Commonwealth v. Deron C. Jones.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: October 8, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-1022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1022

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

DERON C. JONES.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Deron C. Jones, appeals from his conviction,

after a jury trial in the Superior Court, of trafficking in

Oxycodone, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (c) (1). He challenges only the

denial of his motion to suppress. Concluding that the search

warrant affidavit, which recited numerous controlled purchases

where the defendant traveled directly from his apartment

building to sell drugs, provided probable cause to search the

defendant's apartment for evidence of drug distribution, we

affirm.

1. Standard of review. When assessing whether a search

warrant is supported by probable cause, our inquiry "begins and

ends with the 'four corners of the affidavit.'" Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v.

Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995). The affidavit

"should be 'read as a whole, not parsed, severed, and subjected

to hypercritical analysis.'" Commonwealth v. Clagon, 465 Mass.

1004, 1004 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Anthony, 451 Mass.

59, 69 (2008). We consider the affidavit "in a commonsense and

realistic fashion." Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 501

(2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 Mass. 617, 626

(2011). We review the search warrant affidavit "de novo to

determine whether it establishes probable cause." Commonwealth

v. Ponte, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 78, 79 (2020).

"[T]he probable cause inquiry is 'not a high bar.'"

Commonwealth v. Soto-Suazo, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 460, 464 (2021),

quoting Commonwealth v. Guastucci, 486 Mass. 22, 26 (2020). It

is less than a preponderance of the evidence. See Commonwealth

v. Murphy, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 504, 509 (2019). To satisfy the

probable cause requirement, the "affidavit submitted with the

search warrant application must provide a 'substantial basis to

conclude that the items sought are related to the criminal

activity under investigation, and that they reasonably may be

expected to be located in the place to be searched at the time

the search warrant issues.'" Commonwealth v. Colina, 495 Mass.

13, 25 (2024), quoting Commonwealth v. Alexis, 481 Mass. 91,

101-102 (2018).

2 2. Reliability and basis of knowledge. To establish

probable cause based solely on information provided by a

confidential informant, the Commonwealth must satisfy the

familiar Aguilar-Spinelli test by "demonstrat[ing] some of the

underlying circumstances from which (a) the informant gleaned

his information (the 'basis of knowledge' test), and (b) the law

enforcement officials could have concluded the informant was

credible or reliable (the 'veracity' test)." Commonwealth v.

Tapia, 463 Mass. 721, 729 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Cast,

407 Mass. 891, 896 (1990). "Independent police corroboration

can make up for deficiencies in one or both of these factors."

Commonwealth v. Sertyl, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 836, 840 (2022),

quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 409 Mass. 16, 19 (1990).

First-hand knowledge is enough to satisfy the "basis of

knowledge" requirement. See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass.

116, 134 (2012). Here, all five confidential informants

reported personally buying drugs from the defendant. Three

reported that the defendant used his motor vehicle, two reported

that the defendant sold from his apartment, and one reported

purchasing drugs in the defendant's apartment. Such personal

knowledge satisfies the basis of knowledge. See Commonwealth v.

Alfonso A., 438 Mass. 372, 374 (2003).

To satisfy the veracity prong, the Commonwealth "needs to

show . . . that the [informant] had a demonstrated history of

3 reliability." Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 677,

S.C., 493 Mass. 1 (2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2683 (2024),

quoting Commonwealth v. Pinto, 476 Mass. 361, 365 (2017). The

affidavit established that for only one of the confidential

informants. That informant, who reported having purchased drugs

from the defendant in the past, also "provided information in

the past that ha[d] led to narcotics related arrests as well as

the seizure of illegal drugs." An informant's reliability is

established by a single instance where that informant provided

information that "led to the confiscation of illegal narcotics."

Guardado, supra. Cf. Ponte, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 82

(confidential informant not reliable because of lack of prior

history).

Furthermore, "[a] controlled purchase of narcotics,

supervised by the police, provides probable cause to issue a

search warrant." Commonwealth v. Cruz, 430 Mass. 838, 842 n.2

(2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Warren, 418 Mass. 86, 89 (1994).

Here, the six controlled purchases performed by two separate

confidential informants and surveilled by police established

probable cause under Aguilar-Spinelli to believe that the

defendant was dealing drugs. See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 74

Mass. App. Ct. 784, 787-788 (2009).

The confidential informants' reports of the defendant's

residence, automobiles, and contact information was also

4 corroborated by independent police investigation. The police

traced the telephone number the informants provided to the

defendant's brother and used that number to contact the

defendant to set up controlled purchases. The address the

informants provided matched the one the police had on file for

the defendant from a prior investigation. The police also

conducted six controlled purchases from January 2016 to June

2017 where two confidential informants called the defendant and

set up a purchase at a prearranged location. At five of the six

purchases, the defendant arrived driving a 2017 Chevrolet

Silverado, the same motor vehicle that two confidential

informants reported the defendant drove. For four of the six

controlled purchases, police saw the defendant leaving and

returning to the same apartment complex that matched the

defendant's known address. This corroborating evidence speaks

to the knowledge and reliability of the confidential informants.

See Commonwealth v. Arias, 481 Mass. 604, 620 (2019).

