NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1140
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
MELIK HARRISON.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
In April 2023, the defendant was charged in the District
Court with armed burglary, G. L. c. 266, § 14 (count 1); putting
a person in fear for the purpose of stealing from a safe, G. L.
c. 265, § 21 (count 2); larceny over $1,200, G. L. c. 266,
§ 30 (1) (count 3); three counts of assault with a dangerous
weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b) (counts 4, 8, and 9); two counts
of larceny from a person, G. L. c. 266, § 25 (b) (counts 5 and
10); malicious destruction of property over $1,200, G. L.
c. 266, § 127 (count 6); breaking and entering into a vehicle at
night to commit a felony, G. L. c. 266, § 16 (count 7); and home
invasion, G. L. c. 265, § 18C (count 11). After a trial, the
jury convicted the defendant of count 6, malicious destruction of property over $1,200.1 Because we are satisfied that the
evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt on count
6 and that any abuse of discretion in the admission of the
evidence the defendant challenges on appeal did not amount to
prejudicial error, we affirm.
Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. First, the
defendant challenges the judge's denial of his motions for a
required finding of not guilty at the close of the
Commonwealth's evidence.2 In evaluating the defendant's
sufficiency claim, we ask whether the trial evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, would permit a
rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Latimore,
378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979). We bear in mind that guilt may
be established by circumstantial evidence and that inferences
drawn from the trial evidence "need only be reasonable and
1 Before trial, and at the Commonwealth's request, a judge dismissed counts 1, 2, and 11. The trial judge dismissed counts 3, 4, and 7 without objection. The trial judge also found the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction on count 5, thus requiring a finding of not guilty, although we note that the docket entry for that charge reflects that it was "dismissed." The jury acquitted the defendant of counts 8, 9, and 10.
2 As was his right, the defendant did not present any evidence at trial, and so there was no occasion for him to renew his motion for a required finding at the close of all the evidence.
2 possible and need not be necessary or inescapable."
Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 800 (2021), quoting
Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 173 (1980).
Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence sufficient to
permit the finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was one of two men who "knowingly participated in the commission
of the crime charged" -- in this case, malicious destruction of
property over $1,200 -- "and that the defendant had or shared
the required criminal intent." Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454
Mass. 449, 467 (2009). See Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass.
686, 700-701 (2003) ("To succeed on a joint venture theory, the
Commonwealth need not prove the identity of the actual
perpetrator . . ."). See Commonwealth v. Redmond, 53 Mass. App.
Ct. 1, 3-4 (2001) (crime of "[w]ilful and malicious destruction
of property" requires proof that defendant acted out of
"cruelty, hostility or revenge"). The jury could have credited
the Commonwealth's evidence that the defendant borrowed a key
fob that allowed him to access the apartment complex. By
comparing the apartment complex's records of when that key fob
was used with recordings made by apartment surveillance cameras
on the same dates and times, the police were able to capture
still images of the defendant using the fob to enter the
building on March 7 and 11, 2023. The jury saw those
photographs and could have compared them to the defendant, who
3 was present at the trial, and to other images taken from
surveillance recordings made when two men, matching the
description of the suspects, used the same key fob to enter the
complex around the time of the crime. In the photographs taken
on the night of the crime, the two men had their faces covered,
but based on the loan of the key fob, the records of usage of
the key fob, and all the still photographs, the jury could have
found that the smaller of the two intruders was the defendant.
See Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450
Mass. 215 (2007), and 460 Mass. 12 (2011) ("evidence of a
defendant's guilt may be primarily or entirely circumstantial");
Commonwealth v. Pardee, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 496, 503-504 (2025)
(sufficiency of evidence, including evidence of identity,
determined on consideration of "totality of the evidence"). Cf.
Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 463-464 (2021) (taken
together, evidence of defendant's location established by global
positioning system monitor, witness's description of shooter,
and video recording of gunman fleeing scene were sufficient to
establish that defendant was shooter, even where video recording
did not clearly show shooter's face).
As to the defendant's malicious intent and his role in the
damage to the victim's apartment door, the jury could have found
that shortly after the defendant and his companion entered the
building, they sought entry into an occupied apartment and, when
4 they were refused, repeatedly kicked the door until it broke.
