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SJC-13816 COMMONWEALTH vs. JOSE ARIAS.
Suffolk. December 3, 2025. - April 15, 2026.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, Dewar, & Wolohojian, JJ.
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle. Motor Vehicle, Citation for violation of motor vehicle law. Controlled Substances. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress.
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 15, 2019.
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Peter B. Krupp, J., and the case was tried before James H. Budreau, J.
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.
John P. Warren for the defendant. Brooke Hartley, Assistant District Attorney (Thomas Laverty, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, Claudia Leis Bolgen, Katharine Naples-Mitchell, & Radha Natarajan, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & others. Mason A. Kortz for Mailyn Fidler & another. Steven E. Obus, Alisha Gupta, & Emily E. Wakeman, of New York, Christina H. Kroll, of California, Alexander B. Guzy- 2
Sprague, of the District of Columbia, Jessie J. Rossman, Suzanne Schlossberg, Jennifer M. Herrmann, Matthew R. Segal, & John E. Roberts for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & another.
DEWAR, J. While surveilling the defendant as part of a
drug investigation, a Boston police officer in an unmarked
vehicle witnessed the defendant commit a civil traffic
infraction. Twenty-four hours later, the officer, who again was
surveilling the defendant from an unmarked vehicle, requested
that other officers stop the defendant's vehicle. During the
ensuing stop, police discovered cocaine on the defendant's
person and in his vehicle. The defendant moved to suppress the
evidence obtained during the stop, a judge denied the motion in
large part, and the defendant was convicted of one count of
trafficking cocaine.
On appeal, the defendant contends, among other claims of
error, that his motion to suppress all evidence obtained from
the traffic stop should have been allowed. He argues in part
that the police unreasonably delayed conducting the motor
vehicle stop after observing the infraction, and that the
seizure therefore violated the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights.
We conclude that the motor vehicle stop violated art. 14.
Although a police officer may stop a motor vehicle upon 3
observing a civil traffic infraction, such a stop is a seizure
that must be conducted in a reasonable manner. A stop for an
infraction is not reasonable if, upon consideration of the
totality of the circumstances, the stop occurred after an
unreasonable delay. In the particular circumstances here, as
detailed below, the Commonwealth did not carry its burden to
show that the twenty-four hour delay in stopping the defendant
was reasonable. We therefore reverse so much of the judge's
order as denied the defendant's motion to suppress, vacate and
set aside his conviction, and remand the matter to the Superior
Court.1
Background. 1. Facts. We summarize the facts found by
the motion judge.
On March 27, 2019, members of a Boston police drug control
unit, including Sergeant Detective William J. Feeney and Officer
Mathew Pieroway, were patrolling the Brighton section of Boston
in plain clothes and unmarked vehicles. Around 3:10 P.M.,
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Committee for Public Counsel Services, the Criminal Justice Institute at Harvard Law School, the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the New England Innocence Project; Mailyn Fidler and the Electronic Privacy Information Center; and the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts and the American Civil Liberties Union. 4
Feeney observed a man, later identified as the defendant,2 enter
a gray sport utility vehicle (SUV) parked on Foster Street and
drive away. Feeney attempted to follow the SUV but was thwarted
by traffic.
Based on radio communications from Feeney, Pieroway located
the SUV and began surveilling it. Pieroway then trailed the SUV
for approximately six miles, into the Jamaica Plain section of
Boston.
There, Pieroway observed the defendant commit a civil
traffic infraction. The defendant's SUV was stopped behind a
line of approximately seven vehicles that had built up on Centre
Street behind a stop sign at the intersection with South Street.
Pieroway observed the defendant as he pulled the SUV quickly to
the right side of the line of stopped vehicles, passed the
stopped vehicles, failed to stop at the stop sign, and took a
left-hand turn in front of the line of stopped vehicles.3
2 Based on the defendant's physical appearance, it was apparent that the defendant was not the registered owner of the vehicle.
3 Although the Commonwealth does not specify the law or regulation violated by the defendant's conduct, and the record does not reflect that he received a citation, there is no dispute that this conduct amounts to a civil infraction for which a driver may be cited. See generally G. L. c. 90C, § 3 (A) (1) ("If a police officer observes or has brought to the officer's attention the occurrence of a civil motor vehicle infraction, the officer may issue a written warning or may cite the violator for a civil motor vehicle infraction in accordance with this subsection"). 5
Pieroway neither attempted to stop the defendant nor called
for assistance from a marked cruiser to make the stop. Having
determined that it was unsafe for him to attempt to follow the
SUV, Pieroway ceased his surveillance.
