Commonwealth v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc.

222 S.E.2d 526, 216 Va. 686, 1976 Va. LEXIS 186
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedMarch 5, 1976
DocketRecord 750233
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 222 S.E.2d 526 (Commonwealth v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc., 222 S.E.2d 526, 216 Va. 686, 1976 Va. LEXIS 186 (Va. 1976).

Opinion

Harrison, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The Department of Taxation of Virginia, Sales and Use Tax Division, is here on a writ of error to a final order of the lower court holding that Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc. is entitled to an exemption under the Virginia Retail Sales and Use Tax Act, Code § 58-441.6 (s), for drugs purchased by Bluefield and subsequently dispensed to its pa *687 tients. Bluefield admits that the facts are correctly stated by the Attorney General to be as follows:

“Bluefield operates a private hospital, duly licensed, and operating for profit and not as a charity. Patients are admitted as private patients of physicians on the staff of the hospital and are charged for services rendered by the hospital. Bluefield maintains in its hospital a pharmacy under the supervision of a licensed pharmacist who is an employee of the hospital. The pharmacy is not a separate entity, but is a part of the hospital, it is not open to the public, and it does not dispense drugs to persons who are not patients in the hospital.
“A drug committee composed of three staff doctors and the staff pharmacist determines what stock of drugs should be acquired by the hospital, and the hospital purchases these drugs in bulk quantities from drug manufacturers or wholesalers. Once delivered the drugs are maintained under the supervision and control of the pharmacist until needed. When a physician determines that a hospital patient is in need of medication, he executes a work order or prescription and it is delivered to the pharmacy. The pharmacist prepares the prescription and the drug is then taken to the patient to be administered according to the directions on the prescription. The charge for the drug is added to the patient’s bill and invoiced to the patient by the hospital.
“The Department conducted an audit of Bluefield during January, 1971, and assessed use fax and interest of $26,492.11 with respect to its purchases of tangible personal property, including drugs, for the period of December 1, 1966, through November 30, 1970. This tax was paid during January, 1971. No tax was assessed against any of Bluefield’s staff physicians with respect to drug purchases or sales, nor was any tax assessed against any patient with respect to his use of drugs, food, rooms or other property while in the hospital. The taxpayer concedes that it is liable for the tax on all tangible personal property used, acquired or consumed by it except drugs and medicines administered to its patients pursuant to a prescription or work order of a licensed physician. It is only for the tax assessed with respect to the hospital’s purchase of such drugs and medicines that the taxpayer claims an exemption.”

The exemption provided by Code § 58-441.6 (s) was also involved in Doctors Hospital v. Dept. of Taxation, 213 Va. 504, 193 S. E. 2d 684 (1973). Much that we said there is pertinent in the in *688 stant case and need not be repeated. However, in Doctors Hospital the pharmacy was a conventional one, operating separate and apart from the hospital. We held that the procedure followed by the hospital and the pharmacy constituted a sale of drugs on a “prescription or work order” of a licensed physician and that the transaction was tax exempt. This case is significantly different. Here, no sales or use tax has been assessed to the hospital as a retailer of prescription drugs, and no use tax has been assessed to any patient in Bluefield as a consumer of drugs. The amount paid by a patient to Bluefield for hospital services, which include room, meals and drugs, is non-taxable to the patient.

A hospital is engaged primarily in rendering services, and the meals, drugs, bandages, etc. provided its patients are incidental to the rendition of these services. The Retail Sales and Use Tax Act treats a hospital not as a retailer, but as a consumer of all tangible personal property acquired by it for its use in the operation of the hospital. 1

The tax exemption provided in Code § 58-441.6 (s) for drugs dispensed by or sold on prescriptions or work orders of licensed physicians applies at the level where a retail sale is made to a patient or customer. The tax here was assessed against Bluefield on its purchase of bulk drugs from wholesalers and manufacturers. It was imposed by Code § 58-441.5 upon the first instance of use. 2 It attached when Blue-field, as the purchaser, took possession of the drug within the state.

*689 In connection with the transfer of drugs from a manufacturer to a consumer, the first step is normally a sale by the manufacturer to a drug wholesaler. Because this is a sale for resale, the transfer is exempt pursuant to Code § 58-441.2 (c). The next transfer, which is normally a sale by the drug wholesaler to a retail pharmacy, is also exempt because a pharmacy is a retailer. It buys for resale and is not engaged in the service business. In the instant case the sale from the wholesaler or manufacturer was direct to the hospital. This was not a sale for resale, but a sale to a user or consumer.

No taxable event occurs with respect to drugs supplied by the hospital to the patient, for such drugs are being supplied and administered in the performance of its service as a hospital. Irrespective of whether the hospital is providing beds, food or medicines, the hospital is the “consumer” in the tax sense because all property acquired by it is for use in the performance of its service to patients. This points up the distinction between Doctors Hospital and the case under review. In Doctors Hospital we dealt with a retail pharmacy and the charges it made for drugs sold on prescription to patients in the hospital. Here the drugs were sold to the hospital. True, some of these drugs were later prescribed for patients by their physicians, compounded or mixed by the hospital’s pharmacist and administered to the patients by nurses or other hospital personnel. This was all a part of the service the hospital provided its patients and for which it made a charge.

In Doctors Hospital, and more recently in Dept. Taxation v. Prog. Com. Club, 215 Va. 732, 213 S. E. 2d 759 (1975), we cited numerous cases holding that a tax assessment made by the proper authorities is prima facie correct and valid and that the burden is on the taxpayer to show that such assessment is erroneous. We further noted that the construction of a statute by a state official charged with its administration is entitled to great weight.

Our decision here accords with the construction of the applicable tax statutes made by the State Tax Commissioner. It further finds support in Haden v. McCarty, 152 So. 2d 141 (Ala. 1963) and Crutcher Dental Supply Co. v. Rabren, 246 So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1971).

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222 S.E.2d 526, 216 Va. 686, 1976 Va. LEXIS 186, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-bluefield-sanitarium-inc-va-1976.