Commonwealth of Kentucky v. David J. Moore

• Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
• Decided: April 26, 2018
• Docket: 2016-SC-0275
• Status: Published

Opinion

RENDERED: APRIL 26, 2018 TO BE PUBLISHED

feuvumt Qfourf nf ~m ~ l COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT

ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS v. CASE NO. 2014-CA-001444-MR CARROLL CIRCUIT COURT NO. 14-XX-00004

DAVID J. MOORE APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

REVERSING

The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from an opinion of the Court of

Apperus, which vacated and remanded the Carroll Circuit Court's affirmation of

the Carroll District Court's imposition.of a fine upon Appellee-David J. Moore "'-

for· driving under the influence (DUI), :ijrst offense. We reverse the Court of

Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the Carroll District Court ordering

payment of the fine.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Moore was arrested on April 11, 2013, for third-degree criminal mischief

and DUI, first offense. Moore had qualified as indigent for the appointment of

counsel, and counsel had been appointed for him. In the pretrial stages of his ,.· . ;. prosecution, Moore asked that he be permitted to represent himself. After the

Faretta 1 hearing, he accepted hybrid representation. Appointed counsel

conducted pretrial procedures. When the case went to trial in the Carroll

District Court, appointed counsel remained on standby as Moore represented

himself.

Although the jury acquitted Moore of criminal mischief, it convicted him ' '

on the DUI charge and recommend~d for his punishment a fine of $200. The

trial court imposed the $200 fine and, in addition, assessed the $375 service

fee mandated by KRS 189A.050. Because of his indigency, the district court

waived the imposition of court costs and permitted him to proceed in Jonna

pauperis. The fine and service fee totaling $575 were not waived but the trial

court permitted Moore to pay them in monthly installments of at least $25.

Moore appealed to the Carroll Circuit Court arguing that the evidence

was insufficient to support his conviction and that the fine and service fee (

totaling $575 were erroneously imposed because he was indigent. The circuit

court affirmed the trial verdict and the assessment of the fine an'd service fee.

The circuit court reasoned that, since the determination of indigency must be

made at every stage of the proceeding, the district court implicitly found at

sentencing that Moore was not indigent, despite his prior appointment of

counsel and the waiver of court costs.

1 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

2 On discretionary review, the Court of Appeals vacated: the imposition of

the entire $575. We granted the Commonwealth's motion for further review.

As a result, we now reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the Carroll

District Court's order imposing the fine and the service fee.

The sole issue before us involves the 'interpretation of statutes that

govern the imposition of fines for misdemeanor offenses and specifically for

DUI, first offense, and the statutes exempting certain indigent offenders from

fines. We also examine the statute imposing the DUI service fee. The

interpretation of statutes is a matter of law which we review de novo. Bob Hook

Chevrolet Isuzu, Inc. v. Transportation Cabinet, 983 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Ky. 1998).

We afford no deference to the statutory interpretations of the lower courts.

Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1998).

II. ANALYSIS

The Court of Appeals concluded that because a first offense DUI is a I ,

misdemeanor, and because Moore qualifies as an indigent person under KRS

Chapter 31, he was entitled to the waiver of fines for indigent persons set forth

in KRS 534.040.2 We are constrained to disagree.

2 For purposes of our review, we shall accep~ as true that Moore is properly characterized as an indigent person under KRS Chapter 31.

3 A. THE INDIGENCY EXEMPTION P~OVIDED BY KRS 534.040(4) IS NOT AVAILABLE TO MOORE.

\KRS 534.040,. titled "Fines for misdemeanors and violations" provides in . - -

pertinent part:

(2) Except as otherwise provided for an offense defined outside this code, a person who has been convicted of any offense other than a felony shall be sentenced, in addition to any other punishment imposed upon hini, _to pay a fine in an amount not to exceed: I.

(a) For a Class A misdemeanor, five hundred dollars ($500); or

(b) ~or a Class B misdemeanor, two hundred fifty dollars ($250); or

(c) For a violation, two hundred fifty dollars ($250).

(4) Fines required by this section shall not be imposed upon any person determined by the court to be indigent pursuant to KRS Chapter 31.

