POPOVICH, J.:
¶ 1 This is an appeal from the order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County on September 4, 1998, which denied appellant’s petition for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc. Upon review, we find that the lower court erred in refusing to grant appellant’s petition to appeal nunc pro tunc. However, we need not remand this case for the filing of a direct appeal. Rather, given the present state of the record, we are able to resolve appellant’s lone appellate claim, an attack upon the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Upon review, we find that the lower court did not abuse its discretion when fashioning appellant’s sentence. Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s judgment of sentence.
¶ 2 Herein, appellant questions:
I. Is Appellant entitled to an appeal nunc pro tunc when seeking to challenge the discretionary aspects) of sentence in a criminal proceeding when said sentence was rendered pursuant to a guilty plea and trial counsel failed to properly perfect Appellant’s appeal, having been directed to do so by Appellant?
II. In an appeal to establish a Defendant’s right to appeal nunc pro tunc, may the Court consider and rule on Defendant’s underlying claims where a complete record is before the Court and the issues have been briefed?
III. Is a Defendant entitled to have his/her case remanded for resen-tencing where it is shown that the Sentencing Court failed to adequately support its sentence when that sentence was substantially beyond the aggravated range of the guidelines?
IV. Is a Defendant entitled to have his/her case remanded for resen-tencing where it is shown that the sentencing court clearly usurped the prosecution’s prerogative and imposed the mandatory minimum where the record clearly demonstrates that the prosecution had agreed to waive the mandatory minimum?
V. Did the Sentencing Court’s imposition of an aggregate sentence of ninety months when the outer limits of the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines called for a sentence of no more than fifty two months constitute a complete departure from the sentencing guidelines and thus an abuse of, discretion mandating that the case be remanded for resentenc-ing?
VI. Did the sentencing judge’s actions ' reflect such prejudice towards ap[3]*3pellant and an unwillingness to adhere to the resentencing (sic) guidelines such that the present case should be remanded for re-sentencing before another judge?
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 5-6.
¶ 3 The record reveals that on September 20, 1996, appellant pleaded guilty to one count of robbery, one count of aggravated assault, one count of recklessly endangering another person and three counts of criminal conspiracy. In exchange for appellant’s guilty pleas, the Commonwealth agreed not to proceed under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712, which, upon notice from the Commonwealth, requires the sentencing court to impose a five-year mandatory minimum sentence when the defendant visibly possesses a firearm during the commission of the crimes of robbery or aggravated assault, among other crimes. Guilty Plea Colloquy, 9/20/96, p. 3.
¶4 Following a presentence investigation, appellant was sentenced on January 17,1997. The court sentenced appellant to a term of five to ten years of imprisonment for the robbery and a consecutive term of two and one-half to five years for the aggravated assault. The court also sentenced appellant to two terms of two and one-half to five years of imprisonment for the conspiracy to commit a robbery and the conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, to be served concurrently to one another and concurrently to the robbery sentence. The remaining offenses merged for sentencing purposes. During the sentencing, the court noted that the sentence recommended by the sentencing guidelines was “totally inappropriate” in light of the aggravating circumstances of this case.
¶5 Neither appellant nor his counsel objected to his sentence in any manner at the time of its imposition. Further, neither appellant nor his counsel filed a post-sentence motion to modify sentence. Rather, appellant, through counsel, filed a notice of appeal on February 14, 1997. On February 21, 1997, the lower court directed appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal within fourteen days, in accordance with Pa. R.A.P.1925. On March 10, 1997, the lower court filed its opinion, in which it noted that appellant did not comply with its order to file a Pa.R.A.P.1925 statement. Nevertheless, the court attempted to review “the unknown ‘merits’ of the appeal.” Therein, the court opined that appellant’s guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily and that the court was not limited in its sentencing options by the Commonwealth’s agreement not to invoke the mandatory sentencing provisions of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.
¶ 6 On direct appeal, this court, in Commonwealth v. Hernandez, No. 00812 Philadelphia 1997, 704 A.2d 1117 (Pa.Super.1997), held that appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence had been waived due to counsel’s failure to object to appellant’s sentence at the time of its imposition, counsel’s failure to file a motion to modify sentence and counsel’s failure to file a concise statement of matters claimed on appeal, despite a court order so to do. See Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 444 Pa.Super. 295, 663 A.2d 790 (1995) (although motion to modify sentence is optional under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1410, defendant still must preserve challenge to discretionary aspects of sentence at the time of sentencing or in a motion to modify, so that the lower court has an opportunity to address the issue); Commonwealth v. Egan, 451 Pa.Super. 219, 679 A.2d 237 (1996) (Superior Court may address challenge to discretionary aspects of sentence even though claim was not raised in a motion to modify sentence where claim was raised in Pa.R.A.P.1925 statement and lower court addressed issue in its opinion).
