Commonwealth v. Dugan

769 A.2d 512, 2001 Pa. Super. 53, 2001 Pa. Super. LEXIS 168
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 22, 2001
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 769 A.2d 512 (Commonwealth v. Dugan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Dugan, 769 A.2d 512, 2001 Pa. Super. 53, 2001 Pa. Super. LEXIS 168 (Pa. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

LALLY-GREEN, J.:

¶ 1 Appellant, Vincent J. Dugan, appeals the judgment of sentence of fines and costs of prosecution imposed following Appellant’s summary conviction of a vehicle code violation. We affirm.

¶ 2 The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows.

The parties stipulated that [Appellant] was the driver of a truck, towing a horse trailer, that was stopped by the Pennsylvania State Police, on October 21, 1999. (N.T. pgs. 4-5). The parties also stipulated that the truck had a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating of 11,200 pounds and the trailer had a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating of 15,000 pounds. (N.T. p. 8.) The parties further stipulated that [Appellant] did not have a commercial driver’s license or Class A license. Id.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/2/2000, at 1-2.

¶ 3 Appellant was charged with violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1606(a), driving a commercial motor vehicle without a commercial driver’s license. A trial de novo was held [514]*514on March 1, 2000. On March 3, 2000, the trial court found Appellant guilty and sentenced Appellant to pay $541.50 in fines, plus costs of prosecution. Trial Court Opinion, 8/2/2000, at 1. This appeal followed.

¶ 4 Appellant raises one issue on appeal: Whether [Appellant] was driving a “Commercial Motor Vehicle” so as to constitute a violation of Section 1606(a) of the Vehicle Code (75 Pa.C.S.A § 1606(a)).

Appellant’s Brief at 3. Appellant presents a claim not addressed previously by this court, ie., what is the proper interpretation of the Section 1606(a) term “commercial motor vehicle.”1

¶ 5 The issue before us involves the proper statutory construction of Section 1606(a). When reviewing questions of law, our standard of review is plenary. Yaros v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, 742 A.2d 1118, 1121 (Pa.Super.1999) (iciting Borden, Inc. v. Advent Ink Co., 701 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa.Super.1997)). We are free to draw our own inferences and reach our own conclusions. Id. “If a trial court erred in its application of the law, [we] will correct the error.” Id. (citing Francis J. Bernhardt, III, P.C. v. Needleman, 705 A.2d 875, 876-77 (Pa.Super.1997)).

¶ 6 We look for guidance to 1 Pa. C.S.A §§ 1901, et seq., General Provisions, Statutory Construction. ‘Words and phrases are to be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a). In construing a statute, courts must first determine whether the issue may be resolved by reference to the express language of the statute. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 444 Pa.Super. 206, 663 A.2d 746, 748 (1995); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921. Section 1921, Legislative Intent Controls, provides:

(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted....
(4) The object to be attained....

[515]*5151 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921. Thus, when the language of a statute is clear and free from all ambiguity, any further deliberation as to its meaning is unwarranted. Grom v. Burgoon, 448 Pa.Super. 616, 672 A.2d 828, 825 (1996).

¶ 7 Statutes in pari materia are to be construed together, if possible, as one statute. 1 Pa.C.S.A § 1982(b). Statutes or parts of statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same persons or things or to the same class of people. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932(a); Motorists Insurance Companies v. Emig, 444 Pa.Super. 524, 664 A.2d 559, 566-67 (1995).

¶ 8 Appellant is charged with violating Section 1606(a), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1606(a). Section 1606(a) provides:

No person, except those specifically exempted in subsection (b), shall drive a commercial motor vehicle unless the person has been issued and is in immediate possession of a valid commercial driver’s license and applicable endorsements valid for the vehicle he is driving.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1606(a) (emphasis added). Thus, Section 1606 requires persons who drive a “commercial motor vehicle” to obtain a “commercial driver’s license.”

¶ 9 A “commercial motor vehicle” is defined in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1603, in pertinent part, as follows:

A motor vehicle designed or used to transport passengers or property:
(1) if the vehicle has a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 or more pounds or such lesser rating as the department shall adopt under the provisions of section 6103(c) (relating to promulgation of rules and regulations by department), as determined by Federal regulation and published by the department as a notice in the Pennsylvania Bulletin;

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1603 (emphasis added). “Motor vehicle” is defined as:

[a] vehicle which is self-propelled except one which is propelled solely by human power or by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102. “Gross vehicle weight rating” is defined as “[t]he value specified on the Federal weight certification label by the manufacturer as the loaded weight of a single vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102.

¶ 10 A “commercial driver’s license” is a driver’s license to drive a class of commercial motor vehicle. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1603.2 A “Class A” license is required in order for a person to operate a combination of vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 pounds or more, unless the towed vehicle is less than a weight rating of 10,001 pounds. 75 Pa.C.S.A § 1504(d)(1).3

¶ 11 The question here is whether Appellant was required to have a Class A license to drive his pickup truck with an 11,200 pound weight rating which towed a horse trailer with a 15,000 pound weight rating. The Commonwealth argues that Appellant must have the Class A license because the total weight rating of the combination of vehicles, the pickup track plus said horse trailer, was 26,200 pounds, [516]*516which is above 26,001 pounds. Appellant argues he does not need the Class A license because: the only motor

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769 A.2d 512, 2001 Pa. Super. 53, 2001 Pa. Super. LEXIS 168, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-dugan-pasuperct-2001.