OPINION
JUSTICE DONOHUE
On October 22, 2013, Rahiem Cardel Fant (“Fant”) pled not guilty to various charges related to an incident during which he allegedly stabbed a man in the abdomen and arm. Awaiting trial, he was detained at the Clinton County Correctional Facility (the “Facility”). On or about February 20, 2014, approximately one week before his scheduled trial, Fant’s counsel received from the Commonwealth a production of recordings made at the Facility. All but two of the recordings consisted of conversations that occurred between Fant and his visitors in the Facility’s visitation room, where inmates converse with visitors, face-to-face, through a glass partition, using a telephone-like handset apparatus (“visit conversations”). As a result of these recorded visit conversations, law enforcement personnel retrieved additional evidence they sought to use at trial.
On February 21, 2014, Fant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude at trial the visit conversation recordings and the evidence discovered as a result of them. He argued that the recordings violated Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (the “Wiretap Act” or the “Act”). The Commonwealth countered that Section 5704(14) of the Act permits these recordings because it authorizes county correctional facilities to record “any telephone calls from or to an inmate,” as long as certain conditions are met. Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/2014, at 2.
The Wiretap Act generally prohibits intercepting, using, or disclosing communications except pursuant to specified procedures.1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703; see also Karoly v. [139]*139Mancuso, 619 Pa. 486, 65 A.3d 301, 303 (2013). It is designed to safeguard individual privacy while also giving law enforcement authorities a tool to combat crime. See Karoly, 65 A.3d at 303. Consistent with the Act’s emphasis on privacy, its provisions are to be strictly construed. See Boettger v. Miklich, 534 Pa. 581, 633 A.2d 1146, 1148-49 (1993) (cautioning that “[n]o violations of any provisions of the Act will be countenanced, nor will the failure of prosecutors to diligently follow the strict requirements of the Act be lightly overlooked”) (emphasis in original); see also Commonwealth v. Spangler, 570 Pa. 226, 809 A.2d 234, 237 (2002) (explaining that the Act provides an exclusionary remedy that extends to non-constitutional violations).
Section 5704 of the Wiretap Act provides eighteen exceptions to the general prohibition on intercepting communications, including an exception, the interpretation of which is at issue in the present case, allowing employees of county correctional facilities to monitor and record inmate “telephone calls” as long as inmates are notified in writing that such calls may be recorded and anyone calling into the facility is also told that their call may be monitored and recorded. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5704(14). Specifically, the Act provides:
It shall not be unlawful and no prior court approval shall be required under this chapter for:
(14) An investigative officer, a law enforcement officer or employees of a county correctional facility to intercept, record, monitor or divulge any telephone calls from or to an inmate in a facility under the following conditions:
[140]*140(i) The county correctional facility shall adhere to the following procedures and restrictions when intercepting, recording, monitoring or divulging any telephone calls from or to an inmate in a county correctional facility as provided for by this paragraph:
(A) Before the implementation of this paragraph, all inmates of the facility shall be notified in writing that, as of the effective date of this paragraph, their telephone conversations may be intercepted, recorded, monitored or divulged.
(B) Unless otherwise provided for in this paragraph, after intercepting or recording a telephone conversation, only the superintendent, warden or a designee of the superintendent or warden or other chief administrative official or his or her designee, or law enforcement officers shall have access to that recording.
(C) The contents of an intercepted and recorded telephone conversation shall be divulged only as is necessary to safeguard the orderly operation of the facility, in response to a court order or in the prosecution or investigation of any crime.
(ii) So as to safeguard the attorney-client privilege, the county correctional facility shall not intercept, record, monitor or divulge any conversation between an inmate and an attorney.
(iii) Persons who are calling into a facility to speak to an inmate shall be notified that the call may be recorded or monitored.
(iv) The superintendent, warden or a designee of the superintendent or warden or other chief administrative official of the county correctional system shall promulgate guidelines to implement the provisions of this paragraph for county correctional facilities.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(14).
During a suppression hearing on February 25, 2014, the Commonwealth presented testimony, in relevant part, from [141]*141Jackie Motter, Warden at the Facility (the “Warden”).2 The suppression court questioned the Warden as to how the visit conversation apparatus works.
The Court: [Visit conversations] is when I sit across the glass from you and pick it up?
The Witness: Yes.
The Court: Do you have to hit any number?
The Witness: Yes. You use your personal ID number.3
The Court: And it goes through there?
The Witness: Yes.