¶ 7 On July 17, 1998, appellant, through new counsel, filed a petition for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc. Therein, he alleged that he directed his prior counsel to take all necessary steps to perfect a direct appeal properly from the discretionary aspects of his sentence. He specifically requested the court to find that [4]*4counsel rendered ineffective assistance due to his failure to preserve properly his constitutional right to appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Finally, appellant asked the court to grant him the right to file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc.
¶ 8 On September 4, 1998, the lower court dismissed appellant’s petition for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc and granted appellant leave to file a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, subject to its provisions concerning eligibility for relief and filing deadlines. This appeal followed.
¶ 9 To begin, we note that appellant filed his petition for appeal nunc pro tunc on July 17,1998. Several months earlier, this court, in Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 712 A.2d 288, 291 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc), reversed, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (1999), held that:
If a defendant desires to assert that counsel’s ineffective assistance deprived him of the right to appeal, causing him prejudice, but not affecting the underlying verdict or adjudication, the defendant can seek relief by requesting an appeal nunc pro tunc. See Commonwealth v. Stock, 545 Pa. 13, 19, 679 A.2d 760, 764 (1996)(granting a defendant an appeal nunc pro tunc where counsel failed to timely file a direct appeal and noting that “an appeal nunc pro tunc is intended as a remedy to vindicate the right to appeal where that right- has been lost due to extraordinary circumstances.”). The fact that he will not be awarded relief under the PCRA does not prevent the petitioner from obtaining relief altogether.
¶ 10 Appellant’s filing of a petition for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc in the present case, rather than a PCRA petition, clearly is a result of our decision in Lant-zy. Appellant’s lone issue on direct appeal was an attack upon the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Previous holdings of this court clearly indicated that a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve a sentencing claim for direct appeal was not a cognizable PCRA claim under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(a)(2)(n), since such an error by counsel could not “so undermine the truth-determining process that no rehable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” See e.g., Lantzy, 712 A.2d at 292 (claim that counsel was ineffective for advising defendant to withdraw his appeal and post-sentence motions was not a cognizable PCRA claim, since PCRA relief is available only for sentences greater than the lawful maximum); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 430 Pa.Super. 336, 634 A.2d 633, 636 (1993) (claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to modify sentence is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing and, therefore, not cognizable under the PCRA), appeal denied, 539 Pa. 689, 653 A.2d 1228 (1994); Commonwealth v. Grier, 410 Pa.Super. 284, 599 A.2d 993, 996 (1991), appeal denied, 530 Pa. 639, 607 A.2d 250 (1992)(claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the issue of sentencing by filing a motion to modify sentence is outside the scope of the PCRA); Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 398 Pa.Super. 94, 580 A.2d 857, 860 (1990)(claim that counsel' was ineffective for failing to challenge the discretionary aspects of sentence on appeal is not a cognizable PCRA claim since such an ineffectiveness claim does not affect the truth-determining process so as to render the adjudication of guilt unreliable).
¶ 11 Since appellant’s ineffectiveness claim was grounded upon an issue that was not a cognizable PCRA claim, in that it did not relate to the verdict or adjudication of guilt, appellant accepted our invitation in Lantzy and filed his petition for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc. Lantzy, 712 A.2d at 291 (“If a defendant desires to assert that counsel’s ineffective assistance deprived him of the right to appeal, causing him prejudice, but not affecting the underlying verdict or adjudication, the defendant can seek relief by requesting an [5]*5appeal nunc pro fit/ic.”)(emphasis in original).
¶ 12 However, appellant’s decision to file a petition for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc was made without the benefit of our Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements in Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (1999), Commonwealth v. Chester, 557 Pa. 358, 733 A.2d 1242 (1999) and Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326 (1999).1 Subsequent to appellant’s filing of his petition for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc, our Supreme Court reversed our en banc decision in Lantzy, on two points: First, our high court rejected the bifurcated system of post-conviction review which we approved in Lantzy. Rather, our Supreme Court, citing Chester, 733 A.2d at 1251, held that “the PCRA provides the exclusive remedy for post-conviction claims seeking restoration of appellate rights due to counsel’s failure to perfect a direct appeal, since such claims also were cognizable on traditional habeas corpus review.” Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 570.
