RENDERED: MARCH 22, 2018 TO BE PUBLISHED
20 l 6-SC-000558-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS v. CASE NO. 2015-CA-000920-MR FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 14-CR-00299
JOHN E. SMITH, JR. APPELLEE
· . OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VENTERS ..
AFFIRMING
T:µe Commonwealth appeals from a Court of Appeals' decision which
upheld the trial court's suppression of evidence discovered as a result of a
canine sniff searcI:i of Appellee's, John E. Smith, vehide during a traffic stop.
The Commonwealth contends that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding
that 1) the sniff search improperly extended the traffic stop; 2) the traffic stop.
was the only legal justification for stopping Appellee; and 3) the Commonwealth I
failed to pre.serve for appellate review its claim that Appellee's parole st~.tus
· alone permitted police to conduct a warrantless, suspicionless search of his·
vehicle. We granted discretionary review. For the reasons stated below; we affirm
the Court of Appeals' decision.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
_Franklin County Sheriffs Detective Richard Qualls had been surveilling
Appellee for about three weeks trying to corroborat~ tips received from
confidential informants that Appellee had been trafficking in cocaine at a bar in
Frankfort. Qualls knew that he lacked probable cause to arrest Appellee o:i:i
. drug .trafficking charges. On the evening of Appellee's arrest, Qualls followed in
an unmarked police car as Appellee left his· workplace in his SUV, went to his·
residence, left the residence, and then drove to a gas station where he
in~eracted with another resident of his apartment building who leaned into the
passenger-side window. 1 Qualls watched Appellee drive back to his apartment
and then leave again a few minutes later in a different vehicl~. Eventually;
Qualls saw Appellee turn without using his. tum signal.
Because Qualls was in plain clothes and driving an unmarked car with
no emergency lights or siren, .he did not attempt to stop Appellee." Instead, he
had prearranged for canine officer-Eaton to be on standby, briefed on the
situation and ready to respond. Qualls radioed Eaton to inform him of
Appellee's improper tum. Eaton responded immediately by stopping Appellee's
vehicle. He introduced himself as the sheriffs office. canine handler, and he
1 Another officer, Captain Wyatt of the Franklin County Sheriff's Office, also surveilled Appellee from another vehicle. He saw the other resident lean into Appellee's car window.
2 . informed Appellee that he was stopped for failure to use his turn signal; an
allegation which Appellee denied. Eaton asked Appellee if illegal drugs were in . ' . .his car, and Appellee said there was none. Eaton described Appellee as fully
cooperative l:>ut nervous. Eaton went back to his cruiser to get the drug dog
and then commenced a sniff search around Appellee's car. When the dog
, alerted at the driver's door, Eaton asked Appellee to exit the vehicle. He
searched Appellee's car and found seven grams of cocaine tucked between the
front seats. He then arrested Appellee, searched his person, and found
$4,299.00 in his w~let. According fo the uniform citation issued by Eaton,
eight minutes passed· from the time of the traffic violation to the time A.ppellee
was arrested. The citation also noted that Appellee appeared nervous when
asked about the· presence of drugs.
Appellee was indicted for first-degree trafficking in cocaine, second or
greater offense, greater than or equal to four grams of cocaine. He moved to
suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his vehicle and· his person.
He argueq that the traffic stop was not ~egal .because the alleged traffic violation
did not occur in Eaton's presence, and the officers did not have a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of illegal activity to justify the. initial investigative stop of
the vehicle.
The trial court .concluded .that Qualls and Eaton together did not have
.sufficient knowledge of criminal activity to authorize the initial stop, and that
the only valid ba~is for the ~top was the alleged turn signal violation whicl:i . .
Eaton did not witness. The trial court also concluded that Eaton's continued
3 detention of Appellee to conduct the dog sniff search exceeded what was
reasonably necessary to achieve~th,e purpose of the traffic stop, and for that
reason, too, the warrantless search was unreasonable:' Consequently, the trial
. court suppressed the cocaine discovered in the car and the cash found in
Appellee's wallet.