The Court: And it rings on the other side?
The Witness: I don’t think it rings. You just punch your number in and—
The Court: It activates it?
The Witness: Yes.
The Court: It doesn’t go through a telephone company?
The Witness: Well, if it’s on the computer they would have access. Oh, through a telephone company, no.
N.T., 2/25/2014, at 14 (footnote added).
Following the Warden’s testimony, the suppression court engaged in further discussion about the visit conversations with counsel for the Commonwealth, Karen Kuebler.
The Court: But it never hits a telephone company?
[142]*142Ms. Kuebler: It doesn’t—it doesn’t get recorded by the telephone company. It gets recorded by the inmate phone company. It doesn’t get recorded by Verizon.
Id. at 16.
Following the hearing, the suppression court granted Fant’s motion to suppress, making several findings of fact before concluding that the visit conversations were not “telephone calls” because the “every day common sense use of the word telephone does not include this scenario.” See Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/2014, at 2. In articulating its findings of fact, as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 581(1),4 the suppression court found that the visit conversa[143]*143tions utilize “an apparatus that resembles a telephone,” that requires Fant to “punch[] in an i.d. number,” after which point Fant’s visitor “across the glass from [him] picks up that apparatus and a discussion ensues.” Id Furthermore, the suppression court found that “these conversations do not involve the use of a telephone company, telephone lines or equipment outside the correctional facility.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/2014, at 2-3. In the suppression court’s subsequent 1925(a) opinion, it reiterated that “the facts are clear that the [visit] conversations occurred without the use of a telephone company, transmission of voices through telephone lines or anything that would resemble what this [c]ourt would determine to be a ‘telephone call’.” See Trial Court Opinion, 4/1/2014, at l.5
The Commonwealth appealed the suppression court’s decision and the Superior Court reversed. First, it properly enunciated the standard of review governing suppression court rulings:
In reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, our task is to determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record. If so, we are bound by those findings. Where, as here, it is the Commonwealth who is appealing the decision of the suppression court, we must consider only the evidence for the prosecution as read in the context of the record as a whole remains uncontradicted. Moreover, if the evidence supports the factual findings of the suppression court, this Court will reverse only if there is an error in the legal conclusion drawn from those findings.
[144]*144Commonwealth v. Fant, 109 A.3d 776, 777 (Pa.Super.2015) (citations omitted).
Then, of relevance to the issue before this Court, the Superior Court held that “the [suppression] court’s finding that the recordings in question did not involve a telephone company is not supported by the evidence.” Id., 109 A.3d at 779 n. 3. Without citation to authority, the Superior Court announced that it “must consider” from the record “additional uncontradicted facts not enunciated by the [suppression] court” in order to determine whether the suppression court committed legal error. Id. at 779. Included in these additional “facts” was the Superior Court’s own finding that the visit conversations “go through and are recorded by the inmate phone company.” Id. (citing N.T., 2/26/2014, at 14, 16). The Superior Court then indicated that this “uncontradicted fact” required it to conclude that “the [suppression] court’s finding that the recordings in question did not involve a telephone company is not supported by the evidence.” See id. at 779 n. 4 (citing id. at 779 n. 3).
Next, the Superior Court embarked on an effort to ascertain the meaning of “telephone” as used in the Wiretap Act. Id. at 780. Noting that the word is not statutorily defined, the Superior Court considered four different dictionary definitions including, (1) “an instrument for reproducing sounds, especially articulate speech, at a distance;" (2) “an electrical device for transmitting speech, consisting of a microphone and receiver mounted on a handset;” (3) “a device that is connected to a telephone system and that you use to listen or speak to someone who is somewhere else;” and (4) a “telephone consists of two essential parts; a microphone and a speaker. This allows the user to speak into the device and also hear transmissions from the other user.” Id. The first two definitions were offered by the Commonwealth, the third was offered by Fant, and the Superior Court offered the fourth.
