McGINLEY, Judge.
Presently before this Court for disposition, in our original jurisdiction, is a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the action in quo warranto filed by the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Attorney General).1 We grant the motion.
James Large (Large) currently serves as Township Supervisor with Forward Township, a second class township in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
On January 8, 1997, the Attorney General filed a complaint in quo warranto2 against Large, alleging that he should forfeit his office because of a 1986 conviction on four counts of violating Section 9 of the State Ethics Act (Act)3 for swearing falsely under oath before the State Ethics Commission.4
Section 9(e) of the Act, 65 P.S. § 409(e), provides that “[A]ny person who willfully affirms or swears falsely in regard to any material matter before a commission proceeding pursuant to Section 8 is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or be both fined and imprisoned.”
On or about August 1,1997, Large filed an answer and new matter and the Attorney General replied. On September 22,1997, the Attorney General moved for judgment on the pleadings.5
When ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the only pleadings to be considered are the complaint, answer and new matter. Doria v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 158 Pa.Cmwlth. 59, 630 A.2d 980 (1998), affirmed, 589 Pa. 245, 652 A.2d 281 (1994). A motion for judgment on the pleadings, in this Court’s original jurisdiction, will summarily dispose of a case where there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Montgomery Hospital v. Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund, 686 A.2d 432 (Pa. Cmwlth.1996).
Large admits in his answer to the following facts:
1. Large has been a duly elected supervisor of Forward Township since January 1996.
2. Large was convicted by a jury on four counts of violating Section 9(e) of the Act for swearing falsely under oath before the State Ethics Commission.
[1228]*12283. The trial court sentenced Large, on February 8, 1987, to imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than two years.
The Attorney General contends that the position of township supervisor is one of trust or profit within the meaning of Article II, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which requires a forfeiture of an elected office if the elected official was guilty of an infamous crime.
Large contends that there are facts in dispute, specifically whether he was convicted of an infamous crime, and whether the Attorney General’s action is barred by the doctrine of laches or waiver.6
Article II, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states: “[N]o person hereafter convicted of embezzlement of public monies, bribery, perjury or other infamous crime, shall be eligible to the General Assembly, or capable of holding any office of trust or profit in this Commonwealth.”
In the case, In re Petition of Patricia A Hughes, 516 Pa. 90, 532 A.2d 298 (1987), our Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Article II, Section 7 bars a candidate from holding public office after a conviction of an infamous crime.
In Hughes, our Supreme Court held that: “although the term ‘infamous crimes’ is not self-defining, when the language of Article II, Section 7 enumerates the crimes of bribery, embezzlement of public monies, and perjury, followed by the words ‘or other infamous crimes,’ the necessary implication is that the three enumerated crimes are infamous”. Hughes, 516 at 95, 532 A.2d at 301. A conviction of an infamous crime is likewise grounds for disqualification from holding public office. Commonwealth v. Knox, 172 Pa.Super. 510, 94 A.2d 128 (1953) affirmed on opinion below, 374 Pa. 343, 97 A.2d 782 (1953).
Our Supreme Court has further defined an infamous crime as: “one which upon conviction rendered a person incompetent to be a witness or juror.” In Re Joseph P. Braig, 527 Pa. 248, 590 A.2d 284 (1991).
Webster’s Dictionary defines perjury as:
1. The voluntary violation of an oath or vow either by swearing to what is untrue or by omission to do what has been promised under oath; false swearing; a willfully false statement of fact material to the issue made by a witness under oath in a competent judicial proceeding or under statute law so made on affirmation and in some jurisdictions any case including one that is extrajudicial of willful false statement made under an oath authorized to be administered by law.
2. An instance of false swearing or willful breach of oath.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1682 (Merriam-Webster, 1986).
Although Large was not convicted of perjury he was convicted by a jury of swearing falsely under oath. Both crimes consist of identical elements, and a conviction for swearing falsely under oath renders an individual incapable of being a competent witness for any purpose, or juror, and such a person is not capable of holding any office of trust or profit in this Commonwealth.7 [1229]*1229Swearing falsely under oath is an infamous crime.
Large also contends that the Commonwealth does not have the authority to remove him from office because of laches.8 A party claiming the benefit of the doctrine of laches must demonstrate prejudice due to the lapse of time. Beaver v. Penntech Paper Co., 452 Pa. 542, 307 A.2d 281 (1973). Large has established no such prejudice.9
Finally, Large contends that the Attorney General waived the opportunity to remove him from office because this action in quo warranto is based upon a conviction that predated his election.
A waiver is defined as, “the act of intentionally relinquishing or abandoning some known right, claim or privilege,” and will not be presumed or implied unless by his conduct the opposite party has been misled, to his prejudice, into the honest belief that such waiver was intended or consented to. Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 409 Pa. 357, 186 A.2d 399 (1962).
In 1994, the Attorney General declined to bring a quo warranto action in 1994, because of an internal policy to defer to the local district attorney in any action challenging an individual’s eligibility for local government office.
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McGINLEY, Judge.
Presently before this Court for disposition, in our original jurisdiction, is a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the action in quo warranto filed by the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Attorney General).1 We grant the motion.
James Large (Large) currently serves as Township Supervisor with Forward Township, a second class township in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
On January 8, 1997, the Attorney General filed a complaint in quo warranto2 against Large, alleging that he should forfeit his office because of a 1986 conviction on four counts of violating Section 9 of the State Ethics Act (Act)3 for swearing falsely under oath before the State Ethics Commission.4
Section 9(e) of the Act, 65 P.S. § 409(e), provides that “[A]ny person who willfully affirms or swears falsely in regard to any material matter before a commission proceeding pursuant to Section 8 is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or be both fined and imprisoned.”
