Commonwealth v. Favors

323 A.2d 85, 227 Pa. Super. 120, 1974 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2034

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 3, 1974
• Docket: Appeal, 252
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion by

Watkins, P. J.,

This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after conviction of the defendant, Augustus Favors, of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to 1-1% to 8 years.

The ease was tried before the trial judge without a jury and he waived his right to jury trial in accordance with Bule 1101, Pennsylvania Buies of Criminal Procedure.

The colloquy record made prior to accepting his waiver is as follows: “Q. You are waiving your right to a jury trial voluntarily and willingly? A. Yes, Sir. Q. Are you satisfied with your representation by Mr. Stanshine (an Assistant Voluntary Defender)? A. Yes, sir. Q. You had a chance to discuss the case thoroughly with him A. Yes, sir. Q. Are you sure? A. Well, not too much in detail. No, sir. Q. You have some serious charges here and we want to make sure that you are ready to defend yourself through your counsel. Do you think you need more time? A. No, sir. No, sir, I don’t think I need any more time.”

We feel this record colloquy was sufficient to indicate a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial. This position is buttressed by the fact that this was a second time that this man was on trial for the same charges and he waived his right in the first trial. Commonwealth ex rel. Henderson v. Maroney, 448 Pa. 411, 293 A. 2d 64 (1972).

As to the suppression of the evidence issue, we hold that the court below properly refused to suppress. The record established that on October 29, 1970, the victim was standing at the intersection of 19th and Jefferson Streets, Philadelphia, at about 1:00 o’clock a.m., after just having accompanied his sister-in-law from the “Play Bar”, located at the intersection, and having escorted her to a taxicab. As the taxicab drove north on 29th Street, three males crossed the street from a white Ford Mustang automobile which was parked in front of a grocery store, and one of the males pointed a pistol to the victim’s face and said, “Give it up.” The victim stated that he raised his hands and the defendant took two twenty dollar bills and removed his wrist watch. The two men then fled in the white Ford Mustang and drove off at a high speed. The victim positively identified the defendant as the individual who went into his pockets and who took his watch from his arm. He stated that he was face-to-face with the three men who robbed him and he described the defendant as having an “Afro-bush” haircut and was wearing black gloves and an Army-type jacket.

Almost immediately after the robbery, a police car came along and he hailed the car and told the police officer that he had been robbed and described the white Ford Mustang. He stated that he stood on the corner and waited and within minutes the officer returned with the defendant whom he promptly identified.

The police officer testified that he was hailed by the victim and that he pointed out a white Ford Mustang headed east on Jefferson Street. The officer immediately gave pursuit and at 28th and Jefferson Streets, the Mustang stopped and two males ran from the automobile. One ran north and the other south. The officer turned south and at the intersection of 28th and Master Streets, he observed the defendant standing on the corner. This was only a few minutes after he had been informed of the robbery. The officer took him in the car and returned to the place where the victim was waiting and the victim identified him as the man wlio robbed him. The Mustang was later found abandoned.

The issue before us is whether the on-the-scene identification of the appellant as well as the money found in his pocket should have been suppressed as the fruits of an illegal search made pursuant to an illegal arrest.

In regard to the return of the defendant to the scene of the robbery immediately after the arrest, the law is clear that a prompt confrontation by the victim with the accused for the purposes of identification is not inherently a denial of due process of law. Wise v. U.S., 383 F. 2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1199 (1967). Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest and with which he had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect committed a crime.

In this case, there were clearly sufficient facts and circumstances existing within the knowledge of the arresting officer to provide the probable cause to justify this arrest without a warrant. The victim had just complained of being robbed and had described the automobile. The officer saw the car, pursued it and saw the appellant leave the car and flee. He followed him and in a very short time saw the appellant standing on a corner near a bus stop. The appellant said he just got off a bus but there was no sign of a bus either coming or going in the vicinity. Under these circumstances, the officer did have probable cause to arrest the appellant as a suspect and take him to the victim for final identification.

Considering the short amount of time involved in this incident from the initial pursuit to the time of apprehension to hold otherwise would seriously hamstring the police in the apprehension and questioning of suspects.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.