The following day, at around 3:15 P.M., Feeney observed the
defendant leave a residence on Foster Street in Brighton and
enter the same SUV. Feeney began to follow the SUV, but fell
behind due to traffic.
Pieroway located the SUV after hearing Feeney's radio
communications. As on the previous day, Pieroway was in an
unmarked vehicle. At 3:27 P.M., Pieroway requested that a
marked cruiser stop the SUV, stating on the police radio,
"[W]e're looking to stop a vehicle for [a] drug investigation."4
Other officers heard Pieroway's request, stopped the SUV,
asked the defendant to get out of the vehicle, and pat frisked
him. The patfrisk yielded a hard object in the defendant's
pocket, which the defendant acknowledged was cocaine. The
Both in the trial court and before this court, the 4
Commonwealth has not sought to rely on evidence relating to the drug investigation to justify the traffic stop. Regarding the investigation's nature, the motion judge found, based on the limited record before him, only that "[t]he police apparently had information about the SUV and/or defendant before . . . Feeney's observations of the SUV on March 27, 2019." 6
defendant was arrested, and he then directed the officers to
additional cocaine in the SUV.
2. Procedural history. The defendant was charged with one
count of trafficking 200 or more grams of cocaine. He filed a
motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the
traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14, among other
grounds. Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge
denied the motion to suppress the physical evidence.5 As
relevant here, the judge concluded that the police lawfully
stopped the defendant's vehicle based on the traffic infraction
observed the day before. In so concluding, the judge noted the
lack of reported cases in Massachusetts addressing whether "a
motor vehicle stop may . . . be based on a traffic violation
witnessed the previous day."6
The defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial when the
jury were unable to reach a verdict. The Commonwealth
successfully moved to reduce the indictment to one count of
trafficking one hundred to 200 grams of cocaine. At his second
5 The defendant's motion also sought suppression of statements he made during the stop, and the judge allowed the motion with respect to certain statements.
6 At the judge's invitation, the parties had filed supplemental letter briefs on this question. The motion to suppress was decided prior to this court's decision in Commonwealth v. Daveiga, 489 Mass. 342 (2022), discussed infra. 7
trial, the defendant was convicted of the lesser included
offense of trafficking eighteen to thirty-six grams of cocaine.
The defendant timely appealed, and we granted his
application for direct appellate review.
Discussion. The defendant argues that the motor vehicle
stop that yielded the Commonwealth's evidence in this case was
unreasonable, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and art. 14,
because of the twenty-four hour delay that intervened between
the officer's observation of the civil traffic infraction and
the subsequent stop of the defendant's vehicle.7 The delay was
unreasonable, the defendant contends, based on the lack of
justification for the delay, its length, and the pretextual
nature of the eventual stop. The Commonwealth argues that the
delay prior to the stop was reasonable because the officer was
unable to stop the defendant safely at the time of the
infraction and did not maintain surveillance of the defendant
after the infraction occurred.
7 The defendant also argues that all pretextual traffic stops violate art. 14; that the exit order and patfrisk of the defendant were not justified in the circumstances of the stop; and that the trial judge erred in denying the defendant's posttrial motion to interview one of the jurors regarding a letter sent by the juror to the judge and defense counsel. Deciding this case as we do, we need not address these arguments. 8
When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, "we adopt
the motion judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear
error, but we independently determine the correctness of the
judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Buckley, 478 Mass.
861, 864 (2018).
Both the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 guarantee the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Buckley,
478 Mass. at 865. Because art. 14 affords at least as much
protection for individuals as the Fourth Amendment, see
Commonwealth v. Delgado-Rivera, 487 Mass. 551, 555 (2021), cert.
denied, 142 S. Ct. 908 (2022), we review the defendant's claim
under the standards of art. 14, "with the understanding that, if
these standards are met, so too are those of the Fourth
Amendment" (citation omitted), Garcia v. Commonwealth, 486 Mass.
341, 349 (2020).
A police stop of a moving vehicle is a seizure and
therefore must be reasonable to be valid under art. 14.