¶ 13 Second, our Supreme Court rejected the requirement which we set forth in Commonwealth v. Petroski, 695 A.2d 844 (Pa.Super.1997), and clarified in our en banc decision in Lantzy. In Lantzy, 712 A.2d at 292, we held that in order to qualify for PCRA relief under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii), a post-conviction petitioner who seeks a direct appeal nunc pro tunc due to counsel’s failure to perfect a direct appeal must prove not only. that counsel ignored his directive to file an appeal, but also that the claims which he seeks to raise on direct appeal affected the truth-determining process and rendered his adjudication of guilt unreliable. In reversing our decision, our Justices stated:
Thus, the issue of whether a claim for relief based upon counsel’s failure to file a direct appeal meets the prejudice requirement of Section 9543(a)(2)(ii) may be addressed by direct reference to Strickland; indeed, this approach is particularly useful here, since the application of Strickland in this setting is well developed in federal jurisprudence. Indeed, the Strickland decision itself expressly acknowledges that actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel falls within a narrow category of circumstances in which prejudice is legally presumed. Strickland[ v. Washington], 466 U.S. [668] at 692, 104 S.Ct. [2052] at 2067[, 80 L.Ed.2d 674], Since the failure to perfect a requested appeal is the functional equivalent of having no representation at all, see Evitts[ v. Lucey], 469 U.S. [387] at 396-97, 105 S.Ct. [830] at 836[, 83 L.Ed.2d 821] (noting that the failure to perfect an appeal “essentially waived respondent’s opportunity to make a case on the merits; in this sense it is difficult to distinguish respondent’s situation from that of someone who had no counsel at all”), Strickland, on its own terms, establishes the right to relief. Additionally, as President Judge McEwen [in his dissent in Lantzy II ] reasoned, since Article V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees a direct appeal as of right, see Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 490 Pa. 296, 299, 416 A.2d 477, 479 (1980), a failure to file or perfect such an appeal results in a denial so fundamental as to constitute prejudice per se. See generally Canales v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir.1998)(stating that “it appears that every federal court of appeals to address the issue has applied some form of a rule of presumed prejudice where counsel fails to file a notice of appeal”).7
[6]*6
Thus, we hold that, where there is an unjustified failure to file a requested direct appeal, the conduct of counsel falls beneath the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, denies the accused the assistance of counsel guaranteed bg the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well as the right to direct appeal under Article V, Section 9, and constitutes prejudice for purposes of Section 9543(a)(2)(H). Therefore, in such circumstances, and where the remaining requirements of the PCRA are satisñed, the petitioner is not required to establish his innocence or demonstrate the merits of the issue or issues which would have been raised on appeal.
Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 571-572 (footnote 8 omitted) (emphasis added).
¶ 14 These two clear departures from our holding in Lantzy are the key to resolving this appeal. Given our Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Lantzy, appellant should have filed a PCRA petition, rather than a petition for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc. A claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal when so directed by the petitioner is a cognizable claim under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). “[T]he petitioner is not required to establish innocence or demonstrate the merits of the issue or issue which would have been raised on direct appeal.” Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 572. The fact that the issue which appellant seeks to raise on appeal, i.e., the discretionary aspects of his sentence, does not preclude PCRA relief, since appellant’s claim that counsel’s failure to perfect the appeal denied the accused the assistance of competent counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well as the right to a direct appeal under Article V, Section 9, and, thus, such neglect by counsel alone [7]*7is sufficient to establish prejudice for the purposes of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 572.2
¶ 15 The fact that appellant’s request for an appeal nunc pro tunc is a cognizable PCRA claim, despite the fact that the claim which underlies the request is not, is clearly demonstrated by our Supreme Court’s decision in Lantzy, since the Court granted his request for a direct appeal despite the fact that Lantzy might seek to challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 566 (when describing the appellate issues lost to counsel’s ineffectiveness, the Court noted: “It is unclear whether he had originally sought to challenge only the discretionary aspects of his sentence, or whether he also intended to attack his conviction.”).
