Commonwealth v. Mayer

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Commonwealth v. Mayer

362 A.2d 407, 240 Pa. Super. 181, 1976 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1955

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania

DecidedApril 22, 1976

DocketAppeal, 788

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 362 A.2d 407 (Commonwealth v. Mayer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Commonwealth v. Mayer, 362 A.2d 407, 240 Pa. Super. 181, 1976 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1955 (Pa. Ct. App. 1976).

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Opinion by

Van der Voort, J.,

On May 27, 1974, several persons broke into a mobile trailer home being stored on a lot in Montoursville, and removed various items from the trailer. The crime was spotted by a private citizen, Walter Wert, who notified the police. A call went out over the Pennsylvania State Police radio alerting police in the area to stop a green van with a specified license number in connection with a theft from mobile homes. This bulletin was relayed by the Williamsport police radio to local police forces in the vicinity. About fifteen minutes after receiving the bulletin, Officer Floyd Reed and his partner (Williamsport officers) stopped the van in nearby Williamsport. The Montoursville Police Chief, Harold Gottschall, was then notified, and he and another officer arrived in Williamsport a short time later, arrested appellant and another occupant of the van and took them to City Hall. There the van was searched pursuant to a lawful search warrant, and property stolen from the house trailer was discovered. Appellant was charged with the theft of items of the approximate value of two hundred twenty-nine ($229.00) dollars. On December 5, 1974, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained in connection with his arrest, which motion was granted by the lower court on January 16, 1975. The Commonwealth appealed the grant of this suppression motion,¹ arguing that the lower court erred in finding [184]*184that the arrest was for a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the arresting officer. We find that the arrest was made by the police with probable cause to believe that a felony had just been committed and that appellant was one of the perpetrators of the felony.

In deciding whether the police had probable cause to make the arrest, it is first necessary to determine whether or not a finished but uninhabited house trailer is a “building or occupied structure” within the meaning of §3502 of the Crimes Code,* ² since only buildings and occupied structures can be the subject of the felonies of burglary or criminal trespass. The mobile trailer home in question was a forty or fifty foot house trailer. It was adapted for overnight accomodation of persons³ and was [185]*185being stored on a lot with similar trailers. Appellee would have us find that the trailer could not have been the subject of a burglary or criminal trespass since it was not currently being used for human habitation. We disagree. In Commonwealth v. McCoy, 209 Pa. Superior Ct. 399, 401, 228 A.2d 43 (1967), our Court held that an outdoor telephone booth was a “building” within the meaning of the Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, §901, 18 P.S. §4901. We recognized in McCoy that the historical development of the crime of burglary reflected a concern for the protection of property within a structure, with a consequent expansion in the types of structures which would qualify as subjects of that crime. We do not believe that the enactment of the new Crimes Code reflects a lessening in the legislative concern for property. The legislature undoubtedly intended a house trailer, even though uninhabited, to be a “building or occupied structure” within the meaning of §3502 and §3503. Having so determined, we now turn to the question of whether the police had probable cause to believe that appellant was the perpetrator of a felony.

On May 27, 1974, Walter Wert, a private citizen, saw some people in the process of removing items from some mobile trailer homes and putting them into a green van-type automobile. He got the license number of the van and reported the information which he had to the State Police who in turn issued a radio bulletin alerting other police to stop a green van with a specified license number “in regards to a theft or a burglary or something in Montoursville area of some trailers.” The State Police bulletin was broadcast by local police units. Officer Reed and a fellow officer of nearby Williamsport police spotted the van in question within approximately 15 minutes after receiving the radio message and detained the van and its two occupants until Chief Gottschall and another officer arrived from Montoursville.