Buckley, 478 Mass. at 865, citing Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 472
Mass. 767, 773 (2015). "In general, when an officer observes a
traffic violation, the officer may stop the vehicle to address
that violation." Commonwealth v. Daveiga, 489 Mass. 342, 350
(2022). "[A]lthough a vehicle stop does represent a significant
intrusion into an individual's privacy, the governmental 9
interest in allowing such stops for the purpose of promoting
compliance with our automobile laws is clear and compelling";
permitting such stops "gives police the ability to immediately
address potential safety hazards on the road." Rodriguez, supra
at 776-777. Indeed, "[t]he foremost method of enforcing traffic
and vehicle safety regulations . . . is acting upon observed
violations," Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996),
quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979), "which
afford the 'quantum of individualized suspicion' necessary to
ensure that police discretion is sufficiently constrained,"
Whren, supra at 817-818, quoting Prouse, supra at 654-655.
An observed traffic violation justifies a traffic stop
"regardless of the underlying intent or motivations of the
officers involved." Buckley, 478 Mass. at 865, citing
Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 209 (1995). Under this
authorization rule, an officer may stop a vehicle upon observing
a traffic violation even if the officer's subjective aim is to
investigate a different offense. See Buckley, supra at 865-866.
The rule avoids "the illogical result of allowing stops of
nonsuspect drivers who violate motor vehicle laws, but
forbidding stops of suspected criminals who violate motor
vehicle laws." Id. at 868, quoting Santana, supra at 210 n.3.
And it "serves [the] significant government interest of ensuring 10
public safety on our roadways" (quotation omitted). Daveiga,
489 Mass. at 350, quoting Buckley, supra at 869.
"At the same time, the observation of a traffic violation
does not equip an officer with bottomless authority to seize a
defendant." Daveiga, 489 Mass. at 350. A traffic stop, "even
if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose," intrudes
on the privacy interests of the driver and any passengers in the
vehicle. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 430 Mass. 577, 579 (2000),
quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 809. See Rodriguez, 472 Mass. at 776
("Regardless of the reason for it, a police stop of a moving
vehicle can be humiliating, frightening, and embarrassing for
the vehicle's occupants . . ." [quotation and citation
omitted]). Accordingly, a traffic stop "may last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate" the stop's purpose of "addressing
the infraction." Daveiga, supra, quoting Rodriguez v. United
States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). And "[p]olice authority to
seize an individual ends 'when tasks tied to the traffic
infraction are -- or reasonably should have been -- completed.'"
Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 242 (2017), quoting
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354.
We most recently discussed the limits on police authority
to conduct a traffic stop upon observing a civil traffic
infraction in Daveiga, 489 Mass. at 350-355. There, police
encountered a vehicle double-parked and blocking a narrow one- 11
way street. Id. at 343. After the officers pulled alongside
the vehicle and instructed the driver to move, the driver drove
away instead of relocating the vehicle to any of the nearby open
parking spaces. Id. at 343-344. The officers grew suspicious
and "changed [their] mind[s] about pulling over the [vehicle]."
Id. at 344. The officers then conducted a traffic stop, during
which they discovered an unlicensed firearm. Id. at 344-345.
We held that the stop violated art. 14 because, once the
officers had resolved the parking violation by instructing the
driver to move and allowing the vehicle to depart, they had
"complet[ed] the 'mission' of the investigation." Id. at 354,
quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. "[T]he defendant's
important interest in personal security from arbitrary police
conduct . . . thereafter prevailed," and thus the stop was
unreasonable. Daveiga, supra at 354-355.
The circumstances here, by contrast, involve a civil
traffic infraction that was not resolved immediately. While we
observed in Daveiga, 489 Mass. at 353-354, that "police
authority to conduct a motor vehicle stop on the basis of an
observed traffic violation terminates" after an "unreasonable
delay[]," we have not previously had occasion to consider the
reasonableness of a delayed traffic stop.
As the United States Supreme Court recognized in holding
that the Fourth Amendment permits investigatory traffic stops on 12
reasonable suspicion that an occupant "was involved in or is
wanted in connection with a completed felony," the balance of
interests between "the nature and quality of the intrusion on
personal security" posed by a stop and "the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion" may
shift with the passage of time. United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 228-229 (1985). Such is the case for traffic stops
claimed to be justified by a past civil motor vehicle
infraction. With respect to the strong government interest in
ensuring traffic safety, "[p]ublic safety may be less threatened
by a [driver] in a past [incident] who now appears to be going
about his lawful business than it is by a [driver] who is
currently in the process of violating the law," id. at 228, and
whose infraction may indicate, for example, an ongoing threat to
public safety from operating while under the influence of
alcohol or drugs.