After the Commonwealth moved to alter, amend, or v8:cate the
suppression order, the trial court reiterated that "[r]egardless of the
circumstances imputing probable cause from one police officer to another, it is
c'!ear to the Court that the Defendant was detained during the ~top longer than
necessary to dispose of the alleged tra.t:fic violation .." The trial court maintained
its i!litial conclusion that Qualls' long surveillance of Appellee produced . . nothing of substance to justify a reasonable suspicion that Appellee was
· engaged in illegal drug activity on the occasion of the traffic stop.
The Commonwealth appealed the. suppression order. The Court of
Appeals agreed that the collective·knowledge. rule permitted . . Eaton to . rely upon
Qualls' observation of the tum signal violation, and so, it held that the stop of
Appellee's vehicle was justified. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals agreed with
the trial court's conclusion that the police officers' collective knowledge of
App€11ee's criminal record and inform8;11ts' reports of J:lis drug-dealing activity
were insufficient to justify a Terry2 stop of his vehicle, and that nothing
happened during the stop to. generate a reasonable and articulable suspicion
2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
4 that Appellee was engaging in criminal activity.3 The Court of Appeals also
agreed with the 01al court that the d:rug sniff search improperly exceeded the
scope of the traffic stop without reasonable cause and that the dog sniff
unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop. . . Finally, upon grounds that the issue had not been preserved for
appellate review, the Court of Appeals refused to consider ·the Commonwealth's
claim that as an active parolee, Appellee's Fourth Amendment rights were
curtailed and the warrantless, suspicionless .· ' search . of his person and vehicle .
was proper.
We granted discretionary review, and for reasons stated below," we affirm
the decision of the Court·of Appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence,
we defer to the trial court's findings of fact to the extent they are supported by
substantial evidence and are riot clearly erroneous. We review the trial court's
conclusions of law.de novo: Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky.
2016) (citations omitted). Here, the trial court's factual findings have not been - challenged, 4 so our review is essentially de novo, resting upon the facts
determined by the trial court.
a The Co~rt of Appeals specifically noted that Appellee's nervousness during ·the officer's questioning.was not sufficient to create such suspicion. 4 The Commonwealth does challenge the trial court's failure to specifically · address the significance of Appellee's parole status, an argument we address below in Section C. ·
5 A. THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS VALID UNDER THE COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE DOCTRINE, BUT APPELLEE'S DETENTION WAS. UNREASONABLY . PROLONGED .
The Court of Appeals agreed ~th the Commonwealth that Deputy Eaton
was authorized to stop Appellee for the traffic violation wjtnessed only by
Deputy Qualls and communicated by radio to Eaton. s Although Appellee does
not challenge the Court of Appeals on this issue, we note that since the ·court
of Appeals rendered its decision; this Court addressed the same question in
Lamb v. Commonwealth, 510 S.W.3d 316 (Ky. 2017).
We said in Lamb that ~[u]nder the collective .knowledge doctrine, an
arresting officer is entitled to act on the strength of the knowledge
· communicated from a fellow officer and he may assume its reliability provided
he is not otherwise aware of circumstances sufficient to materiaj.ly impeach ·the
information received." 510 S.W.3d at 323 (citing Hen.Sley, 469 U.S. at 232-2~3·;
s The trial court's initial suppression: ~rder rejected application of the collective knowledge rule, but in response to the Commonwealth's m9tion to alter, amend, or vacate that order the trial court corrected itself in that regard, citing Commonwealth v. -Vaughn, 117 S.W.3d 109 (Ky. App. 2003) (agreeing that law enforcement officers may rely on the collective knowledge of other officers) ap.d United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d · 754, 765-766 (6th Cir. 2012) ("It is well-established that an officer may conduct a stop ba,sed on info~ation obtained by fellow officers." (citing Unite.d States v. Barnes, 910 F.2d 1342, 1344 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v, Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 {1985))). However, after reviewing the radio transmissions between the officers, the trial court furthet·concluded that the communication betwee:n the officers did not support a ·fi.ndin.g that Qualls relayed his observation of Appellee's traffic violation to Eaton. Consequently, since Eaton had not observed a traffic Violation himself, the trial court concluded the stop for a "traffic violation was not valid. The Commonwealth does not challenge the trial court's amended findings of fact and conclusion of law that the radio transmission between Qualls and Eaton did not support Qualls' testimony that he relayed his own observations to Eaton and as such, the collective khowledge rule was :p.ot applicable in this case. As this finding and conclusion are not challenged, we do not address them in this appeal. · 6 Darden v. Commonwealth, 298 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Ky. 1957)).6 Lamb specifically
held that an arrest for a felony offense was properly based upon probable cause
known to one officer and relayed to another who actually made the arrest. We
agree now that the same rule applies to authorize a traffic stop for a violation
committed in the presence of one officer who. then relays that information to
another· officer who actually executes the stop. Consequently, Qualls'
contemporaneous report to Eaton that he _had observed Appellee violate a
traffic law vested Eaton with the authority based upon , probable . cause . to stop
Appellee's vehicle.