The instant case is similar to that of Commonwealth v. Jones, 233 Pa. Superior Ct. 461, 335 A.2d 789 (1975). [186]*186In Jones, our Court found probable cause for an arrest without a warrant where the police officers relied upon a police radio bulletin which indicated that two black males driving a red automobile with a black top, license number 866662 or 866226, were wanted in connection with the crime. The officers stopped a maroon-bottomed black-topped automobile bearing the license number 866226 about six blocks from the scene of the robbery and arrested the driver and the other occupant of the car. A search of the automobile disclosed a gun which was later linked to a robbery. Similar to the situation in Jones, the information available to the police in the instant case consisted essentially of a description of the motor vehicle (a green van), together with the name of the owner and the vehicle’s registration (license) number, which was used in the commission of a crime. This information, transmitted by police radio, was relied upon by the police officers effecting the arrest. The arrest was made within fifteen to thirty minutes after the commission of the crime and within approximately six miles of the site of the crime.

Both police officers Gottschall and Reed testified at the suppression hearing that they received information over the police radio that persons traveling in a green van with a certain license number were wanted for stealing undetermined items from mobile homes in Montoursville. Officer Reed testified as to the radio message:

“... that this was in regards to a theft or burglary or something in Montoursville area of some trailers,”

and as to the reason for stopping the van:

“At the time we stopped them, we thought it was probably theft or breaking into the trailers of some kind.”

Neither officer testified expressly that he believed the appellant had committed a burglary or a felony, however, both Officer Gottschall and Officer Reed did indicate that they were in possession of information of [187]*187criminal activity which amounted to the felony of either burglary⁴ or criminal trespass.⁵ That appellant was charged with, tried and convicted of theft only, does not change the fact that police officers had information from which they could reasonably have believed that a felony had been committed and that the appellant was one of the perpetrators of the crime, giving them probable cause to arrest appellant. Why appellant was charged with theft instead of burglary does not appear in the record and we are not called upon to speculate on the reason. We therefore find that there was probable cause for the stopping, detaining and arresting of the appellant.

The order of the lower court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Jacobs and Hoffman, JJ., concur in the result.

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Opinion by

Van der Voort, J.,

On May 27, 1974, several persons broke into a mobile trailer home being stored on a lot in Montoursville, and removed various items from the trailer. The crime was spotted by a private citizen, Walter Wert, who notified the police. A call went out over the Pennsylvania State Police radio alerting police in the area to stop a green van with a specified license number in connection with a theft from mobile homes. This bulletin was relayed by the Williamsport police radio to local police forces in the vicinity. About fifteen minutes after receiving the bulletin, Officer Floyd Reed and his partner (Williamsport officers) stopped the van in nearby Williamsport. The Montoursville Police Chief, Harold Gottschall, was then notified, and he and another officer arrived in Williamsport a short time later, arrested appellant and another occupant of the van and took them to City Hall. There the van was searched pursuant to a lawful search warrant, and property stolen from the house trailer was discovered. Appellant was charged with the theft of items of the approximate value of two hundred twenty-nine ($229.00) dollars. On December 5, 1974, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained in connection with his arrest, which motion was granted by the lower court on January 16, 1975. The Commonwealth appealed the grant of this suppression motion,¹ arguing that the lower court erred in finding [184]*184that the arrest was for a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the arresting officer. We find that the arrest was made by the police with probable cause to believe that a felony had just been committed and that appellant was one of the perpetrators of the felony.

In deciding whether the police had probable cause to make the arrest, it is first necessary to determine whether or not a finished but uninhabited house trailer is a “building or occupied structure” within the meaning of §3502 of the Crimes Code,* ² since only buildings and occupied structures can be the subject of the felonies of burglary or criminal trespass. The mobile trailer home in question was a forty or fifty foot house trailer. It was adapted for overnight accomodation of persons³ and was [185]*185being stored on a lot with similar trailers. Appellee would have us find that the trailer could not have been the subject of a burglary or criminal trespass since it was not currently being used for human habitation. We disagree. In Commonwealth v. McCoy, 209 Pa. Superior Ct. 399, 401, 228 A.2d 43 (1967), our Court held that an outdoor telephone booth was a “building” within the meaning of the Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, §901, 18 P.S. §4901. We recognized in McCoy that the historical development of the crime of burglary reflected a concern for the protection of property within a structure, with a consequent expansion in the types of structures which would qualify as subjects of that crime. We do not believe that the enactment of the new Crimes Code reflects a lessening in the legislative concern for property. The legislature undoubtedly intended a house trailer, even though uninhabited, to be a “building or occupied structure” within the meaning of §3502 and §3503. Having so determined, we now turn to the question of whether the police had probable cause to believe that appellant was the perpetrator of a felony.

