Commonwealth v. Clinton

137 A.2d 463, 391 Pa. 212, 1958 Pa. LEXIS 521
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 16, 1958
DocketAppeals, 281 and 282
StatusPublished
Cited by81 cases

This text of 137 A.2d 463 (Commonwealth v. Clinton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Clinton, 137 A.2d 463, 391 Pa. 212, 1958 Pa. LEXIS 521 (Pa. 1958).

Opinions

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Musmanno,

On the night of October 24, 1954, at about 11:45 o’clock, Eugene Clinton and Thomas Houser were arrested by Philadelphia police and later charged with the crimes of Possessing Burglars’ Tools (Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §904, 18 P.S. §4904) and Prowling (Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §418, added May 27, 1949, P. L. 1900, §1, 18 P.S. §4418.) They were tried before Judge Kun of the Court of Quarter Sessions, Philadelphia County, without a jury and convicted. Clinton appealed to the Superior Court which affirmed his conviction and then petitioned this Court for an allocatur which was allowed. Houser did not appeal.

On the night of his arrest, Clinton was seen, at the corner of 23rd and Manning Streets, to get into an Oldsmobile automobile in which the police found 4 electric drills, a screwdriver, a hatchet, electric razor, and a crowbar. Houser was arrested on the street. He had in his possession two clocks, three electric bits and a chisel. Being questioned at detective headquarters about the tools in his car, Eugene Clinton explained that he worked for his brother, Edward Clin[215]*215ton, who was in the business of installing television and high power aerials, and that the tools in question were used in that work.

At the trial, the defendant’s brother, Edward Clinton, corroborated what Eugene had said, and identified all of the tools, which had been found in Eugene’s car, as belonging to him. Referring to the items he testified: “This is a common cold chisel for cutting work. We do some metal work in supports and stuff like that. These are common, ordinary high-speed bits that we use . . . These are crowbars that we use. in ceiling work when they are remodeling. We work with the electricians and contractors.” When the Trial Judge asked him to demonstrate how the crowbar was used he replied: “Supposing you had 2 by 4s coming this way and we wanted to put something behind them. I would go at it this way, and you can also use it this way with the other end. You see, you have leverage here, where you don’t have it here.”

The Court questioned further and Edward replied: “Q. That is good enough. Now, how about the little hatchet. A. The little hatchet is a common thing. I, myself, use a smaller hatchet because I have a regular belt that I use to hold all my tools for certain things. There are times when we might want to nick out a little bit. Q. How about the drills? A. We had about 14 inches of concrete to go through over here and we went through that — Q. You mean at Callahan’s? A. Yes. What we had to do was put a television in the wall and everything had to be concealed, so we took it from the basement up to the bar to keep the cables concealed. It involved work with the walls.”

The two Clinton brothers had worked on a job that day, and had ceased operations about 6 p.m. The tools were left in the car, Edward explained, because: “With heavy equipment such as this, I don’t always take it [216]*216out of the car. I have a couple of set-ups and if I have one in the car, I usually leave it there.”

Eugene Clinton, the defendant, testified that he had used the indicated tools that day on the job described by his brother, and that after dinner, he drove to 5033 Woodland Avenue, a used car lot where Houser worked as an auto mechanic. At this place Houser did some repair work on Eugene’s car and then they both got into the car to test out the repair work. "When they arrived at 23rd and Manning Streets, Eugene asked Houser to let him drive. Houser stopped the car and they both got off so as to exchange places.

Since Houser’s case is not before us, there will be no need to relate the circumstances attendant upon his arrest. As already stated, Judge Kun found both defendants guilty. The record fails to establish that the Commonwealth made out a prima facie case against Eugene Clinton on either the Burglary Tool charge or the Prowling charge.

The learned Trial Judge said in his Opinion filed under Rule 43 of the Superior Court that it was not satisfactorily explained why the two defendants should have been trying out a car which they had fixed “near midnight, some 50 or 60 blocks from where they lived.” A man charged with crime is not required to explain anything. It is the Commonwealth’s obligation to prove guilt. When an accused person is confronted with incriminating evidence which, if unexplained, will work a conviction, he remains mute at his peril, but when the evidence submitted by the Commonwealth does not rise to the dignity of authoritative accusation, much less proof of guilt, the Commonwealth may not declare that the silence of the accused, if he prefers not to speak, supplies deficiencies in the prosecution’s ease. Even if the defendant does speak and speaks unconvincingly or self-contradictory, but the Common[217]*217wealth has not made out a prima facie case, a resulting conviction will not be allowed to stand. Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand why, if Clinton and Houser were out testing a recently-repaired car, there would be anything unreasonable about their being 50 or 60 blocks from their homes.

• Regardless of Eugene Clinton’s explanation as to why he was out in his car “near midnight”, the finding of certain tools in his car did not make out a conviction under the Act of June 24,1939, P. L. 872, which provides, inter alia: “Whoever has in his possession any tool, false-key, lockpick, bit, nippers, fuse, force-screw, punch, drill, jimmy, or any material, implement, instrument or other mechanical device, designed or commonly used for breaking into any vault, safe, railroad car, boat, vessel, warehouse, store, shop, office, dwelling house, or door, shutter or window of a building of any kind, with the intent to use such tools or instruments for any of the felonious purposes aforesaid, is guilty of a misdemeanor . . .” (Emphasis supplied).

The Commonwealth failed to present any evidence whatsoever that the tools found in Clinton’s car were “designed or commonly used for breaking into any vault, etc.,” an indispensable feature in a conviction under this statute. In affirming the conviction of the Court of Quarter Sessions, the Superior Court said, with reference to Clinton’s tools: “If they are suitable for felonious breaking and entering, it is immaterial that they can be adapted also for lawful uses.” This is not the law. There are many tools and implements which are suitable for felonious breaking and entering, the possession of which would not subject the possessor to criminal prosecution. Saws, hammers, nails, tongs, awls, knives, mattocks, scythes, files, pliers, gimlets, pincers, wrenches, gauges, and spatulas, all can be used [218]*218for breaking and. entering a house, but they still retain their non-criminal status. With the countless types of do-it-yourself kits, there are hundreds of other tools and instruments which are supposed to be of service to the mechanically or non-mechanically inclined householder in holding his house together, keeping the plumbing operating, and preventing the roof from caving in. Even a corkscrew can be employed to get into a house, but the law would come to a sorry pass indeed if the possessor of a corkscrew had to prove that the corkscrew on his key ring had no purpose other than that of opening ketchup and more fluent bottles.

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Bluebook (online)
137 A.2d 463, 391 Pa. 212, 1958 Pa. LEXIS 521, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-clinton-pa-1958.