Commonwealth v. Lenroy W. Bruce.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: January 16, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0519
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-519

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

LENROY W. BRUCE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Lenroy Bruce, was convicted of one count of

assault and battery and one count of disorderly conduct.1 He

appeals, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to disprove that

he was acting in self-defense. Because the evidence was

sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant did not act in self-defense, we affirm.

1The judge placed the latter conviction on file. A conviction placed on file with the defendant's consent ordinarily cannot be appealed. See Commonwealth v. Delgado, 367 Mass. 432, 438 (1975). Here, however, although the defendant's brief states in passing that he consented, the record does not reflect any such consent, and so the appeal of that conviction is before us. The defendant's brief nevertheless does not claim any error affecting that conviction, and so we affirm it. Background. We summarize the facts the jury could have

found, reserving certain details for later discussion. The

defendant was at a trampoline park with his family, celebrating

his daughter's birthday. Upset by an error made by the park

operator, the defendant went to talk to a manager at the park's

front desk. The park's security guard heard the defendant and

his wife "yelling and screaming and swearing," so the guard

walked to the desk.

The family was walking in the direction of the front door,

away from the desk, when they stopped to talk to the guard, who

had come around to stand between the defendant and the desk.

The conversation escalated into a physical altercation, which

was seemingly initiated by the defendant's wife but quickly

encompassed the guard and the defendant as well. The

altercation consisted of two brief struggles, separated by a

short intermission after the two men fell to the floor.

Police were called and a complaint issued against the

defendant in the District Court. At trial, the defendant

claimed he acted in self-defense, and the jury, after being

instructed on the issue,2 returned verdicts of guilty on both

charges.

2 The Commonwealth disputes whether the defendant was entitled to an instruction on self-defense in the first instance. Such an instruction "need not be given where there

2 Discussion. We review to determine "whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the [Commonwealth's case] beyond a reasonable doubt."

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). To satisfy its

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

did not act in self-defense, the Commonwealth must establish

that at least one of the following factors did not exist:

"(1) the defendant had reasonable concern for his personal

safety; (2) he used all reasonable means to avoid physical

combat; [or] (3) the degree of force used was reasonable in the

circumstances" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth

v. King, 460 Mass. 80, 83 (2011).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, a reasonable jury could have found that the

defendant did not use all reasonable means to avoid physical

combat and, therefore, did not act in self-defense. "Whether a

defendant used all reasonable means of escape before acting in

self-defense is a factual question dependent on a variety of

was insufficient evidence to support a theory of self-defense." Commonwealth v. Maguire, 375 Mass. 768, 772 (1978). We do not address that issue, because we conclude that in any event the Commonwealth disproved self-defense.

3 circumstances, including . . . means of escape from[] the area,

and the location of the assault." Commonwealth v. Pike, 428

Mass. 393, 399 (1998). Thus, for example, "[s]elf-defense is

generally unavailable where the confrontation occurs on a public

street and where there is no evidence that the principal was not

able to walk away" (quotations and citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Ortega, 480 Mass. 603, 611 (2018).

Here, the altercation occurred in the front lobby area of a

facility which was open to the public at the time. Video

footage of the altercation shows that no one blocked the

defendant's path to the facility's exterior door when the

altercation started. There was also no evidence that the

defendant could not walk away after the guard pushed him.3

Indeed, the video footage shows that the guard pushed the

defendant in the direction of the door and only had his hands on

the defendant for at most a second or two before the defendant

pushed and held onto the guard's shirt collar until the two fell

to the floor. Thus, the jury could find beyond a reasonable

3 The parties do not agree as to who was the first aggressor as between the defendant and the guard. For the purposes of this appeal, we assume the jury found that the defendant was not the first aggressor and note that this finding is reasonably supported by the video footage. Although the guard appears to have initiated physical contact with the defendant, and thus might well have been subject to charges along with the defendant, that issue is not before us.

4 doubt that the defendant did not avail himself of reasonable

means of escape.4

Even if we focus solely on the second struggle, the

evidence was again sufficient for the jury to find that the

defendant was able to walk away and avoid combat but did not.

The video footage shows that the defendant recovered from the

first struggle with the guard, and was back on his feet with an

employee pointing him toward the door, before the guard stood

back up and approached the defendant and the two resumed

fighting. Though the defendant testified that he was unable to

leave because employees including the guard were blocking his

exit, the jury was entitled not to credit this testimony. Thus,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Commonwealth, the jury could conclude that the defendant failed

4 The defendant argues that he had no ability to retreat after being pushed, citing Commonwealth v. Galvin, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 698 (2002). His reliance on Galvin is misplaced, however, as that case addressed whether a self-defense instruction was warranted in the first place, as determined by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. See id. at 698-699.

5 to avail himself of another opportunity to retreat and thus did

not act in self-defense.

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Henry, Sacks & Tan, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: January 16, 2026.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.