Regarding the defendant's interests, while a traffic stop
conducted immediately upon observing a traffic violation "cannot
be 'arbitrary,' because it is predicated on a driver violating a
traffic law," Buckley, 478 Mass. at 869, the passage of time
after such a violation increases the possibility of arbitrary
police conduct, see Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228-229, citing Brown
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). See Brown, supra ("central
concern" in assessing seizures short of arrest is "to assure 13
that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not
subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered
discretion of officers in the field"). The risk of arbitrary
police conduct is heightened in the context of civil traffic
infractions, because "[t]he nature of traffic citations renders
them uniquely suited to manipulation and misuse." Commonwealth
v. Pappas, 384 Mass. 428, 431 (1981) (discussing "normally
fleeting and nonserious nature of most traffic infractions").
See Commonwealth v. Long, 485 Mass. 711, 739 (2020) (Budd, J.,
concurring), quoting LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop" from
Start to Finish: Too Much "Routine," Not Enough Fourth
Amendment, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1843, 1853 (2004) (collecting
statistics illustrating that "[v]ery few drivers can traverse
any appreciable distance without violating some traffic
regulation"). Indeed, in part "to prevent such abuses by
eliminating unreasonable or unnecessary delay," Pappas, supra,
our Legislature has provided a defense to "automobile law
violations" -- whether civil or criminal -- where a citation is
not issued "at the time and place of the violation," subject
only to limited exceptions, Commonwealth v. Foley, 496 Mass.
320, 324 (2025), quoting G. L. c. 90C, § 2.
Acknowledging the salience of the passage of time in this
context and guided by the touchstone of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment, other courts presented with claims that delay 14
in conducting a traffic stop for a motor vehicle violation
rendered the stop unreasonable have considered all of the
circumstances surrounding the stop to determine whether the
delay rendered the stop unreasonable, without imposing a
"contemporaneity requirement" or other "specific time
limitation." United States v. Zuniga, 860 F.3d 276, 281-282
(5th Cir. 2017). These courts have considered factors including
the length of the delay, any justification for the delay, and
the nature of the violation. See, e.g., id. at 282 (fifteen-
minute delay reasonable where officer "radioed information about
the turn-signal violation to his colleagues as soon as he saw it
occur" and no officer was "in position to stop the vehicle at
the time"); United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 594-595
(6th Cir. 2003) (stop one mile away from parking violation
reasonable where officers "immediately circled the block to
further investigate" violation, third-party vehicle "entered the
road between the defendants' vehicle and the patrol car," and
officers made stop "[o]nce this third vehicle turned off the
road"); United States v. Mendonca, 682 F. Supp. 2d 98, 101, 104
(D. Mass. 2010) (one-hour delay following series of traffic
violations unreasonable where not required "to gain a tactical
advantage" in making stop and where "obvious rationale" for stop
was to investigate unrelated conduct; defendant had loaded
suspicious packages into vehicle during delay). See also State 15
v. Myers, 490 So. 2d 700, 701-702, 704 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
(same-morning stop reasonable based on police report from
neighboring State of driver leaving scene of one-vehicle
accident, where "impaired or non-attentive driver . . . might
have been dangerous to other traffic").
We agree that, while there is no "specific time limitation"
on stopping a driver for a civil traffic violation, "the elapsed
time between an observed violation and any subsequent stop must
be reasonable upon consideration of the totality of the
circumstances." Zuniga, 860 F.3d at 282. Because art. 14
protects defendants from arbitrary police conduct, an observed
civil traffic infraction "cannot hang over a suspect
indefinitely until a time at which he has engaged in some other
suspicious activity that officers believe warrants a pretextual
stop." Daveiga, 489 Mass. at 353, quoting Mendonca, 682 F.
Supp. 2d at 104. When, based on the totality of the
circumstances, there is an unreasonable delay between a traffic
infraction and a stop, "the individual['s] interests prevail,
and police authority to conduct a motor vehicle stop on the
basis of [the] observed traffic violation terminates." Daveiga,
supra at 353-354. As with all warrantless seizures, the
Commonwealth bears the burden to establish that the stop was
reasonable. See Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 587-588
(2016); Commonwealth v. Shields, 402 Mass. 162, 164 (1988). 16
On the record before us, the Commonwealth has not met its
burden. As the motion judge found and the Commonwealth duly
emphasizes on appeal, some delay in stopping the defendant was
reasonable. It was reasonable on safety grounds for Pieroway
not to attempt to stop the defendant's SUV himself at the time
of the infraction, given the nature of the unlawful maneuver the
defendant had just performed -- passing on the right and then
cutting left in front of a line of stopped vehicles -- and the
fact that Pieroway was in an unmarked vehicle. In this respect,
the circumstances here are unlike those in Mendonca, 682 F.