On May 27, 1974, Walter Wert, a private citizen, saw some people in the process of removing items from some mobile trailer homes and putting them into a green van-type automobile. He got the license number of the van and reported the information which he had to the State Police who in turn issued a radio bulletin alerting other police to stop a green van with a specified license number “in regards to a theft or a burglary or something in Montoursville area of some trailers.” The State Police bulletin was broadcast by local police units. Officer Reed and a fellow officer of nearby Williamsport police spotted the van in question within approximately 15 minutes after receiving the radio message and detained the van and its two occupants until Chief Gottschall and another officer arrived from Montoursville.

The instant case is similar to that of Commonwealth v. Jones, 233 Pa. Superior Ct. 461, 335 A.2d 789 (1975). [186]*186In Jones, our Court found probable cause for an arrest without a warrant where the police officers relied upon a police radio bulletin which indicated that two black males driving a red automobile with a black top, license number 866662 or 866226, were wanted in connection with the crime. The officers stopped a maroon-bottomed black-topped automobile bearing the license number 866226 about six blocks from the scene of the robbery and arrested the driver and the other occupant of the car. A search of the automobile disclosed a gun which was later linked to a robbery. Similar to the situation in Jones, the information available to the police in the instant case consisted essentially of a description of the motor vehicle (a green van), together with the name of the owner and the vehicle’s registration (license) number, which was used in the commission of a crime. This information, transmitted by police radio, was relied upon by the police officers effecting the arrest. The arrest was made within fifteen to thirty minutes after the commission of the crime and within approximately six miles of the site of the crime.

Both police officers Gottschall and Reed testified at the suppression hearing that they received information over the police radio that persons traveling in a green van with a certain license number were wanted for stealing undetermined items from mobile homes in Montoursville. Officer Reed testified as to the radio message:

“... that this was in regards to a theft or burglary or something in Montoursville area of some trailers,”

and as to the reason for stopping the van:

“At the time we stopped them, we thought it was probably theft or breaking into the trailers of some kind.”

Neither officer testified expressly that he believed the appellant had committed a burglary or a felony, however, both Officer Gottschall and Officer Reed did indicate that they were in possession of information of [187]*187criminal activity which amounted to the felony of either burglary⁴ or criminal trespass.⁵ That appellant was charged with, tried and convicted of theft only, does not change the fact that police officers had information from which they could reasonably have believed that a felony had been committed and that the appellant was one of the perpetrators of the crime, giving them probable cause to arrest appellant. Why appellant was charged with theft instead of burglary does not appear in the record and we are not called upon to speculate on the reason. We therefore find that there was probable cause for the stopping, detaining and arresting of the appellant.

The order of the lower court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Jacobs and Hoffman, JJ., concur in the result.

²

. §3502 states that “[a] person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.” 18 Pa. C.S. §3502(a).

§3503 states: “(a) Buildings and occupied structures. —

(1) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or gains entrance by subterfuge or surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S. §3503(a)(l).

The definition section of that chapter defines “occupied structure” as “[a]ny structure, vehicle or place adapted for overnight accomodation of persons, or for carrying on business therein, whether or not a person is actually present.” 18 Pa. C.S. §3501.

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362 A.2d 407, 240 Pa. Super. 181, 1976 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1955, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-mayer-pasuperct-1976.

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