Commonwealth v. Bradford

2 A.3d 628, 2010 Pa. Super. 142, 2010 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1617, 2010 WL 3034506

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 4, 2010
• Docket: 1916 WDA 2009
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION BY

COLVILLE, J.:

The Commonwealth appeals the trial court’s order dismissing the charges against David Bradford due to a violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(3).¹ We affirm the dismissal.

Facts

The record reveals the following facts. On September 24, 2008, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint against Bradford. On October 9, 2008, a preliminary hearing was held. An Assistant District Attorney (“A.D.A.”) represented the Commonwealth at that hearing. At the conclusion thereof, the case was held for trial. The Commonwealth did not diary this case or keep any type of record in order to track it for purposes of Rule 600.

On October 9, 2009, 380 days after the complaint date, Bradford filed a motion under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(G).² Therein, he asked the trial court to dismiss this case because more than 365 days had passed since the filing of the complaint and the Commonwealth had not yet brought him to trial. The trial court then convened a hearing on Bradford’s request. At that hearing, the Commonwealth made the claim that it did not know this case existed until Bradford filed his aforesaid motion. When reminded by the trial court that an A.D.A. had been present at the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth’s response was that the A.D.A. routinely handled multiple cases at more than one district justice on a weekly basis. The Commonwealth then argued it does not begin monitoring cases for purposes of timely prosecution until the district justice presiding over the preliminary hearing forwards the relevant case paperwork to the Allegheny County Department of Court Records and the Department, in turn, transmits certain paperwork and/or an electronic notice to the District Attorney’s Office. Upon receipt of the paperwork and/or notice from the Department, the Commonwealth then begins tracking its cases. Thus, the Commonwealth asserted that its system for complying with Rule 600 is to rely on district justices and the Department of Court Records to transmit information timely and, after the district justices and the Department transmit the information, to start monitoring prosecutions for purposes of Rule 600.

The Commonwealth further asserted it did not receive any paperwork or other notice in this case and was therefore not to blame for the failure to bring Bradford to trial.³ Part of the Commonwealth’s argument was the proposition that its decision to rely on the district justice and the Department of Court Records for the proper, timely transmittal of paperwork/notice constituted sufficient due diligence by the Commonwealth so as to satisfy its Rule 600 duty.

Also during the aforesaid hearing, the Commonwealth contended Bradford had some type of obligation to complain at an earlier date about the stagnancy of the prosecution against him. The Commonwealth’s position was that, had Bradford complained at an earlier date, the Commonwealth would have known about this case and would have been able to prosecute Bradford in a timely manner.

After the hearing on Bradford’s motion, the trial court took the matter under advisement and, later, issued findings of fact and an order granting the motion to dismiss. Essentially, the court’s findings and order indicated that more than 365 days from the filing of the complaint had elapsed and were attributable to the Commonwealth, that the Commonwealth had not exercised due diligence in attempting to bring Bradford to trial and that the circumstances occasioning the failure to bring Bradford to trial were not beyond the Commonwealth’s control.

The Commonwealth then filed this timely appeal. Herein, the Commonwealth argues it acted with due diligence under Rule 600 by relying on the district justice and/or the Department of Court Records to transmit the appropriate information to the District Attorney’s Office and, therefore, the Commonwealth’s failure to bring Bradford to trial within 365 days of the complaint should be excused. Additionally, the Commonwealth suggests Bradford is accountable for some or all of the elapsed time because he did not, at some earlier date, notify the trial court or the Commonwealth that the Commonwealth was not proceeding with the prosecution against him.

Legal Principles

Rule 600 provides, inter alia, that a defendant on bail is entitled to have trial commence no later than 365 days after the complaint date. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(3). When computing the number of pretrial days attributable to the Commonwealth under this rule, certain delays are excluded, such as those occasioned by defense postponements, by express defense waivers of Rule 600, by the unavailability of the defendant or defense counsel, and/or by the fact that the defendant could not be located and apprehended. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C).

