Commonwealth v. Mfouad Faris.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-1275
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1275

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

MFOUAD FARIS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of

involuntary manslaughter, G. L. c. 265, § 13, and motor vehicle

homicide by reckless operation, G. L. c. 90, § 24G (c). The

defendant contends that the Commonwealth's evidence was

insufficient to prove reckless conduct. The defendant also

argues, and the Commonwealth concedes, that the convictions of

motor vehicle homicide and manslaughter are duplicative. We

affirm the conviction of manslaughter and reverse the conviction

of motor vehicle homicide by reckless operation.

Background. On October 9, 2021, the defendant was out with

friends, including the victim, at a bar in Worcester. The

defendant was telling his friends about his recently purchased car, a Mitsubishi Lancer of the type featured in the street

racing film franchise, "Fast & Furious." The defendant said his

Mitsubishi had been modified "to make it go a little faster."

One friend, who drove a white BMW sedan, responded, "Stop

talking about it. I will beat it." The defendant and the BMW

driver had raced before. They agreed that night to race "at the

last light," located at the intersection of Summer Street,

Thomas Street, and Prospect Street in Worcester.

They drove to the intersection, passing other vehicles on

the road. The victim was in the back seat of the defendant's

car. The defendant pulled his Mitsubishi into the left-turn-

only lane alongside the BMW. They began "revving the engine[s],

the light turned green," and "[they] both took off" straight

ahead down Summer Street and onto Goldsberry Street. The

defendant drove northbound in the southbound lane. The two cars

continued at pace side by side "around the bend" of Goldsberry

Street. They were traveling double the speed limit at

approximately 60 miles per hour. As the defendant overtook the

BMW and attempted to reenter the northbound lane, he lost

control of his Mitsubishi and "spun out" into the other lane.

The defendant's Mitsubishi hit the front of an oncoming car and

careened through a fence into the Worcester police department

parking lot, where it hit a wall and came to rest. The victim

was ejected out of the back windshield of the defendant's

2 Mitsubishi onto the pavement. She died from the resulting

"blunt impact injuries of [her] head and torso."

Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. "In

reviewing a denial of a motion for a required finding of not

guilty, our inquiry is whether the evidence, viewed in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to satisfy a

rational trier of fact that the essential elements of the crime

have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v.

Vazquez, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 622, 626 (2007). "In satisfying that

test, the Commonwealth may rely on reasonable inferences drawn

from circumstantial evidence." Id., quoting Commonwealth v.

Degro, 432 Mass. 319, 325 (2000).

"Involuntary manslaughter arises where death is caused by

wanton or reckless conduct -- that is, 'intentional conduct that

create[s] a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will

result to another person.'" Commonwealth v. Njuguna, 495 Mass.

770, 781 (2025), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 494 Mass. 288,

297 (2024). The defendant need not "inten[d] to cause the

specific harm," but only "inten[d] to engage in the wanton or

reckless conduct itself." Njuguna, supra. The Commonwealth can

prove intent "either subjectively, based on the defendant's

specific knowledge, or objectively, based on what a reasonable

person should have known in the circumstances." Id.

3 The defendant was racing in the street when he crashed.

The area was well lit and the road was dry. Despite the late

hour, there were other vehicles on the road. In the moments

before the accident, the defendant was speeding into the

oncoming lane at almost double the speed limit. He failed to

control his Mitsubishi, spun out, and slammed tail first into an

oncoming car, sending his Mitsubishi into the parking lot and

the victim out of the back windshield.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

this evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. See

Njuguna, 495 Mass. at 782-783 (traveling at excessive speed,

weaving between lanes, and attempting to pass vehicles in

dangerous manner may constitute wanton or reckless conduct

sufficient for manslaughter conviction); Commonwealth v.

DeSimone, 349 Mass. 770, 770-771 (1965) (weaving through traffic

and hazardous passing may constitute wanton or reckless conduct

sufficient for manslaughter conviction).

The defendant argues that he was no longer in the wrong

lane when he lost control, so any reckless conduct ended before

the accident and thus could not have caused the victim's death.

We are not persuaded. "Conduct is a proximate cause of death if

the conduct, 'by the natural and continuous sequence of events,

causes the death and without which the death would not have

occurred.'" Commonwealth v. Carlson, 447 Mass. 79, 83 (2006),

4 quoting Commonwealth v. Rosado, 434 Mass. 197, 202, cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 963 (2001). Viewed in the light most favorable

to the Commonwealth, the evidence supports a finding that the

blunt impact injuries that caused the victim's death "would not

have occurred" except for the "natural and continuous sequence

of events" arising from the defendant's racing at double the

speed limit between the correct lane and oncoming traffic.

Carlson, supra, quoting Rosado, supra. Regardless of whether

the defendant was in the proper or improper lane when he lost

control, it was his driving that caused the accident and the

victim's death.

2. Duplicative conviction. The defendant also asserts

that a conviction of motor vehicle homicide by reckless

operation is duplicative of a conviction of involuntary

manslaughter. The Commonwealth concedes as much, and having

conducted an independent examination of the issue, we agree.

See Commonwealth v. Poirier, 458 Mass. 1014, 1015 (2010). In

Njuguna, 495 Mass. at 771, the Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed

the holding of Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. 387, 394-395

(1981), that a conviction of motor vehicle homicide is

duplicative of a conviction of involuntary manslaughter. See

id. at 394 ("If involuntary manslaughter by reckless driving in

public is proved, homicide by negligently [or recklessly]

operating to endanger is proved as well"). Because we uphold

5 the defendant's conviction of involuntary manslaughter, we

reverse the conviction of motor vehicle homicide.

Conclusion. The order denying the defendant's

postconviction motion to vacate duplicative conviction is

reversed. On indictment no. 21-0332-2, charging motor vehicle

homicide by reckless operation, the judgment is vacated, the

verdict is set aside, and the indictment is to be dismissed. On

indictment no. 21-0332-1, charging involuntary manslaughter, the

judgment is affirmed.

So ordered.

By the Court (Shin, Grant & Hershfang, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: October 15, 2025.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.