Commonwealth v. McNair

Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas

Commonwealth v. McNair

72 Pa. D. & C.2d 740, 1975 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 210

CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Luzerne County

DecidedMay 13, 1975

Docketno. 2476 of 1974

StatusPublished

This text of 72 Pa. D. & C.2d 740 (Commonwealth v. McNair) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Luzerne County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Commonwealth v. McNair, 72 Pa. D. & C.2d 740, 1975 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 210 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).

Pincite

Opinion

OLSZEWSKI,/.,

Michael A. McNair, defendant herein, was arrested and in-[741]*741dieted for the crimes of burglary¹ and receiving.² The se ch ar g e s re suite d fr om a b ur gl ary of the pr emises of Leonard and Josephine F arber. Property stolen from the Farbers included three watches, four rings and a coin collection. When defendant, Michael A. McNair, was arrested on November 23, 1974, approximately five days after the burglary, the following items were recovered from his possession: 1 watch, Bulova, gold, gold band, self-winding; 1 watch, Timex, red face, red band; 1 ring, diamond, white gold, 14 carat; 1 ring, white gold, 3 stones, emerald, sapphire and zircon opal; 1 watch, blue black, white gold, 17 jewel, no band; 1 [742]*742watch, gold Orion, Swiss made, serial no. 11561; and abracelet, silver ID, with the name of Michelle.

Not all of the items which were missing from the burglary were in the possession of defendant. The Orion watch and the bracelet with the name “Michelle” on it belonged to defendant and were not part of the items missing from the F arber home. These were returned to defendant at the court’s direction.

After a trial without jury, defendant was found guilty on both indictments. Motion for new trial and/or in arrest of judgment were filed. In support of those motions, the following reasons were advanced:

“1. The verdict is contrary to the evidence.

“2. The verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.

“3. The verdict is contrary to the laws.

“4. The Court erred in failing to sustain Defendant’s demurrer.

“5. That the Court erred in finding the Defendant guilty of burglary since the Defendant was also found guilty of Receiving and a finding of guilty for Receiving is a finding that the Defendant was not a principal involved in the commission of the crime which he is accused of having entered the structure intending to commit.

“6. That the Court erred in finding the Defendant guilty of Receiving since the Defendant was also found guilty of burglary and a finding of guilt for burglary is a finding that the Defendant was a principal involved in the commission of the crime which he is alleged to have entered the premises intending to commit, presumably theft, and thus the Defendant was not capable of committing the [743]*743crime of receiving, as a matter of law, he cannot ‘receive’ from himself.

“7. That the Court erred in finding the Defendant guilty of both Receiving and Burglary since, under the facts of the case, the Defendant could not be both a receiver and a burglar.

“8. That the Court erred in finding the Defendant guilty of Burglary since there was no evidence that the Defendant entered the building or occupied structure involved.”

On November 18, 1974, Mrs. Farber left her home at about 10 a.m., and when she returned at approximately noon, she found her home disrupted and items of personal property missing. She also testified that the lattice-work on her porch was broken, where it appeared that somebody took a stick and was trying to pry open a side window.

Mr. Farber identified some of the items which were stolen, but he was at work on the day in question.

Mrs. Loretta Davis testified that on the day of the burglary at about 11:50 a.m., she observed a young Negro walking up the middle of the highway. Her home was located about one-quarter mile from the home of the Farbers, and there were no homes between them. She stated she was unable to identify this young black boy, but that he was well dressed and wearing a light-weight, beige or yellow jacket. Mr. Philip Farber, father of the victim, Leonard Farber, testified that defendant came to his house just before noon selling magazine subscriptions, and that defendant was well dressed and had a two-tone coat on. Trooper Sylvester Meyer, of the Pennsylvania State Police, testified that upon investigation, it appeared that a window on the north [744]*744side of the home was attempted to be opened by a piece of lattice which was lying on the ground underneath the window, and that there were marks on the frame and on the window itself. It appeared that someone had tried to push it open. No fingerprints were found at the scene, and all of the missing items were not recovered.

Defendant McNair testified that he was selling magazine subscriptions in the area, and that some distance from the Farber house, another black boy came out of a red barn and offered to sell certain jewelry to him. Further, he stated that he, in fact, purchased some of the jewelry for $15. Defendant specifically testified that the red barn was about a mile and a half away from the Philip Farber house. Defendant stated that the black boy from whom he purchased the jewelry was not working with the team of men with whom he was selling magazines.

In rebuttal, Mrs. Josephine Farber testified that there was no red barn in the area.

We first address ourselves to the serious question that defendant could not be both the burglar and the receiver of stolen goods. In the case of Commonwealth v. Joseph Williams, 63 Luz. 171 (1973), the Luzerne County court en banc held in a unanimous decision that the principal or thief cannot also be adjudged guilty of criminally receiving the things stolen. See also 66 Am. Jur. 2d, 302, 303, “Receiving Stolen Property.” Also, in Commonwealth v. Maxberry et al., 13 D. & C. 371, 372 (1930), the court stated: “A thief cannot be convicted of receiving goods which he stole.”

Under the circumstances of this case, we feel compelled to follow the decision in the Williams case, supra. In view of Williams, supra, we hold that defendant is entitled to a new trial. Because we [745]*745hold that defendant is entitled to a new trial on both the burglary and receiving convictions, we need not consider the merit of the issues, which are obviated by this decision.

