NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1023
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
JARED J., a juvenile.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following the denial of a motion to suppress, the juvenile
entered a conditional guilty plea on one count of discharging a
firearm within 500 feet of a building, in violation of see G. L.
c. 269, § 12E, and one count of possession of ammunition without
a firearm identification (FID) card, in violation of G. L.
c. 269, § 10 (h) (1).1 The juvenile argues that the judge
erroneously denied the motion to suppress because the evidence
in question was obtained as a result of an unconstitutional
seizure and patfrisk. We affirm.
1The parties agreed that the juvenile reserved his right to appeal from the denial of the motion to suppress. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (b) (6), as appearing in 482 Mass. 1501 (2019); Commonwealth v. Gomez, 480 Mass. 240, 252-253 (2018). Background. We summarize the facts as found by the motion
judge, supplemented with the uncontroverted testimony of the
hearing witnesses. See Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645,
655 (2018). In the afternoon of April 3, 2022, New Bedford
police Officer Scott DeCosta received a "ShotSpotter" alert
while on routine patrol.2 The alert stated that five possible
gunshots were fired in an area of New Bedford near a medical
facility. As Officer DeCosta responded to the area of the
alert, he noticed three young men, each wearing black clothing,
crossing the street and moving away from a cemetery. DeCosta
then spoke with a roofer working on a roof nearby who said he
heard five gunshots and saw three males in the cemetery, masked
and all wearing black, running toward the street where DeCosta
had noticed the young men.
DeCosta continued patrolling until he saw the juvenile
walking, recognizing him as one of the three persons he had seen
near the location of the alert. DeCosta could not see the
juvenile's hands, and, as DeCosta exited his marked police car,
he asked the juvenile to show his hands. The juvenile looked
surprised and began running in the opposite direction. DeCosta
2 ShotSpotter is "a system that identifies firearm discharges by sound and directs officers to the general location of the shots." Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass. 691, 694 (2020).
2 called in the juvenile's flight on his police radio. Another
officer, also in the area to investigate the ShotSpotter alert,
heard DeCosta's radio call and saw someone duck under a van.
DeCosta arrived on the scene, and the two officers surrounded
the van. With his gun drawn, the second officer ordered the
person under the van to come out. When the juvenile emerged
from under the van, the officer lifted him up from the ground,
feeling a hard object in his pocket. DeCosta handcuffed the
juvenile, and the second officer removed the hard object, which
turned out to be a revolver wrapped in an article of clothing.
Shortly thereafter, DeCosta felt another hard object in the
juvenile's pocket and removed a sandwich bag containing
ammunition.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "When reviewing a
ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary
findings of fact absent clear error but conduct an independent
review of his ultimate findings and conclusions of law"
(quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 482 Mass. 538, 543
(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 587
(2016). The juvenile claims error in the judge's conclusion
that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop him and that
he was armed and dangerous. We take each issue in turn.
3 2. Reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop. The parties
agree that the juvenile was seized for purposes of Article 14 of
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights when DeCosta asked him
to show his hands. Thus, we must determine if police had
reasonable suspicion that the juvenile "'was committing, had
committed, or was about to commit a crime' at the time of the
seizure." Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 365 (2019),
quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 303 (2014).
"Reasonable suspicion must be grounded in specific, articulable
facts and reasonable inferences [drawn] therefrom rather than on
a 'hunch'" (quotations and citation omitted). Matta, supra.
Reasonable suspicion is measured by an objective standard, and
the totality of the facts on which the seizure is based must
establish "an individualized suspicion that the person seized by
the police is the perpetrator of the crime under investigation"
(quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476
Mass. 231, 235 (2017).
Here, the facts found by the judge in support of the
reasonableness of the stop are as follows: ShotSpotter alerted
DeCosta to five potential gunshots in a residential area, near a
cemetery. Upon reaching the area, DeCosta noticed three young
men, all wearing black, crossing the street in the opposite
direction of the cemetery. The juvenile was one of the three
4 young men. Shortly thereafter, Decosta spoke to a roofer
working on a roof that overlooked the cemetery. The roofer told
DeCosta he heard five gunshots and saw three men wearing black
running in the direction of where DeCosta saw the three young
men. DeCosta proceeded to drive around until he saw the
juvenile, at which point he performed the stop.
In arguing that DeCosta did not have reasonable suspicion
to stop him, the juvenile raises several alternative
interpretations of the judge's findings of facts. Broadly, the
juvenile argues that nobody saw a gun being fired and that the
stop was not based on reasonable suspicion because the juvenile
was simply at the proverbial "wrong place at the wrong time."
