OPINION BY
STEVENS, J.:
¶ 1 This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County following Appellant’s negotiated guilty plea to the charges of aggravated indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125, and three counts of robbery, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1). On appeal, Appellant seeks review of the trial court’s determination that he is a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Megan’s Law.1 Specifically, Appellant contends the trial court erred in determining the Commonwealth proved by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) Appellant suffered from an antisocial personality disorder and (2) Appellant was “likely” to engage in future predatory sexual violence. We affirm.
¶ 2 The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On March 9, 2006, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Appellant, who was twenty-four years old, approached the sixteen-year-old victim, her sixteen-year-old sister, and her sister’s nineteen-year-old boyfriend in a threatening manner in the area of the 4100 block of M Street in Philadelphia. N.T. 5/30/07 at 12-13. All of the victims believed Appellant “might have a gun.” N.T. 5/30/07 at 13. Appellant took the sister’s boyfriend’s jacket, wallet, and day planner, and he removed from the sister’s pocket one dollar. N.T. 5/30/07 at 13. Appellant took the victim into an alley, which was right next to the sidewalk. N.T. 5/30/07 at 13. Appellant kissed the victim, fondled her vaginal area, exposed his penis, and forced her to touch it. N.T. 2/29/08 at 13. Appellant then pulled down the victim’s pants, inserted his finger into her vagina without her permission, and threatened to kill her if she reported the sexual assault. N.T. 5/30/07 at 13; N.T. 2/29/08 at 13. Appellant took the victim’s earrings and left the scene. [937]*937N.T. 5/30/07 at 13. Police subsequently-recovered the sister’s boyfriend’s jacket, which contained the victim’s earrings, and arrested Appellant.
¶ 3 On May 30, 2007, Appellant, who was represented by counsel, entered a negotiated guilty plea to the charges indicated supra, and on February 29, 2008, he proceeded to a Megan’s Law hearing and sentencing. During the hearing, the parties stipulated to the qualifications of Barbara Ellen Ziv, M.D., a member of the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (the Board) who conducted the assessment in this case. N.T. 2/29/08 at 5-6.
¶ 4 On direct-examination, Dr. Ziv testified that she reviewed Appellant’s records, which were provided to the Board, and she completed a report on July 23, 2007. N.T. 2/29/08 at 8. Dr. Ziv noted that Appellant declined to be interviewed and the materials in this case consisted largely of police records. N.T. 2/29/08 at 12.
¶ 5 Dr. Ziv testified that Appellant has a mental abnormality or personality disorder, which makes it likely that he will engage in predatory behavior. Specifically, Dr. Ziv testified as follows:
[Appellant] met the criteria of both of these arms of the statute. In terms of predatory behavior, he pled guilty to aggravated assault — aggravated indecent assault. He had no previous relationship with the victim, and clearly that meets the criteria for predatory behavior in that he initiated this relationship for the purpose of sexual victimization.
In addition, [Appellant] meets the criteria for antisocial personality disorder. The criteria for antisocial personality disorder as defined by the DSM-IV are as follows. [A], pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since the age 15 years, as indicated by three or more of the following.
One, failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest. [Appellant’s] criminal arrest history began when he was 12 years old and has continued into adulthood.
Two, deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases or conning others for personal profit or pleasure. [Appellant] has a history of using aliases. He has used Jose Gonzalez and Barry Gonzalez in the past when he was arrested.
[Three,] [i]mpulsivity or failure to plan ahead. [Appellant’s] life has been characterized by impulsivity with respect to his unlawful behaviors.
Four, irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults. I do not have information about this particular symptom.
Reckless disregard for safety of others. [Appellant’s] conviction for aggravated indecent assault indicates such disregard.
Consistent irresponsibility as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations. Although his complete work employment is not known, he was reportedly employed at the Washington Distribution Center at the time of his arrest.
Lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated or stolen from another. I don’t have any information about this.
[B], the individual is at least 18 years old. [Appellant] was 24 years old at the time of the indecent assault of [the victim].
There’s evidence of conduct disorder before age 15. [Appellant] was adjudicated delinquent at age 12.
[938]*938The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or manic episode and there is no evidence that [Appellant] was acutely psychotic or manic at the time of this assault.