At any time before trial, a defendant may move for dismissal of the case if Rule 600 has been violated. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(G). However, even when the defendant has not been tried within the aforesaid 365 days, and even when those days appear to be attributable to the Commonwealth, a Rule 600 motion shall nevertheless be denied if the Commonwealth proves that it acted with due diligence in attempting to try the defendant timely and that the circumstances occasioning the delay were beyond the Commonwealth’s control. Commonwealth v. Frye, 909 A.2d 853, 858 (Pa.Super.2006); Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(G). Thus, if the Commonwealth establishes it acted with due diligence and shows the delay in question was beyond the Commonwealth’s control, the delay is excusable. Frye, 909 A.2d at 858.

Due diligence is a fact-specific concept to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1102 (Pa.Super.2007). While due diligence does not demand perfection, it does require the Commonwealth to put forth a reasonable effort. Id. For example, due diligence requires the Commonwealth to employ a record-keeping system to keep track of its cases so that they are prosecuted within the time requirements of the law. Commonwealth v. Browne, 526 Pa. 83, 584 A.2d 902, 906 (1990). The failure to employ a diary or other record-keeping system shows a lack of due diligence. Id.

Additionally, the Commonwealth’s duty to be diligent exists throughout all stages of a case. Commonwealth v. Hawk, 528 Pa. 329, 597 A.2d 1141, 1145 (1991). Thus, the Commonwealth cannot “carelessly linger in the early stages” of a prosecution. Commonwealth v. Kearse, 890 A.2d 388, 393 (Pa.Super.2005). Indeed, Rule 600 makes plain that the time period for bringing a case to trial begins to run on the day the complaint is filed, not at some later point in the prosecution. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A). Also, the duty to ensure that a case is timely tried rests with the Commonwealth, not with any other office or entity. Kearse, 890 A.2d at 392-93.

When this Court reviews a trial court’s ruling under Rule 600, we are required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed on the Rule 600 motion. Commonwealth v. Williams, 876 A.2d 1018, 1020 (Pa.Super.2005). Moreover, we must review the trial court’s order under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. An abuse of discretion is not a mere error in judgment but, rather, involves bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice, manifest unreasonableness, or misapplication of law. Commonwealth v. Hacker, 959 A.2d 380, 392 (Pa.Super.2008).

Analysis

There is no dispute in this case concerning the amount of time that passed after the filing of the complaint. The Commonwealth acknowledges Bradford was not tried within 365 days of the complaint date. Also, none of the elapsed time is excludable under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C). In this vein, we note this case does not involve any defense postponements, defense waivers of Rule 600, periods wherein the defense was unavailable, or periods wherein Bradford could not be located and apprehended.

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth’s brief implies Bradford should somehow be accountable for some of the delay. More specifically, the Commonwealth comments no fewer than four times in its brief that Bradford failed to alert the trial court or anyone else about the delay in his case. Thus, although the Commonwealth also states that Bradford had no duty to ensure he was brought to trial in a speedy fashion, the Commonwealth nevertheless suggests Bradford should somehow be responsible for some or all of the elapsed time. This suggestion is wrong. The duty to adhere to Rule 600 rested with the Commonwealth, not Bradford. Bradford did not have an obligation to tell the Commonwealth that the Commonwealth was not proceeding with its case against him. As such, to whatever extent the Commonwealth may be contending some or all of the delay in this case is excludable because Bradford did not complain earlier about the dormancy of the prosecution, that contention is frivolous.

Accordingly, all the time in question appears to be attributable to the Commonwealth. We must therefore consider whether any of that time is excusable. We recall the Commonwealth kept no record of this matter in order to track it for purposes of Rule 600. Indeed, after filing the complaint and appearing at the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth took no action whatsoever until Bradford sought dismissal of the charges. The Commonwealth, though, argues some or all of the elapsed time is excusable because the Commonwealth could not control the district justice’s office or the Department of Court Records so as to ensure the proper case information was transmitted at the appropriate time in order that the Commonwealth could then begin to monitor the case for purposes of Rule 600. This argument, of course, actually works against the Commonwealth because the argument demonstrates the obvious hazard in the Commonwealth’s deliberate reliance on offices not within its control: the Commonwealth knew it could not control those offices and yet the Commonwealth chose to rely on them. That is, knowing it could not control when the district justice would forward the case information to the Department of Court Records, knowing it could not control when the information would be received by the Department, and knowing it could not control when the Department of Records would then transmit case information to the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth nonetheless decided not to keep its own records but, instead, to utilize a system wherein the Commonwealth rendered its compliance with Rule 600 dependent on the district justice, on the Department of Court Records, on the transmission of information between those offices, and on the transmission of information between the Department and the Commonwealth. This approach by the Commonwealth was not reasonable.