Of course, this ignores that reasonable suspicion may be based
on "reasonable inferences" drawn from articulable facts
(citations omitted). Matta, 483 Mass. at 365. Where
ShotSpotter had alerted DeCosta to five potential gunshots in
the vicinity of the cemetery, and where an informant had heard
five gunshots and then saw three males in the cemetery, all
wearing black, running away, it was reasonable for DeCosta to
infer that the group of three young men, also wearing black,
that he had earlier seen near the location of the shots, moving
away from the cemetery, had committed the crime of discharging a
firearm within 500 feet of a building, either as the shooter or
5 as a joint venturer. See Commonwealth v. Severino, 106 Mass.
App. Ct. 170, 187 (2025) (Toone, J., concurring) (discharging
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1023
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
JARED J., a juvenile.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following the denial of a motion to suppress, the juvenile
entered a conditional guilty plea on one count of discharging a
firearm within 500 feet of a building, in violation of see G. L.
c. 269, § 12E, and one count of possession of ammunition without
a firearm identification (FID) card, in violation of G. L.
c. 269, § 10 (h) (1).1 The juvenile argues that the judge
erroneously denied the motion to suppress because the evidence
in question was obtained as a result of an unconstitutional
seizure and patfrisk. We affirm.
1The parties agreed that the juvenile reserved his right to appeal from the denial of the motion to suppress. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (b) (6), as appearing in 482 Mass. 1501 (2019); Commonwealth v. Gomez, 480 Mass. 240, 252-253 (2018). Background. We summarize the facts as found by the motion
judge, supplemented with the uncontroverted testimony of the
hearing witnesses. See Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645,
655 (2018). In the afternoon of April 3, 2022, New Bedford
police Officer Scott DeCosta received a "ShotSpotter" alert
while on routine patrol.2 The alert stated that five possible
gunshots were fired in an area of New Bedford near a medical
facility. As Officer DeCosta responded to the area of the
alert, he noticed three young men, each wearing black clothing,
crossing the street and moving away from a cemetery. DeCosta
then spoke with a roofer working on a roof nearby who said he
heard five gunshots and saw three males in the cemetery, masked
and all wearing black, running toward the street where DeCosta
had noticed the young men.
DeCosta continued patrolling until he saw the juvenile
walking, recognizing him as one of the three persons he had seen
near the location of the alert. DeCosta could not see the
juvenile's hands, and, as DeCosta exited his marked police car,
he asked the juvenile to show his hands. The juvenile looked
surprised and began running in the opposite direction. DeCosta
2 ShotSpotter is "a system that identifies firearm discharges by sound and directs officers to the general location of the shots." Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass. 691, 694 (2020).
2 called in the juvenile's flight on his police radio. Another
officer, also in the area to investigate the ShotSpotter alert,
heard DeCosta's radio call and saw someone duck under a van.
DeCosta arrived on the scene, and the two officers surrounded
the van. With his gun drawn, the second officer ordered the
person under the van to come out. When the juvenile emerged
from under the van, the officer lifted him up from the ground,
feeling a hard object in his pocket. DeCosta handcuffed the
juvenile, and the second officer removed the hard object, which
turned out to be a revolver wrapped in an article of clothing.
Shortly thereafter, DeCosta felt another hard object in the
juvenile's pocket and removed a sandwich bag containing
ammunition.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "When reviewing a
ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary
findings of fact absent clear error but conduct an independent
review of his ultimate findings and conclusions of law"
(quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 482 Mass. 538, 543
(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 587
(2016). The juvenile claims error in the judge's conclusion
that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop him and that
he was armed and dangerous. We take each issue in turn.
3 2. Reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop. The parties
agree that the juvenile was seized for purposes of Article 14 of
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights when DeCosta asked him
to show his hands. Thus, we must determine if police had
reasonable suspicion that the juvenile "'was committing, had
committed, or was about to commit a crime' at the time of the
seizure." Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 365 (2019),
quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 303 (2014).
"Reasonable suspicion must be grounded in specific, articulable
facts and reasonable inferences [drawn] therefrom rather than on
a 'hunch'" (quotations and citation omitted). Matta, supra.
Reasonable suspicion is measured by an objective standard, and
the totality of the facts on which the seizure is based must
establish "an individualized suspicion that the person seized by
the police is the perpetrator of the crime under investigation"
(quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476
Mass. 231, 235 (2017).
