Liacos, J.
The Commonwealth appealed from an order granting dismissal of complaints against the defendant due to interference with the defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art.
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.1 We transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion. We summarize the motion judge’s findings of fact.
On September 9, 1986, at approximately 5:15 p.m., officers of the Lancaster police department executed a search warrant for the defendant’s home, arrested the defendant, and brought him to the police station. He was booked and incarcerated in a holding cell.2 The defendant’s mother promptly retained Attorney Richard J. White to represent her son. Mr. White proceeded immediately to the police station. On arrival, Mr. White identified himself to the booking officer, Stanley Roberts, as the defendant’s attorney, and asked to meet with his client. The booking officer was alone in the station. He required Mr. White to conduct the interview in the defendant’s cell. No other prisoners, officers, or employees were in the cellblock area.
[493]*493Unbeknownst to Mr. White, audio-visual equipment covered the cellblock area.3 The booking officer, although aware that the audiovisual system operated continuously, did not inform Mr. White of its existence.4 The judge found specifically that Roberts “could have easily turned off the microphones so he would not hear or record the conversation between Attorney White and his client . . . [but] did not set the system so the conversation would not be monitored and recorded.”
The ensuing cellblock interview reached the merits of the charges. The defendant admitted to Mr. White that in the [494]*494defendant’s home were marihuana plants, hashish, marihuana, as well as a bag of money. He insisted that the money in the bag belonged to someone else. At some point, Mr. White became aware that the conversation might be monitored, mentioned this to his client, and suspended the interview in order to speak with Roberts about the problem. Mr. White also stated his objections about the recording to the chief of police, Eric Me A vene, on McAvene’s return from the search of the defendant’s home. Me Avene refused to turn over the videotape to Mr. White. He did, however, lock the tape in the police safe with assurances that neither he nor anyone else would view or listen to the tape.
McAvene did not, in fact, view the tape outside the presence of the defendant’s counsel. However, Sergeant Kevin Lamb of the police department, after testifying at a motion to suppress hearing on this case on November 20, 1986, became aware of the tape’s existence. After leaving the court, he returned to the police station and viewed the videotape in its entirety.5
The judge concluded that the Commonwealth failed to sustain its burden of proving that the police misconduct posed no threat of prejudice to the defendant. To the contrary, the judge found several ways in which the defendant would be prejudiced. First, the recording could be used for impeachment purposes, as a prior inconsistent statement, should the defendant testify at a trial. Second, discussions or settlement negotiations might be tainted.6 Third, later civil forfeiture proceedings regarding [495]*495the money might be affected. Finally, Lamb’s private viewing of the tape would taint any future testimony on his part.7 The judge further concluded, based on his subsidiary findings, that “we are faced with egregious misconduct which occurred at the police station on the night of the arrest and on the day of the hearing on the motion to suppress [November 20]. Sgt. Lamb’s viewing of the tape, after listening to a conversation between the court and counsel, is not only an affront to this court but also flagrant misconduct which evinces a total disrespect and disregard for the confidentiality of the attorney, client relationship.”
1. Standard of review. “Absent egregious misconduct or at least a serious threat of prejudice, the remedy of dismissal infringes too severely on the public interest in bringing guilty persons to justice.” Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 210, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983). Accord Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 199 (1985). See Commonwealth v. King, 400 Mass. 283, 290 (1987). The Commonwealth agrees that, under the circumstances of this case, it bears the burden of proving that no prejudice to the defendant resulted from the viewing of the videotape. There must be a showing that, for any future proceedings, the improper police conduct neither improves the Commonwealth’s case nor prevents adequate protection of the defendant’s position. See Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. 301, 312-313 (1984) (where prosecution acts improperly, issue of dismissal turns primarily on defendant’s ability to obtain fair trial in light of the impropriety). See also Commonwealth v. King, supra. “A trial judge, therefore, must rest a dismissal of criminal charges for failure of the prosecution to comply with [constitutional mandates] ... on findings that the [misconduct] was due to deliberate and egregious action ... or unintentional conduct [496]*496resulting in irremediable harm to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Cronk, supra, and cases cited.
Absent clear error, we accept the judge’s subsidiary findings of fact. Id. Accord Commonwealth v. Hine, 393 Mass. 564, 568 (1984), and cases cited. “A trial judge’s discretion to find prejudice is much broader than ours.” Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, supra at 309, quoting Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 385 Mass. 165, 177 (1982). Within this context, however, “where the ultimate findings and rulings bear on issues of constitutional dimension, they are open for review.” Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 550 (1977). Accord Commonwealth v. Murphy, 362 Mass. 542, 551 (1972) (Hennessey, J., concurring).
