CIRILLO, President Judge:
Appellants take this appeal from a judgment of sentence of one day to three months imprisonment imposed by the Honorable John J. Poserina of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County following their conviction for defiant trespass.1 We affirm.
On August 10, 1985, as part of an anti-abortion demonstration, appellants pushed their way into the Northeast Women’s Center on Roosevelt Boulevard in Philadelphia, and occupied several rooms there. Once inside, they damaged two aspirator machines and other medical instruments, threw equipment out of a third floor window, and placed “pro-life” stickers on the doors, walls, and ceilings. Appellants refused to leave, even after several requests by the Center’s staff, and were ultimately removed when police arrived and carried them from the scene.
Appellants appeared for trial before the Honorable Mitchell S. Lipschutz of the Philadelphia Municipal Court, and were found guilty. All appellants except Tenaglio and Wall proceeded to a de novo trial before Judge Poserina.
During a hearing on a motion in limine, appellants made an offer of proof in support of their claim that they be allowed to present a defense of justification. Following the submission of briefs and argument on March 24, 1986, Judge Poserina ruled that justification did not lie. Judge Poserina certified the question of justification for interlocutory appeal, but this court denied appellants’ petition and remanded the case for trial.
On September 30, 1986, the jury returned guilty verdicts as to all appellants. On October 20, 1986, Judge Poserina [344]*344found the remaining appellants, Tenaglio and Wall, guilty after they stipulated to the testimony presented at the jury trial of their co-defendants.
Following sentencing, the appellants were immediately paroled on the condition that they each perform fifty hours of community service, not to be served in any pro-life agencies, and refrain from trespassing on medical facilities that perform abortions. Post-trial motions were filed and denied and this timely appeal followed.
Appellants raise one issue on appeal: whether the trial judge erred in not allowing appellants to present the defense of justification to the jury.
In Pennsylvania, the defense of justification is grounded in statute. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 501-10. This legislation has several provisions. However, it must be noted that appellants failed to specify which justification provision they deemed applicable to their case. In Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 508 Pa. 372, 381-382, 498 A.2d 806, 810-811 (1985), our supreme court held that a litigant must specify which section of the justification statute their claim is based upon. In Capitolo, the appellants proceeded under § 503; therefore, the court held that any claim under § 510 was waived. Here, where appellants only nebulously claimed justification, without specifically invoking either §§ 503 or 510, their claim may have been waived altogether. However, inasmuch as appellants asserted the defense at trial, in post trial motions, and again on appeal, we will consider the issue to be properly preserved and presented.
Section 503 states:
(a) General rule. — Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable if:
(1) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged;
[345]*345(2) neither this title nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
(b) Choice of evils. — When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification afforded by this section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.
Section 510 states:
Conduct involving the appropriation, seizure or destruction of, damage to, intrusion or interference with property is justifiable under circumstances which would establish a defense of privilege in a civil action based thereon, unless:
(1) this title or the law defining the offense deals with the specific situation involved; or
(2) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed otherwise plainly appears.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 508 Pa. 372, 498 A.2d 806 (1985), and Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 509 Pa. 118, 501 A.2d 226 (1985), addressed the applicability of the justification provisions of §§ 503 and 510, respectively.
In Capitolo, Patricia Capitolo and four others crept under a fence enclosing the Shippingsport Nuclear Power Plant. Once through, they sat down about ten to twelve feet inside of the fence and held hands. They were placed under arrest after refusing requests of plant representatives that they leave the premises. The five sought to present a justification defense under § 503, the general justification provision of the statute, but were refused by the trial judge because they would not have been able to prove that their trespass was justified. They were subsequently convicted [346]*346of trespass in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County-
On appeal, a majority of this court reversed the decision of the trial court, concluding that appellants’ offer of proof met the requirements of § 503 and that they should have been able to present to the jury evidence in support of the defense.
Our supreme court reversed and reinstated the convictions, holding that the defense of justification is available only when the appellee is able to make an offer of proof which establishes:
(1) that the actor was faced with a clear and imminent harm, not one which is debatable or speculative;
(2) that the actor could reasonably expect that the actor’s actions would be effective in avoiding this greater harm;
(3) there was no legal alternative which will be effective in abating the harm; and
(4) the Legislature had not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding the matter at issue.