Witnesses testified that the suspects then pushed a gun through
the opening and came into the apartment where they held the
occupants at gunpoint and terrorized them over the course of
forty-five minutes. Where the jury could have concluded that
the damage to the door was part of the intruders' attempt to
intimidate and overpower the apartment's occupants, and not
merely to gain entry to the apartment for the purpose of
stealing, the evidence of the defendant's malicious intent was
sufficient.3 Cf. Redmond, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 5, quoting
Commonwealth v. Wynn, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 452, 456 (1997)
(destruction of doors was merely means to end goal of theft "and
was not 'gratuitous, excessive violence purposefully designed to
intimidate and overpower'"). "It was for the fact finder . . .
to determine whether the defendant's actions were malicious."
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 227, 233 (2012). See
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 144-145 (2016)
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1140
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
MELIK HARRISON.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
In April 2023, the defendant was charged in the District
Court with armed burglary, G. L. c. 266, § 14 (count 1); putting
a person in fear for the purpose of stealing from a safe, G. L.
c. 265, § 21 (count 2); larceny over $1,200, G. L. c. 266,
§ 30 (1) (count 3); three counts of assault with a dangerous
weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b) (counts 4, 8, and 9); two counts
of larceny from a person, G. L. c. 266, § 25 (b) (counts 5 and
10); malicious destruction of property over $1,200, G. L.
c. 266, § 127 (count 6); breaking and entering into a vehicle at
night to commit a felony, G. L. c. 266, § 16 (count 7); and home
invasion, G. L. c. 265, § 18C (count 11). After a trial, the
jury convicted the defendant of count 6, malicious destruction of property over $1,200.1 Because we are satisfied that the
evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt on count
6 and that any abuse of discretion in the admission of the
evidence the defendant challenges on appeal did not amount to
prejudicial error, we affirm.
Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. First, the
defendant challenges the judge's denial of his motions for a
required finding of not guilty at the close of the
Commonwealth's evidence.2 In evaluating the defendant's
sufficiency claim, we ask whether the trial evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, would permit a
rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Latimore,
378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979). We bear in mind that guilt may
be established by circumstantial evidence and that inferences
drawn from the trial evidence "need only be reasonable and
1 Before trial, and at the Commonwealth's request, a judge dismissed counts 1, 2, and 11. The trial judge dismissed counts 3, 4, and 7 without objection. The trial judge also found the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction on count 5, thus requiring a finding of not guilty, although we note that the docket entry for that charge reflects that it was "dismissed." The jury acquitted the defendant of counts 8, 9, and 10.
2 As was his right, the defendant did not present any evidence at trial, and so there was no occasion for him to renew his motion for a required finding at the close of all the evidence.
2 possible and need not be necessary or inescapable."
Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 800 (2021), quoting
Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 173 (1980).
Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence sufficient to
permit the finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was one of two men who "knowingly participated in the commission
of the crime charged" -- in this case, malicious destruction of
property over $1,200 -- "and that the defendant had or shared
the required criminal intent." Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454
Mass. 449, 467 (2009). See Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass.
686, 700-701 (2003) ("To succeed on a joint venture theory, the
Commonwealth need not prove the identity of the actual
perpetrator . . ."). See Commonwealth v. Redmond, 53 Mass. App.
Ct. 1, 3-4 (2001) (crime of "[w]ilful and malicious destruction
of property" requires proof that defendant acted out of
"cruelty, hostility or revenge"). The jury could have credited
the Commonwealth's evidence that the defendant borrowed a key
fob that allowed him to access the apartment complex. By
comparing the apartment complex's records of when that key fob
was used with recordings made by apartment surveillance cameras
on the same dates and times, the police were able to capture
still images of the defendant using the fob to enter the
building on March 7 and 11, 2023. The jury saw those
photographs and could have compared them to the defendant, who
3 was present at the trial, and to other images taken from
surveillance recordings made when two men, matching the
description of the suspects, used the same key fob to enter the
complex around the time of the crime. In the photographs taken
on the night of the crime, the two men had their faces covered,
but based on the loan of the key fob, the records of usage of
the key fob, and all the still photographs, the jury could have
found that the smaller of the two intruders was the defendant.
See Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450
Mass. 215 (2007), and 460 Mass. 12 (2011) ("evidence of a
defendant's guilt may be primarily or entirely circumstantial");
Commonwealth v. Pardee, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 496, 503-504 (2025)
(sufficiency of evidence, including evidence of identity,
determined on consideration of "totality of the evidence"). Cf.
Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 463-464 (2021) (taken
together, evidence of defendant's location established by global
positioning system monitor, witness's description of shooter,
and video recording of gunman fleeing scene were sufficient to
establish that defendant was shooter, even where video recording
did not clearly show shooter's face).
As to the defendant's malicious intent and his role in the
damage to the victim's apartment door, the jury could have found
that shortly after the defendant and his companion entered the
building, they sought entry into an occupied apartment and, when
4 they were refused, repeatedly kicked the door until it broke.
Witnesses testified that the suspects then pushed a gun through
the opening and came into the apartment where they held the
occupants at gunpoint and terrorized them over the course of
forty-five minutes. Where the jury could have concluded that
the damage to the door was part of the intruders' attempt to
intimidate and overpower the apartment's occupants, and not
merely to gain entry to the apartment for the purpose of
stealing, the evidence of the defendant's malicious intent was
sufficient.3 Cf. Redmond, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 5, quoting
Commonwealth v. Wynn, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 452, 456 (1997)
(destruction of doors was merely means to end goal of theft "and
was not 'gratuitous, excessive violence purposefully designed to
intimidate and overpower'"). "It was for the fact finder . . .
to determine whether the defendant's actions were malicious."
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 227, 233 (2012). See
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 144-145 (2016)
(evidence of malice sufficient where defendant kicked victim's
door because she was "enraged" by location of vehicle in
3 It is noteworthy that none of the cases on which the defendant relies to support this aspect of his argument involve damage done to gain access to an occupied dwelling. See Commonwealth v. Doyle, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 388-389 (2013), S.C., 472 Mass. 1002 (2015) (breaking into automated teller machine); Redmond, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 2-3 (early morning breaking and entry into office building).
5 driveway); Commonwealth v. Domingue, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 987, 989–
990 (1984) (sufficient malice demonstrated by defendant's firing
handgun into bar to frighten bartender); Commonwealth v.
Peruzzi, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 437, 443 (1983) (malicious
destruction of property requires "state of mind of cruelty,
hostility or revenge").
Even without direct evidence of who broke the door, the
jury could have found that the defendant's presence at the door
when it was kicked in "was not a chance occurrence,"
Commonwealth v. Pope, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 505, 510-511 (1983), and
that the defendant was at least "present, able and ready to
assist" in doing the damage. Commonwealth v. Pasteur, 66 Mass.
App. Ct. 812, 819 (2006). As such, the evidence was sufficient
to establish the defendant's guilt. See Commonwealth v. McCray,
93 Mass. App. Ct. 835, 843 (2018).
2. Admissibility of photographic evidence. As we note
above, the judge admitted in evidence still photographs derived
from the apartment complex's March 7 and March 11 surveillance
footage. He did so over defense counsel's objection on the
first day of trial4 that, although she received still photographs
4 Defense counsel also raised challenges to the March 7 and March 11 photographs based on her determination that it was not possible to identify the person depicted in them. The defendant does not raise this argument on appeal.
6 derived from the video surveillance footage, the underlying
videotapes that the prosecutor provided to her would not play,
an argument the defendant frames on appeal as a Brady violation.
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
"To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that (1) material information was in the possession of the prosecutor or those police who are participants in the investigation and presentation of the case; (2) the information tended to exculpate him; and (3) the prosecutor failed to disclose the evidence. . . . The so-called Brady obligation is one of disclosure; it imposes no obligation on the prosecution to gather evidence or conduct additional investigation." (Quotation and citations omitted.)
Commonwealth v. Caillot, 454 Mass. 245, 261–262 (2009), cert.
denied, 559 U.S. 948 (2010). "Evidence is exculpatory if it
'provides some significant aid to the defendant's case, whether
it furnishes corroboration of the defendant's story, calls into
question a material, although not indispensable, element of the
prosecution's version of the events, or challenges the
credibility of a key prosecution witness.'" Commonwealth v.
Watkins, 473 Mass. 222, 231 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v.
Daniels, 445 Mass. 392, 401-402 (2005). See Commonwealth v.
Cintron, 438 Mass. 779, 784 (2003) ("A defendant who seeks
relief from the loss or destruction of potentially exculpatory
evidence has the initial burden to establish a reasonable
possibility . . . that access . . . would have produced evidence
favorable to his cause" [quotations and citations omitted]). On
review, we discern no constitutional violation stemming from the
7 unplayable videotapes nor abuse of discretion in the judge's
decision to admit the photographs.