KRS 534.040 generally establishes the fir:ies that can be imposed for

misdemeanors and violations, but subsection (2) expressly excepts from its

provisions any "offense defined outside this code" wl;tere the fine has been

"otherwise provided." "This code" means the Kentucky Penal Code, KRS

Chapters 500 through 534.

By its plain language, the fines that KRS 534.040 requires for

misdemeanor offenses do not apply to crimes that are defined outside the penal

code. By its own clear language, the indigency exemption of subsection (4)

applies only to "fines requireq by" KRS 534.040. In other words, the plain·

language of the statute grants an indigency exemption only for misdemeanors

defined within the penal code and for which KRS 534.040 establishes the

4 )

applicable fines. We find no ambiguity,; and so, there is no alternate reading of

the statute that would lead us to a different construction. '

KRS Chapter 189A, rather than the Kentucky Penal Code, provides the

body of law that primarily governs the offense of driving under the influence.

KRS 189A.010(1) defines the conduct that constitutes the crime of DUI. KRS - . . 189A.010(5) states ~th particularity the fines that may be imposed for DUI, as

a first, second, and third offense. Specifically, KRS 189A.010(5)(a) provides \

that for a first DUI offense within a ten-year period, the offender shall be fined r

not less than $200'nor more than $500.3. In like fashion, subsections (b) and

(c) of KRS 189A.010(5) provide, respectively, the fines applicable to second and )

third offense DUis.

We find no ambiguity in the statutes under review insofar as they relate

to availability of the indigency ex;emption for fines imposed under KRS

189A.010(5)(a), first offen~e DUI. As we recently summarized in University of

Louisville v. Rothstein:

In interpreting a statute, we have a duty to accord to words of a statute their literal meaning ~nless to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable conclusion. As such, we must look first . to the plain 'language of a statute and, if the language is clear, our inquiry ends. We hold f~st to the rule of construction that the plain meaning of the statutory language is presumed to be what the legislature intended, and if the meaning is plain,\hen the court cannot base its interpretation on any other method or source. In

3 This subsection· also sets applicable imprisonment sentences that may be imposed as punishment in addition or as an alternative to a fine, depending on the circumstances .. The applicable imprisonment provisions are not germane to this appeal.

5 other worc:is, we assume -that the Legislature meant exactly',what it said, and said exactly what it meant.

532_ S.W.3d 644, 648 (Ky. 2017) (internal alterations, citations, and quotation

marks omitted). Bound by those time-proven standards, we cannot re-write

the plain language of the statutes. Instead, we can only acknowledge their

plain meaning. Moore's $200 fine for a first offense DUI simply-falls outside

the parameters that KRS 534.040(4) _sets for the indigency exemption.

Consequently,. the exception iscunavailable to him and the trial court correctly

declined to waive the fine.

Our rules of statutory ·construction, however, do not constrain us from

commenting upon plainly-written statutes when oddities within them are

exposed by the litigation before us. As noted above, sub~ections (a), (b), and (c)

of KRS_ 189A.010(5) respectively prescribe the fines that can be imposed for the

misdemeanors offirst, second; and third offense DUI. Because DUI is defined ( outside the penal code and because the fines for DUI as a first, second, or third

offense are not "fines required by KRS 534.040," the indigency exemption of

KRS 534.040(4) is not available to an Indigent person convicted _-of those

misdemeanors.

In marked contrast with_ the fines specifically detailed in 189A.010(5)(a},

(b), and (c) for first, second, and thir~ time DUI offenders, KRS 189A.010(5)(d),

pertaining to fourth and subsequent DUI offenses, specifies no fines. Instead, ) the1 statute simply designates DUI, fourth or subsequent offense, as a Class D

6 felony. 4 Thus, for fines that can be imI?osed for a felony DUI offense, one must

refer to fines generically provided in the penal code for any Class D felony.

