. Miller filed a timely motion for reconsideration of sentence, which the trial court denied on January 13,2015. This appeal followed. 2

*3 On appeal, Miller challenges the sufficiency of the evidence -supporting his conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia, which was based solely upon the burnt paper surrounding the marijuana cigarette recovered from the vehicle. Acknowledging the lack of appellate decisions on this issue, Miller, claims “the definition of drug paraphernalia as set forth in [35 P.S.] § 780-102 cannot plausibly be interpreted to include that portion of a marijuana cigarette that is not actually a controlled substance.” Miller’s Brief at 16. He notes “the burned wrappings of a marijuana cigarette” are not included in the list of items defined as drug paraphernalia in the statute, and the Legislature could not have intended to expose a defendant in possession of “nothing more than a half-smoked joint, to punishment for more than one crime.” Id. at Í5. Rather, Miller asserts the more “reasonable view” is that “the cigarette (or blunt as the case may be), in all its parts, constitutes possession of marijuana on the whole[,]” Id. at 16.

In the present case, Miller’s sufficiency argument-focuses upon an interpretation of “The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act” (“the Drug Act”), 35 P.S. ’§ 780-101 et seq. Accordingly, our review is as follows:

These are questions of law, to which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Bowling v. Office of Open Records, 621 Pa. 133, 75 A.3d 453, 466 (2013); Anderson v. McAfoos, 618 Pa. 478, 57 A.3d 1141, 1148 (2012). Additionally, because the legal issues are premised on the,sufficiency of the evidence, the record is read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, with the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pagan, 597 Pa. 69, 950 A.2d 270, 278 (2008).
Moreover, in this endeavor we are guided by the well settled principles of statutory construction. The purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). In this respect, the language of the statute is the best indication of this intent; accordingly, where the words of the statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Id., § 1921(b). Only in the event of an ambiguity may we consider other aspects of the statute and the statutory process, and may we discern the General Assembly’s intent by considering, inter alia, the various factors listed in the Statutory Construction Act, Id., § 1921(c). See Commonwealth v. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 926 A.2d 957, 962 (2007).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
130 A.3d 1, 2015 Pa. Super. 241, 2015 Pa. Super. LEXIS 756, 2015 WL 7421385, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-miller-pasuperct-2015.