2. Possible prejudicial effect. The monitoring of privileged communications between a defendant and his attorney touches the core of the right to counsel. The audio-visual system had been in place since 1985, yet no guidelines to protect defendants’ rights were instituted.8 Roberts, who knew of the system’s existence, neither alerted the defendant’s attorney nor turned off the audio recording. We find particularly intolerable Lamb’s conduct in listening to the videotape after being made aware of the constitutional problems involved in this case. That viewing was, indeed, an affront to both the Constitution and the court.
In this context, we consider the possible prejudice to the defendant. Regarding the charges for possession of marihuana and hashish with intent to distribute, we conclude that the judge had ample facts on which to find prejudice to the defendant. Revelation of the defendant’s assertion that the money did not belong to him made the prosecution privy to a probable defense strategy.9 The defendant asserts, and the Common[497]*497wealth has not denied, that no direct evidence linked the defendant to the sale or distribution of drugs.
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Liacos, J.
The Commonwealth appealed from an order granting dismissal of complaints against the defendant due to interference with the defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art.
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.1 We transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion. We summarize the motion judge’s findings of fact.
On September 9, 1986, at approximately 5:15 p.m., officers of the Lancaster police department executed a search warrant for the defendant’s home, arrested the defendant, and brought him to the police station. He was booked and incarcerated in a holding cell.2 The defendant’s mother promptly retained Attorney Richard J. White to represent her son. Mr. White proceeded immediately to the police station. On arrival, Mr. White identified himself to the booking officer, Stanley Roberts, as the defendant’s attorney, and asked to meet with his client. The booking officer was alone in the station. He required Mr. White to conduct the interview in the defendant’s cell. No other prisoners, officers, or employees were in the cellblock area.
[493]*493Unbeknownst to Mr. White, audio-visual equipment covered the cellblock area.3 The booking officer, although aware that the audiovisual system operated continuously, did not inform Mr. White of its existence.4 The judge found specifically that Roberts “could have easily turned off the microphones so he would not hear or record the conversation between Attorney White and his client . . . [but] did not set the system so the conversation would not be monitored and recorded.”
The ensuing cellblock interview reached the merits of the charges. The defendant admitted to Mr. White that in the [494]*494defendant’s home were marihuana plants, hashish, marihuana, as well as a bag of money. He insisted that the money in the bag belonged to someone else. At some point, Mr. White became aware that the conversation might be monitored, mentioned this to his client, and suspended the interview in order to speak with Roberts about the problem. Mr. White also stated his objections about the recording to the chief of police, Eric Me A vene, on McAvene’s return from the search of the defendant’s home. Me Avene refused to turn over the videotape to Mr. White. He did, however, lock the tape in the police safe with assurances that neither he nor anyone else would view or listen to the tape.
McAvene did not, in fact, view the tape outside the presence of the defendant’s counsel. However, Sergeant Kevin Lamb of the police department, after testifying at a motion to suppress hearing on this case on November 20, 1986, became aware of the tape’s existence. After leaving the court, he returned to the police station and viewed the videotape in its entirety.5
The judge concluded that the Commonwealth failed to sustain its burden of proving that the police misconduct posed no threat of prejudice to the defendant. To the contrary, the judge found several ways in which the defendant would be prejudiced. First, the recording could be used for impeachment purposes, as a prior inconsistent statement, should the defendant testify at a trial. Second, discussions or settlement negotiations might be tainted.6 Third, later civil forfeiture proceedings regarding [495]*495the money might be affected. Finally, Lamb’s private viewing of the tape would taint any future testimony on his part.7 The judge further concluded, based on his subsidiary findings, that “we are faced with egregious misconduct which occurred at the police station on the night of the arrest and on the day of the hearing on the motion to suppress [November 20]. Sgt. Lamb’s viewing of the tape, after listening to a conversation between the court and counsel, is not only an affront to this court but also flagrant misconduct which evinces a total disrespect and disregard for the confidentiality of the attorney, client relationship.”
1. Standard of review. “Absent egregious misconduct or at least a serious threat of prejudice, the remedy of dismissal infringes too severely on the public interest in bringing guilty persons to justice.” Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 210, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983). Accord Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 199 (1985). See Commonwealth v. King, 400 Mass. 283, 290 (1987). The Commonwealth agrees that, under the circumstances of this case, it bears the burden of proving that no prejudice to the defendant resulted from the viewing of the videotape. There must be a showing that, for any future proceedings, the improper police conduct neither improves the Commonwealth’s case nor prevents adequate protection of the defendant’s position. See Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. 301, 312-313 (1984) (where prosecution acts improperly, issue of dismissal turns primarily on defendant’s ability to obtain fair trial in light of the impropriety). See also Commonwealth v. King, supra. “A trial judge, therefore, must rest a dismissal of criminal charges for failure of the prosecution to comply with [constitutional mandates] ... on findings that the [misconduct] was due to deliberate and egregious action ... or unintentional conduct [496]*496resulting in irremediable harm to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Cronk, supra, and cases cited.
