Com. v. Newnam, L.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 25, 2019
Docket1504 MDA 2017
StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Newnam, L. (Com. v. Newnam, L.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Com. v. Newnam, L., (Pa. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

J-A28012-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LUCAS ALLEN NEWNAM : : Appellant : No. 1504 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 9, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0003420-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JANUARY 25, 2019

Lucas Allen Newnam appeals from his judgment of sentence, entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, following his conviction of

first-degree murder.1 Newnam was sentenced to life imprisonment, without

the possibility of parole. After careful review, we affirm.

On May 27, 2016, Newnam fatally shot Julius Dale, III, at Newnam’s

residence located at 304 Creek Road, Sadsbury Township, in Lancaster

County. We refer to pages 2-11 of the attached trial court opinion, dated

December 20, 2017, for a recitation of the relevant trial testimony and factual

background of the case.

Following a five-day jury trial, first-degree murder conviction, and

sentencing, Newnam filed timely post-sentence motions alleging the verdict

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). J-A28012-18

was against the weight of the evidence and that the Commonwealth provided

insufficient evidence to disprove his defense of justification. The court denied

the motion and, on September 20, 2017, Newnam filed the instant, timely

notice of appeal. After being granted an extension by the trial court, Newnam

filed a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal.

On appeal, Newnam raises the following issues for our consideration:

(1) Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying [Newnam’s] request to have newly[-]retained counsel of his choice assume his defense of his pending murder trial and afford counsel a brief continuance to prepare, where [Newnam’s] original attorney abruptly withdrew from his case for medical reasons and the court appointed new counsel to [Newnam’s] case[?]

(2) Did the trial court err when it allowed the Commonwealth to introduce [Newnam’s] intercepted prison visit conversations, in the absence of explicit consent by both parties or judicial authorization, in violation of the Wiretap Act, 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 5701, et se[q]., and Commonwealth v. Fant[, 146 A.3d 1254 (Pa. 2016)?]

(3) Did the trial court err when it refused to suppress [Newnam’s] statements during a custodial interrogation when the state police troopers failed to properly inform him of the nature of the investigation prior to advising [Newnam] of his Miranda[2] rights[?]

(4) Did the trial court err by refusing to charge the jury pursuant to [Newnam’s] requested castle doctrine instruction when [Newnam] testified, as well as put on witnesses buttressing

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

-2- J-A28012-18

his claim of self-defense and the decedent’s stated intent to kill [Newnam?]3

Appellant’s Brief, at 7-9.

In his first issue on appeal, Newnam contends that the trial court

improperly denied his request to have newly-retained, private counsel

appointed and permit counsel to have a brief continuance to prepare his case.

He asserts the denial was an abuse of discretion where Newnam’s original

attorney withdrew from his case for medical reasons and the court appointed

new counsel for him, depriving him of his right to choose counsel.

It is a fundamental principle that a defendant has a constitutional right

to choose any lawyer he may desire, at his own cost and expense.

Commonwealth v. Rucker, 761 A.2d 541 (Pa. 2000); Pennsylvania

Constitution, Art. I, § 9; U.S. Constitution, Amend. V. Cf. Commonwealth

v. Moore, 633 A.2d 1119, 1125 (Pa. 1993) (citing Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 236 A.2d 805, 807 (Pa. 1968) (defendant who is not employing

counsel at own expense and seeks court-appointed counsel, at public expense,

does not have right to choose particular counsel to represent him)). In

3 The Commonwealth has presented our Court with a post-submission communication, attaching a recent decision, Commonwealth v. Cannavo, 3729 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 3, 2018), that addresses the castle doctrine and 18 Pa.C.S. § 505. The Commonwealth asserts that Cannavo is relevant to our analysis of Newnam’s last issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2501 (after argument of case, no brief, memorandum or letter relating to case shall be presented either directly or indirectly to court or any judge, except upon application or when expressly permitted to bar at time of argument) (emphasis added). We accept the submission pursuant to Rule 2501.

-3- J-A28012-18

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 364 A.2d 665, 674 (Pa. 1976), our Supreme

Court noted:

Due process demands that the defendant be afforded a fair opportunity to obtain the assistance of counsel of his own choice to prepare and conduct his defense; the constitutional mandate is satisfied so long as the accused is afforded a fair or reasonable opportunity to obtain particular counsel, provided there is no arbitrary action prohibiting the effective use of such counsel.

Id. at 674 (citations omitted).

However, a person’s right to be represented by the counsel of his choice

is not absolute. “[T]he right of the accused to choose his own counsel, as well

as a lawyer’s right to choose his clients, must be weighed against and may

reasonably be restricted by ‘the state’s interest in the swift and efficient

administration of criminal justice.’” Id. at 676. Effectively, a defendant

cannot “utilize his right to choose his own counsel so as unreasonably to clog

the machinery of justice and hamper and delay the state in its efforts to do

justice with regard to both him and to others whose right to a speedy trial

may thereby be affected.” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the party fails to offer evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel. Contrariwise, a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality. There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.

-4- J-A28012-18

Id. at 675 (emphasis added). Moreover, in Commonwealth v. Brooks, 104

A.3d 466 (Pa. 2014), our Supreme Court noted that:

[a]ppellate review of a trial court’s continuance decision is deferential. The grant or denial of a motion for a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment.

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Com. v. Newnam, L., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/com-v-newnam-l-pasuperct-2019.