Eaton's stop of Appellee's vehicle was proper; but a valid traffic stop can
become unlawful if it is ·prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to issue
a tr_affic citation. Rlinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405; 407 (2005). The trial court,
citing Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412 (Ky. 2013),7 Caballes, and
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015),s and the Court of
Appeals, citing 'fu:rley, concluded that Eaton's dog sniff search unlawfully
prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonabiy required to complete the traffic
. stop's mission. The Court of Appeals noted that Eaton did none of the routine
matters associated with a traffic stop, including the issuance of a citation,
6 Lamb, rendered Febz:uary 16, 201.7, was decided after the. September 16, 20"16 C.ourt of Appeals'- decision. Lamb was not mentioned in the briefing for this Court. Prior to Lamb, in Brumley v. Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 280, 286 (Ky. 2013), !'[w]e. recognize[d] that the transmission of collective knowledge between investigating and arresting officers is crueial to the success of law enforcement." · . 7 Turley was cited in the order granting Appellee's motion to suppress. s Caballes and Rodriguez were cited in the order denying 1;he Commonwealth's motion to alte_r, amend, or vacate. ·
7 while he conducted the sniff search. The Commonwealth contends that
Eaton's sniff search did not unreasonably extend the t!me of Appellee's
detention beyond what would reasonably be necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop since Eaton could not have run a license and registration
check or completed the citation paperniork in the time taken to conduct the
sniff search. What the Commonwealth overlooks is that Eaton conducted the
sniff search instead. of conducting the usual procedures incidental to a routine
traffic stop.
Prolonging a stop beyond what is reasonably required to complete the
stop's mission violates the Fourth Amendment's proscription against
unreasonable seizures. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (citing Caballes, 543
U.S .. at 407). The legitimate purpose of the traffic stop, Eaton's proper mission,·
was to cite Appellee . for making ari. improper turn,. . "[W]fien tasks . tied to the
.traffic infraction are-or reasonably should have been-completed," further
detention of the 'driver is unreasonable. Id. at 1614 ("[I]n determining the
reasonable duration of a stop, 'it [is] appropriate to examine whether the police
diligently pursued [the] investigation. m (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 4 70
U.S. 675, 686 (1985))). Significantly, instead of diligently pursuing the purpose
of the traffic stop, Eaton seemingly abandoned the legitimate purpose of
issuing a traffic citation b~cause he immediately asked Appellee about drugs
and launched the dog's sniff search. "The critical question [i~] wh~ther.
c~nducting the sniff 'prolongs'-i.e., adds time to-'the stop.m Id. at 1616.
Obviously, the search added time to the stop because it was conducted before·
8 · the purpose of the stop was addressed. Indeed, along with the other
undisputed facts of record, it is apparent that the traffic stop was anticipated
as an advantageous opportunity to conduct a snif(test for drugs, rather than . ' ' the genuine enforcement of traffic laws.