Capitolo, 508 Pa. at 378, 498 A.2d at 809 (emphasis ours). The court went even further in stating that
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CIRILLO, President Judge:
Appellants take this appeal from a judgment of sentence of one day to three months imprisonment imposed by the Honorable John J. Poserina of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County following their conviction for defiant trespass.1 We affirm.
On August 10, 1985, as part of an anti-abortion demonstration, appellants pushed their way into the Northeast Women’s Center on Roosevelt Boulevard in Philadelphia, and occupied several rooms there. Once inside, they damaged two aspirator machines and other medical instruments, threw equipment out of a third floor window, and placed “pro-life” stickers on the doors, walls, and ceilings. Appellants refused to leave, even after several requests by the Center’s staff, and were ultimately removed when police arrived and carried them from the scene.
Appellants appeared for trial before the Honorable Mitchell S. Lipschutz of the Philadelphia Municipal Court, and were found guilty. All appellants except Tenaglio and Wall proceeded to a de novo trial before Judge Poserina.
During a hearing on a motion in limine, appellants made an offer of proof in support of their claim that they be allowed to present a defense of justification. Following the submission of briefs and argument on March 24, 1986, Judge Poserina ruled that justification did not lie. Judge Poserina certified the question of justification for interlocutory appeal, but this court denied appellants’ petition and remanded the case for trial.
On September 30, 1986, the jury returned guilty verdicts as to all appellants. On October 20, 1986, Judge Poserina [344]*344found the remaining appellants, Tenaglio and Wall, guilty after they stipulated to the testimony presented at the jury trial of their co-defendants.
Following sentencing, the appellants were immediately paroled on the condition that they each perform fifty hours of community service, not to be served in any pro-life agencies, and refrain from trespassing on medical facilities that perform abortions. Post-trial motions were filed and denied and this timely appeal followed.
Appellants raise one issue on appeal: whether the trial judge erred in not allowing appellants to present the defense of justification to the jury.
In Pennsylvania, the defense of justification is grounded in statute. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 501-10. This legislation has several provisions. However, it must be noted that appellants failed to specify which justification provision they deemed applicable to their case. In Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 508 Pa. 372, 381-382, 498 A.2d 806, 810-811 (1985), our supreme court held that a litigant must specify which section of the justification statute their claim is based upon. In Capitolo, the appellants proceeded under § 503; therefore, the court held that any claim under § 510 was waived. Here, where appellants only nebulously claimed justification, without specifically invoking either §§ 503 or 510, their claim may have been waived altogether. However, inasmuch as appellants asserted the defense at trial, in post trial motions, and again on appeal, we will consider the issue to be properly preserved and presented.
Section 503 states:
(a) General rule. — Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable if:
(1) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged;
[345]*345(2) neither this title nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
(b) Choice of evils. — When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification afforded by this section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.
Section 510 states:
Conduct involving the appropriation, seizure or destruction of, damage to, intrusion or interference with property is justifiable under circumstances which would establish a defense of privilege in a civil action based thereon, unless:
(1) this title or the law defining the offense deals with the specific situation involved; or
(2) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed otherwise plainly appears.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 508 Pa. 372, 498 A.2d 806 (1985), and Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 509 Pa. 118, 501 A.2d 226 (1985), addressed the applicability of the justification provisions of §§ 503 and 510, respectively.
In Capitolo, Patricia Capitolo and four others crept under a fence enclosing the Shippingsport Nuclear Power Plant. Once through, they sat down about ten to twelve feet inside of the fence and held hands. They were placed under arrest after refusing requests of plant representatives that they leave the premises. The five sought to present a justification defense under § 503, the general justification provision of the statute, but were refused by the trial judge because they would not have been able to prove that their trespass was justified. They were subsequently convicted [346]*346of trespass in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County-
On appeal, a majority of this court reversed the decision of the trial court, concluding that appellants’ offer of proof met the requirements of § 503 and that they should have been able to present to the jury evidence in support of the defense.
Our supreme court reversed and reinstated the convictions, holding that the defense of justification is available only when the appellee is able to make an offer of proof which establishes:
(1) that the actor was faced with a clear and imminent harm, not one which is debatable or speculative;
(2) that the actor could reasonably expect that the actor’s actions would be effective in avoiding this greater harm;
(3) there was no legal alternative which will be effective in abating the harm; and
(4) the Legislature had not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding the matter at issue.