¶ 16 At this point in our discussion of appellant’s appeal, an apparent block to appellant’s request for an appeal nunc pro tunc exists, that being the fact that appellant did have a direct appeal in which counsel filed a brief, albeit his sentencing claim was waived by counsel’s ineffectiveness. In Commonwealth v. Hall, 713 A.2d 650, 652 (Pa.Super.1998), appeal granted 561 Pa. 669, 749 A.2d 467, 2000 Pa. LEXIS 128, (Pa. Jan. 6, 2000), which was decided before our Supreme Court’s Lantzy decision, we opined that the grant of appeal rights nunc pro tunc would be “limited to extraordinary circumstance and [would] be available only to defendants who have not already pursued their direct appeal rights.” However, we are convinced that despite prior counsel’s filing of a brief in appellant’s direct appeal and our rejection of that appeal based upon a waiver analysis, appellant has not actually enjoyed the benefits of a direct appeal.
' ¶ 17 The United States Supreme Court, in Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396-97, 105 S.Ct. 830, 836-37, 83 L.Ed.2d 821, 830-31 (1985), stated:
A first appeal as of right therefore is not adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney. This result is hardly novel. The petitioners in both Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 87 S.Ct. 1402, 18 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967), claimed that, although represented in name by counsel, they had not received the type of assistance constitutionally required to render the appellate proceedings fair. In both cases, we agreed with the petitioners, holding that counsel’s failure in Anders to submit a brief on appeal and counsel’s waiver in Entsminger of the petitioner’s right to a full transcript rendered the subsequent judgments against the petitioners unconstitutional. In short, the promise of Douglas [v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963) ] that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel on appeal — like the promise of Gideon [v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) ] that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel at trial — would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to the effective assistance of counsel.
¶ 18 In Evitts, the defendant’s counsel failed to file “a statement of appeal” in accordance with Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure 1.095(a)(1) when he filed his brief and record with the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.3 Due to this failure, the [8]*8Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to file the requisite statement of appeal. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing that all the necessary information was included within his brief and tendering a formal statement of appeal. Reconsideration was summarily denied. Defendant sought discretionary review before the Supreme Court of Kentucky, which affirmed the conviction. Defendant then made one last attempt to obtain state appellate review when he moved the trial court to grant him the right to file an appeal nunc pro tunc. This request was also denied.
¶ 19 The defendant then sought federal habeas corpus relief on the grounds that counsel’s failure to file a timely statement of appeal resulted in dismissal of his direct appeal and, thus, deprived him of the right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that there was no dispute that ■ counsel was ineffective in failing to file the statement of appeal. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 892, 105 S.Ct. at 833-34. The Supreme Court further observed:
To prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant must face an adversary proeeed-ing that-like a trial-is governed by intricate rules that to a layperson would be hopelessly forbidding. An unrepresented appellant — like an unrepresented defendant at trial — is unable to protect the vital interests at stake. To be sure, respondent did have nominal representation when he brought this appeal. But nominal representation on appeal as of right — like nominal representation at trial — does not suffice to render the proceedings constitutionally adequate; a party whose counsel is unable to provide effective representation is in no better position than one who has no counsel at all.
¶ 20 The Supreme Court then affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s grant of the right to appeal, stating: “A system of appeal as of right is established precisely to assure that only those who are validly convicted have their freedom curtailed. A State may not extinguish this right because another right of the appellant — the right to effective assistance of counsel — has been violated.” Evitts, 469 U.S. at 399-400, 105 S.Ct. at 838.