Discounting the suppression court’s finding that the visit conversations do not involve a telephone company, the Superi- or Court pointed instead to “the additional uncontradicted fact” not found by the suppression court that the apparatus [145]*145used for visit conversations is “connected to the ‘inmate phone company’,” Id. at 779, 780-81 (citing N.T., 2/25/2014, at 14,16). The Superior Court then concluded that “under any of the [four] ‘common [dictionary] meanings’,” including the third definition put forth by Fant, the apparatus in question is a telephone. Id. at 781. In the Superior Court’s view, the visit conversations are telephone calls because the “Act does not distinguish between external and internal telephone calls from or to an inmate in a county correctional facility.” Id,
We granted Fant’s petition for allowance of appeal and the case was submitted to us on the briefs. The issue presented is whether the Superior Court erred in holding that the visit conversations constitute telephone calls subject to the exception set forth in Section 5704(14) of the Wiretap Act. See id. To answer this question, we first determine the meaning of “telephone” under the Act and then apply that meaning to the suppression court’s findings of facts. Ultimately, we hold that the term “telephone call” in Section 5704(14) does not include the visit conversations and conclude that the suppression court’s decision to suppress the recordings of those conversations was proper.
The meaning of “telephone call” in Section 5704(14) is a question of statutory interpretation. “Because statutory interpretation is a matter of law,” our standard of review is de novo. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 609 Pa. 22, 14 A.3d 798, 814 (2011). “The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” 1 Pa.C.S.A § 1921(a). The best indication of the legislature’s intent may be found in the plain language of the statute. Wright, 14 A.3d at 814.
As the Wiretap Act does not define the term “telephone call,” we must give the term its ordinary meaning. See Centolanza v. Lehigh Valley Dairies, Inc., 540 Pa. 398, 658 A.2d 336, 340 (1995) (“Absent a definition in the statute, statutes are presumed to employ words in their popular and plain everyday sense, and the popular meaning of such words [146]*146must prevail.”); Commonwealth v. Harner, 533 Pa. 14, 617 A.2d 702, 705 (1992) (noting that clear and unambiguous statutory language must be given effect in accordance with its plain and common meaning). Similarly, “it is not for the courts to add, by interpretation ... a requirement which the legislature did not see fit to include. Consequently ... although one is admonished to listen attentively to what a statute says[;][o]ne must also listen attentively to what it does not say.” Wright, 14 A.3d at 814; accord Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 132 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012) (favoring a definition that matches “how we use the word in everyday parlance” and observing that the legislature “remains free, as always, to give the word a broader or different meaning. But before we will assume it has done so, there must be some indication [the legislature] intended such a result”) (emphasis in original).
We have explained, however, that statutory context also matters. We must read a section of a statute in conjunction with other sections, construing them always with reference to the entire statute. See Watts v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist., 121 A.3d 964, 972 (Pa.2015). By the same token, we cannot arrive at the meaning of a word, even the “ordinary” meaning, without considering the surrounding words and provisions. See 1 Pa.C.S.A § 1903; Horosko v. Sch. Dist. of Mount Pleasant Twp., 335 Pa. 369, 6 A.2d 866, 869 (1939) (explaining that a statutory term’s “common and approved usage” must be construed “having regard, of course, [for] the context in which the legislature used [it]”). Indeed, “a statute cannot be dissected into individual words, each one being thrown onto the anvil of dialectics to be hammered into a meaning which has no association with the words from which it has violently been separated.” Bertera’s Hopewell Foodland, Inc, v. Masters, 428 Pa. 20, 236 A.2d 197, 204 (1967) overruled on other grounds by Goodman v. Kennedy, 459 Pa. 313, 329 A.2d 224 (1974); accord Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486-87, 126 S.Ct. 1252, 163 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2006) (noting that “ ‘[a] word is known by the company it keeps’—a rule that ‘is often wisely applied [147]*147where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended [legislative] breadth’ ”).
As an initial matter, we note that one would not ordinarily consider face-to-face conversations at a prison between an inmate and his visitor to be “telephone calls.” Although the inmate and his visitor use handsets to communicate through glass, this is an in-person visit bearing few characteristics of what is commonly considered to be a telephone call. And there is no indication that the Wiretap Act carries a buried implication that the term “telephone call” should be given a broader definition than the one that is commonly understood. See 1 Pa.C.S.A § 1903; accord Mohamad, 132 S.Ct. at 1707. Moreover, as discussed in detail infra, reading the term “telephone calls” in Section 5704(14) to encompass the visit conversations is in tension with how the legislature refers to the concept of a telephone call elsewhere in the Act. See, e.g., 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5702.