·That statute is KRS 534.030, which sets the fines for felony offenses and, as

relevant to our inquiry, is perfectly analogous to .its misdemeanor counterpart,

KRS 534.040, including the exemption for indigent persons provided by KRS

534.030(4). But because the fine for a felony DUI (fourth or subsequent ·

offense) is not set.forth in KRS Chapter 189A, but is instead found in the penal

code p_rovisi<:>n, KRS 534. 030, which sets· fines for felony offenses generally, a

DUI felon (fourth or subsequent offense) who is indigent may be exempted from

the payment of their fines while DUI misdemeanants like Moore, who are

indigent, are allotted no such relief.

Our recognition of that anomaly does not afford us the authority or

opportunity to change it. As noted above, we presume the legisla,ture intended

what it plainly states in the statutes. y.le cannot presume this differential

treatment is unintended, although we recognize that it is most likely an

unforeseen consequence of the way the DUI penalty provisions of KRS

189A.O 10(5) were drafted. If any. of the statutes involved here were ambiguous,

we could consider an interpretation .that takes the apparent anomaly.into

account. But, they are not ambiguous.

4 While KRS 189A.O lO(S)(d) does not explicitly prescribe the range of punishments to be imposed upon fourth or subsequent DUI offenses, it does provide a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 240 days when certain aggravating circumstances are present.

7 . I / We may wonder why the legislature would provide more advantageous

treatment of indigent DUI felons, who may be relieved of their fines by KRS

534.030(4), while indigent DUI misdemeanants cannot.. But "the power to

define crimes and assign their penalties belongs to the legislative department ..

. ." Mcclanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694, 7_QO (Ky. 2010) (quoting -'

Hoskins v. Maricle, 'ISO S.W.3d 1, 11 (Ky. 2004)); see also Hampton~·

Commonwealth, 666 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Ky. 1984) ("[T]he appropriate range for

the length of sentence is d~termined 'purely a matter of legislative

prerogative. m). This oddity is within the legislature's prerogative and its

correction, if indeed correction is warranted, must come from the legislature.

Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate .the

fine imposed by the trial court.

We further find significant the fact that KRS 189A.130 explicitly invokes

the nonpayment provisions of KRS 534.020 and KRS 534.060 for DUI offenders

who fail to pay a DUI fine. Neither-of those sections contains the exclusion of '

offenses defined outside the penal code that we find in KRS 534.030(4) and ' '

534.040(4), an omission which furtb.er·suggests that the General Assembly

has,'for whatever reason, chosen to exclude DUI misdemeanants from the

iridigency exemption. s

s We note that the trial court found Moore to be a "poor person" and as such, waived Moore's obligation to pay court costs: This Court has held that it is a contradiction to classify a defendant as a poor person .but not an indigent person. McMahan v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-SC-000162-MR,. 2012 WL 601216, at *1, *5 (Ky. Feb. 23, 2012). Should we have ruled in Moore's favor, this contradictory classification would have added s~pport for that decision. However, because we hold that Moore is not entitled to the indigency exemption contained in KRS 534.040(4), the 8 B. MOORE IS NOT ENTITLED TO A WAIVER OF THE DUI SERVICE FEE. Throughout the proceedings in this case, from the district c<:>Urt through

the Court of Appeals, the $200 fine and the $375 service fee were regarded as

single assessment of $575_, notwithstanding the fact that each arises under a

different statutory section. Neither Moore nor the Commonwealth now

challenges that assumption. Undoubtedly, that is because, when this Court

first analyzed the DUI service fee in Beane v. Commonwealth, we held '"the

mandatory service fee imposed herein [pursuant to KRS 189A.050] constitutes

an additional 'fine' or 'penalty."' 736 S.W.2d 317, 318 (Ky. 1987).

The issue in Beane was whether the DUI service fee was 8: fine, for which

no indigency exemption existed at the time, 6 or a court cost which could be

subject to such an exemption. No other alternative seems tohave been

considered. Justice Leibson disagreed with the· classification of the service fee

as a fine. In his dissent, he asserted that the service fee "is an administrative

function, and not a punishme:q.t or fine." He further noted that if the service

fee was held to be a penalty for the illegal act of driving under the influence,

then "the defendant should have the right to have the jury instructed that this

penalty will be imposed in addition to any sentence provided by the jury." Id.

at 319.

distinction is irrelevant. We mention this distinction as a reminder of the significance of adhering to the proper statutory methods for determiiiing a criminal defendant's indigency and poor person status. 6 At that time, the General Assembly had not yet expressed any intention to exempt indigent convicted offenders from fines, although "poor persons" had been exempted from court costs.