Supp. 2d at 104, where nothing prevented the officer who
observed a series of traffic violations from immediately
stopping the defendant, and yet the officer instead waited until
one hour later to request that the defendant be stopped, after
the defendant had loaded suspicious packages into his vehicle.
However, the duration of the twenty-four hour delay here is
longer than the delay in Mendonca and also the delays of mere
minutes to a few hours addressed in other cases. See, e.g.,
Zuniga, 860 F.3d at 282; Copeland, 321 F.3d at 594-595; Myers,
490 So. 2d at 704. Moreover, the defendant's unlawful maneuver,
while unsafe, was not a violation of a "continuing" kind. Cf.
United States v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1129 (2005) (officer had reasonable
suspicion to stop driver for "continuing offense" of driving 17
without license based on license check three weeks earlier,
where no facts suggested offense "had ceased" in interim).
The Commonwealth has not provided a reasonable
justification for the length of this delay. The record does not
make clear why Pieroway did not call for a marked police cruiser
to stop the defendant at the time of the defendant's infraction,
as Pieroway testified was his regular practice when observing a
traffic violation from an unmarked vehicle. The motion judge
made no factual finding on this point, and the record does not
supply a firm answer. When asked why he did not call for a
marked vehicle that day, Pieroway gave a one-word reply of
"[s]afety." Pressed further, the officer stated only that "[o]n
that day, [he] did not [have any intention of trying to stop the
SUV]."
The manner in which the defendant was stopped the following
day underscores the lack of explanation for the delay's
duration. Feeney observed the defendant as he left a residence,
entered the SUV, and drove away. Once Pieroway located the
defendant based on Feeney's radio communications, Pieroway, who
again was traveling in an unmarked vehicle, requested that a
marked cruiser stop the defendant, and other officers carried
out Pieroway's request. While the Commonwealth notes that
Pieroway thus summoned a marked cruiser "the first time" he
observed the defendant's SUV after losing sight of it the day 18
before, the Commonwealth has not established any reason why
Pieroway did not call a marked cruiser upon observing the
infraction the day before, and yet did take this same step after
a delay of twenty-four hours.
Although the Commonwealth asserts that this case is unlike
Mendonca, 682 F. Supp. 2d at 101, 104, because "Officer Pieroway
did not choose to delay the traffic stop so that he could
continue surveilling the defendant," the motion judge made no
such factual finding, and, as we have said, the record is
unclear as to why the call for a marked cruiser to stop the
defendant did not occur until twenty-four hours after the
infraction, as surveillance of the defendant continued. To be
sure, unlike in Mendonca, supra, Pieroway's own surveillance of
the defendant did not continue immediately after the defendant's
traffic violation, and there is no evidence akin to police
observation of a suspicious package being loaded into the
defendant's SUV in the interim between the infraction and
Pieroway's call for a marked cruiser to stop the defendant the
following day. But, where the Commonwealth bears the burden of
showing that the stop was reasonable, the absence of evidence
regarding the reason for this twenty-four hour delay does not
inure to the Commonwealth's benefit.
As the defendant emphasizes, the record does support the
judge's finding that the stop for the traffic infraction was a 19
pretext intended to advance a drug investigation; indeed,
Pieroway expressly stated over the police radio that he was
"looking to stop a vehicle for [a] drug investigation." Such an
ulterior motive on the part of an officer does not deprive a
traffic stop for an observed motor vehicle violation of its
objective justification. See Buckley, 478 Mass. at 865-866.
Nor, however, does the mere existence of the drug investigation
reasonably justify the delay in stopping the defendant for the
traffic infraction, and the Commonwealth does not attempt to
claim otherwise. See Daveiga, 489 Mass. at 353, citing
Mendonca, 682 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
Considering the totality of the circumstances here, where
the Commonwealth has shown that some amount of delay in stopping
the defendant for a civil traffic violation was reasonable but
has not provided any reasonable justification for a delay
lasting twenty-four hours, we conclude that the Commonwealth has
not met its burden to show that the stop of the defendant was
reasonable. The defendant's motion to suppress therefore should
have been granted.
Conclusion. So much of the order entered on June 17, 2021,
as denied the defendant's motion to suppress is reversed. The
judgment is vacated, the verdict is set aside, and the matter is
remanded to the Superior Court.
So ordered.