HOFFMAN, Judge:
The instant case raises a question of first impression in Pennsylvania: whether an accused is entitled to a hearing to determine whether he has a right to expungement of his arrest record after the charges are dismissed at the preliminary hearing.
On June 16, 1975, appellant was arrested in Harrisburg, and charged with solicitation to commit involuntary deviate sexual intercourse.1 At the time of the arrest, the police took appellant’s photograph and fingerprints as part of the normal “booking” procedure. On June 23, 1975, the charge against the appellant was dismissed at the preliminary hearing.
Thereafter, appellant filed a petition in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas in which he requested that the police record be expunged and that the court order the Harrisburg Chief of Police to request a return of appellant’s record from the F.B.I. See 19 P.S. § 14022 for police authority to forward police records to other crime fighting agencies. Appellant requested a hearing to present the merits of his claim.
[65] On August 20, 1975, the lower court denied the petition without a hearing. In relevant part, the lower court’s opinion stated that “[appellant] has asked this Court to order any records made by the Harrisburg Police Department, the Pennsylvania State Police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to be expunged from their files and destroyed. Unfortunately there is no Pennsylvania authority for such action.
“. . . [T]here is not only a lack of statutory authority in Pennsylvania to grant such relief but the legislative intent appears to be to the contrary . . . . ” This appeal followed.
Whether the court properly denied appellant relief turns on the resolution of two questions: first, did the court have the authority to order the police to expunge the record; and, second, if the authority exists, under what circumstances is it properly exercised.
Initially, the Commonwealth argues that Pennsylvania courts lack the authority to order expungement. By statute,3 the Pennsylvania State Police are authorized “to procure and file for record photographs, pictures, descriptions, fingerprints, and such other information as may be pertinent, of all persons who . . . may hereafter be . convicted of crime within this Commonwealth . . . .” 19 P.S. § 1401. Further, “. . .it shall be the duty of the chiefs of bureaus of all cities within this Commonwealth to furnish daily, to the Pennsylvania State Police, copies of the fingerprints and, if possible, photographs, of all persons arrested within their jurisdiction charged with the commission of felony, or who they have reason to believe are fugitives from justice . . . .” 19 P.S. § 1403. Finally, § 1406 makes “[n]eglect or refusal of any person mentioned in this act to make the report required herein . ” a misdemeanor. The Commonwealth con-[66] eludes that “ [c] onspicuous by its absence in this statutory language is any reference to judicial authority to order the general destruction of arrest records. Such authority would clearly fly in the face of the affirmative duty imposed on the Pennsylvania State Police by § 1403 and § 1404 to develop and carry on a complete system of criminal identification. We note that this duty is buttressed by § 1406, which makes the destruction of arrest records a criminal offense. These provisions establish, in the least, that the legislature was not contemplating judicial expungement when it enacted laws construing a Pennsylvania criminal identification system.”
The lower court relied on the reasoning of an opinion in a similar case in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. In Durham v. Straub, No. 338, Misc. Docket 1973, the court held that because The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act4 provides for ex-pungement of the arrest record if charges are dismissed or the accused is acquitted, the legislature’s failure to provide a similar remedy in other instances is evidence of a legislative intent to the contrary. Further, the court cited with approval the analysis in Commonwealth v. Magaziner, 50 D. & C.2d 291, 296 (1970): “The act nowhere directs destruction of that material in cases of acquittal. Thus, local chiefs of police are not required to destroy such records of persons acquitted or whose bills of indictment are dismissed by a grand jury, and we lack power or authority to order them to do so. The positive direction contained in section 5 5 of the act requiring district attorneys to destroy fingerprints of persons acquit[67] ted, together with the complete absence from all other sections of the act of a direction to detectives or police officers to destroy fingerprints or photographs, shows a legislative intent to limit directions to destroy the fingerprints of acquitted persons to those kept by district attorneys and by their chief detectives. ‘Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.’ ”
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HOFFMAN, Judge:
The instant case raises a question of first impression in Pennsylvania: whether an accused is entitled to a hearing to determine whether he has a right to expungement of his arrest record after the charges are dismissed at the preliminary hearing.
On June 16, 1975, appellant was arrested in Harrisburg, and charged with solicitation to commit involuntary deviate sexual intercourse.1 At the time of the arrest, the police took appellant’s photograph and fingerprints as part of the normal “booking” procedure. On June 23, 1975, the charge against the appellant was dismissed at the preliminary hearing.
Thereafter, appellant filed a petition in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas in which he requested that the police record be expunged and that the court order the Harrisburg Chief of Police to request a return of appellant’s record from the F.B.I. See 19 P.S. § 14022 for police authority to forward police records to other crime fighting agencies. Appellant requested a hearing to present the merits of his claim.