9 Upon reflection, we now agree with Justice Leibson that the classification.

of the DUI service fee as a fine was erroneous, and we overrule Beane. We do

not, however, accept the opposing view that it be classified as part of court

costs. We are satisfied that it is neither.

The service fee imposed by KRS 189A.050 is an ~dministrative function.

The DUI service fee cannot be equated with fines or court costs because the

statutes repeatedly distinguish between them. See KRS 24A.1 76(2) ("In

criminal cases a fee of twenty dollars ($20) shall be added to the costs imposed

by KRS 24A.175 that the defendant if; required to pay."); see also KRS 24A.180 ) ) ' '

Disposition of DistriCt Court fees and costs (emphasis added). "Installment

plans shall be applied first to court costs, then to restitution, then to fees, and

then to fines." KRS- 534.020(2)(c).

We have statutes and court rules that provide for filing fees, CR 3.03,

and fees required for an individual released on probation or parole subject to

supervision by the Department of Corrections, KRS 439.315. This Court has

also analyzed jail fees and found them not to be considered "costs" subject to

KRS 31.llO(l)(b). Jones v. Commonwec;ilth, 382 S.W.3d 22, 33 (Ky. 2011). The

· jail fee is to "reimburse the county for expenses incurred by reason of the

prisoner's confinement," whereas cost~ are those- more directly connected to the

defense of the charges. Id.

This interpretation that the service fee is not a fine is consistent with

these statutes and rules even though the service fee in KRS ~89A ..050 is . . subject to enforcement pursuant to K~S 534.020, located. in the "Fines"

10 /

chapter o.f the penal code. KRS 534.020 also deals with imposition of court

costs and fees, in addition to fines. Court costs have their own statutory

section in Chapters 23A and 24A. The mere fact that the service fee is subject

to KRS 534.Q20 does not make it a fine, no more than the fact that court costs

are not fine~ even though they are also subject to KRS ~34.020.

Even though the service fee is not a fine, it is subject to waiver under

. KRS 534.020(3)(a)(1L which may or may not result in complete elimination of

the defendant's responsibility for payment of the service fee. The ·waiver ·

required in KRS 534.020 is more stringent than the waiver associated with

indigency, not in the substantive inquiry of ability to pay, but rather in the

process required of courts and defendants. The service fee must be imposed in

all cases. Only after its imposition can the court analyze a defendant's ability

to pay by way of a show cause hearing. If a defendant is unable to pay, "the . - court may eriter an order allowing additional time for payment, reducing the.

amount of each installment, or modifying the manner of payment in any other

way." KRS 534.020(3)(a)(l).

The service fee is alloca~~d to multiple departments and agencies of the

Commonwealth, includin~ the Department of J>:ublic Advocacy. Because the

service fee be.nefits m~y programs and services, the policy behind requirin~

payment ·thereof, in most inst!=l.Ilces, is a sound one. This also furth~r supports

the Court's interpretation of the service fee as an administrative function and,

in fact, a fee, distinct and separate froi:n both fines,and court costs.

11 Because the trial court exercised its discretion to permit Moore to pay the

service fee, -along with his fine, at the rate of $25 per month, pursuant to KRS

534.020, as expre·ssly authorized by KRS 189A.050, Moore is. not entitled to

further consideration of the fee waiver absent an abuse of discretion. We find

no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to permit installment

payments rather than a complete waiver of the fee.

III. ·CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the Court of Appeals and

reinstate the order of the Carroll District Court imposing upon Moore the fine

of $200 and the service fee of $375, payable in installments as directed by the

trial court.

All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Andy Beshear Attorney General of Kentucky Jason Bradley Moore Assistant Attorney General

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

John ·Gerhart Landon Assistant Public Advocate