N.T. 2/29/08 at 9-11.
¶ 6 Dr. Ziv opined, to a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty, that Appellant is a SVP for Megan’s Law purposes. N.T. 2/29/08 at 11. Dr. Ziv noted that the nature of the instant crime was predatory. N.T. 2/29/08 at 13. She revealed that Appellant has three arrests as a juvenile, including at ages twelve, sixteen, and seventeen. N.T. 2/29/08 at 14. The charges included robbery, theft, receiving stolen property, simple assault, reckless endangerment, criminal conspiracy, and unauthorized use of an automobile. N.T. 2/29/08 at 14. As a juvenile, Appellant failed to appear in court on one occasion and he violated his probation on another occasion. N.T. 2/29/08 at 14. Despite being committed to a juvenile facility, Appellant was arrested three times as an adult prior to the crimes at issue. N.T. 2/29/08 at 15. Specifically, at age nineteen, Appellant pled guilty to possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance, and he violated his probation three times with regard thereto. N.T. 2/29/08 at 30. At age twenty, Appellant was arrested for robbery; however, the victim failed to appear and the case was discharged. N.T. 2/29/08 at 31. Also, at age twenty, Appellant was arrested in connection with a stolen automobile; however, the Commonwealth declined to prosecute. N.T. 2/29/08 at 31.
¶ 7 Dr. Ziv explained that Appellant’s criminal history is indicative of his personality disorder. N.T. 2/29/08 at 15. Specifically,
[H]e has a wide variety of criminal acts. His acts began when he was 12. He was adjudicated delinquent.
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OPINION BY
STEVENS, J.:
¶ 1 This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County following Appellant’s negotiated guilty plea to the charges of aggravated indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125, and three counts of robbery, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1). On appeal, Appellant seeks review of the trial court’s determination that he is a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Megan’s Law.1 Specifically, Appellant contends the trial court erred in determining the Commonwealth proved by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) Appellant suffered from an antisocial personality disorder and (2) Appellant was “likely” to engage in future predatory sexual violence. We affirm.
¶ 2 The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On March 9, 2006, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Appellant, who was twenty-four years old, approached the sixteen-year-old victim, her sixteen-year-old sister, and her sister’s nineteen-year-old boyfriend in a threatening manner in the area of the 4100 block of M Street in Philadelphia. N.T. 5/30/07 at 12-13. All of the victims believed Appellant “might have a gun.” N.T. 5/30/07 at 13. Appellant took the sister’s boyfriend’s jacket, wallet, and day planner, and he removed from the sister’s pocket one dollar. N.T. 5/30/07 at 13. Appellant took the victim into an alley, which was right next to the sidewalk. N.T. 5/30/07 at 13. Appellant kissed the victim, fondled her vaginal area, exposed his penis, and forced her to touch it. N.T. 2/29/08 at 13. Appellant then pulled down the victim’s pants, inserted his finger into her vagina without her permission, and threatened to kill her if she reported the sexual assault. N.T. 5/30/07 at 13; N.T. 2/29/08 at 13. Appellant took the victim’s earrings and left the scene. [937]*937N.T. 5/30/07 at 13. Police subsequently-recovered the sister’s boyfriend’s jacket, which contained the victim’s earrings, and arrested Appellant.
¶ 3 On May 30, 2007, Appellant, who was represented by counsel, entered a negotiated guilty plea to the charges indicated supra, and on February 29, 2008, he proceeded to a Megan’s Law hearing and sentencing. During the hearing, the parties stipulated to the qualifications of Barbara Ellen Ziv, M.D., a member of the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (the Board) who conducted the assessment in this case. N.T. 2/29/08 at 5-6.
¶ 4 On direct-examination, Dr. Ziv testified that she reviewed Appellant’s records, which were provided to the Board, and she completed a report on July 23, 2007. N.T. 2/29/08 at 8. Dr. Ziv noted that Appellant declined to be interviewed and the materials in this case consisted largely of police records. N.T. 2/29/08 at 12.