As noted, supra, the Superior Court cites various dictionary definitions in its quest to identify the “common meaning” of “telephone.” See Fant, 109 A.3d at 781. The Superior Court’s collection of definitions suggests that the word “telephone” has a definitional breadth encompassing almost any instrument that facilitates a transfer of the human voice between two points, regardless of whether the instrument is capable of making or receiving a call.6 As our analysis demonstrates, the Wiretap Act, read as a whole with attention to its purpose and various provisions, reflects that the drafters did not under[148]*148stand the term “telephone call” to be imbued with such broad meaning.7
To begin, we interpret the word “telephone” in the context of the words that surround it. See Masters, 236 A.2d at 204. Section 5704(14) permits recording “any telephone calls from or to an inmate in a facility,” so long as the prison follows prescribed procedures. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(14) (emphasis added). Section 5704(14)(iii) provides that “[p]ersons who are calling into a facility to speak to an inmate shall be notified that the call may be recorded or monitored.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(14)(iii) (emphasis added). The use of the word “calls” alongside “telephone” indicates that the popular meaning of a telephone is a device capable of making a telephone “call.” In addition to requiring the involvement of a telephone company to connect the caller to the call recipient, making a telephone “call” also requires the dialing of a telephone number, not merely the “punch[ing] of an ID number.”
Similarly, the inclusion of the phrase “from or to an inmate in a facility” immediately following “telephone calls” indicates that the legislature understood a “telephone” to be a device that is capable of reciprocal functionality, i.e., each apparatus is associated with a telephone number such that both caller and recipient have the potential to dial one another. The procedural requirement that people “calling into a facility” must be notified that their calls can be recorded reinforces this definitional characteristic. Use of the word “into” contem[149]*149plates a call originating outside the prison. Visit conversations may be initiated only by an inmate entering his personal ID number. A visitor, on the other hand, cannot use the apparatus to dial or call anyone, let alone from outside the Facility; he merely sits in the Facility, behind a glass partition in the visitation room waiting to “pick up” and speak. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/2014, at 2.
Although the Act does not define the term telephone call, it makes clear that a telephone call requires the involvement of a telephone company, or “communication common carrier,” by situating a telephone call, amongst other types of “aural transfers,” within the definition of wire communication.8 A wire communication is:
Any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communication by wire, cable or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception, including the use of such a connection in a switching station, furnished or operated by a telephone, telegraph or radio company for hire as a communication common carrier.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5702 (emphasis added).9 That the ordinary meaning of “telephone call” necessarily involves the use of a telephone company is similarly reflected in the Act’s basic requirement for lawfully intercepting telephone calls. Typically, in order to intercept a telephone call, law enforcement must [150]*150apply to the Superior Court for a wiretap order, which, in part, is an order directing a telephone company to place a tap on a specific line of communication. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5712(f); see also Boettger v. Loverro, 526 Pa. 510, 587 A.2d 712, 718 (1991) (making reference to the “mandatory cooperation by telephone companies” under the Act); see also Superior Court Operating Procedures §§ 65,65(1) (“If requested by the applicant, the order shall direct the pertinent communications common carrier to furnish the applicant with all information, facilities and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception... ”), 65.68 (“At the time the original order is signed, a duplicate original should also be signed for presentation to the communication common carrier.”).
Absent the exception set forth in Section 5704(14), intercepting telephone calls to or from an inmate in a county correctional facility would require an application for a wiretap order, and that order would enlist a telephone company to assist in the interception. See id. Section 5704(14) removes the need for court approval with respect to intercepting telephone calls to or from inmates, but its reference to “telephone calls” must be read consistently with other provisions of the Act. See Watts, 121 A.3d at 972. The legislature’s determination that the Superior Court may order the participation of a telephone company in an authorized interception indicates that the legislature understood the term “telephone call,” ordinarily, to be the sort communication that relies on the operation of a telephone company.10
Therefore, we hold that the common sense, plain meaning of a “telephone call,” as understood in the context of the Wiretap Act, is a communication that involves the (1) dialing of a telephone number, and; (2) an apparatus that is connected by wire or the like to a telephone company. By virtue of these features, a “telephone call” (8) permits a caller to converse [151]*151with a call recipient whose similar apparatus is associated with the dialed telephone number.
As an analytical matter, ascertaining the meaning of “telephone” under the Act does not fully resolve the issue before us. The second question in this case is whether the record supports the suppression court’s finding that the visit conversations do not, in fact, “involve the use of a telephone company... outside the [Facility].” See Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/2014, at 3. The Superior Court concluded that “the [suppression court’s] finding that the recordings in question did not involve a telephone company is not supported by the evidence.” Fant, 109 A.3d at 779 n.3. (emphasis added).11 The Superior Court erred in this regard. The uncontradicted evidence in the record supports the suppression court’s finding; the Superior Court was therefore bound by it, and so are we. See In re L.J., 622 Pa. 126, 79 A.3d 1073, 1080-85 (2013) (explaining that if the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, a reviewing court may only reverse the suppression court’s ruling if the suppression court erred in applying the law to those factual findings).
