NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-386
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
MANUEL GUERRERO ESCALANTE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, the defendant,
Manuel Guerrero Escalante, pleaded guilty to one count of
possession of ammunition without an firearm identification (FID)
card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (1); five counts of possession of a
large capacity firearm or feeding device without a valid license
to carry firearms, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m); and one count of
possession of a class B substance, G. L. c. 94C, § 34. The
agreement also dismissed a separate count of possession of a
class B substance and deemed the defendant not responsible for a
motor vehicle lights violation. Before entering into the plea
agreement, the defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress any
evidence obtained during a search of his vehicle, asserting that the stop of that vehicle was unreasonably prolonged. We agree
and therefore reverse the order denying the defendant's motion
to suppress.1
Background. "We summarize the facts as found by the motion
judge, . . . supplemented by evidence in the record that is
uncontroverted and that was implicitly credited by the judge"
(quotations and citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Jones, 100
Mass. App. Ct. 600, 601-602 (2022). To the extent the findings
rely on video from a body-worn camera, "the judge's findings
drawn from it are not entitled to deference, and we may review
such evidence de novo." Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass.
645, 656 (2018). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass.
461, 464 (2015).
On September 9, 2022, at approximately 7:35 P.M., State
police Trooper Tiffany DaRosa was conducting a routine patrol in
the city of Taunton. She signaled for the defendant to pull his
vehicle over, which he did without incident. The trooper
approached the passenger side of the vehicle and informed the
defendant that she had stopped him for not having his headlights
1 We need not reach the defendant's argument that he did not give consent to search his bag freely and voluntarily. "Because we conclude that the prolonged seizure of the defendant was unconstitutional, any consent given during the illegal seizure was invalid." Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 238 n.1 (2017).
2 on. After the defendant apologized and turned his lights on,
the trooper requested his license and registration. Following
minutes of searching for the requested items and conversation,
the defendant provided the trooper with his New Hampshire
driver's license, registration, and documentation of insurance
(collectively, the defendant's documents).
During their interaction, the trooper "noticed the
defendant looking at a backpack that was located on the
passenger seat while the documents [were] being produced." The
video shows that after the trooper had the defendant's documents
in hand, the trooper asked, "Got anything good in the backpack?"2
In response, the defendant said, "You can check. Go ahead."
The trooper then asked if the defendant wanted to open the
backpack for her, and he proceeded to do so. In the backpack,
the trooper observed orange medication bottles with the name and
date of birth ripped off the labels. As a result, the trooper
issued an exit order and searched the defendant's vehicle. The
trooper found another prescription bottle with the label crossed
out, a box of ammunition, several high-capacity magazines, and
several rounds of ammunition. The defendant, who claimed he had
2As the trooper finished reading the defendant's insurance documents she specifically said, "Okay. Sounds good. Sounds good. Okay. I'll be righ--. Got anything good in the backpack?"
3 a gun license in New Hampshire but not Massachusetts, was then
placed in handcuffs and read his Miranda rights.
Discussion. "A routine traffic stop may not last longer
than 'reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop.'" Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 241 (2017),
quoting Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 151 (2016). "The
nature of the stop, i.e., for a traffic offense, defines the
scope of the initial inquiry by a police officer." Commonwealth
v. Buckley, 478 Mass. 861, 873 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v.
Bartlett, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 470 (1996). "The scope of a
stop may only extend beyond its initial purpose if the officer
is confronted with facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion
that further criminal conduct is afoot" (quotation and citation
omitted). Commonwealth v. Tavares, 482 Mass. 694, 703 (2019).
Otherwise, "[p]olice authority to seize an individual ends 'when
tasks tied to the traffic infraction are -- or reasonably should
have been -- completed.'" Commonwealth v. Soriano-Lara, 99
Mass. App. Ct. 525, 528 (2021), quoting Cordero, supra at 242.
The defendant argues that the motion judge erred in denying
his motion to suppress because, upon production of a valid
license and registration, the trooper had no basis for any
further inquiry or detention of the defendant. We agree.
4 Here, once the trooper had the defendant's license,
registration, and insurance documentation, she could have
permissibly taken the time reasonably necessary to verify their
validity. Instead, the trooper unreasonably prolonged the
interaction by inquiring about the defendant's backpack.3 The
Commonwealth correctly conceded at oral argument that based on
the relaxed interactions with the defendant to that point, the
trooper did not have independent reasonable suspicion to inquire
about the bag. The trooper had no justification to extend the
scope of the stop beyond its initial purpose -- issuing the
defendant a citation for a motor vehicle lights violation. See
Tavares, 482 Mass. at 703 (traffic stop should have concluded
when officer realized he mistakenly identified passenger as
individual who had outstanding arrest warrant, and there was no
other concern).
3 Review of the video demonstrates that the motion judge's finding that the trooper inquired about the backpack "before she had an opportunity to return to her cruiser and run the defendant's information," is clearly erroneous. While the defendant did not use the phrase "clearly erroneous" in his brief, he did argue that the trooper had no basis for further inquiry after the defendant produced his documents.
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-386
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
MANUEL GUERRERO ESCALANTE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, the defendant,
Manuel Guerrero Escalante, pleaded guilty to one count of
possession of ammunition without an firearm identification (FID)
card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (1); five counts of possession of a
large capacity firearm or feeding device without a valid license
to carry firearms, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m); and one count of
possession of a class B substance, G. L. c. 94C, § 34. The
agreement also dismissed a separate count of possession of a
class B substance and deemed the defendant not responsible for a
motor vehicle lights violation. Before entering into the plea
agreement, the defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress any
evidence obtained during a search of his vehicle, asserting that the stop of that vehicle was unreasonably prolonged. We agree
and therefore reverse the order denying the defendant's motion
to suppress.1
Background. "We summarize the facts as found by the motion
judge, . . . supplemented by evidence in the record that is
uncontroverted and that was implicitly credited by the judge"
(quotations and citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Jones, 100
Mass. App. Ct. 600, 601-602 (2022). To the extent the findings
rely on video from a body-worn camera, "the judge's findings
drawn from it are not entitled to deference, and we may review
such evidence de novo." Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass.