¶ 5 Dr. Ziv testified that Appellant has a mental abnormality or personality disorder, which makes it likely that he will engage in predatory behavior. Specifically, Dr. Ziv testified as follows:
[Appellant] met the criteria of both of these arms of the statute. In terms of predatory behavior, he pled guilty to aggravated assault — aggravated indecent assault. He had no previous relationship with the victim, and clearly that meets the criteria for predatory behavior in that he initiated this relationship for the purpose of sexual victimization.
In addition, [Appellant] meets the criteria for antisocial personality disorder. The criteria for antisocial personality disorder as defined by the DSM-IV are as follows. [A], pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since the age 15 years, as indicated by three or more of the following.
One, failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest. [Appellant’s] criminal arrest history began when he was 12 years old and has continued into adulthood.
Two, deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases or conning others for personal profit or pleasure. [Appellant] has a history of using aliases. He has used Jose Gonzalez and Barry Gonzalez in the past when he was arrested.
[Three,] [i]mpulsivity or failure to plan ahead. [Appellant’s] life has been characterized by impulsivity with respect to his unlawful behaviors.
Four, irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults. I do not have information about this particular symptom.
Reckless disregard for safety of others. [Appellant’s] conviction for aggravated indecent assault indicates such disregard.
Consistent irresponsibility as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations. Although his complete work employment is not known, he was reportedly employed at the Washington Distribution Center at the time of his arrest.
Lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated or stolen from another. I don’t have any information about this.
[B], the individual is at least 18 years old. [Appellant] was 24 years old at the time of the indecent assault of [the victim].
There’s evidence of conduct disorder before age 15. [Appellant] was adjudicated delinquent at age 12.
[938]*938The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or manic episode and there is no evidence that [Appellant] was acutely psychotic or manic at the time of this assault.
N.T. 2/29/08 at 9-11.
¶ 6 Dr. Ziv opined, to a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty, that Appellant is a SVP for Megan’s Law purposes. N.T. 2/29/08 at 11. Dr. Ziv noted that the nature of the instant crime was predatory. N.T. 2/29/08 at 13. She revealed that Appellant has three arrests as a juvenile, including at ages twelve, sixteen, and seventeen. N.T. 2/29/08 at 14. The charges included robbery, theft, receiving stolen property, simple assault, reckless endangerment, criminal conspiracy, and unauthorized use of an automobile. N.T. 2/29/08 at 14. As a juvenile, Appellant failed to appear in court on one occasion and he violated his probation on another occasion. N.T. 2/29/08 at 14. Despite being committed to a juvenile facility, Appellant was arrested three times as an adult prior to the crimes at issue. N.T. 2/29/08 at 15. Specifically, at age nineteen, Appellant pled guilty to possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance, and he violated his probation three times with regard thereto. N.T. 2/29/08 at 30. At age twenty, Appellant was arrested for robbery; however, the victim failed to appear and the case was discharged. N.T. 2/29/08 at 31. Also, at age twenty, Appellant was arrested in connection with a stolen automobile; however, the Commonwealth declined to prosecute. N.T. 2/29/08 at 31.
¶ 7 Dr. Ziv explained that Appellant’s criminal history is indicative of his personality disorder. N.T. 2/29/08 at 15. Specifically,
[H]e has a wide variety of criminal acts. His acts began when he was 12. He was adjudicated delinquent. That has been persistent in that it has continued beyond into adulthood despite the fact that he was put in a juvenile facility, one that is presume[ably] designed to address those behaviors, and that he continues to act in a criminal manner after he reached adulthood is indicative of an antisocial personality disorder.
N.T. 2/29/08 at 15.
¶ 8 With regard to predatory behavior, Dr. Ziv noted that “[Appellant] was unacquainted with the victim and he forced her into an alley and then sexually assaulted her. That’s the definition of predatory behavior.” N.T. 2/29/08 at 15.
¶ 9 With regard to the factors to be examined under Megan’s Law, Dr. Ziv testified:
The statute asks that you address certain factors. There is one victim in this case. He sexually assaulted a stranger. Multiple assaults are associated with a higher risk of recidivism. He exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense by threatening the victim, she thought, with a gun and threatening to kill her.
The nature of the sexual contact involves intention, deliberate, involved and persistent risk taking. He was unrelated to the victim and [she] was a stranger to him. The victim was 16 years old at the time of the assault. He displayed unusual cruelty toward her by threatening her with death.