First, the Warden’s testimony was clear that the visit conversations “[do not] go through a telephone company.” See N.T., 2/25/2014, at 14 (“Oh, through a telephone company, no.”). Furthermore, her testimony that only a “personal ID number”—not a telephone number—is required to “activate” the visit conversation is additionally supportive of the trial court’s finding of fact that the visit conversations do not use a “telephone company, telephone lines or equipment outside the [Facility].” See id. The “personal ID number,” as we under[152]*152stand it, essentially serves to turn on the visit conversation apparatus and enable a recording function. See id. There is no dispute that recordings of the visit conversations were saved to a Facility computer server, but this evidence does not invalidate the trial court’s finding that the conversations themselves did not involve the use of an outside telephone company. See id.
Moreover, evidence as to the non-involvement of a telephone company remains uncontradicted throughout the record. The Superior Court’s citation to a statement by Attorney Kuebler, the prosecutor representing the Commonwealth, is inapposite. See N.T., 2/25/2014, at 16. A statement by counsel during a suppression hearing is not evidence of record and the Superior Court may not consider such a statement when analyzing whether the record supports the suppression court’s findings of fact. See Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 533 Pa. 491, 626 A.2d 109, 113 (1993) (noting that “trial counsel’s statement of facts are not considered evidence”), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Burke, 566 Pa. 402, 781 A.2d 1136 (2001). Even if Attorney Kuebler’s statement fell within the Superior Court’s proper scope of review, however, her statement simply does not controvert the Warden’s testimony and is equally supportive of the suppression court’s finding of fact that the visit conversations “do not involve the use of a telephone company ,.. outside the Facility.” Compare Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/2014, at 3, with N.T., 2/25/2104, at 16 (Attorney Kuebler acknowledging that the visit conversations are not “recorded by a telephone company,” but instead “by the inmate phone company”).
We can speculate that the “inmate phone company,” referenced by Attorney Kuebler as distinct from a “telephone company,” is Inmate Telephone Inc. (ITI), the entity that provides the Facility with its Inmate Telephone Management System (ITM). ITM receives a brief description in the Facility’s “Telephone Regulations for Inmates,” which were admitted as evidence. See Telephone Regulations at 1. These Regulations state that ITM “empowers [the Facility] in the area of [153]*153security, call control, live call monitoring, call recording and long term tape archiving, and site-specific reports.” See id
Neither the Warden nor Attorney Kuebler considered the inmate phone company to be a “telephone company.” See N.T., 2/25/2014, at 14, 16. Moreover, given its limited functionality related only to monitoring and recording, the suppression court accurately found that the visit “conversations do not involve the use of a telephone company, telephone lines or equipment outside the [Facility].” Nor does the fact that ITM is also used to record actual telephone calls, which require the inmate to enter his personal ID number and to dial a telephone number, contradict the trial court’s finding that visit conversations occur without the use of an outside telephone company.12 See infra n. 3.
We therefore conclude that the Superior Court erred in holding that “the record does not support the trial court’s legal conclusion that the ‘apparatus that resembles a telephone’ is not a telephone and that the recorded telephone ‘visit’ conversations are not subject to the exception set forth in § 5704(14) of the Wiretap Act.” See Fant, 109 A.3d at 781. As the foregoing reveals, the ordinary meaning of “telephone” under the Act requires both the dialing of a telephone number and the involvement of a telephone company in connecting a caller to his or her call recipient. By contrast, the visit conversations are activated when an inmate merely “punches [154]*154in an ID number,” not a telephone number. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/2014, at 2. There is no dispute as to this fact. Additionally, there is uncontradicted testimony that no “telephone company” is involved in facilitating the visit conversations. See N.T., 2/25/2014, at 14. For these reasons, the suppression court’s decision to suppress the visit conversations was proper. They are not “telephone calls,” and they are not subject to the county correctional facility “telephone” exception under the Wiretap Act.13 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(14).
Order reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
[155]*155Chief Justice Saylor and Justice Dougherty join the opinion, Justice Todd joins the opinion except for its mandate and Justice Wecht joins the opinion except for footnote 13.
Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion.
Justice Todd files a concurring and dissenting opinion.
Justice Baer files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Mundy joins.