¶ 21 Like the defendant in Evitts, appellant lost his right to file a direct appeal via counsel’s failure to comply with rules of procedure, i.e., by not filing a motion to modify sentence or by not raising the issue in a Pa.R.A.P.1925 statement. Appellant sought to raise one issue on direct appeal, his challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. However, counsel, through his clear ineffectiveness, waived that lone issue. See Discussion, infra, at pp. 10-11. The fact that he actually filed a brief is of no moment because it was a worthless and futile gesture in light of his prior incompetence. Since counsel’s inaction had waived appellant’s sentencing claim, his filing of the brief had no more value to appellant than had he not filed a brief at all. See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 146, 371 A.2d 468, 476 (1977) (where counsel’s brief on appeal failed to comply with Supreme court rules and appeared to be a “preliminary draft,” appellate counsel was ineffective, and “the proper remedy is to afford appellant a new appeal in which he may reassert the issues adversely affected by his initial counsel’s ineffective stewardship of his appeal.”). Cf., Entsminger, supra (where counsel perfected a direct appeal and filed a brief, but failed to file the entire record of the petitioner’s trial, the United States Supreme Court held counsel was ineffective for failing to insure that the Iowa Supreme Court had the full record available for its review during consideration of the appeal and remanded for an appeal nunc pro tunc); Commonwealth v. Ciotto, 382 [9]*9Pa.Super. 458, 555 A.2d 930, 931 (1989) (where counsel’s ineffective assistance denied him entirely his right to a direct appeal, defendant is entitled to a direct appeal nunc pro tunc without regal'd to the merits of the issues he wishes to raise on appeal; defendant entitled to pursue post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc where prior counsel’s procedural error resulted in waiver of post-trial motions).4
¶ 22 Having determined that appellant has presented a valid PCRA claim, it appears that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc, and we should remand this case for the filing of a PCRA petition, as ordered by the lower court. However, such action by this court would impose an injustice upon appellant, as the following analysis indicates.
¶ 23 Appellant reasonably relied upon our Lantzy decision and complied with the procedure set forth therein. If we were to remand this case for the filing of a PCRA petition, it would be untimely. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545, any PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, excepting under three very limited circumstances:
(b) Time for filing petition.—
(1)Any petition under this subchap-ter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.
(3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.
(4) For purposes of this subchapter, “government officials” shall not include defense counsel, whether appointed or retained.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
¶24 Appellant’s judgment of sentence was imposed on January 17, 1997, and [10]*10appellant’s direct appeal was denied by this court by order filed on October 7, 1997. Thus, his judgment of sentence became final on November 6, 1997, when the thirty (30) day period for filing a petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a). Since his judgment of sentence was final well in excess of one year ago, appellant’s PCRA petition would be untimely if filed on remand. Furthermore, we cannot contemplate any claim by appellant which would render a PCRA petition filed upon remand timely under any of the exceptions to section 9545 so as to allow the court to exercise jurisdiction. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i — iii). See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214 (1999)(time limitations of the PCRA are jurisdictional in nature, and may only be avoided by one of the three specific exceptions enumerated therein).
¶ 25 Unfortunately for appellant, he has been caught in a jurisdictional trap of our making. He filed a petition for an appeal nunc pro tunc, rather than a timely PCRA action, because our decision in Lantzy, clearly indicated that his claim would not be cognizable under the PCRA. Now, upon further illumination of the issue in our Supreme Court’s Lantzy decision, appellant’s claim is cognizable under the PCRA, but, if we remand for filing of such a petition, the lower court would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue as the petition would be untimely.5
¶ 26 Thus, in the interest of justice and fundamental fairness, we find that the lower court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s petition for appeal nunc pro tunc. In so ruling, we follow our recent en banc decision in Commonwealth v. Hitchcock, 2000 Pa.Super. 88, 749 A.2d 935, 2000 Pa.Super. LEXIS 301 (March 23, 2000) (en banc). Therein, in ruling upon a similar situation to appellant’s, we stated:
As previously noted, Appellant chose to file a petition for permission seeking reinstatement of his right to appeal nunc pro tunc rather than file a futile post-conviction petition that would have been dismissed pursuant to this Court’s decisions in Hall, Lantzy and Petroski. Appellant specifically cited to these cases as well as Stock in his appellate brief and in the memorandum of law filed in support of his petition. Appellant’s Brief at 10-11; Petition for Permission to File Post-Trial Motions Nunc Pro Tunc and Motion to Direct Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, filed 11/24/98, at 2. It thus appears that he relied on the existing caselaw.
Insofar as the effect on the administration of justice is concerned, we note that sweeping retrospective application would only concern a limited number of individuals who followed this Court’s rulings in Hall, Lantzy and Petroski. While the total of affected defendants may be slight in comparison to the volume of criminal cases pending in the courts, retroactive application may leave such persons wholly without a remedy as their ability to obtain PCRA relief may be precluded by the time constraints in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). By comparison, prospective application will have no effect on those who specifically relied on prior practice and caselaw. Consideration of the above factors thus militates against sweeping retroactive [11]*11application of our Supreme Court’s decision in Lantzy.