At the time that I did this, the mental capacity of the victim was not specifically known but I have since learned that she had mild mental retardation. He has no known prior offense history.
N.T. 2/29/08 at 16.
¶ 10 With regard to Appellant’s risk to reoffend, Dr. Ziv indicated:
[939]*939The two most robust factors in all the literature associated with recidivism risk are antisocial traits and deviant sexual interest. Obviously, raping somebody or sexually assaulting somebody, a stranger, is deviant sexual interest and he has, as I have talked about, a repeated pattern of antisocial behavior. In addition, the fact that it’s a stranger victim and that he was less than 25 years old are also associated with recidivism risks.
N.T. 2/29/08 at 16-17.
¶ 11 Dr. Ziv testified that all of her opinions were based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty. N.T. 2/29/08 at 17.
¶ 12 On cross-examination, Dr. Ziv reiterated that Appellant has a personality disorder which makes it likely that Appellant will reoffend. N.T. 2/29/08 at 20. Specifically, Dr. Ziv opined that Appellant meets the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual’s definition of an individual who has an antisocial personality disorder. N.T. 2/29/08 at 22-23. An essential feature of antisocial personality disorder is “a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into adulthood[.]” N.T. 2/29/08 at 25. Dr. Ziv admitted that she made Appellant’s diagnosis solely based on his arrest record, N.T. 2/29/08 at 27, and in this vein testified as follows:
[0]ften that is not enough to make that determination. In this case, he passed a threshold. I suspect that if I had additional information, I could make it with greater elaboration. Very often when people don’t participate — and the fact that I do get limited records, about a third of the people I evaluate meet [the] criteria for SVP. That meets [sic ] two-thirds don’t. Very often those two-thirds don’t because I don’t have enough information. In the case of [Appellant], it’s [sic ] he has enough information just by in his arrest record only to meet that threshold.
N.T. 2/29/08 at 27-28.
¶ 13 Defense counsel asked Dr. Ziv how Appellant’s arrest record differs from thousands of other young men growing up in Philadelphia, who commit many crimes, such as robbery, “a couple of car cases,” and a drug case, and was there “something magical about [Appellant’s] set of facts that would make you jump to the conclusion that this person suffers from antisocial personality disorder?” N.T. 2/29/08 at 32-33. Dr. Ziv replied:
First of all, I’m not jumping to the conclusion. I’m using the DSM-IV as the scaffolding in order to make this determination. Second of all, what makes [Appellant] different from the other guys that I have evaluated, even people who have stranger sexual assaults, is that it began at 12-and it doesn’t really matter what he did at 12. Obviously, if he had been truant from school, that’s a different thing. But it’s at 12, it’s at 16 and then he continues to persist in his behaviors while he’s in— you know, he’s got three violations of probation.
It’s at 16, 17,19, 20 and it’s an escalation. His unauthorized use of an auto and robbery, which are occurring earlier, have now progressed to rape or sexual assault and use of gun and threats of death. Those are all — that’s all the information that is consistent with my ability to render this determination.
N.T. 2/29/08 at 33.
¶ 14 Dr. Ziv opined that “[t]here are certain areas where clinicians can disagree^] however, I don’t think that this is one of them.” N.T. 2/29/08 at 34. Defense counsel then questioned Dr. Ziv [940]*940about an article, which was written by Professor Levinson and discussed the reliability that a certain outcome will result.2 N.T. 2/29/08 at 36. Dr. Ziv noted that the article does not address antisocial personality disorder, and in her opinion, the article is an “incredibly flawed paper.” N.T. 2/29/08 at 87. She further noted that the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder has a “higher inter-rater reliability than other personality disorders.” N.T. 2/29/08 at 38.