The evidence presented at trial established that the still
photographs reflected the specific dates and times on which the
borrowed key fob was used within the footage obtained from the
motion-activated cameras.5 Given the specificity of the relevant
timeframes -- that is, the times at which the borrowed fob was
used -- we see little, if any, likelihood that the video footage
featuring dates and times other than those for which the stills
were taken would have shown potentially exculpatory evidence of
"other tenants and visitors entering or exiting the apartment
complex."6 Where the requirements for proving a Brady violation
are conjunctive, see Caillot, 454 Mass. at 261-262, the
defendant's failure to show that the video recordings in the
Commonwealth's control were exculpatory, and the defendant's
resulting failure to show that he was prejudiced by his
inability to view them, is fatal to his challenge stemming from
5 The police also had a photograph from May 19, 2023, that was unconnected to the use of the key fob; defense counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude that photograph. The judge excluded that photograph as not relevant, and it is not at issue in this appeal.
6 The only videotape that defense counsel "was able to play was the one that came from the date of the actual offense," so she had access to the video footage that may have shown people other than the defendant entering or leaving around the time of the crime.
8 the Commonwealth's failure to provide legible copies of the
video recordings in its control.
3. Other evidentiary challenges. a. Lay opinion
testimony about photographs. Over the defendant's objection,
the prosecutor was permitted to show his witness, a police
officer, two still photographs -- one showing a lone man
entering the apartment complex on March 11, 2023, wearing a
black hooded sweatshirt with a zipper and with his face visible,
and the second showing the two intruders on the night of the
crime -- and then to elicit both the witness's description of
what the intruders were wearing and the witness's opinion that
one of them was wearing the same sweatshirt that appeared on the
person in the March 11 photograph. We agree that where the
officer had no greater familiarity with the defendant than the
jury did, and where his testimony would not enable the jury to
more reliably determine whether any of the photographs in
evidence depicted the defendant, his testimony about the
photographs should not have been admitted. See Commonwealth v.
Gomez, 495 Mass. 688, 696 (2025) ("The identification of an
individual from a photograph or video image is an expression of
lay opinion"); Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass. 455, 476 (2022)
("Where the jury are capable of viewing video or photographic
evidence and drawing their own conclusions regarding what is
depicted, a lay witness's testimony about the content of the
9 video or photographs is admissible only if it would assist the
jury in reaching more reliable conclusions"). See also
Commonwealth v. Vacher, 469 Mass. 425, 441-442 (2014). We are
not, however, persuaded that the error was prejudicial. See
Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994) (prejudicial
error standard); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 91 Mass. App. Ct.
580, 585, 593 (2017) (admission of lay opinion testimony is
reviewed for abuse of discretion and, where objection was
preserved, prejudice to defendant). Given the substantial
evidence tying the defendant to the crime through his use of the
borrowed key fob and the ability of jurors to view the
photographs and make their own determination as to what they
could see, we conclude that the officer's testimony about his
interpretation of the still photographs was likely to have had
"but very slight effect" on the jury's verdict, and we are not
persuaded that the error requires us to disturb the judgment.
See Flebotte, supra, quoting Peruzzi, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 445.
Contrast Grier, 490 Mass. at 477-478 (assuming error in
admission of lay opinion about photographs but discerning no
prejudice where witness did not "actually identify[] the
defendant as the individual seen in them"), with Commonwealth v.
Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 476-477 (2019) (reversing conviction
where improper lay opinion was "extensive" and permeated
prosecutor's closing argument).
10 b. Evidence of county employee's identification of
defendant. The judge allowed the same officer to testify on
direct examination that he showed the still photographs to a
named county employee who was quickly "able to identify the
person in those photographs."7 The officer's testimony did not
include the name of the person whom the county employee
identified. Assuming without deciding that the judge erred in
permitting the officer to testify to the fact that the county
official recognized the person in the photograph, we discern no
prejudice caused by that testimony. See Flebotte, 417 Mass. at
353 (prejudicial error standard). The officer was not asked
whom the county employee recognized the person in the photograph
as, and as discussed below, the county employee did not give
testimony regarding the person he identified.8 Where the judge's
7 Defense counsel objected to the question, "And when you showed [the county employee] these photographs, was he able to identify the person in those photographs?" The officer was permitted to answer, "He was." Over objection, the officer was allowed to testify that the county employee made the identification "within 10 [to] 15 seconds."