The Commonwealth cites Davi.s v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011),9
for the proposition that to the extent Rodriguez changed the state of the law, it . . '
should not be applied·retroactively . to this . case. The Supreme Court in
Rodriquez granted certiorari to resolve the question whether police, absent.
reasonable suspicion, may routinely extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop
·in order to conduct a dog sniff search. 135 S. Ct. at 1614: The case is introduced with the statement, "A seizure justified only by a police:-observed
traffic violation: .. 'become[sJ unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete th[e] missic.m' of issti.ing a ticket for the
violation." 135 S. Ct.· at 1612 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407). Rodriguez
did not change the law, it simply applied preexisting Fourth Amendment case.
law. to the circumstances presented.
Under the circumstances of this case, as reflected in the trial court's
findings, we cai:inot conclude that Eaton "diligently pursued" the traffic
violation. Eaton did nothing to advance the traffic stop's mission-a citation
for not using a tum signal. Cf. Ca.balles, 543 U.S. 405. We reject the
• . 9 of "[T]he h~sh sanction exclusion 'spould not be applied. to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.' Evidence obtained during a search conducted in ·reasonable reliance.on binding precedent is not subject to' the exclusionary rule." 564 U.S. at 241 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984)).· 9 Commonwealth's argument that Eaton avoided the Rodriguez problem siinply
by deploying the ·dog at the beginning of the stop, before addressing the traffic
violation, .instead of at the end of the stop after addressing the trarfi~ violation.
If the traffic citation was deferred to complete the sniff search, then the officer
. did not act with reasonable diligence to pursue the l~gitimate object of the ·
traffic stop. Either way, the stop was prolonged beyond what was reasonably
needed to complete _the purpose of the stop. Eaton deferred the issuance of the
citation to conduct the dog sniff search, and thereby unreasonably prolonged
the stop, ·albeit for a vt:'.ry brief time. "There is no 'de minimis exception' to the
rule that a traffic• stop cannot be prolonged for reasons unrelated to the
purpose of the stop." Davis, 484 S.W.3d at 294. "[A]n officer cannot detain a,
vehicle's . occupants beyond completion of the purpose of the . initial traffic stop
unless something happened during the stop to cause the officer to have a
reasonable and articulabfo suspicion that criminal .activity [is] afoot." Turley,
399 S.W.3d at 421 (citation and internal quotes omitted) ..
B. BUT fOR THE .TRAFFIC VIOLATION, THE OFFICERS LACKED A REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OF ILLEGAL CONDUCT TO JUSTIFY THE STOP OF APPELLEE'S VEHICLE · The Commonwealth asserts that, independent_ of their authority to stop
Appellee's vehicle for a traffic law violation, Eaton and Qualls were also
authorized to stop Appellee based upon a reasonable suspicion that Appellee
had illegal drugs in his vehicle. Under that theory, the Rodriquez/Davis
analysis would be unnecessary. The Commonwealth contends that the
collective knowledge of Qualls and Eaton about Appellee's criminal history and
10 the .confidential informants' reports of Appellee's trafficking)n cocaine supplied
Eaton with a reasonable suspicion to ·stop Appellee for illegal drug activity,.
thereby redefining the original purpose of the stop as a drug investigation by • I
which Appellee was properly subjected to the sniff search. We _disagree.
Certainly, a police officer may rely on tj:le collective knowledge doctrine
when initiating an investigative stop, see Lamb, 510 S.-W.3d 316, but in this
instance, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the
totality of the circumstances known to the officers did not support a
particularized and objective belief that Appellee was in;volved in criminal
activity at the time he was stopped· and searched, Bauder v. Commonwealth,
299 S,W.3d 588, 591 (Ky. 2009) (citing. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417-418 (1981)). An investigatory stop is authorized under the Fourth
Amendment when the officer ·has a reasonable suspicion, based on objective
and articulable facts; that criminal actiyity has occurred, is occurring, or is
about to occur. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,.51 (1979) (citations omitted). We
look at the totality.of the circumstances presented to the officer to determine . '
whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop. Cortez, 449
u.s~ at 417. . . The Commonwealth pro~fers two circumstances known to the officers
before the stop as support for its argument that a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of drug trafficking existed to authorize the investigatory stop, even
11 withou.t the traffic violation.10 First, the Commonwealth notes that the officers
had information from reliable confidential informants that Appellee had
trafficked in cocaine at a Frankfort bar. Specifically, the informants prf:?vided
Appellee's name, a~ias, residence, vehicles, employment, and the bar Appellee
frequented for transacting cocaine sales. Qualls' surveillan.ce confirmed some
of that information. Second, the officers knew that Appellee was on parole for a
previous conviction for trafficking in cocaine. Assuming the reliability of the
informants, which we have no reason to doubt, that accumulation of
information . does not create a reasonable . belief that Appellee had cocaine in his
car whyn he was stopped.