In support of its position, the Commonwealth points out that the district justice was required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 547 to submit certain case information to the Department of Court Records within five days of the preliminary hearing. The Commonwealth then argues that, because the district justice failed to do so, the Commonwealth must be excused from its Rule 600 duty. This argument is specious. Rule 600 does not condition the Commonwealth’s obligation on what other offices do. Rather, Rule 600 jurisprudence is clear that, to be diligent, the Commonwealth needs to track its own cases.

We stress that compliance with Rule 600 was not at all beyond the Commonwealth’s control in this case. The Commonwealth could have kept a list, used a diary, maintained a docket, or employed some other record-keeping system to track this case, but the Commonwealth elected not to do so. That is, the A.D.A. walked out of the preliminary hearing without any record of this case for Rule 600 purposes, and the District Attorney’s Office assumed the district justice and Department of Court Records would remind the District Attorney’s Office about this case at some later time. Such conduct is inappropriate. The Commonwealth cannot choose to rely on offices it does not control and then, when Rule 600 time limits expire, assert a lack of control over those offices as an excuse for noncompliance with the rule. In short, the Commonwealth must not outsource any aspect of its obligation to bring cases to trial in a timely fashion.

The Commonwealth also argues that, in Allegheny County, there are dozens of district justices and some 20,000 cases that pass annually from the district justices to the Court of Common Pleas. Given this volume of cases, the Commonwealth argues, it is reasonable for the Commonwealth to rely on the district justices and/or the Department of Court records to forward appropriate paperwork and to do so timely. First, we note at least some of the statistics on which the Commonwealth relies in its brief are not in the record. This Court must not rely on facts dehors the record. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 722 (Pa.Super.2007). In any event, however, the Commonwealth’s argument again works against itself because the existence of a high number of cases would only highlight the risk the Commonwealth takes by not keeping track of so many prosecutions: knowing it has so many cases to prosecute, the Commonwealth consciously lets the timely prosecution of all those cases depend on the conduct of outside offices-offices not charged with a Rule 600 duty as is the Commonwealth.

We realize that, because Bradford was accused of sex crimes, some members of the public may react emotionally, believing there should be some device to ensure he is prosecuted even if the law must be overlooked or manipulated to reach that end. However, this Court cannot ignore a lack of due diligence in order to facilitate a prosecution. The outcome of this case must be guided by the rule rather than by the nature of the underlying accusations. Rule 600 is not a mere technicality.

The Commonwealth’s Rule 600 duty to be diligent applies equally in every criminal case. In any event, if some find themselves focusing, for whatever reason, on the seriousness of the alleged offenses, the Commonwealth’s lack of diligence should seem to such persons even more problematic when the case involves particularly egregious accusations. That is, despite knowing the seriousness of the alleged offenses, the Commonwealth did not act reasonably. It did not keep any list, any diary, any docket, any calendar, or any other record of any kind to ensure that the prosecution of its case proceeded on time.

We understand Rule 600 is not intended to insulate the criminally accused from good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Jones, 886 A.2d 689, 699 (Pa.Super.2005). However, this prosecution was delayed through the fault of the Commonwealth. Moreover, it is clear that the speedy-trial concerns of Rule 600 are not hypertechnical requirements to be emasculated by the acceptance of the Commonwealth’s unreasonable excuses for failing to proceed in a timely manner. Browne, 584 A.2d at 905-06. Like all rules of procedure, Rule 600 is to be followed so that society is afforded an effective, orderly, predictable administration of justice and so that individual rights (e.g., the right to a speedy trial) are protected. Jones, 886 A.2d at 699. While recognizing society’s interest in the prosecution of criminal charges, this Court surely cannot rationalize the Commonwealth’s conscious choice not to monitor its prosecutions. Doing so would not just ignore Bradford’s rights but would also undermine society’s interest in having a well-managed, rule-based and effective criminal justice system.⁴ Indeed, rationalizing the Commonwealth’s “system” of relying on and then blaming non-prosecutorial offices would encourage further dereliction and would likely foster violations of Rule 600 in future cases.

