Commonwealth v. Miller

318 N.E.2d 909, 366 Mass. 387, 1974 Mass. LEXIS 730

• Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
• Decided: November 14, 1974
• Status: Published

Opinions

Reardon, J.

The Commonwealth appeals under G. L. c. 278, § 28E, from an order allowing in part the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence in cases involving narcotic charges. The trial judge made findings of fact in part as follows. A special officer of the Amherst police department, acting on the possibility that a Ford Econoline van was not properly registered, stopped it as it pulled away from the curb in an Amherst street. On request the operator handed the officer the registration of the van and alighted from the van, at which time the officer observed a “clear plastic packet containing a green substance protruding about an inch and a half from the left pocket of the garment that the operator was wearing.” From his prior experience the officer believed this to be marihuana and thereupon seized it, placing the operator of the van under arrest and simultaneously also placing the other four occupants of the motor vehicle under arrest. He radioed for assistance and two additional officers responded, at which time the four occupants of the van were ordered to alight, being then transported immediately to the Amherst police station a short distance away. “At the time of the arrest the officer did not know of any other marijuana that was present in the car nor did he suspect the presence of any other contraband in the car.” It was dark, there was no lighting inside the van, and it would have been impossible for the officer to have observed a knapsack with protruding marihuana inside the van that he testified to having seen. There was no indication that anyone had been smoking marihuana in the van. The judge found that the arresting officer had no warrant when he searched the van at the spot where he had stopped it, and after the occupants had been placed in custody and transported to the police station at a time when he was in complete charge and control of the van, and when there was no likelihood that the van would be removed because of the exclusive control of the Amherst police. He further found that the officer had engaged in an unreasonable search and seizure. The motion to suppress evidence of the articles in the van was allowed but was denied as to the plastic bag and its contents taken from the operator.

The allowance of the motion was erroneous. If at the moment of the arrest the officer had probable cause to search the van it is indisputable that the resulting search was proper. Commonwealth v. Rand, 363 Mass. 554, 558-560 (1973). Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 52 (1970). Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 463 (1971). Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 592-596 (1974). The difficulty seems to be that the trial judge found “that at the time the search began the officer had no probable cause to believe that there was other contraband present.” It is argued that this precludes our determination as to whether there was probable cause and that the Chambers case is therefore inapplicable. But the judge’s conclusion on probable cause is a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact. The very purpose of our review under G. L. c. 278, § 28E, is to assess the judge’s conclusion on probable cause or its absence on the facts found. This becomes obvious when a reverse decision is made as to whether there were sufficient facts to support the judge’s finding that there was probable cause. See Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, ante, 51 (1974). Thus the judge’s conclusion of probable cause or no probable cause cannot foreclose our inquiry into its existence.

In this instance one of the occupants of the van had said on the approach of the special officer, “Let’s go, here come the cops.” The officer thereupon observed marihuana in the pocket of the driver. It seems clear that probable cause existed to believe that further drugs might be found in the van. There are numerous Federal cases in which it has been found that the observation of contraband in a vehicle or on the person of an occupant of a vehicle provides probable cause for a complete search for more contraband. United States v. Bourassa, 411 F. 2d 69, 72 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. den. 396 U. S. 915 (1969). Meade v. Cox, 438 F. 2d 323 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. den. sub nom. Meade v. Slayton, 404 U. S. 910 (1971). United States v. Ragsdale, 470 F. 2d 24, 28-30 (5th Cir. 1972). United States v. Henderson, 472 F. 2d 157 (6th Cir. 1973).¹

Furthermore, as was said in White v. United States, 448 F. 2d 250, 254 (8th Cir. 1971): “Nor does the fact that at the time of the search, the officers did not completely and correctly articulate their grounds for the search invalidate it, if in fact from an objective standpoint probable cause existed. ‘The test of probable cause is not the articulation of the policeman’s subjective theory but the objective view of the facts.’ ” Commonwealth v. Lawton, 348 Mass. 129 (1964). Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F. 2d 699, 702 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. den. 374 U. S. 807 (1963). Smith v. United States, 402 F. 2d 771 (9th Cir. 1968). Klinger v. United States, 409 F. 2d 299, 304 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. den. 396 U. S. 859 (1969). Dodd v. Beto, 435 F. 2d 868, 870 (5th Cir. 1970).

It follows that the order of the trial judge to the extent that it allowed the defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

1 We do not see that St. 1974, c. 508, “An Act regulating searches conducted incident to an arrest,” amending G. L. c. 276, § 1, is applicable in this instance.