As the trial court noted, Qualls did not observe any suspicious activity
while he surveilled Appellee for an extended period during the day of the stop
and the Commonwealth admitted that the officers were looking for a traffic
violation to provide a pretext .basis to ·stop Appellee's vehicle. Qualls described . . none of the typical observations ordinarily indicative of suspicious drug-related
activity. There was no complaint from neighbors about suspicious activity at
Appellee's apartment or reports of. numerous .people coming and going from
Appellee's residence .. There was no controlled buy of cocaine from Appellee to
' '
10 The Com.moriwealth also cites Appellee's n.ervousness when questioned about the presence of drugs as a third circumstance allowing the stop's extension to conduct the canine sniff search. But Appellee's nervousness was not a circumstance known prior to the stop, so it cannot contribute to the accumulation of information that might otherwise add, up to reasonable suspicion for initiating a Terry stop.
12 corrobo~ate the informants' tips. There was no indication that Appellant was
using his car to transport cocaine. I
In Commonwealth v. Morgan, we recognized that "an officer's knowledge
about a suspect's prior record can be a relevant factor in the reasonable
suspicion analysis." 248 S.W.3d.538, 541 (Ky. 2008) (citing Collier v.
Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Ky; App. 1986)).'- If there are other
articulable factors, "a prior record is a legitimate factor to be considered in
determining whether there is a sufficient quantum of suspicion to justify a
stop." Id. at 541-542 (quoting. Collier,. 713 S.W.2d at 828). However, "the prior
record of a suspect, standi;ng alone, will never justify a Terry stop." Id. at 541 ..
The officers' knowledge that Appellee had been convicted of and was then on
parole for trafficking in cocaine does not support reasonable, articulable
suspicion that he was in possession of cocaine at the time of the stop, and· the
confidential tips that he was known to be trafficking at a nearby bar did not '
provide sufficient additional information to create a reasonable suspicion to
conduct the stop, or to extend the otherwise lawful stop to condu~t the search.
The Commonwealth cites Commonwealth v. Bucalo, 422 S.W.~d 253, 260
(Ky. 2013), as support for its contention that officers conducting a traffic stop . '
.may acquire during the execution of the stop additional information ~at
justifies a ~earch beyond what was known ':"hen the stop began. We do not
disagree. We simply conclude, as did the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
that nothing happened before Eaton launched the dog sniff search that
· transformed the situation from a routine stop for a . traffic infraction into a drug
13 trafficking case. The only additional factor cited is Appellee's apparent
nervousness. While that is certainly part of the totality of circumstances to be
examined, Adkins .v. Commonwealth, 9q S.W.3d 779, 788 (Ky. 2003), it is,
nevertheless, not uncommon dupng a traffic stopll and will not create a · ·
reasonable suspicion when paired with other facts whiCh otherwise do not ·
constitute a reasonable suspicion to search for drugs. As the facts here did _not
support a reasonable suspicion.for an investigative stop based upon a
suspicion that the vehicle contained drugs, Appellee's nervousness after b~ing
stopped does not change the analysis.
C. THE COMMONWEALTH'S CLAIM THAT APPELLEE'S PAROLE STATUS SUBJECTED HIM TO A WARRANTLESS AND SUSPICIONLESS. SEARCH · AND SEIZURE WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR REVIEW The Commonwealth argued before the Court of Appeals that under
·Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.3d 411 (Ky. 2014), and Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), Appelle~'s statUs as parolee was sufficient to
subject him to a warrantless and suspicionless search and seizure. ·The· Court
of Appeals declined ·to addre~s the .issue on the grounds that it was not I ,
preserved for appellate review. The Commonwealth cites that conclusion as
error requiring reversal.