3. Nexus to the defendant's apartment. Of course,

probable cause to believe that the defendant was dealing drugs

does not, by itself, mean that the police may search the

defendant's home. To justify a search of the suspect's home,

"the affidavit and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 'must

provide a substantial basis for concluding that evidence

connected to the crime will be found on the specified

5 premises.'" Clagon, 465 Mass. at 1004, quoting Commonwealth v.

Escalera, 462 Mass. 636, 642 (2012).

"Observations by police of a suspect on multiple occasions

leaving his residence and proceeding directly to a prearranged

location to sell drugs can support a reasonable inference that

the suspect is a drug dealer who stores drugs or packages drugs

for resale in his residence." Escalera, 462 Mass. at 643.

Here, at five of the six controlled purchases, police saw the

defendant leave his apartment building and proceed to the

controlled purchase. At three of those purchases, the police

saw the defendant return to the building after the purchase.

See Clagon, 465 Mass. at 1006 ("return to the premises . . . is

also some evidence that [the defendant] was using the premises

as a base of operation").

In Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 59

(2007), we determined that there was probable cause to search

the defendant's residence after the police saw the defendant

twice leave directly from her home to a controlled purchase and

return to the premises immediately after the sale. This routine

was enough to create a reasonable inference that the "delivery

service was based out of her apartment." Id. at 60.

In Escalera, 462 Mass. at 646, the Supreme Judicial Court

held that the search of the defendant's home was proper after

watching him leave the residence before three suspected drug

6 sales and return home after six drug transactions. This pattern

provided a "substantial basis for concluding that drugs, as well

as contraband related to an illegal drug distribution

enterprise, would be found in the defendant's apartment" rather

than just in the defendant's motor vehicle. Id.

In Clagon, 465 Mass. at 1006, the Supreme Judicial Court

concluded that a search warrant affidavit established probable

cause to search a home where, inter alia, the defendant was

twice seen going directly from the home to a controlled purchase

and once returning to his home after a purchase. As the court

held, "the fact that [the defendant] twice, while under police

surveillance, left the premises and went directly to the

location of a controlled purchase strongly suggests that he kept

his supply of heroin at the premises." Id. This pattern

reasonably supports the inference that evidence of the

defendant's drug distribution could be found in his apartment.

To this, the defendant argues that the size of the

apartment building is distinguishable. We are not persuaded.

First, the affidavit described the building as "a multi unit,

brick and tan sided building," similar to the description the

building in Escalera as a "multi unit building of brick and wood

7 construction containing individual apartments." 1 Second, the

affidavit contained significant evidence connecting the

defendant to the apartment searched. The officer averred that

he knew "[t]hrough past investigations . . . that [the

defendant] resides" at the specified apartment. Another officer

had, within the previous six months, responded to the apartment

and spoke to the defendant and his girlfriend. Two confidential

informants, including the one who had purchased drugs in the

defendant's apartment, provided the apartment number. As the

Supreme Judicial Court stated in Escalera, "there need not be

definitive proof that the seller keeps his supply at his

residence. . . . [I]t will suffice if there are some additional

facts [that] would support the inference that the supply is

probably located there.'" Escalera, 462 Mass. at 645, quoting 2

W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(d), at 420-421 (4th ed.

2004). 2 Here, the information within the four corners of the

1 The defendant makes numerous assertions about the nature of the apartment building complex that find no purchase in the search warrant affidavit and were supported at the suppression hearing only by the unsworn statements of defense counsel.

2 The defendant also argues that it is more probable that the narcotics would be stored in his motor vehicle rather than the apartment. Even if the "substance itself was stored in the car," other items related to the distribution enterprise were "'far more likely to be located in the residence.'" Clagon, 465 Mass. at 1006-1007, quoting Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 299 (2009).

8 affidavit established probable cause to believe that there was

evidence of drug trafficking in the defendant's apartment.

Finally, Ponte, relied upon by the defendant, is not on

point. In Ponte, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 82-83, we faced the

question whether a single "controlled buy within this large

multiunit apartment building furnished sufficient corroboration

to establish the CI's veracity in combination with the minimal

corroboration by the defendant's arraignment record and details

provided by the CI." Accord Commonwealth v. Costa, 97 Mass.

App. Ct. 902, 903 (2020). Here, at least one of the

confidential informants who participated in a controlled

purchase had previously established veracity. Furthermore, the

question is whether the Commonwealth established a nexus to

search the defendant's apartment after six controlled purchases

and two confidential informants reported that the defendant

sells drugs in his apartment. 3 Ponte's limited exception to the

general rule that a proper controlled purchase in an apartment

building adequately corroborates the reliability of a

confidential informant, see Commonwealth v. Desper, 419 Mass.

163, 169 (1994); Warren, 418 Mass. at 89; Commonwealth v.

Monteiro, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 478, 483-485 (2018), is inapplicable

for the simple reason that this case does not involve a

3 One of the confidential informants attested to buying drugs from the defendant in the defendant's apartment.

9 controlled purchase in the defendant's apartment building and

thus does not turn on that line of cases.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Neyman, Ditkoff & Englander, JJ. 4),

Clerk

Entered: October 8, 2025.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.