If we were to retrospectively apply the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lantzy here, Appellant’s sole means of obtaining reinstatement of his direct appeal rights would be to file a petition under the PCRA. Lantzy, 558 Pa. at 221, 736 A.2d at 569. Unfortunately for Appellant, any such petition would be subject to the time limitation set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). As applied here, Appellant’s petition would be untimely unless he could satisfy one of the exceptions in section 9545(b). Retroactive application of our Supreme Court’s decision in Lantzy could therefore result in the affirmance of Appellant’s conviction, leaving him without any remedy.
Such a result is unjust. It would serve to unfairly penalize Appellant for adhering to a procedure for obtaining redress that was specifically approved by this Court. Where, as here, a defendant has been misled by the actions of the appellate court, our Supreme Court has not hesitated to grant relief in the interests of justice. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tyson, 535 Pa. 391, 394-395, 635 A.2d 623, 624-625 (1993) (granting relief in the form of a new trial where the defendant was misled by the Supreme Court’s own decision); Commonwealth v. Powell, 527 Pa. 288, 292-294, 590 A.2d 1240, 1242-1243 (1991) (discussing the inherent right of the courts to grant relief in the interest of justice whenever it is so required).
Viewed in this manner, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by summarily denying Appellant’s petition. The record unequivocally demonstrates that Appellant asked Attorney Shugars to file a direct appeal. N.T. Sentencing, 11/26/97, at 10; Shugars’ Letter, supra. Notwithstanding his awareness of Appellant’s desires, Attorney Shugars advised that he would not file an appeal and that Appellant could proceed pro se or with private counsel. Shugars’ Letter, supra. This was improper.
Trial counsel certainly was not obligated to pursue frivolous claims on appeal. Lantzy, 558 Pa. at 226 n.8, 736 A.2d at 572 n. 8. Nevertheless, he was not permitted to unilaterally withdraw. If counsel believed Appellant’s claims to be wholly frivolous, he was obligated to adhere to the procedures set forth in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) and Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981). Lantzy, 558 Pa. at 226 n.8, 736 A.2d at 572 n. 8. As recognized by our Supreme Court, where there is an unjustified failure to file a requested direct appeal, the conduct of counsel falls beneath the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and denies the accused the right to the assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Id., 558 Pa. at 226, 736 A.2d at 572.
Because it is apparent from the face of the record that trial counsel unjusti-fiedly failed to file a requested direct appeal and because Appellant relied upon the procedure for obtaining redress outlined by this Court in Lantzy, the interests of justice require the reinstatement of Appellant’s right to a direct appeal. Tyson and Powell, supra. As the trial court summarily denied Appellant’s petition, we are compelled to reverse and remand. Upon remand, we direct the trial court to enter an appropriate order reinstating Appellant’s right to a direct appeal nunc pro tunc. Lantzy, 558 Pa. at 226-228, 736 A.2d at 572-573. In addition, as it appears that Appellant is indigent, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent Appellant.
See also, Commonwealth v. Garcia, 2000 Pa.Super. 89, 749 A.2d 928, 2000 Pa.Super. LEXIS 299 (March 23, 2000) (fin banc).
¶ 27 Likewise, it is apparent from the face of the record that appellants trial counsel was ineffective. First, appellant [12]*12had a right to file an appeal challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence and, in light of counsel’s filing of an appeal raising that issue, appellant clearly directed counsel to perfect this issue for appeal.6 Second, counsel’s failure to preserve this claim for appellate review by fifing a motion to modify sentence or by raising the issue in a Pa.R.A.P.1925 statement, as ordered by the lower court, obviously lacks a reasonable basis to effectuate appellant’s interests. And third, appellant was actually prejudiced by counsel’s omissions, because counsel’s failure effectively waived his right to direct appeal challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Accordingly, we need not remand for a hearing to determine whether appellant requested counsel to file a direct appeal. Cf. Commonwealth v. Harmon, 1999 PA Super 236, *P 8 n. 5, 1999 Pa.Super. LEXIS 2871, at **5 n. 5, 738 A.2d 1023, 1024 n. 5 (Sept. 17,1999).