¶ 15 With regard to Appellant’s antisocial personality diagnosis, Dr. Ziv admitted that Appellant’s work history was largely unknown. N.T. 2/29/08 at 39. Dr. Ziv noted that Appellant used two aliases, including Barry Gonzalez and Jose Gonzalez. N.T. 2/29/08 at 40. Defense counsel asked Dr. Ziv whether she knew “Gonzalez” is Appellant’s mother’s maiden name and people in the Hispanic community often use their mother’s maiden name as part of their last name. N.T. 2/29/08 at 40. Dr. Ziv noted that Appellant was using the first names of “Barry” and “Jose,” even though his first name is “Barmi.” N.T. 2/29/08 at 40-41. As to the evidence of a conduct disorder with onset before age fifteen, Dr. Ziv testified that this criteria was met because Appellant was adjudicated delinquent at age twelve. N.T. 2/29/08 at 41-42. Dr. Ziv opined it was likely Appellant would reoffend, and she indicated this opinion was based on Appellant’s antisocial personality, the fact the victim was a stranger, his deviant sexual interest, his age, and his behavior has escalated. N.T. 2/29/08 at 42. Dr. Ziv indicated she used actuarial points to render her conclusion that it is likely Appellant will reof-fend. N.T. 2/29/08 at 44. She indicated that, in determining the likelihood a person will reoffend, “[t]he two strongest [factors] are deviant sexual interest and antisocial traits.... [PJeople who have done it once and do it again also are at high risk.” N.T. 2/29/08 at 45.
¶ 16 Dr. Ziv noted that she could not make a diagnosis as to whether Appellant has paraphilia because she was not provided with relevant information for the six month time period. N.T. 2/29/08 at 24-25. Moreover, while Dr. Ziv admitted that the instant arrest was Appellant’s first arrest for a sexual offense, Dr. Ziv opined that “it is highly unlikely, from a clinical point of view, [the instant offense was] an isolated instance ... I can tell you as a clinician that it is unlikely that [Appellant], this is the first and only time that he’s acted in a deviant sexual way, but what I can tell you is this is the first time and only time he’s been arrested for it.” N.T. 2/29/08 at 25-26.
¶ 17 On re-direct examination, the following relevant exchange occurred between the prosecutor and Dr. Ziv:
Q: The mental abnormality that the statute requires, it requires any mental abnormality not just a sex-related one, correct?
A: It requires a mental abnormality that renders somebody likely to reof-fend. As I have said repeatedly, antisocial traits [are] number one in terms of recidivism risk.
Q: You’re able to meet that threshold with just the arrest record alone, correct?
A: Correct.
Q: Would it make a different if you had the specific facts of each of those arrests?
[941]*941A: No, it would probably bolster and flesh out this diagnosis.
Q: Correct, because you are aware of the charges he was actually arrested on?
A: Right.
Q: And you’re aware of his probation violations?
A: Correct.
Q: You also said that two-thirds of your assessments, they don’t meet sexually violent predators, so most of the time you’re actually saying somebody is not a sexually violent predator?
A: I’m saying that they don’t meet the criteria for a sexually violent predator.
Q: Under the statute?
A: Yes.
N.T. 2/29/08 at 46-47 (bold in original).
¶ 18 At the conclusion of Dr. Ziv’s testimony, the trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Appellant is a SVP for Megan’s Law purposes. N.T. 2/29/08 at 68-64. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate of 29 months to 102 months in prison, to be followed by four years of probation. N.T. 2/29/08 at 73. Appellant did not file post-sentence motions; however, this timely appeal followed. On March 26, 2008, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and on April 15, 2008, Appellant filed a statement contending the evidence was insufficient to sustain the trial court’s SVP determination.3 The trial court filed a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
¶ 19 On July 31, 2009, the majority of a three-judge panel of this Court filed an Opinion reversing the trial court’s SVP determination and discharging all requirements attendant to it. In all other respects, the majority affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. However, on August 13, 2009, the Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration/reargument, which this Court granted on September 30, 2009, resulting in the withdrawal of the three-judge panel Opinion.
¶ 20 Appellant presents the following question for our review;
Did not the Commonwealth fail to prove by clear and convincing evidence that appellant met the statutory definition of a “sexually violent predator” (SVP) where[:] a) the Commonwealth failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that appellant suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD), and b) the Commonwealth failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that appellant was “likely” to engage in future predatory sexual violence, where the instant offense was his only arrest for a sexual crime?
Brief for Appellant at 3.4
¶ 21 In support of his question presented, Appellant argues that the evidence adduced in support of his SVP designation failed to satisfy either of the required statutory prongs and, therefore, the evidence was not legally sufficient to prove that he is an SVP.