8 Because neither the officer's testimony about the county employee's recognition of the person depicted in the still photograph nor the county employee's own testimony included an identification of the defendant, we do not agree with the defendant that his constitutional rights were infringed here, and we therefore do not rely on the constitutional standard of review requiring determination whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Commonwealth v. Vardinski, 438 Mass. 444, 449-450 (2003) (concluding that right to cross- examine in one-witness identification case was closely linked to
11 instructions to the jury included a prohibition on speculating
about matters outside the trial evidence, we discern no
prejudice stemming from either the officer's testimony about the
county employee's identification or the county employee's own
testimony. See Gomez, 495 Mass. at 697 (no error in admission
of compilation videotape where no witness identified defendant
as shooter); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 473 Mass. 415, 427 (2015)
(jurors are presumed to follow judge's instructions on law).
c. County employee's testimony. The defendant moved in
limine to preclude the county employee -- mentioned in the
officer's testimony -- from testifying. The Commonwealth
intended to call the county employee to identify the defendant
based on the employee's past professional familiarity with him.
See Commonwealth v. Pleas, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 325-327
(2000). We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's order
denying the defendant's motion in limine. See id. Even if we
were to conclude otherwise, we would discern no prejudice
stemming from the judge's decision because the county employee
was excused after testifying only to his name, age, and
employer. Whatever the prosecutor's intentions were in calling
the county employee, that witness did not make any
constitutional right to put on defense and, therefore, any error was thus reversible unless harmless beyond reasonable doubt).
12 identification of the defendant. Cf. Gomez, 495 Mass. at 697.
As we have already discussed, the judge instructed the jury that
they were not to engage in any speculation outside the evidence
presented at trial. Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 718
(2000) (proper jury instructions minimize risk of prejudice).
Lastly, the prosecutor did not mention the county employee in
either his opening statement or his closing argument.
4. Commonwealth's argument. "The proper function of an
opening is to outline in a general way the nature of the case
which the counsel expects to be able to prove or support by
evidence" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456 Mass.
182, 188 (2010). "The prosecutor's expectation must be
'reasonable and grounded in good faith.'" Id., quoting
Commonwealth v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 451, 456 (1978). In a closing
argument, "[t]he prosecutor is entitled to argue the evidence
and fair inferences to be drawn therefrom." Commonwealth v.
Paradise, 405 Mass. 141, 152 (1989). We evaluate the
prosecutor's opening statement and closing argument in their
entirety and in light of both the judge's instructions to the
jury and the evidence introduced at trial. See Davis, 487 Mass.
at 468-469 (opening statements); Commonwealth v. Lamrini, 392
Mass. 427, 432 (1984) (closing arguments). In his brief, the
defendant contends that in the prosecutor's opening statement
and closing argument the prosecutor "improperly suggested the
13 jury identify [the defendant] from grainy, low-resolution
surveillance photographs," and in doing so, "told the jury that
it was [the defendant] in the photos." The defendant did not
raise these objections at trial, so to the extent that we
discern error, our review is for a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Marquetty, 416
Mass. 445, 450 (1993).
We discern no error here. We do not agree that in his
opening statement the prosecutor "told the jury that it was [the
defendant] in the photos." Instead, we read the opening
statement as a proper description of the evidence the prosecutor
expected to present to the jury and the conclusions he
anticipated the jurors would be able to draw from that evidence.
See Gomez, 495 Mass. at 698-699.
The prosecutor's closing argument was likewise within
permissible bounds. Unlike in Davis, 487 Mass. at 469, the
resolution of the March 7 and March 11 photographs was adequate
to allow the jury to discern at least some of the subject's
facial features and to permit the jury to compare the
photographs to the defendant, who was present at the trial. Cf.
id. ("The video is not high enough resolution and is taken from
too far away to be able to discern any features of the shooter's
face"). There was nothing improper in the prosecutor's
suggesting that the jury make that comparison and draw the
14 conclusion that the photographs depicted the defendant. See
Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 381 Mass. 306, 316 (1980).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Hand, Hodgens & Tan, JJ.9),
Clerk
Entered: December 19, 2025.
9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.