Along these lines, we recall the Supreme Court has condemned and/or otherwise expressed concern over the judicial tendency to accept excuses for the Commonwealth’s failure to bring defendants to trial within the time limits of the rule. Browne, 584 A.2d at 905-06. Indeed, it is plain that this Court, and all courts, must not seek to condone or devise such excuses but must, instead, preserve the vitality of the rule. See id. The vitality of the rule cannot be preserved if courts rationalize the Commonwealth’s failure to follow it.

There is another point which is critical. We recall this Court is not to disturb the trial court’s ruling unless the trial court abused its discretion. In this case, the trial court conducted a hearing, took evidence and heard argument. The court then authored a lengthy opinion setting forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this matter, examining the relevant law, analyzing the parties’ positions, and applying the law to the particulars of this case. In so doing, the court’s analysis addressed many or all of the matters we have considered supra. The trial court’s analysis of this case was thorough, thoughtful, supported by the record, and grounded in the law. Upon our review of the court’s decision, we see there are no grounds to conclude the court’s ruling was based on bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice, manifest unreasonableness, or misapplication of the law. There being no abuse of discretion, we must not disturb the trial court’s order dismissing this case.⁵

In its remaining issue, the Commonwealth complains the trial court released Bradford from custody after issuing its order dismissing this case but before notifying the Commonwealth of that order. The Commonwealth contends the trial court thereby denied the Commonwealth the right to an automatic stay during this appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1736(b). Given our resolution of the Commonwealth’s first issue, this latter claim is moot. Therefore, we will not address it.

Prior to leaving this matter, we wish to make a few comments regarding the Dissent. The Dissent relies largely on Commonwealth v. Monosky, 511 Pa. 148, 511 A.2d 1346 (1986), to excuse the delay in this case. In Monosky, the district attorney was not present at the preliminary hearing, the district attorney did not learn of the charges until the district justice forwarded the case papers, and the Supreme Court found the Commonwealth was not accountable for the delay occurring during the time while the district justice failed to transmit the papers. Id. at 1348. In the present matter, however, an A.D.A. was present at the preliminary hearing, the D.A.’s Office therefore did know about the case, and the D.A. failed to keep a record of this case. The D.A. cannot say that it did not know about the case until after the district justice forwarded the papers. Thus, Monosky is inapplicable.⁶

In fact, the Dissent itself acknowledges that the Supreme Court limited Monosky to its facts (ie., facts where the district attorney was not present at the preliminary hearing and did not know about the case until after the judicial delay). Id. at 1848. Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly stated, “We do not now consider whether ... judicial delay, which occurs after the district attorney is aware of the charges ... may justify an extension” of the Rule 600 time limits. Id. (bold emphasis added). Such is the present case: the district justice failed to transmit papers, but that failure occurred after the D.A. knew of the charges. Accordingly, the Monosky court decided a case with facts critically different than the present one and, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s own explicit remarks, Monosky does not control the instant matter.⁷

Next, we note the Dissent seems to think we are requiring the Commonwealth to use a perfect system. Dissent at 645. We are not. What we are saying is that the D.A.’s Office should keep a list of its cases, just as all practicing lawyers and law firms know to do. Thus, we are only holding the Commonwealth to the same standard as we would all attorneys — ie., not to miss deadlines such as statutes of limitations or, in this case, Rule 600.

Further, the Dissent speaks of the “prosecution of a person identified by his victim as a kidnapper and rapist.” Id. at 649. There has been no trial in this case. We do not know if the accuser in this case is a victim. If she is a victim, we certainly do not know if she is “his” (ie., Bradford’s) victim. Bradford is presumed to be innocent. In any event, the question before us is about Rule 600, not the underlying accusations.

Moreover, the Dissent discusses what seem to be parts of Bradford’s criminal history. His criminal history should have no bearing on Rule 600 considerations. Once again, the question is about Rule 600. In this case, the Commonwealth simply did not comply with Rule 600, and we cannot overlook this violation merely because Bradford has some criminal history.

Despite the Dissent’s assertions to the contrary, both the trial court and this Majority were cognizant of the serious crimes with which Bradford was charged. However, both this Majority and the trial court also considered the protection of the speedy trial rights of the year-long-incarcerated presumed-innocent Bradford in our analyses. In addition, as noted above, we considered society’s interest in an effective, orderly, predictable administration of justice. There is no caselaw cited in the Dissent which holds that a Rule 600 analysis is affected in any way by the charges at issue.

Additionally, we note the Dissent claims that the “system” employed by the D.A.’s Office to keep track of cases “has worked until the particular instance.” Dissent at 645. The record does not show that the instant failure was the first. The Dissent is impermissibly relying on facts not in the record.

The Dissent credits the Commonwealth for a variety of efforts the D.A.’s Office took in order to advance the case after learning that the time period under Rule 600 had passed. We do not doubt the D.A.’s Office felt a sense of urgency after Bradford filed his motion. However, attempting to advance the case after the expiration of the time for doing so did not constitute due diligence as required by Rule 600. The rule requires due diligence before the time limit expires.

The Dissent also claims the trial court was “quick to punish the prosecutor and to vindicate the speedy trial rights of the accused.” Dissent at 648. We do not believe that the trial court acted to punish the prosecutor or that the court was in any sense hasty. Rather, the court acted in a thoughtful manner to comply with the Supreme Court’s rules, specifically Rule 600. After Bradford’s motion was filed, the Commonwealth filed a detailed response along with affidavits from the Department of Court Records and the D.A.’s Office about the monitoring or lack of monitoring in this case. The court then conducted a hearing. At the end thereof, the court did not issue an immediate ruling but, rather, took the matter under advisement. Roughly one week later, after having considered Bradford’s request, the Commonwealth’s response, the affidavits, and the arguments made at the aforesaid hearing, the court issued its ruling in an order containing twelve paragraphs and several subparagraphs of findings of fact and legal conclusions. The order was later supported by a thirty-five page trial court opinion that was detailed, careful and, most importantly, accurate in fact and law. The trial court thus proved itself to be deliberate, rational and guided correctly by law and fact.

Ultimately, the problem with the Dissent and the Commonwealth’s position is this: the Commonwealth knew of this case, did not keep track of it, exercised no due diligence before the time limits of the rule expired, and failed to bring Bradford to trial within those limits. The record and the trial court’s thoughtful opinion show that, in reaching its decision to grant Rule 600 relief, the trial court did not reach its conclusion as a result of bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice, manifest unreasonableness, or misapplication of the law. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, there is no basis for us to disturb the ruling in this case.

Based on our foregoing discussion, the Commonwealth is not entitled to relief and we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing this case.

Order affirmed.

Judge BOWES files a Dissenting Opinion.

1 . Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(3) provides the following:

Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant, when the defendant is at liberty on bail, shall commence no later than 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.

2 . In pertinent part, Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(G) reads as follows:

For defendants on bail after the expiration of 365 days, at any time before trial, the defendant or the defendant’s attorney may apply to the court for an order dismissing the charges with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been violated. A copy of such motion shall be served upon the attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall also have the right to be heard thereon.

If the court, upon hearing, shall determine that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence and that the circumstances occasioning the postponement were beyond the control of the Commonwealth, the motion to dismiss shall be denied and the case shall be listed for trial on a date certain. If, on any successive listing of the case, the Commonwealth is not prepared to proceed to trial on the date fixed, the court shall determine whether the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in attempting to be prepared to proceed to trial. If, at any time, it is determined that the Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence, the court shall dismiss the charges and discharge the defendant.

3 . The district justice's docket transcript of this case was printed on April 20, 2009. It appears the trial court accepted the printing date as evidence that the docket transcript and/or other relevant paperwork was mailed on that date by the district justice to the Allegheny County Department of Court Records. The Department of Court Records denied having received any such paperwork.