¶28 Although we find that the lower court should have granted appellant’s petition for a direct appeal nunc pro tunc in fight of the existing precedent at the time the motion was filed, we need not remand this case for the fifing of a direct appeal. Rather, we will turn now to appellant’s attack upon the discretionary aspects of his sentence, since the record is adequate for review. Herein, appellant has specifically addressed the challenges to his sentence and the record includes the sentencing transcript, a copy of the presentence investigation and the Opinion Sur Appeal which the sentencing court filed on March 10, 1997, in response to appellant’s direct appeal and set forth in detail the reasons for the sentence imposed. Cf., Commonwealth v. Reed, 488 Pa. 221, 226 n. 3, 412 A.2d 477, 480 n. 3 (1980) (court will not remand for fifing of post-verdict motion to withdraw guilty plea and a hearing on motion, where plea colloquy’s inadequacy is evident in the existing record); Commonwealth v. McKnight, 311 Pa.Super. 460, 457 A.2d 1272, 1276 (1983) (remand for fifing of appeal nunc pro tunc is not necessary where the record is sufficient to review the issue which would be raised on appeal and appellant has briefed those issues).
¶29 Appellant begins his sentencing claims with an assertion that the lower court did not adequately explain its reasons for imposing a sentence outside the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines and thereby abused its discretion.
Appellate review of sentencing issues is prescribed by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781, and is discretionary as to all aspects of sentencing except legality of the sentence. Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987). We will grant allowance of appeal only where the appellant avers that there is a substantial question whether the sentence imposed is appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9701-9799.6. [Commonwealth v.] Canfield, [432 Pa.Super. 496,] 639 A.2d [46] at 48 [Pa.Super. 1994] (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 418 Pa.Super. 93, 613 A.2d 587, 590 (1992) (en banc)). We will be inclined to recognize a substantial question “where an appellant advances a colorable argument that the trial court’s actions are inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Id. Where the appellant asserts that the trial court failed to state sufficiently its reasons for imposing sentence outside the Sentencing Guidelines, we will conclude that the [13]*13appellant has stated a substantial question for our review. Commonwealth v. Wagner, 702 A.2d 1084, 1086 (Pa.Super.1996 [1997])....
“Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” [Commonwealth v.] Johnson, [446 Pa.Super. 192,] 666 A.2d [690] at 693 [Pa.Super. 1995]. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Canfield, 639 A.2d at 50 (citing Commonwealth v. Kocher, 529 Pa. 303, 305, 602 A.2d 1308, 1310 (1992)). Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. Id.
Commonwealth v. Rodda, 723 A.2d 212, 213-14 (Pa.Super.1999).
¶30 In light of appellant’s allegation that the court imposed a sentence well in excess of the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines without stating adequate reasons, we find that appellant has raised a substantial question whether his sentence is appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9701-9799.6. See Wagner, swpra.
¶ 31 As previously stated, the lower court sentenced appellant to a term of five to ten years of imprisonment for his robbery conviction and a consecutive sentence of two and one-half to five years of imprisonment for his aggravated assault conviction.7 At the time of appellant’s sentencing on January 17, 1997, the sentencing guidelines provided the standard range of eight to twenty months for both offenses and an aggravated range of twenty to twenty-six months. 204 Pa.Code. §§ 303.10, 303.16 (as amended, effective August 12, 1994).8 Clearly, appellant’s robbery sentence of sixty to one hundred and twenty months greatly exceeds the aggravated range of the guidelines. In addition, appellant’s aggravated assault sentence of thirty to sixty months also exceeds the aggravated range of the guidelines.9
¶ 32 At the time of sentencing, the lower court explained its reasons for appellant’s sentence, as follows:
In imposing sentence we have considered the presentence report, the Sentencing Code, the sentencing guidelines, the comments of the District Attorney and Defense Counsel, and the remarks of the victim and the victim impact statement.
We have also considered the tyranny abroad in the land in which citizens are practically on their own in defending themselves against criminal predators.
Our Supreme Court in Commonwealth versus Wright, 508 Pa. 25, [494 A.2d 354,] summed up this concern when it said: Society cannot tolerate the tyranny of armed felons.
There are so many aggravating circumstances in this case, one hardly knows where to begin reciting them.
First, this was a felony by force and surprise against victims who have the right, by law and common decency, to physical inviolability.
[14]*14Second, this loathsome intrusion, robbery, and assault left physical and psychological marks on the victims.
I read from the victim impact statement of Donald L. Watson: Donald Watson was beaten about the head with a gun that was in the possession of Ricardo Hernandez. I was then kicked as I lay helpless on the ground.
