Commonwealth v. Hope

39 Mass. 1
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedFebruary 4, 1839
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 39 Mass. 1 (Commonwealth v. Hope) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Hope, 39 Mass. 1 (Mass. 1839).

Opinion

Shaw C. J.

delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is, whether the appeal taken in the present [2]*2case by the defendant, ought to be allowed, ft appears that in the Municipal Court, he was indicted upon four distinct charges of housebreaking in the daytime. In each of these cases, the indictment charges that he, either by himself, or with others, broke and entered a dwellinghouse in the daytime, with an intent to steal, and did then and there steal, take and carry away certain property, specially described. Each therefore contains a substantive charge of housebreaking with a felonious intent, and of actual larceny in a dwellinghouse, either of which is a distinct offence by the statute.

In the Municipal Court, these were considered as convictions of larceny, within the meaning of the Revised Statutes, c. 126, § 19, and thereupon the defendant was sentenced as a common and notorious thief. The provision of that section is, that every person who shall be convicted at the same term of the court, either as principal or accessory before the fact, in three distinct larcenies, shall be deemed a common and notorious thief, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison, not more than twenty years.

In the case of Commonwealth v. Tuck, 20 Pick. 356, it was held that a person thus convicted, was within the provision of the Revised Statutes, c. 86, § 10, which allows aright of appeal, upon conviction of an offence punishable by impris onment in the State prison, for a term exceeding five years. It may be proper to remark here, that the three convictions, upon which the defendant in the case cited, was sentenced, and from which conviction and sentence he appealed, were charges of larceny only, without the charge of shopbreaking, or housebreaking ; and the question which afterwards arose in the same cause, after trial, in this Court, and in which the question was whether the charge of shopbreaking and larceny, and a conviction of larceny only, were within the statute, arose in consequence of his having been acquitted on the appeal, of one of the three indictments for larceny only, of which he had been convicted in the Municipal Court.

Then the question is, whether a conviction upon the combined charge of housebreaking and larceny, is to be considered as one of the distinct larcenies contemplated by the 19th section of the 126th chapter of the Revised Sts utes If it [3]*3eg, then the defendant was convicted of three distinct larcenies, he was rightly adjudged a common and notorious thief, and was rightly convicted and sentenced accordingly ; but if this combined charge of housebreaking and larceny is not one of the larcenies there contemplated, then the defendant was liable to be sentenced on each of those convictions separately, and not as a notorious thief. On neither of those convictions separately, would he have been liable to a punishment, by imprisonment, for a term exceeding five years, and then, by the statute cited, he would not have been entitled to an appeal.

One construction of this statute contended for, is, that the 19th section, by which one may be adjudged a common and notorious thief, and punished accordingly, applies only to simple larcenies, that is, stealing property, without any of the aggravations mentioned in different sections. By this construction, stealing from a dwellinghouse, office, bank, shop or warehouse, c. 126, § 14,—stealing from a building on fire, § 15,—stealing from the person of another, § 16, — would not be larcenies, within the meaning of the 19th section rendering one liable to be punished as a common and notorious thief. But we think this cannot be the true construction of the statute. In each of these cases the larceny is not only the gist of the offence, but is all which the law regards as an offence. In each case, it is the stealing of property, it is theft, but more atrocious, as it manifests more boldness, cunning or disregard of the rights of others. Where therefore nothing criminal but larceny, is charged, it comes within the 19th section, because though aggravated by the various circumstances of force or fraud, mentioned in the statute, it is still larceny and larceny only.

The question recurs, whether the combined charge of housebreaking and larceny, is to be considered as falling under the same conditions. It is contended by the defendant, that though, the indictment charges housebreaking, yet it does also charge a larceny, with all the circumstances, and all the precision, which would be requisite upon an indictment for larceny, if that were the only offence charged, and in fact, one so charged maybe acquitted of the housebreaking and may be convicted of the larceny only.

[4]*4The question is certainly attended with great difficulty, and requires a careful consideration. The indictment in effect sets forth two distinct offences, either of which, if set forth alone, wonld warrant a conviction and subject the convict to punish ment, under the statute.

Is such a mode of declaring double, is it bad kv duplicity, may two distinct judgments be rendered upon it ? Or is it to be regarded as a larceny aggravated by breaking the dwelling-house, and punished upon the 14th section as stealing from the dwellinghouse in the daytime, or is it to be regarded as the breaking of a dwellinghouse, with an intent to steal, manifested by an actual larceny and punished on the 13th section as for breaking and entering a dwellinghouse, in the daytime, with an intent to steal ? In order the better to meet these inquiries, to "understand the subject and come to some satisfactory conclusion, it seems necessary to examine the principles of the common law, the ancient statutes which were in force before the emigration of our ancestors to this country, and which are adopted here as common law, and the modes of proceeding which have been long in use in like cases. It will be also necessary to consider the different statutes of this Commonwealth on the same subject. This mode of charging the double offence of housebreaking and theft, when used in regard to burglary properly so called, that of breaking and entéring a dwellinghouse in the night time, and the kindred offence of breaking and entering dwellinghouses and other buildings in the daytime, seems to have been long in use and has not been considered obnoxious to the charge of duplicity.

House-breaking with a felonious intent has always been considered a crime of an aggravated nature ; if committed in the night time, it has been, both in England and in this country, a capital offence. Lord Hale says, the common genus of of-fences, that comes under the name of hamsecken, is that which is usually called housebreaking, which sometimes comes under the common appellation of burglary, whether committed in the day or the night, to the intent to commit felony.” 1 Hale’s P. C. 547. And again, p. 559 ; “ to make up burglary, it must not be only to break and enter a house in the night time, but either a felony must be committed in the house, or it must [5]*5be to the intent to commit a felony.” It is .therefore quite sufficient to lay the breaking and entering with intent to commit a larceny or other felony ; yet the usual course is also to add the averment, that he did then and there steal, take and carry away property, that is, actually commit the larceny intended.

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39 Mass. 1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-hope-mass-1839.