On or about August 1,1997, Large filed an answer and new matter and the Attorney General replied. On September 22,1997, the Attorney General moved for judgment on the pleadings.5
When ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the only pleadings to be considered are the complaint, answer and new matter. Doria v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 158 Pa.Cmwlth. 59, 630 A.2d 980 (1998), affirmed, 589 Pa. 245, 652 A.2d 281 (1994). A motion for judgment on the pleadings, in this Court’s original jurisdiction, will summarily dispose of a case where there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Montgomery Hospital v. Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund, 686 A.2d 432 (Pa. Cmwlth.1996).
Large admits in his answer to the following facts:
1. Large has been a duly elected supervisor of Forward Township since January 1996.
2. Large was convicted by a jury on four counts of violating Section 9(e) of the Act for swearing falsely under oath before the State Ethics Commission.
[1228]*12283. The trial court sentenced Large, on February 8, 1987, to imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than two years.
The Attorney General contends that the position of township supervisor is one of trust or profit within the meaning of Article II, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which requires a forfeiture of an elected office if the elected official was guilty of an infamous crime.
Large contends that there are facts in dispute, specifically whether he was convicted of an infamous crime, and whether the Attorney General’s action is barred by the doctrine of laches or waiver.6
Article II, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states: “[N]o person hereafter convicted of embezzlement of public monies, bribery, perjury or other infamous crime, shall be eligible to the General Assembly, or capable of holding any office of trust or profit in this Commonwealth.”
In the case, In re Petition of Patricia A Hughes, 516 Pa. 90, 532 A.2d 298 (1987), our Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Article II, Section 7 bars a candidate from holding public office after a conviction of an infamous crime.
In Hughes, our Supreme Court held that: “although the term ‘infamous crimes’ is not self-defining, when the language of Article II, Section 7 enumerates the crimes of bribery, embezzlement of public monies, and perjury, followed by the words ‘or other infamous crimes,’ the necessary implication is that the three enumerated crimes are infamous”. Hughes, 516 at 95, 532 A.2d at 301. A conviction of an infamous crime is likewise grounds for disqualification from holding public office. Commonwealth v. Knox, 172 Pa.Super. 510, 94 A.2d 128 (1953) affirmed on opinion below, 374 Pa. 343, 97 A.2d 782 (1953).
Our Supreme Court has further defined an infamous crime as: “one which upon conviction rendered a person incompetent to be a witness or juror.” In Re Joseph P. Braig, 527 Pa. 248, 590 A.2d 284 (1991).
Webster’s Dictionary defines perjury as:
1. The voluntary violation of an oath or vow either by swearing to what is untrue or by omission to do what has been promised under oath; false swearing; a willfully false statement of fact material to the issue made by a witness under oath in a competent judicial proceeding or under statute law so made on affirmation and in some jurisdictions any case including one that is extrajudicial of willful false statement made under an oath authorized to be administered by law.
2. An instance of false swearing or willful breach of oath.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1682 (Merriam-Webster, 1986).
Although Large was not convicted of perjury he was convicted by a jury of swearing falsely under oath. Both crimes consist of identical elements, and a conviction for swearing falsely under oath renders an individual incapable of being a competent witness for any purpose, or juror, and such a person is not capable of holding any office of trust or profit in this Commonwealth.7 [1229]*1229Swearing falsely under oath is an infamous crime.
Large also contends that the Commonwealth does not have the authority to remove him from office because of laches.8 A party claiming the benefit of the doctrine of laches must demonstrate prejudice due to the lapse of time. Beaver v. Penntech Paper Co., 452 Pa. 542, 307 A.2d 281 (1973). Large has established no such prejudice.9
Finally, Large contends that the Attorney General waived the opportunity to remove him from office because this action in quo warranto is based upon a conviction that predated his election.
A waiver is defined as, “the act of intentionally relinquishing or abandoning some known right, claim or privilege,” and will not be presumed or implied unless by his conduct the opposite party has been misled, to his prejudice, into the honest belief that such waiver was intended or consented to. Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 409 Pa. 357, 186 A.2d 399 (1962).
In 1994, the Attorney General declined to bring a quo warranto action in 1994, because of an internal policy to defer to the local district attorney in any action challenging an individual’s eligibility for local government office. After the district attorney declined to challenge Large, the Attorney General timely proceeded. We find that this internal policy was not the equivalent of a waiver.
Further, prosecutorial discretion may depend on policy matters wholly apart from the existence or non-existence of probable cause. Courts are wary of supervising any exercise of such discretion. Commonwealth v. Benz, 523 Pa. 203, 565 A.2d 764 (1989). When determining whether a policy decision is an abuse of discretion, this Court must consider if the policy advanced by the Attorney General comports with both the law and justice. A policy must embrace the general principles by which the prosecutor is guided in the management of his public responsibilities. Commonwealth v. Jury, 431 Pa.Super. 129, 636 A.2d 164 (1993) appeal denied, 537 Pa. 647, 644 A.2d 733 (1994). Here, the Attorney General’s policy to defer to the local district attorney was consistent with the Attorney General’s management of his public responsibilities.
Accordingly, we grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 21st day of July, 1998, upon consideration of the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by the Commonwealth, it appearing that there are no facts or questions of law in dispute, said motion is granted, and James Large is removed from the office of Supervisor of Forward Township.