Capitolo, 508 Pa. at 378, 498 A.2d at 809 (emphasis ours). The court went even further in stating that
it is essential that the offer meet a minimum standard as to each element of the defense so that if a jury finds it to be true, it would support the affirmative defense — here that of necessity____ Where the proferred evidence supporting one element of the defense is insufficient to sustain the defense, even if believed, the trial court has the right to deny use of the defense and not burden the jury with testimony supporting other elements of the defense.
Id.
After applying these basic principles to the facts of the trespass action, the court concluded that the danger at the nuclear plant was not imminent and that the appellees “could not establish that their criminal conduct was necessary to avoid harm or evil to themselves or others.” Id.
[347]*347In Berrigan, the Berrigan brothers and six others entered the General Electric plant in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, where they damaged hydrogen bomb missile components and poured human blood on the premises. Property damage exceeded $28,000. The eight involved were charged and convicted of burglary, criminal mischief, and criminal conspiracy. An offer of proof was made under § 510, (the property crimes provision of the justification statute) to present the defense of justification. The trial judge permitted them to offer their own testimony in support of the defense, but refused to permit them to present expert testimony.
On appeal, this court held that appellants should have been able to present the defense, and present expert testimony in support of the defense.
Once again, our supreme court reversed. By applying §§ 196 and 262 of the Restatement of Torts Second to 18 Pa.C.S. § 510, the court concluded that the Restatement imposes upon § 510 the requirements that the actor reasonably believe that the act in question was necessary to avoid an imminent and public disaster. Berrigan, 509 Pa. at 123-124, 501 A.2d at 229. The court then reiterated the four-part test used in Capitolo and determined that the trial court had properly ruled that the offer of proof was insufficient to establish that the nuclear holocaust that appellees sought to avert was a clear and imminent public disaster.
The court in Berrigan went even further, however, and held additionally that the defense of justification was not available “in situations where the conduct some perceive to engender public disaster has been specifically approved of by legislation making it legal conduct ...” Id.
Abortion has been specifically approved by the Pennsylvania Legislature in the Abortion Control Act, which was adopted in January of 1983. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3201-3220. Were it not protected by such legislation, the justification defense would continue to remain unavailable because a woman’s right to abortion is protected by the Constitution [348]*348of the United States. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). The Berrigan mandate that a justification defense may not be raised if the asserted “harm” is legal is not dependent upon whether such conduct has been made legal through legislative choice or judicial fiat. We live in a society of laws and no individual is entitled to raise himself above the law. We are each bound by the law no matter its source. Were we free to pick and choose which laws we wished to obey, the result would be a society of strife and chaos. Therefore, even if the legislature had not made a clear choice regarding abortion, the justification defense would be unavailable because abortion is lawful by virtue of the United States Constitution. Certainly, justification may not be asserted as a grounds for interference with a person’s right to free speech even though that right has not been legislatively approved. Free speech has been constitutionally approved, as has a woman’s right to abortion. Democracy allows the citizenry to protest laws of which they disapprove. But they must nonetheless obey such laws or face the legal consequences. To allow the defense of justification to those who willingly and intentionally break the law would encourage criminality cloaked in the guise of conscience.
As the Capitolo-Berrigan test makes clear, there must be a threat of an imminent and public disaster. Appellants’ offer of proof was insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy this four-part test. The use of justification as a defense could be precluded on this ground alone, regardless of the fact that abortion is legally sanctioned.
Appellants wish to produce testimony to establish that life begins at conception. They wish to show scientifically that a fetus as young as eight weeks of age has measurable brain-wave activity. Because Pennsylvania’s Determination of Death Act, 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 10201-10203, provides that death occurs when all brain activity ceases, appellants assert that their evidence would demonstrate that abortion is the taking of a human life, and hence, a “public disaster.” They also claim that the disaster was imminent, not specula[349]*349tive, and that their actions were effective in averting the disaster. Finally, they assert that there was no legal alternative for their actions.
Appellants’ first argument, that abortion constitutes a public disaster, fails. As we have noted, pre-viability abortion is lawful by virtue of state statute and federal constitutional law. The United States Supreme Court, from Roe through its progeny, has consistently held that the state’s interest in protecting fetal life does not become compelling, and cannot infringe on a woman’s right to choose abortion, until the fetus is viable. Roe at 163-164, 93 S.Ct. at 732. Appellants do not suggest that viability and conception are simultaneous occurrences. We find that a legally sanctioned activity cannot be termed a public disaster.
