Commonwealth v. Alberto Vega, Jr.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: March 11, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-0103
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-103

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ALBERTO VEGA, JR.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In August 2023, after a jury trial in the District Court,

the defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle under

the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI). On appeal, the

defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We

affirm.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. In analyzing whether

the evidence on the record is sufficient to support a

conviction, we "do not weigh the supporting evidence against

conflicting evidence." Commonwealth v. Rarick, 87 Mass. App.

Ct. 349, 351 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Merry, 453 Mass.

653, 660 (2009). Rather, we assess the evidence in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth "notwithstanding the contrary evidence presented by the defendant" and ask whether it is

"sufficient . . . to permit the jury to infer the existence of

the essential elements of the crime charged" (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).

2. Sufficiency of the evidence. In order to be convicted

of OUI, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant

(1) operated a motor vehicle (2) on a public way, (3) while

under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See G. L. c. 90,

§ 24 (1) (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence on the third element, arguing that

the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was under the

influence of alcohol. With respect to this element, the

Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

"defendant's consumption of alcohol diminished [his] ability to

operate a motor vehicle safely." Rarick, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at

352, quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass. 169, 173

(1985). The Commonwealth "need not prove that the defendant

actually drove in an unsafe or erratic manner, but it must prove

a diminished capacity to operate safely." Rarick, supra,

quoting Connolly, supra. "Proof of drunkenness is not

required." Rarick, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Sudderth, 37

Mass. App. Ct. 317, 321 (1994).

2 In the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the

evidence was more than sufficient for a rational fact finder to

infer that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol and

that his intoxication diminished his ability to safely operate a

vehicle. This included the testimony from a civilian witness

who called 911 to report that the defendant was driving on the

highway at a high rate of speed, swerving in and out of traffic,

mostly in the breakdown lane, and passing other cars on the

right. In addition, the arresting and booking officers observed

that the defendant's eyes were glassy and bloodshot, he had a

strong odor of alcohol emanating from his breath, and his

emotions were irregular -- he was sometimes calm and cooperative

and other times crying and upset. The defendant also faltered

in the performance of several roadside assessments, as he was

unsteady on his feet and had to use his arms to catch his

balance; he had a half-empty nip bottle of alcohol in his pants

pocket; he admitted that he "got a little tipsy"; and when asked

at booking if he had been drinking, the defendant admitted that

he had had "a few," which the defendant said was "three or more"

and that they were "100 proof." Finally, the defendant told the

officers that he knew he had a drinking problem and needed help

to quit drinking and that he had considered entering into a

"detox" program but had decided against it.

3 Despite this evidence, the defendant nevertheless maintains

that it was insufficient to show that his consumption of alcohol

impaired his ability to drive. Here, he argues that the

evidence establishes that he was, at best, a "hurried driver"

who was not criminally charged with negligent operation of a

motor vehicle, and whom the arresting officer admitted he did

not observe driving with diminished capacity. These arguments

are unavailing. First, as noted above, in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence to

sustain the conviction of OUI. Second, in establishing that a

defendant was operating a vehicle under the influence, the

Commonwealth is not required to "prove [that] the defendant

actually drove unskillfully or carelessly" (citation omitted).

Rarick, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 354.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Ditkoff, Hand & Walsh, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: March 11, 2025.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.