We recognized in Bratcher that the Fourth Amendment affords less
protection· to parolees and probationers. We also recognized that oth~r factors,
such as· the specific terms of orders of probation· and parole, and applicable
u See United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir. 1997).
14 regulations, such as Department of Corrections Policy No. 27-16-01 II(D), must
also be considered. Bratcher, 424 S.W.3d at 415.
Although Appellee's parole status was part of the evidentiary record
before the triaI court, the Commonwealth did not argue that his status as a ·
parolee made him subject to a warrantless and suspicionless search and
seizure. Consequently, the trial court made no specific findings relating to
Appellee's parole status or his susceptibility· to a warrantless, suspicionless
search on account of that status. The.Commonwealth complains that the ttj.al
court's findings of fact are, therefore, incomplete, arbitrary, and clearly
errop.eous, since Appellee's parole status was clearly a determinative fact.
RCr 8.20(2) plainly states. that "[w]hen factual issues are involved in
deciding [the suppression] motion, the' court shall state its essential findings on I the record." Nevertheless, even if Appellee's parole status was as determinative
as the Commonwealth now contends, it was oblige4 to ·raise the omi~sion by
motion under CR 52.02 asking the trial court to make the additional findings
and amend its order accordingly. The Commonwealth did not do so.
An appellate qourt may decide only those issues which were fully
presented to the trial court. Combs v. Knott County Fiscal Court, 141 S.W.2d.
859, 860 (Ky. 1940). "[B]y requiring that trial counsel focus the trial court's
attention on a purported error by specifically identifying it, the rule makes sure·
that there is a discrete decision for an appellate court to review." ~cher v.
Fischer,.348 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Ky. 2011). "The appellate c.ourt reviews for
errors, and a·nonruling cannot be erroneous when the issue has not been
15 presented to the trial court for decision." Hatton v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.2d
818, 819-820 (Ky. 1966) (citation omitted). The Commonwealth's failure to
raise this omission of what it regards as a critical finding of fact in the trial . . .
court precludes appellate review of the omission. Consequently, we can find no . ( . .
error in_ the decision of the Court of Appeals to conclude its appellat~ review
without consideration of the omitted fact ..
III.. CONCLUSION
For the reason set forth above, we affirm the opinion of the Court of
Appeals.
All sitting·. All concur. Cunningham, J., also concurs by separate
opinion in which Keller and Venters, JJ., join.
CUNNINGHAM, J., CONCURRING: I concur in the majority opinion. I
only write to fire a .shot across the bow.
It is well settled law, as well as common sense, that law enforcement is
authorized to stop and cite drivers upon our public highways for traffic
vioiations. _This includes su,ch mip.or infractions as obstructed license plate, .,__
failure to use tum signal, faulty tail lights, and many. more.
However, ¢.ese stops are not akin to the shaking down of cars and
people at border crossings'.
The use of large police dogs straining at their leashes and directed in
their foraging by uniform policemen are needed at times. But they are al:Ways
intimidating.. Neither a driver, nor a vehicle stopped only for a simple traffic
violation,_ should be subject to this invasion without the officer having acquired . .\
16 articulable suspicion that some otjler mischief is afoot. Therefore, I do not
support the use of canine inspection of vehicles without the circumstances
reaching such a level, even if done simultaneously with the processing of the
traffic stop and without. any delay of that purpose. It may not be a violation of
the U.S. _Constitution. But we have our own collective conscience in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky as proudly asserted in Section 10 of our state
constitutio:n..
I realize that this practice in not normally utilized with our typically Ozzie
and, Harriet family on the way to the beach. The subjects are usually not our
best citizens, and there may be, in fact, a high likelihood that some other crime
is being committed. However, our sacred pledge of equal "justice for all" is not
reserved for hollow recantations at public gatherings.
Keller and Venters, JJ., join.
17 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Andy Beshear Attorney General of Kentucky
Lany Wayne Cleveland Zachary Becker Special Assistant Attorneys General
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Willie Edward Peale, Jr. · 219 St. Clair Street, Suite 7 Frankfort, Ky 40601-1844
I