I was again beaten with a gun by Hernandez. I received numerous cuts on my head, knees, received stitches on my head. I was also x-rayed for pains in my chest and abdomen, stitches on my head. I spent three hours in emergency. I was also given a CAT Scan.
I tend to have nightmares about the attack. I experience moments of anger when I reflect on that night of February 11,1996.
I feel almost like a prisoner because of the fear of leaving my home. I do not feel safe. I always carry a gun now.
My wife and I avoid coming home at night. I feel that we always have to look over our shoulder.
Third, and the most egregious aggravating circumstance, appears in the pre-sentence report, and was testified to hear (sic) this morning, in which the victim, Watson, states: The next thing he knew, the suspects were standing on his side of the vehicle, pointing a nickel-plated small caliber handgun at the window, at him, yelling: Give me your money, wallet, your rings, you mother fucker.
This detestable word, mother fucker, which is painful and embarrassing for the Court to utter, is a frequently used vulgarity in our slowly decaying society.
This vulgarity no longer has any sexual connotation but reveals an utter contempt for the victim, is ruthlessly degrading, and impairs the dignity of the human substance.
These predators not only had the shameless audacity to rob and attack this husband in the presence of his wife but to utter this loathsome word of utter contempt.
If I have not already recited enough aggravating circumstances, let me recite a few more.
Again, there were two victims in this case, Mr. Watson and his wife.
While she was not robbed, she was present. She was threatened by this incident. She was frightened. She was terrorized. She had fear. She was humiliated.
The guidelines recommended in this case are totally inappropriate.
Sentencing Transcript, pp. 9-12.
¶ 33 Upon review, we find that the lower court did express sufficient reasons for a sentence in excess of the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines. Presently, appellant repeatedly hit Mr. Watson in the head with a handgun and kicked him while shouting profanities and demanding and seizing Mr. Watson’s valuables. Appellant used a handgun to commit the robbery and aggravated assault. Use of a handgun is not a necessary element of robbery or aggravated assault as charged in this case, and as such is clearly an aggravating factor. Cf., Commonwealth v. Darden, 366 Pa.Super. 597, 531 A.2d 1144, 1149 (1987) (trial court properly considered as an aggravating factor the victim’s age of 70 years, since the age of the victim is not an element of the crime of robbery). Further, Mr. Watson suffered bodily and psychological injuries as a result of appellant’s unprovoked attack, and Mrs. Watson, who was present during the robbery and aggravated assault, was also traumatized by the event. These factors, which were not necessary elements of the offenses to which appellant pleaded guilty, were properly cited by the lower court when sentencing appellant outside the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines.
¶ 34 Appellant argues that the lower court erred when it considered his use of the profanity “mother fucker” during the commission of his crime as an aggrava[15]*15ting circumstance. Initially, we agree with the lower court that the use of this profanity could be considered an aggravating circumstance. Nevertheless, if this was the lone aggravating factor cited by the lower court, a sentence outside of the aggravated range of the guidelines would not be justified. However, as previously stated, the court did state other sufficient reasons for the sentence imposed, including appellant’s use of a handgun and the negative impact of the crime on the victims.
¶ 35 Also, appellant, citing Commonwealth v. Pittman, 515 Pa. 272, 528 A.2d 138 (1987), claims that the court erred in imposing the mandatory minimum sentence where the Commonwealth did not exercise its discretion to proceed under that mandatory sentencing provision. We certainly agree with appellant that the lower court cannot itself invoke the mandatory sentencing provisions of 42 Pa.C.SA. § 9712, which requires the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of five years where the defendant is in visible possession of a firearm during the commission of robbery, among other crimes. Pittman, 528 A.2d at 141. However, this is not what the lower court did presently. Rather, the court exercised its sentencing discretion under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712, and imposed a sentence of five to ten years upon appellant’s robbery conviction only after setting forth sufficient aggravating circumstances to warrant such a sentence. Accordingly, we find that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence which coincidentally equaled the mandatory minimum sentence under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.10
¶ 36 In sum, we find that appellant’s attack upon the discretionary aspects of his sentence must fail. We have reached this issue by finding that the lower court erred in denying appellant’s petition for appeal nunc pro tunc, since to do otherwise would impose an injustice upon appellant.
¶ 37 Judgment of sentence affirmed.
¶ 38 BROSKY, J. files a Dissenting Opinion.