Commonwealth v. Meggs
This text of 565 N.E.2d 1249 (Commonwealth v. Meggs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Subsequent to the defendant’s conviction 1 in October, 1973, on four counts of assault while armed in a dwelling, and of rape, scientific tests to identify the blood grouping of semen donors became acceptable as evidence in criminal cases. Such tests were not available at the time of the defendant’s trial. 2
*112 On August 27, 1982, a judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendant’s postjudgment motion to produce evidence for analysis by the defendant’s expert to be conducted in California. In September, 1984, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on the results of those tests. For a reason not disclosed in the record, the motion was not acted upon until August 10, 1988.
This appeal is from the denial of that motion by a Superior Court judge without an evidentiary hearing. In support of the motion for a new trial, the defendant filed an analytical report dated November 24, 1982, by Brian Wraxall of the Serological Research Institute in California, supplemented by an undated affidavit.* * 3 Wraxall’s affidavit interpreted the report and set forth that he had received from the Commonwealth the underpants introduced at trial and, from defense counsel, samples of blood, saliva and semen from the defendant. The underpants stain was subjected to a number of tests. Wraxall tested for semen and found a concentration high enough that, if the donor were a secretor, his blood group substances would have been detected by a test known as the absorption-inhibition test. Wraxall found no ABO blood group substances using that test, which led him to conclude that the semen donor must be a nonsecretor. 4 That the *113 donor was a nonsecretor was confirmed by the Lewis system of grouping.* 5
Because Wraxall did not have blood samples from the victim (see note 4, supra), he could not be sure of the exact ABO type of the semen donor, but the analysis showed that the donor was a nonsecretor. Since the defendant is an ABO type A secretor, Wraxall concluded that “the semen could not have originated from Dennis Meggs” (emphasis in original).
Wraxall rejected two possibilities: one was that the panty stain, which was ten years old when examined, had degraded and the ABO substances had been lost. Wraxall concluded that this had not happened (1) because ABO substances are extremely stable, (2) because the P30 protein and acid phosphatase enzymes which were detected on the stain are not so stable and would generally be lost before the ABO substances, and (3) because Lewis antigens were also detected.
Wraxall also considered and rejected the possibility that the semen stains would not have shown the defendant’s blood type. The defendant was not a “low level” ABO secretor, but rather a normal ABO A type secretor, and the concentration of semen on the panties was sufficient for Wraxall to have detected Meggs’s blood group substances had they been present.
In opposition to the defendant’s motion, the Commonwealth presented the affidavit of James P. Canney, a laboratory supervisor with the Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory. He, too, had significant experience in the field of forensic serology. In conclusory fashion, 6 he made three statements disputing Wraxall’s conclusions: (1) “It is my opinion based upon my experience and training and survey of the literature that the prolonged storage of semen stains on clothing such as underwear at room temperature would cause *114 a significant degradation of the blood group substances present in those stains.” (2) “It is my opinion based upon my experience and training and on a survey of the literature that the presence of Le(a) [Lewis] substances in a seminal stain does not confirm the presence of a nonsecretor.” (3) “It is my opinion based upon my experience and training and on a survey of the literature that the presence of a high acid phosphatase concentration in a seminal stain on female clothing such as underpants may result either from the presence of a mixture of semen acid phosphatase and vaginal acid phosphatase in that stain or from an increase in the acid phosphatase level due to bacterial action.”
The motion judge — not the trial judge 7 — agreed that the evidence was now newly discovered. She concluded, however, “While the issue of identification is without a doubt a vital aspect in this case, the evidence to be presented is subject to countering opinions of experts; one, that the tests are conclusive, the other, that the tests cannot be conclusive due to the age and condition of the physical evidence.”
We agree with the defendant that the motion should not have been decided on affidavits alone, and that a “substantial issue” meriting an evidentiary hearing under Mass.R. Crim.P. 30(c)(3), 378 Mass. 901 (1979), has been raised. Commonwealth v. Saarela, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 403, 407 (1983). We recognize that the decision whether to decide the motion on the basis of affidavits or to hear oral testimony is a matter within the discretion of the judge, Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 257 (1981); Fogarty v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 103, 110-111 (1989), and we do not suggest that every dispute among experts requires an evidentiary hearing. In this case, however, looking at the “seriousness of the issue asserted [and] also ... the adequacy of the defendant’s showing,” Stewart at 257-258, we think the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Wraxall’s résumé and bibliography indicate he is an eminent forensic serologist. His affidavit sets forth with precision *115 the tests performed on the particular stain involved, the reasons for his conclusion that the defendant “could not be the donor of the semen,” and the basis for his rejection of the possibility that the stain had degraded.
Canney, on the other hand, did not examine the stain and gave only conclusory statements supported by sentences from various published studies. The quality of Wraxall’s affidavit compared to Canney’s precludes, in the absence of additional circumstances, a determination that the defendant has not raised a substantial issue “supported by a substantial evidentiary showing.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. at 260. Commonwealth v. Saarela, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 406-407.
The statement of agreed facts which, among other things, incorporates the facts set forth in the defendant’s brief on the previous appeal to this court, see note 2, supra, indicates that the case rested entirely on less than powerful identification evidence. 8
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
565 N.E.2d 1249, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 111, 1991 Mass. App. LEXIS 69, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-meggs-massappct-1991.