Appellants’ second argument, that the disaster was imminent and that their actions were effective in averting it, similarly must fail. It is unreasonable for appellants to believe that their brief occupation of one center would effectively put an end to the practice of abortion. Appellants’ occupation of the Women’s Center did not stop its operation. Legal abortions continued to be performed in the Center and were available in other medical facilities throughout Pennsylvania.
Appellants’ third contention, that there was no legal alternative to their actions, is misguided. As Judge Poserina noted, “[t]here are obviously numerous means in a democratic society to express a point of view or to attempt to prevent a perceived harm without resorting to criminal behavior.” Appellants were free to peacefully demonstrate outside of the center in an effort to prevent the harm that they perceived from occurring.
Finally, appellants’ offer of proof was insufficient to show that no legislative purpose exists to exclude the justification defense, nor could they, because Pennsylvania law is to the contrary. The Abortion Control Act specifically provides that “[i]n every relevant civil and criminal proceeding in which it is possible to do so without violating [350]*350the Federal Constitution, the common and statutory law of Pennsylvania shall be construed to extend to the unborn the equal protection of the laws____” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3202(c) (emphasis ours). Clearly, to permit private citizens the right to prevent women from exercising their right to abortion would be a violation of both state statute and federal constitutional law.
As in Berrigan, appellants in the instant case were trying to halt legal conduct. It has been suggested that the justification defense might lie where appellants can show that the conduct which they attempted to halt was illegal. However, even if illegal conduct could be proven, and appellants’ offer of proof contained no allegations that the Northeast Women’s Center was engaging in other than legal abortions, the Capitolo-Berrigan test would prohibit the use of the defense if there were other legal alternatives for abating the harm. Because the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act specifically proscribes post-viability abortion (with narrow exceptions), any public disaster that such abortions present can be adequately controlled by law enforcement personnel. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3201(a). Therefore, any claim of justification under § 510 will fail according to the supreme court mandate in Berrigan. Appellants cannot use unlawful means in an effort to stop lawful behavior, no matter how morally reprehensible they feel that behavior to be. “[T]respassing on private property ... is not legally justified by philosophical disagreement. [The justification defense] does not condone ... ad hoc self help which forebodes legal chaos.” Capitolo, 508 Pa. at 381, 498 A.2d at 810.
The appellants are actually requesting that this court countenance civil disobedience, which is defined as:
A form of lawbreaking employed to demonstrate the injustice or unfairness of a particular law and indulged in deliberately to focus attention on the allegedly undesirable law.
Black’s Law Dictionary 223 (1st ed. 1979).
Though, our nation has a long and proud history of civil disobedience, appellants are not in that tradition. From the [351]*351Boston Tea Party to the abolitionists to conscientious objectors to the sit-ins of Martin Luther King, civil disobedience has often stirred our nation’s collective conscience and spurred us to change or repeal unjust laws. Often, juries refused to convict good men of conscience whose love of justice had motivated them to violate the law. On some occasions, a jury would convict but the judge in recognition of the righteousness of the underlying cause would suspend sentence or issue a nominal find. Abortion demonstrators argue that they are in this tradition and should be treated accordingly. They overlook the key distinction between their actions and the behavior of those cited above.
The true conscientious objector refuses to obey the very law which he claims is unjust. Rosa Parks refused to sit in the back of the bus and “draft dodgers” refused to register for the draft. When prosecuted, they challenged the wisdom, morality and constitutionality of the law in question.2 They did not employ their objections to that law as an excuse to engage in general or targeted violence. But that is what the demonstrators in this case have done. On this appeal, the demonstrators challenge the applicability of our criminal trespass laws to their activities. But they do not assert that those laws are unconstitutional or unjust. Rather they believe that because they disagree with the practice of abortion they are entitled to deface and occupy property belonging to other persons. How sad that their sense of justice and outrage is so narrowly focused.
Judge Poserina correctly determined that the justification defense would not lie. The action sought to be prevented by appellants was lawful, and as such, could not be prevented by unlawful conduct. Furthermore, appellants’ offer of proof was insufficient to satisfy the four-part Capitolo-Berrigan test for determining when the defense of justifi[352]*352cation will lie. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
McEWEN, J., concurs and dissents.
TAMILIA, J., dissents.