The determination of a defendant’s SVP status may only be made following [942]*942an assessment by the Board and hearing before the trial court. In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court, must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a sexually violent predator. As with any sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. We will reverse a trial court’s determination of SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence that each element of the statute has been satisfied.
Commonwealth v. Geiter, 929 A.2d 648, 650 (Pa.Super.2007), appeal denied, 596 Pa. 703, 940 A.2d 362 (2007) (quotations, quotation marks, citations and footnotes omitted).
The standard of proof governing the determination of SVP status, i.e., “clear and convincing evidence,” has been described as an “intermediate” test, which is more exacting than a preponderance of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. * * *
The clear and convincing standard requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the [trier of fact] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts [in] issue.”
Commonwealth v. Meals, 590 Pa. 110, 120-21, 912 A.2d 213, 219 (2006) (quotation omitted).
¶ 22 Pennsylvania’s version of Megan’s Law defines an SVP as:
A person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense as set forth in section 9795.1 (relating to registration)5 and who is determined to be a sexually violent predator under section 9795.4 (relating to assessments) due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.
42 Pa.C.SA. § 9792 (footnote added).
The process of determining SVP status is statutorily-mandated and well-defined. The triggering event is a conviction for one or more offenses specified in 42 Pa.C.SA. § 9795.1, which, in turn, prompts the trial court to order an SVP assessment by the SOAB. The Board’s administrative officer then assigns the matter to one of the Board’s members, all of whom are “experts in the field of the behavior and treatment of sexual offenders.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.3. At the core of the expert’s assessment is a detailed list of factors, which are mandatory and are designed as “criteria by which ... [the] likelihood [of reoffense] may be gauged.” Commonwealth v. Bey, 841 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa.Super.2004).
Commonwealth v. Dixon, 907 A.2d 533, 535-36 (Pa.Super.2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 722, 920 A.2d 830 (2007).
Geiter, 929 A.2d at 650.
¶ 23 The statute specifies that the assessment must include, but is not limited to, an examination of the following factors:
(1) Facts of the current offense, including:
(i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims,
(ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense,
(iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim,
(iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim,
[943]*943(v) Age of the victim,
(vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the individual during the commission of the crime,
(vii) The mental capacity of the victim.
(2) Prior offense history, including:
(i) The individual’s prior criminal record,
(ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences,
(iii) Whether the individual participated in available programs for sexual offenders.
(3) Characteristics of the individual, including:
(i) Age of the individual,
(ii) Use of illegal drugs by the individual,
(iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental abnormality,
(iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the individual’s conduct.
(4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reof-fense.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.4(b). See Geiter, supra.
The precise line of inquiry for the Board’s expert, as well as any other expert who testifies at an SVP hearing, is “whether the defendant satisfied the definition of a sexually violent predator set out in the statute, that is, whether he or she suffers from ‘a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes [him or her] likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.’ 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9792.” Dixon, 907 A.2d at 536. The salient inquiry to be made by the trial court is the identification of the impetus behind the commission of the crime and the extent to which the offender is likely to reoffend. Commonwealth v. Price, 876 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 706, 897 A.2d 1184 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 902, 127 S.Ct. 224, 166 L.Ed.2d 179 (2006).
Geiter, 929 A.2d at 650-651 (italics in original).
¶ 24 In this context, a “mental abnormality” is a “congenital or acquired condition of a person that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes that person to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a menace to the health and safety of other persons.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9792. See Meals, supra. Moreover, “predatory” conduct, which is indispensable to the designation, is defined as an “act directed at a stranger or at a person with whom a relationship has been initiated, established, maintained or promoted, in whole or in part, in order to facilitate or support victimization.” Meals, 590 Pa. at 120, 912 A.2d at 218-19 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9792).
¶ 25 After a careful review, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s classification of Appellant as an SVP. For example, Dr. Ziv identified antisocial personality disorder as Appellant’s “mental abnormality or personality disorder,” noting that Appellant, who was at least eighteen years old, has engaged in a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others since at least the age of fifteen. See Meals, supra (discussing analysis to be used in determining sufficiency of the evidence for SVP status). She explained that Appellant’s extensive criminal arrest history, which commenced when he was twelve years old, indicated a failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior; he engaged in [944]*944deceitfulness through the use of aliases; his life has been characterized by impulsivity, which has been displayed through his unlawful behaviors; and his conviction for aggravated indecent assault displayed a reckless disregard for the safety of others. She noted that he engaged in persistent risk taking and exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense in the instant sexual assault. She also indicated that Appellant’s behaviors did not result from a schizophrenic or manic episode.