Accordingly, we enter the following

ORDER

It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the motion for new trial is hereby granted.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

OLSZEWSKI,/.,

Michael A. McNair, defendant herein, was arrested and in-[741]*741dieted for the crimes of burglary¹ and receiving.² The se ch ar g e s re suite d fr om a b ur gl ary of the pr emises of Leonard and Josephine F arber. Property stolen from the Farbers included three watches, four rings and a coin collection. When defendant, Michael A. McNair, was arrested on November 23, 1974, approximately five days after the burglary, the following items were recovered from his possession: 1 watch, Bulova, gold, gold band, self-winding; 1 watch, Timex, red face, red band; 1 ring, diamond, white gold, 14 carat; 1 ring, white gold, 3 stones, emerald, sapphire and zircon opal; 1 watch, blue black, white gold, 17 jewel, no band; 1 [742]*742watch, gold Orion, Swiss made, serial no. 11561; and abracelet, silver ID, with the name of Michelle.

Not all of the items which were missing from the burglary were in the possession of defendant. The Orion watch and the bracelet with the name “Michelle” on it belonged to defendant and were not part of the items missing from the F arber home. These were returned to defendant at the court’s direction.

After a trial without jury, defendant was found guilty on both indictments. Motion for new trial and/or in arrest of judgment were filed. In support of those motions, the following reasons were advanced:

“1. The verdict is contrary to the evidence.

“2. The verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.

“3. The verdict is contrary to the laws.

“4. The Court erred in failing to sustain Defendant’s demurrer.

“5. That the Court erred in finding the Defendant guilty of burglary since the Defendant was also found guilty of Receiving and a finding of guilty for Receiving is a finding that the Defendant was not a principal involved in the commission of the crime which he is accused of having entered the structure intending to commit.

“6. That the Court erred in finding the Defendant guilty of Receiving since the Defendant was also found guilty of burglary and a finding of guilt for burglary is a finding that the Defendant was a principal involved in the commission of the crime which he is alleged to have entered the premises intending to commit, presumably theft, and thus the Defendant was not capable of committing the [743]*743crime of receiving, as a matter of law, he cannot ‘receive’ from himself.

“7. That the Court erred in finding the Defendant guilty of both Receiving and Burglary since, under the facts of the case, the Defendant could not be both a receiver and a burglar.

“8. That the Court erred in finding the Defendant guilty of Burglary since there was no evidence that the Defendant entered the building or occupied structure involved.”

On November 18, 1974, Mrs. Farber left her home at about 10 a.m., and when she returned at approximately noon, she found her home disrupted and items of personal property missing. She also testified that the lattice-work on her porch was broken, where it appeared that somebody took a stick and was trying to pry open a side window.

Mr. Farber identified some of the items which were stolen, but he was at work on the day in question.

Mrs. Loretta Davis testified that on the day of the burglary at about 11:50 a.m., she observed a young Negro walking up the middle of the highway. Her home was located about one-quarter mile from the home of the Farbers, and there were no homes between them. She stated she was unable to identify this young black boy, but that he was well dressed and wearing a light-weight, beige or yellow jacket. Mr. Philip Farber, father of the victim, Leonard Farber, testified that defendant came to his house just before noon selling magazine subscriptions, and that defendant was well dressed and had a two-tone coat on. Trooper Sylvester Meyer, of the Pennsylvania State Police, testified that upon investigation, it appeared that a window on the north [744]*744side of the home was attempted to be opened by a piece of lattice which was lying on the ground underneath the window, and that there were marks on the frame and on the window itself. It appeared that someone had tried to push it open. No fingerprints were found at the scene, and all of the missing items were not recovered.

Defendant McNair testified that he was selling magazine subscriptions in the area, and that some distance from the Farber house, another black boy came out of a red barn and offered to sell certain jewelry to him. Further, he stated that he, in fact, purchased some of the jewelry for $15. Defendant specifically testified that the red barn was about a mile and a half away from the Philip Farber house. Defendant stated that the black boy from whom he purchased the jewelry was not working with the team of men with whom he was selling magazines.

In rebuttal, Mrs. Josephine Farber testified that there was no red barn in the area.

We first address ourselves to the serious question that defendant could not be both the burglar and the receiver of stolen goods. In the case of Commonwealth v. Joseph Williams, 63 Luz. 171 (1973), the Luzerne County court en banc held in a unanimous decision that the principal or thief cannot also be adjudged guilty of criminally receiving the things stolen. See also 66 Am. Jur. 2d, 302, 303, “Receiving Stolen Property.” Also, in Commonwealth v. Maxberry et al., 13 D. & C. 371, 372 (1930), the court stated: “A thief cannot be convicted of receiving goods which he stole.”

Under the circumstances of this case, we feel compelled to follow the decision in the Williams case, supra. In view of Williams, supra, we hold that defendant is entitled to a new trial. Because we [745]*745hold that defendant is entitled to a new trial on both the burglary and receiving convictions, we need not consider the merit of the issues, which are obviated by this decision.

Accordingly, we enter the following

ORDER

It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the motion for new trial is hereby granted.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

72 Pa. D. & C.2d 740, 1975 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 210, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-mcnair-pactcomplluzern-1975.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack