Commonwealth v. Baldassarre

160 A.2d 461, 399 Pa. 411, 88 A.L.R. 2d 223, 1960 Pa. LEXIS 468

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 4, 1960
• Docket: Appeal, 120
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion by

Me. Justice Boic,

On October 3, 1959, appellant, aged 67, surrendered to the Delaware County police, saying that he had just killed his wife.

A week later he filed a petition for a Sanity Commission and one was appointed by the court below: it found appellant mentally ill but not of criminal tendency. In a supplementary report it found him unable to comprehend his position, unable to confer with counsel, and unable to make a rational defense, and in addition to describing his symptoms and behavior it reported a history of treatment from 1948 to 1951, in 1955, and in 1959, including two periods in a mental hospital under shock therapy. It added that in the opinion of the commissioners his condition, which stems from cerebral sclerosis, would not improve but would worsen.

Appellant was indicted for murder after the court below, on November 20, had approved the Commissioners’ report and had found that appellant was mentally ill. However, it disagreed with the commission’s ultimate conclusion and found that appellant was of criminal tendency. The court then ordered him committed to Farview State Hospital. This appeal followed.

In its opinion the court said: “The Court considered the nature of the crime, the former mental condition of the defendant, his repeated need of treatment, his attempt to strangle himself, and the finding of the commission that his mental condition would not improve but would gradually become worse . . .”

The court also referred to the defendant’s “failure, omission, and violation of duty” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., “Delinquency”), as evidence of habitual delinquency, and declared that Farview would best guarantee maximum protection to both defendant and the community.

The Mental Health Act of June 12, 1951, P. L. .533, 50 PS §1071 et seq., specifies in Art. II, §230(b), 50 PS §1140(b), that the “Parview State Hospital shall be exclusively devoted to the care of patients convicted of crime or with criminal tendencies.” And Art. I, §102(4), 50 PS §1072(4), lists “tendency to habitual delinquency” as a meaning of “criminal tendency”. Finally, it is clear from Art. Ill, §345(d), 50 PS §1225(d), that it is the court that is to be satisfied of the defendant’s mental illness.

Our cases also make it plain that the findings of a Sanity Commission are advisory to the court and are not mandatory upon it: Commonwealth v. Patskin, 375 Pa. 368 (1953), 100 A. 2d 472; Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18 (1955), 117 A. 2d 96; Commonwealth v. Bechtel, 384 Pa. 184 (1956), 120 A. 2d 295; Commonwealth v. Gossard, 385 Pa. 312 (1956), 123 A. 2d 258; Commonwealth v. Cook, 390 Pa. 516 (1957), 135 A. 2d 751; Commonwealth v. Ballem, 391 Pa. 626 (1958), 139 A. 2d 534. In Moon we said: “Assuming the commission found appellant a proper subject for commitment under this standard, its findings while persuasive were nevertheless advisory only and nof mandatory upon the court, for under Section 345(d) of the Act it is the court and not the commission which must be satisfied that appellant is mentally ill under the standard prescribed. It follows that the court in the instant case could have rejected, although not arbitrarily or capriciously, the commission’s findings and conclusions and could have independently determined from the evidence that appellant’s capacity to use his customary self-control, judgment and discretion had not been so lessened that it was necessary or advisable for him to be under care. . . P'

We find it difficult to determine the basis of the court’s reversing the conclusion of the commission that defendant was not of criminal tendency. The court has told us what it considered but has not shared with us the reasons why such consideration should lead to an opposite result. Nor do we have the benefit of the commission’s testimony. All of the cases cited immediately, supra, mention testimony and evidence. In Patskin, for example, we observed that the lower court made its findings “after a careful and conscientious study of (a) the written report of the Comission, and (b) their answers to the questions asked by the Court at the oral examination, and (c) a reading and consideration of the record and the transcript of the- testimony of the ivitnesses interviewed by the Commission.”

In Balem Ave said: “Of course, the Court may not act arbitrarily or capriciously, nor may the Commission, and the latter’s advice having been sought, it must be considered by the Court.”

Since Ave are considering the ease on broad certiorari, as we said in Patskin and Moon where commitment to a mental hospital Avas refused, we feel ourselves insufficiently informed to pass upon the exercise of the court’s discretion.

We refrain from making suggestions of what the court below should do. Under Section 345 of the Act of 1951 (50 PS §1225), it is to be “satisfied” and may “hold a hearing, summon other witnesses, and secure further evidence . . .” Nor should wé require a stenographic transcript in all cases, since the presence of a stenographer might unusually disturb the defendant, but we should greatly prefer one whenever possible.

The record is remanded to the court below for further inquiry and proceedings consonant with this opinion.