¶26 With respect to the question of whether Appellant’s abnormality/disorder resulted in a predisposition to commit criminal sexual acts, Dr. Ziv testified that Appellant was likely to reoffend. See Meals, supra. She explained that the “two most robust factors” associated with “recidivism risks” are “antisocial traits and deviant sexual interest.” N.T. 2/29/08 at 16-17. Dr. Ziv testified about Appellant’s repeated pattern of antisocial behavior, which has been exhibited by his three juvenile arrests and four adult arrests, and explained that criminal acts have been persistent in his life. She noted that, despite the fact he was placed in a juvenile facility, which was designed to address Appellant’s behaviors, he continued to act out in a criminal manner after he reached adulthood. Dr. Ziv testified about the deviant sexual interest displayed by Appellant, including the fact he sexually assaulted a sixteen-year-old stranger, who was mildly retarded, on the street. She indicated that Appellant’s actions have escalated over time, resulting in the most recent sexual assault and threats of death, and people who have antisocial traits are “number one in terms of recidivism risk.” N.T. 2/29/09 at 46. Moreover, with respect to “predatory” behavior, Dr. Ziv opined that Appellant displayed predatory behavior. See Meals, supra. She stressed that Appellant was unacquainted with the victim, forced her into an alley, and then sexually assaulted her. “That’s the definition of predatory behavior.” N.T. 2/29/08 at 15.
¶ 27 Finally, Dr. Ziv’s opinions were rendered to a reasonable degree of professional certainty. “Because the expert’s report and testimony support the trial court’s finding that [Appellant] was an SVP, there is no basis for granting sufficiency relief.” Meals, 590 Pa. at 128, 912 A.2d at 223.
¶ 28 We note that we find unavailing Appellant’s arguments that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his SVP status since (1) Dr. Ziv did not personally interview Appellant, (2) her opinions were based solely on Appellant’s prior criminal record and police reports, (3) Dr. Ziv had “no information about [his] background, education, economic circumstances, health, work history or home life,” Brief for Appellant at 11, (4) Dr. Ziv’s opinion that Appellant was likely to reoffend was based solely on her clinical judgment and not on any actuarial instrument to predict risk, and (5) Dr. Ziv admitted that a prior sexual assault is one of the best predictors of future sexual violence; however, Appellant has not been arrested or charged with any previous sexual offenses.
¶ 29 We conclude that Appellant has mischaracterized his arguments as sufficiency of the evidence claims, and in particular, we specifically disagree with his contention that his claims challenge the sufficiency, and not the weight, of the evidence. Appellant’s arguments ignore the well-settled law that an expert’s opinion, which is rendered to a reasonable degree of professional certainty, is itself evidence. See Meals, supra. As this Court has held ■with regard to SVP claims:
We do not weigh the evidence presented to the sentencing court and do not make credibility determinations.... We keep in mind that a Board report or opinion that the individual has an abnormality [945]*945indicating the likelihood of predatory sexual violent offenses is itself evidence. Also, while a defendant is surely entitled to challenge such evidence by contesting its credibility or reliability before the SVP court, such efforts affect the weight, not the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s case. Accordingly, they do not affect our sufficiency analysis.
Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 382 (Pa.Super.2008) (citations omitted).
¶ 30 In the case sub judice, to the extent Appellant believes that Dr. Ziv’s “diagnosis” was not fully explained, did not square with accepted analyses of the disorder, or was simply erroneous, he was free to introduce evidence to that effect and/or to argue to the fact-finder that the Commonwealth’s expert’s conclusions should be discounted or ignored. See Meals, supra. However, such arguments would affect the weight, and not the sufficiency of the expert’s evidence.6 See id.
¶ 31 For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
¶ 32 Affirmed.
¶ 33 BENDER, J. files a Dissenting Opinion in which DONOHUE, J. joins.