Absent clear error, we accept the judge’s subsidiary findings of fact. Id. Accord Commonwealth v. Hine, 393 Mass. 564, 568 (1984), and cases cited. “A trial judge’s discretion to find prejudice is much broader than ours.” Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, supra at 309, quoting Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 385 Mass. 165, 177 (1982). Within this context, however, “where the ultimate findings and rulings bear on issues of constitutional dimension, they are open for review.” Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 550 (1977). Accord Commonwealth v. Murphy, 362 Mass. 542, 551 (1972) (Hennessey, J., concurring).
2. Possible prejudicial effect. The monitoring of privileged communications between a defendant and his attorney touches the core of the right to counsel. The audio-visual system had been in place since 1985, yet no guidelines to protect defendants’ rights were instituted.8 Roberts, who knew of the system’s existence, neither alerted the defendant’s attorney nor turned off the audio recording. We find particularly intolerable Lamb’s conduct in listening to the videotape after being made aware of the constitutional problems involved in this case. That viewing was, indeed, an affront to both the Constitution and the court.
In this context, we consider the possible prejudice to the defendant. Regarding the charges for possession of marihuana and hashish with intent to distribute, we conclude that the judge had ample facts on which to find prejudice to the defendant. Revelation of the defendant’s assertion that the money did not belong to him made the prosecution privy to a probable defense strategy.9 The defendant asserts, and the Common[497]*497wealth has not denied, that no direct evidence linked the defendant to the sale or distribution of drugs. Rather, the defendant claims that the relatively large amount of money found in the bag, taken in conjunction with the marginal amount of drugs found in the defendant’s home, would create the appearance of drug dealing. Advance knowledge of the defendant’s position that the money belonged to another would give the prosecution an improper advantage in anticipating defense trial strategy and in preparing for cross-examination of the defendant, should he choose to testify. See Commonwealth v. King, supra at 288. Furthermore, the prosecution’s knowledge of a possible third-party offender could toughen the Commonwealth’s bargaining posture and strengthen unfairly its case regarding charges carrying substantial penalties. See Commonwealth v. Carlson, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 52, 55-56 (1983).
This is not a case where prosecutorial misconduct is remediable through disclosure of exculpatory evidence which a defendant may then use at a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, supra at 308-309. Here, the Commonwealth’s violation of constitutional guarantees yielded information to which it was not entitled. This knowledge is not retractable. The judge’s dismissal of the complaints charging the sale and distribution of drugs was proper and necessary because the “misconduct was so pervasive as to preclude any confident assumption that proceedings at a new trial would be free of the taint.” Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, supra at 313, quoting Commonwealth v. Manning, 373 Mass. 438, 444 (1977).
Our conclusion differs, however, regarding the complaints charging illegal possession of certain drugs and of fireworks. Here, the Commonwealth has met its burden of showing no irremediable prejudice to the defendant. Assuming that the search of the defendant’s home was valid, we can anticipate [498]*498no defense strategy that the recorded conversation would be likely to affect. An order barring the testimony of Lamb and McAvene (except as provided in note 10, infra) can remedy the effect of the tainted knowledge on their part. Obviously, any use of the videotape or of its fruits must also be suppressed. The matter of plea bargaining leverage is a closer issue. However, the Commonwealth’s case on possession is strong, and the contents of the videotape do not enhance it substantively. At least on these lesser charges, the judge’s careful attention to the parties’ interactions confers sufficient protection.
3. Dismissal for egregious misconduct. This court has declined to adopt a per se rule mandating dismissal of complaints in cases in which government agents intentionally violate the attorney-client relationship and the right to a fair trial. Commonwealth v. King, supra at 291. Commonwealth v. Cinelli, supra at 208. Commonwealth v. Manning, supra. See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-365 (1981) (Federal rule is not to dismiss indictment for egregious prosecutorial misconduct absent prejudice or substantial threat thereof). Cf. Commonwealth v. Light, 394 Mass. 112, 116 (1985) (Liacos, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. King, supra at 292 (Abrams and Liacos, JJ., dissenting). While we are concerned that a key member of the prosecutorial team intentionally violated the attorney-client relationship, the prejudicial effect to the defendant regarding the possession charges is remediable. In this light, the circumstances of this case do not give rise to the level of egregious conduct that might necessitate complete dismissal. See Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 207-211 (1983); Commonwealth v. Manning, supra at 442-445.
The dismissal of the complaints charging intent to sell and distribute marihuana and hashish is affirmed. The dismissal of the remaining complaints is reversed. The case is remanded for trial on the latter charges, with orders to be entered suppressing use of the videotape and the fruits thereof, and, further, suppressing the testimony of Lamb and McAvene.10
So ordered.