Com. v. Straughen, W., Jr.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 20, 2018
Docket1145 MDA 2017
StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Straughen, W., Jr. (Com. v. Straughen, W., Jr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Com. v. Straughen, W., Jr., (Pa. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

J-A11035-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : WINFIELD KELLY STRAUGHEN JR. : : Appellant : No. 1145 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 5, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at No.: CP-06-SA-0000161-2017

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 20, 2018

Appellant, Winfield Kelly Straughen, Jr., appeals pro se from the

judgment of sentence in a summary appeal, at which he was found guilty of

failure to have a commercial driver’s license and failure to have a required

medical card.1 We affirm.

We take the factual and procedural history in this matter from our

review of the certified record and the trial court’s September 14, 2017 opinion.

At the de novo hearing on July 5, 2017, Officer David M. Bentz testified that

on January 31, 2017, he stopped Appellant. (Trial Court Opinion, 9/14/17, at

1). Appellant was driving a Dodge Ram pickup truck and towing a trailer.

____________________________________________

1 Although counsel entered appearance on behalf of Appellant after Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal, he was later permitted to proceed pro se. ____________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A11035-18

(See id.). Counsel for the Commonwealth stated the Commonwealth believed

that the gross combination weight rating (“GCWR”) for the Dodge truck was

26,000 pounds and the trailer 20,000 pounds. (See N.T. Hearing, 7/5/17, at

4). These two weights required Appellant to have a commercial driver’s

license. (See id.). The Commonwealth contended that the truck was

registered in Virginia and introduced the registration, showing the GCWR for

the truck was 26,000 pounds. (Id. at 7, 70).

Appellant testified he had information from the manufacturer that the

GCWR for the vehicle was 23,000 pounds. (Id. at 6).2 He contended the

gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) for his truck was 12,200 pounds,

according to the manufacturer label on the door, not 26,000 pounds. (Id. at

7).

Officer Benz testified that his “training has always been and prior

enforcement efforts we certainly take the [GVWR] of the primary unit and the

gross weight of the trailer and add them together to determine the

combination.” (Id. at 9). Counsel for the Commonwealth stated that the

registration for the trailer indicated the GVWR was 20,000 pounds. (Id. at

14). Appellant conceded that the value for the truck is assigned the

“maximum value for its weight rating which the [GCWR] is the maximum that

they specify for a truck and trailer combined. It’s a combination.” (Id. at

2 Appellant appeared pro se at the hearing.

-2- J-A11035-18

20). He agreed that “[i]f my gross vehicle, my truck and trailer, actual weight

exceeded 26,000 pounds, then it would become [sic] commercial vehicle. But

I did not exceed it.” (Id. at 22).

Officer Bentz testified that he “sent for certified registrations for both

the truck and trailer from Virginia.” (Id. at 31). He received a certified

registration from Virginia for the truck. (Id. at 32). The registration indicated

the GVWR for the truck itself was 14,000 pounds. (See id.). The registration

showed the GVWR for the trailer was 20,000 pounds. (Id. at 33).

The Commonwealth showed Appellant the registration from the Virginia

Department of Motor Vehicles for the trailer, indicating the GVWR of the trailer

was 20,000 pounds. (Id. at 33.). Documentation from Virginia indicated the

pickup truck had a GVWR of 14,000 pounds and the trailer had a GVWR of

20,000 pounds. (Id. at 70, 72). Appellant contended that the actual weight

of his truck was 6,000 pounds and the trailer weighed 15,000 pounds

according to the manufacturer. (Id. at 38). At the time Officer Bentz stopped

Appellant, Appellant admitted he did not have the registrations for the truck

or the trailer. (Id. at 46). Appellant averred that “[t]he law used to say that

[the officers] have to weigh the vehicles to determine whether it was a

commercial vehicle. That’s the issue I had in 2011.” (Id. at 59).

After the hearing, the court found Appellant guilty of driving without a

commercial driver’s license, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1606(a), and

-3- J-A11035-18

medical card.3 (See id. at 64-65). The court imposed a fine of $525.4 (See

id.). This timely appeal followed, on July 24, 2017.5

Appellant raises the following issue for our review: “Is the correct

measurement of [GCWR] upon which the truck driver can rely determined by

the stated GCWR on either the side truck panel or the vehicle’s manual, as

opposed to adding the [GVWR] of the trailer to the GCWR?” (Appellant’s Brief

at 6). Appellant argues that the trailer’s GVWR should not be added to that

of the truck in the absence of the actual weights of the towing vehicle and the

trailer. (Id. at 11). This claim does not merit relief.

When, as here, the appellant raises a question of statutory construction, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.

In matters involving statutory interpretation, the Statutory Construction Act directs courts to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. A statute's plain language generally provides the best indication of legislative intent. In construing the language, however, and giving it effect, we should not interpret statutory words in isolation, but must read them with reference to the context in which they appear.

3 See 49 CFR § 391.41. The trial court noted that both Appellant and the Commonwealth agreed that the citation for failure to have a medical card “was wholly dependent on the requirement that [Appellant] have a commercial driver’s license, and rises or falls along with that issue.” (See Trial Ct. Op., at 4).

4 The Commonwealth withdrew five separate traffic citations. (See id. at 64- 65).

5Appellant also filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court filed an opinion on September 14, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

-4- J-A11035-18

Commonwealth v. Ford, 175 A.3d 985, 991–92 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

The applicable statutory provisions state, in relevant part, as follows:

Requirement for commercial driver's license

(a) When required.−No person, except those specifically exempted in subsection (b), shall drive a commercial motor vehicle unless:

(1) the person has been issued a commercial driver's license;

(2) the person's commercial driver's license is in his immediate possession; and

(3) the person's commercial driver's license was issued for the class of commercial motor vehicle operated and contains all applicable license endorsements.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1606(a)(1)-(3).

“Commercial motor vehicle.” A motor vehicle or combination designed or used to transport passengers or property: * * *. . .

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Related

Commonwealth v. Ford
175 A.3d 985 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2017)
Commonwealth v. Dugan
769 A.2d 512 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2001)

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Com. v. Straughen, W., Jr., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/com-v-straughen-w-jr-pasuperct-2018.