Here, the facts found by the judge in support of the
reasonableness of the stop are as follows: ShotSpotter alerted
DeCosta to five potential gunshots in a residential area, near a
cemetery. Upon reaching the area, DeCosta noticed three young
men, all wearing black, crossing the street in the opposite
direction of the cemetery. The juvenile was one of the three
4 young men. Shortly thereafter, Decosta spoke to a roofer
working on a roof that overlooked the cemetery. The roofer told
DeCosta he heard five gunshots and saw three men wearing black
running in the direction of where DeCosta saw the three young
men. DeCosta proceeded to drive around until he saw the
juvenile, at which point he performed the stop.
In arguing that DeCosta did not have reasonable suspicion
to stop him, the juvenile raises several alternative
interpretations of the judge's findings of facts. Broadly, the
juvenile argues that nobody saw a gun being fired and that the
stop was not based on reasonable suspicion because the juvenile
was simply at the proverbial "wrong place at the wrong time."
Of course, this ignores that reasonable suspicion may be based
on "reasonable inferences" drawn from articulable facts
(citations omitted). Matta, 483 Mass. at 365. Where
ShotSpotter had alerted DeCosta to five potential gunshots in
the vicinity of the cemetery, and where an informant had heard
five gunshots and then saw three males in the cemetery, all
wearing black, running away, it was reasonable for DeCosta to
infer that the group of three young men, also wearing black,
that he had earlier seen near the location of the shots, moving
away from the cemetery, had committed the crime of discharging a
firearm within 500 feet of a building, either as the shooter or
5 as a joint venturer. See Commonwealth v. Severino, 106 Mass.
App. Ct. 170, 187 (2025) (Toone, J., concurring) (discharging
firearm within 500 feet of building subject to principal or
joint venturer liability).
Next, the juvenile argues that the informant, the roofer,
was too unreliable for the information to form the basis of
reasonable suspicion. "Information from an anonymous informant
may warrant reasonable suspicion if it is shown to be reliable."
Commonwealth v. Costa, 448 Mass. 510, 514 (2007). "[O]ur
evaluation of the tip's indicia of reliability will be focused
on the informant's reliability and his or her basis of
knowledge. Independent police corroboration may make up for
deficiencies in one or both of these factors" (citation
omitted). Id. at 514-515. To be sure, the informant was
unidentified. But he had a strong basis of knowledge, being
present in the vicinity of the crime with a good vantage from
which to see and hear it. Furthermore, the fact that the
information was corroborated by the ShotSpotter alert for the
same number of gunshots and DeCosta previously saw three young
men who matched the informant's description leaves us satisfied
that the informant was adequately reliable. See Commonwealth v.
Manha, 479 Mass. 44, 48 (2018). The information that DeCosta
possessed, along with reasonable inferences therefrom, were
6 adequate to establish the existence of reasonable suspicion.
The motion to suppress on the basis of the stop was,
accordingly, appropriately denied.
3. Reasonable suspicion the juvenile was armed and
dangerous. In order to conduct a lawful patfrisk, "police must
have a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable
facts, that the suspect is armed and dangerous." Commonwealth
v. Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. 34, 38-39 (2020). Having concluded
that the police had reasonable suspicion to believe that the
juvenile had recently discharged a firearm in a residential
area, it was likewise reasonable for them to believe that the
juvenile was armed and dangerous. See Commonwealth v. Ford, 100
Mass. App. Ct. 712, 719 (2022) (reasonable suspicion that
defendant had just repeatedly discharged firearm in residential
neighborhood justifies reasonable suspicion that defendant was
armed and dangerous).
The juvenile also argues that the police officers exceeded
the scope of the patfrisk because, while the officers testified
that they felt a "hard object," they did not immediately
identify the items as a gun. We are not persuaded. The police
need not have certainty that a given object is a weapon before
performing a patfrisk for safety. See Commonwealth v. Silva,
366 Mass. 402, 406 (1974) ("Essentially, the question is whether
7 a reasonably prudent [person] in the policeman's position would
be warranted in the belief that the safety of the police or that
of other persons was in danger"). Given that the police had
reasonable suspicion that the juvenile was armed and dangerous,
we are satisfied that the officers were justified in performing
a search upon feeling hard objects in the juvenile's pockets.3
The motion to suppress was appropriately denied.
Order denying motion to suppress affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin, Walsh & Hershfang, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: January 20, 2026.
3 We are similarly unpersuaded by the juvenile's implied argument that the second officer's discovery of the gun was somehow inappropriate because he had felt the object in question by plain feel while helping the juvenile to his feet, rather than conducting a "traditional patfrisk."
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.