[65] On August 20, 1975, the lower court denied the petition without a hearing. In relevant part, the lower court’s opinion stated that “[appellant] has asked this Court to order any records made by the Harrisburg Police Department, the Pennsylvania State Police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to be expunged from their files and destroyed. Unfortunately there is no Pennsylvania authority for such action.
“. . . [T]here is not only a lack of statutory authority in Pennsylvania to grant such relief but the legislative intent appears to be to the contrary . . . . ” This appeal followed.
Whether the court properly denied appellant relief turns on the resolution of two questions: first, did the court have the authority to order the police to expunge the record; and, second, if the authority exists, under what circumstances is it properly exercised.
Initially, the Commonwealth argues that Pennsylvania courts lack the authority to order expungement. By statute,3 the Pennsylvania State Police are authorized “to procure and file for record photographs, pictures, descriptions, fingerprints, and such other information as may be pertinent, of all persons who . . . may hereafter be . convicted of crime within this Commonwealth . . . .” 19 P.S. § 1401. Further, “. . .it shall be the duty of the chiefs of bureaus of all cities within this Commonwealth to furnish daily, to the Pennsylvania State Police, copies of the fingerprints and, if possible, photographs, of all persons arrested within their jurisdiction charged with the commission of felony, or who they have reason to believe are fugitives from justice . . . .” 19 P.S. § 1403. Finally, § 1406 makes “[n]eglect or refusal of any person mentioned in this act to make the report required herein . ” a misdemeanor. The Commonwealth con-[66] eludes that “ [c] onspicuous by its absence in this statutory language is any reference to judicial authority to order the general destruction of arrest records. Such authority would clearly fly in the face of the affirmative duty imposed on the Pennsylvania State Police by § 1403 and § 1404 to develop and carry on a complete system of criminal identification. We note that this duty is buttressed by § 1406, which makes the destruction of arrest records a criminal offense. These provisions establish, in the least, that the legislature was not contemplating judicial expungement when it enacted laws construing a Pennsylvania criminal identification system.”
The lower court relied on the reasoning of an opinion in a similar case in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. In Durham v. Straub, No. 338, Misc. Docket 1973, the court held that because The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act4 provides for ex-pungement of the arrest record if charges are dismissed or the accused is acquitted, the legislature’s failure to provide a similar remedy in other instances is evidence of a legislative intent to the contrary. Further, the court cited with approval the analysis in Commonwealth v. Magaziner, 50 D. & C.2d 291, 296 (1970): “The act nowhere directs destruction of that material in cases of acquittal. Thus, local chiefs of police are not required to destroy such records of persons acquitted or whose bills of indictment are dismissed by a grand jury, and we lack power or authority to order them to do so. The positive direction contained in section 5 5 of the act requiring district attorneys to destroy fingerprints of persons acquit[67] ted, together with the complete absence from all other sections of the act of a direction to detectives or police officers to destroy fingerprints or photographs, shows a legislative intent to limit directions to destroy the fingerprints of acquitted persons to those kept by district attorneys and by their chief detectives. ‘Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.’ ”
There is no Pennsylvania appellate court decision directly on point. Appellant does cite three Pennsylvania cases which refer to the problem. Without citing a statutory or constitutional basis for such a proceeding, the Supreme Court stated that one aggrieved by an unjust arrest for contempt could present a motion to expunge his arrest record: “ [Appellant] contends that the case is not moot because he has been unjustly arrested, as a result of which he now has a criminal record. However, a simple proceeding to remedy this exists in what is now the Criminal Division of the Common Pleas Court. [Appellant] can there present his motion to expunge the arrest from his record. This Court is not the proper body to which such a motion should be presented.” Commonwealth ex rel. Magaziner v. Magaziner, 434 Pa. 1, 9, 253 A.2d 263, 268 (1969). We distinguished Magaziner in Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 215 Pa.Super. 534, 258 A.2d 695 (1969), because Zimmerman was attempting to have the record of a valid criminal conviction expunged. In dictum, however, we implied that an accused who is acquitted has a right to have his record expunged: “We are compelled to agree with the Commonwealth. This is not a case involving a defendant acquitted of a crime whose conduct since that acquittal furnishes no basis for keeping the arrest record alive. Unlike the circumstances in Commonwealth ex rel. Magaziner v. Magaziner, [supra], the petitioner in this case has been convicted of the crime and the only way that the record of conviction can be erased is by a Governor’s exercise of his power to grant clemency . . . .” 215 Pa.Super. at 536, 258 A.2d at 696. Finally, again without discussing [68] the basis of that right, we recently stated that “[t]he clear weight of authority holds that one who has been falsely or illegally arrested is entitled to expungement of his record and removal of his fingerprints from criminal files. . . .” Commonwealth v. Fredericks, 235 Pa.Super. 78, 340 A.2d 498, 505 (1975). No motion for ex-pungement was made in Fredericks; failure to do so constituted a waiver of the appellant’s right to object to subsequent use of unlawfully procured fingerprint-evidence.