4 . We observe with concern that, even after its failure to bring Bradford to a timely trial, the Commonwealth might still not fully appreciate that it alone has the duty under Rule 600. For example, in its brief, the Commonwealth talks of how it, the Department of Court Records and the Court Administrator are developing a system and have identified certain local rules that will need to be enacted to ensure a Rule 600 violation of the instant type does not again occur. The brief also speaks of funding that the Commonwealth, the Department and the Court Administrator are trying to secure to invest in personnel and equipment to assure compliance with Rule 600. These comments by the Commonwealth seem to suggest a continuing belief that there is some shared duty under Rule 600 or that the Commonwealth is right to depend on outside offices for its compliance with that rule. What the Commonwealth needs to understand is that it — not the Department of Court Records, not the Court Administrator, not district justices — needs to track the prosecution of criminal cases in order to comply with Rule 600. Another way to appreciate this duty is to recall the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s directive that, just as defense attorneys must keep track of their cases so as to comply with deadlines and other dates relevant thereto, "[n]o less is required of a properly administered district attorney's office.” Browne, 584 A.2d at 906. Here, the Commonwealth did not keep track of its case and was not duly diligent.

5 . Before completing our discussion of Rule 600, however, there is an additional matter we wish to address for the sake of clarity. Bradford was incarcerated on this case when he filed his Rule 600 motion but, by their terms, Sections (A)(3) and (G) of Rule 600 appear to apply only to defendants at liberty on bail. As such, a claim might have arisen as to whether Bradford was even entitled to file a motion under Section (G). However, there are multiple reasons why this possible claim cannot lead to relief for the Commonwealth. First, the claim was not raised in the trial court and has not been presented to us. Additionally, at the time Bradford filed his motion for dismissal under Rule 600(G), he had already reached the point where he was entitled to be at liberty on bail — specifically, nominal bond under Rule 600(E) — had he made such a request. The Commonwealth concedes this point. Thus, it seems to be indisputable that, rather than filing a motion asking only for dismissal, Bradford could have filed a combined motion, asking first to be released on bail (i.e., nominal bond due to his continued pretrial incarceration of more than 180 days) and then asking, in the same motion, for the immediate dismissal of his case due to the passage of more than 365 pretrial days. In this fashion, he could have secured bail status, bringing himself squarely within the wording of Sections (A)(3) and (G) for the instant before his case was dismissed. As such, it is hard to argue there is some reversible error in the trial court’s action of having proceeded directly to a dismissal of the charges rather than first granting momentary liberty on bail as a prerequisite to the dismissal that would occur in the next instant. Accordingly, although Bradford was not at liberty on bail before the trial court dismissed his case, any error by the trial court in granting dismissal without first releasing him on bail would be harmless.

Moreover, despite the words “at liberty on bail” in Section (A)(3) and the words “on bail” in Section (G), we have previously indicated the 365-day limit applies to at least some incarcerated defendants. Jones, 886 A.2d at 699 (indicating 365-day limit applies to incarcerated capital defendants who have no right to bail). Thus, it would seem the operative fact in Sections (A)(3) and (G) is whether 365 days have passed from the filing of the complaint, not whether the defendant is incarcerated or free on bail. In this case, more than 365 days of non-excusable days attributable to the Commonwealth passed after the complaint was filed.

6 . Notably, the Dissent fails to articulate how the A.D.A.’s presence at the preliminary hearing in the instant case affects the Rule 600 calculation, or precisely what time should be attributable to “judicial delay.”

7 . While we believe Monosky is easily distinguishable from this case, we also question the viability of Monosky after Browne. For example, while we need not make the following observation to resolve the instant matter, there is an interesting point that comes to mind: the police, who file criminal complaints, are part of the Commonwealth just as much as a D.A.’s Office is. Because the police are part of the Commonwealth, it would seem illogical to say that the Commonwealth does not know of a case until the D.A.’s Office learns of it. Phrased differently, the Commonwealth files the complaint and the Commonwealth surely knows of its own complaint when it files its own complaint. Rule 600 time limits run from the filing of the complaint and the terms of the rule do not state that the time is tolled until the police advise the local D.A.'s Office of the complaint. Accordingly, if police and district attorneys do not employ some system of communication so as to advise each other of cases and to prosecute them timely, the fault would logically seem to be the Commonwealth's. Such a result would be consistent with Browne in that Browne requires the Commonwealth, to employ systems to keep track of cases. In any event, the D.A.’s Office in the present case did know of this case shortly after the complaint was filed.