645, 656 (2018). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass.
461, 464 (2015).
On September 9, 2022, at approximately 7:35 P.M., State
police Trooper Tiffany DaRosa was conducting a routine patrol in
the city of Taunton. She signaled for the defendant to pull his
vehicle over, which he did without incident. The trooper
approached the passenger side of the vehicle and informed the
defendant that she had stopped him for not having his headlights
1 We need not reach the defendant's argument that he did not give consent to search his bag freely and voluntarily. "Because we conclude that the prolonged seizure of the defendant was unconstitutional, any consent given during the illegal seizure was invalid." Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 238 n.1 (2017).
2 on. After the defendant apologized and turned his lights on,
the trooper requested his license and registration. Following
minutes of searching for the requested items and conversation,
the defendant provided the trooper with his New Hampshire
driver's license, registration, and documentation of insurance
(collectively, the defendant's documents).
During their interaction, the trooper "noticed the
defendant looking at a backpack that was located on the
passenger seat while the documents [were] being produced." The
video shows that after the trooper had the defendant's documents
in hand, the trooper asked, "Got anything good in the backpack?"2
In response, the defendant said, "You can check. Go ahead."
The trooper then asked if the defendant wanted to open the
backpack for her, and he proceeded to do so. In the backpack,
the trooper observed orange medication bottles with the name and
date of birth ripped off the labels. As a result, the trooper
issued an exit order and searched the defendant's vehicle. The
trooper found another prescription bottle with the label crossed
out, a box of ammunition, several high-capacity magazines, and
several rounds of ammunition. The defendant, who claimed he had
2As the trooper finished reading the defendant's insurance documents she specifically said, "Okay. Sounds good. Sounds good. Okay. I'll be righ--. Got anything good in the backpack?"
3 a gun license in New Hampshire but not Massachusetts, was then
placed in handcuffs and read his Miranda rights.
Discussion. "A routine traffic stop may not last longer
than 'reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop.'" Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 241 (2017),
quoting Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 151 (2016). "The
nature of the stop, i.e., for a traffic offense, defines the
scope of the initial inquiry by a police officer." Commonwealth
v. Buckley, 478 Mass. 861, 873 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v.
Bartlett, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 470 (1996). "The scope of a
stop may only extend beyond its initial purpose if the officer
is confronted with facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion
that further criminal conduct is afoot" (quotation and citation
omitted). Commonwealth v. Tavares, 482 Mass. 694, 703 (2019).
Otherwise, "[p]olice authority to seize an individual ends 'when
tasks tied to the traffic infraction are -- or reasonably should
have been -- completed.'" Commonwealth v. Soriano-Lara, 99
Mass. App. Ct. 525, 528 (2021), quoting Cordero, supra at 242.
The defendant argues that the motion judge erred in denying
his motion to suppress because, upon production of a valid
license and registration, the trooper had no basis for any
further inquiry or detention of the defendant. We agree.
4 Here, once the trooper had the defendant's license,
registration, and insurance documentation, she could have
permissibly taken the time reasonably necessary to verify their
validity. Instead, the trooper unreasonably prolonged the
interaction by inquiring about the defendant's backpack.3 The
Commonwealth correctly conceded at oral argument that based on
the relaxed interactions with the defendant to that point, the
trooper did not have independent reasonable suspicion to inquire
about the bag. The trooper had no justification to extend the
scope of the stop beyond its initial purpose -- issuing the
defendant a citation for a motor vehicle lights violation. See
Tavares, 482 Mass. at 703 (traffic stop should have concluded
when officer realized he mistakenly identified passenger as
individual who had outstanding arrest warrant, and there was no
other concern).
3 Review of the video demonstrates that the motion judge's finding that the trooper inquired about the backpack "before she had an opportunity to return to her cruiser and run the defendant's information," is clearly erroneous. While the defendant did not use the phrase "clearly erroneous" in his brief, he did argue that the trooper had no basis for further inquiry after the defendant produced his documents. Moreover, the Commonwealth properly conceded at oral argument that when the trooper asked about the defendant's backpack, she already had all of the documents necessary to run the defendant's license and registration at her police cruiser.
5 Once the trooper received all of the defendant's documents,
she could have checked their validity and thereby completed the
investigative tasks reasonably included in a traffic stop for a
motor vehicle violation. The defendant's backpack had no
relation to that violation. Thus, the investigation into the
contents of the backpack "that followed was unreasonable unless
supported by additional justification." Cordero, 477 Mass. at
242.4 As set forth above, we conclude that it was not.
We reverse the order denying the defendant's motion to
suppress and remand the case to the District Court where the
defendant may seek further relief in accordance with the terms
of his conditional plea agreement and Mass. R. Crim. P.
12 (b) (6), as appearing in 482 Mass. 1501 (2019).
So ordered.
By the Court (Henry, Hand & Brennan, JJ.5),
Clerk
Entered: October 6, 2025.
The Commonwealth's argument that the trooper was permitted 4
to inquire about the defendant's bag because she had not yet completed the traffic stop is misplaced. The issue is not whether the trooper had completed her stop; it is whether her investigative inquiry into the defendant's backpack was "reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop" (citation omitted). Cordero, 477 Mass. at 241.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.