It seems clear, therefore, that our appellate courts recognize the right of an accused to seek expungement of an arrest record. Cf. Sullivan v. Murphy, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 478 F.2d 938 (1973). Although our research does not indicate a stated legal basis for that right in our appellate decisions, we believe that such a right is an adjunct to due process.6 The harm ancillary to an arrest record is obvious: “Information denominated a record of arrest, if it becomes known, may subject an individual to serious difficulties. Even if no direct economic loss is involved, the injury to an individual’s reputation may be substantial. Economic losses themselves may be both direct and serious. Opportunities for schooling, employment, or professional licenses may be restricted or nonexistent as a consequence of the mere fact of an arrest, even if followed by acquittal or complete exoneration of the charges involved. An arrest record may be used by the police in determining whether subsequently to arrest the individual concerned, or whether to exercise their discretion to bring formal charges against an individual already arrested. Arrest records have been used in deciding whether to allow a defendant to present his story without impeachment by [69] prior convictions, and as a basis for denying release prior to trial or an appeal; or they may be considered by a judge in determining the sentence to be given a convicted offender.” Menard, v. Mitchell, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 430 F.2d 486, 490-91 (1970). See also, Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948). Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971). Thus, it is not hyperbole to suggest that one who is falsely accused is subject to punishment despite his innocence. Punishment of the innocent is the clearest denial of life, liberty and property without due process of law. To remedy such a situation, an individual must be afforded a hearing to present his claim that he is entitled to an expungement —that is, because an innocent individual has a right to be free from unwarranted punishment, a court has the authority to remedy the denial of that right by ordering expungement of the arrest record.7
Once it is concluded that a court may order expungement, it must be decided under what circumstances that authority is properly exercised.
The Commonwealth argues that society’s interest in maintaining arrest records outweighs the limited intrusion on the individual’s rights. We recognize the legitimate interest of society in retention of arrest records. However, recognition of that right in competition with [70] the individual’s rights is properly the beginning of the court’s inquiry: “What is . required is a more delicate balancing of law enforcement needs against the privacy and other interests of affected individuals, and a closer analysis of whether legitimate law enforcement needs may be served in a manner which does not unduly trench upon the individual’s rights.” Utz v. Cullinane, 172 U.S.App.D.C. 67, 520 F.2d 467, 475, n. 10 (1975). In some instances, retention of an arrest record is clearly invalid: “Many individuals have unjustly acquired arrest records without even the excuse of an honest and unavoidable mistake by the police. In the District of Columbia alone, literally thousands of persons were once arrested ‘for investigation’ and then released; but their records often remain. Dragnet arrests are at best matters of recent memory. Even worse are those occasions, far more common than we would like to think, where invocation of the criminal process is used — often with no hope of ultimate conviction — as punitive sanction. Hippies and civil rights workers have been harassed and literally driven from their homes by repeated and unlawful arrests, often made under statutes unconstitutional on their face. Innocent bystanders may be swept up in mass arrests made to clear the streets either during a riot or during lawful political demonstrations.” Menard v. Mitchell, supra at 493-94. (footnotes omitted). See also, Wheeler v. Goodman, 298 F.Supp. 935 (W.D.N.C.1969); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F.Supp. 881 (E.D.Pa.1968); Trilling v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 159, 260 F.2d 677 (1958). In other instances, the court must balance the competing interests involved and resolve each case on its own facts. United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1975). Given the substantial interest of an accused in his good name and in freedom from the disability flowing from an arrest record, we believe that the Commonwealth must come forward with compelling evidence to justify retention of such information.
[71] Despite the rhetoric of both briefs, the issue in the instant case is not whether all individuals who are acquitted at trial or who are exonerated at the preliminary hearing stage are entitled to expungement; nor is the question whether the appellant is presently entitled to expungement.8 Rather, the appellant was denied a hearing on the issue of his right to expungement because the court believed that it was without authority to grant the requested relief. As discussed, supra, we believe that such a right exists under the appropriate circumstances.9 We, therefore, remand the case for a hearing.
VAN der VOORT, J., files a dissenting opinion in which JACOBS and PRICE, JJ., join.