[J-37-2023] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 41 WAP 2022 : Appellant : Appeal from the Order of the : Superior Court entered June 23, : 2022, at No. 601 WDA 2021, v. : vacating the Order of the Court : of Common Pleas of Allegheny : County entered April 14, 2021, RONNIE LEHMAN, : at No. CP-02-CR-0003380-2018, : and remanding. Appellee : : SUBMITTED: June 21, 2023
OPINION
JUSTICE BROBSON DECIDED: MARCH 21, 2024 Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code1 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] prisoner
or inmate commits a felony of the second degree if he unlawfully has in his possession
or under his control any controlled substance in violation of [S]ection 13(a)(16) of The
Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act” (Controlled Substance Act).2
1 18 Pa. C.S. § 5123(a.2).
2 Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act provides: (a) The following act[] and the causing thereof within the Commonwealth [is] hereby prohibited: .... (16) Knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance by a person not registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State board, unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription order or order of a practitioner, or except as otherwise authorized by this act. Section 5123(e) of the Crimes Code3 defines “inmate” as “[a] male or female offender
who is committed to, under sentence to or confined in a penal or correctional institution.”
The question that we must decide in this case, in the context of an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim brought under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),4 is whether Ronnie
Lehman (Lehman), who was residing at Renewal Center as a condition of his parole, was
an “inmate” at the time that he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance in violation
of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act. After careful consideration, we hold
that, under the circumstances presented here, Lehman was an “inmate” as that term is
used and defined in Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code, and, therefore, the
evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction for a violation of Section 5123(a.2).
Because the Superior Court concluded otherwise and granted Lehman post-conviction
relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we reverse the judgment of that court.
I. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts and procedural history underlying this matter, which do not
appear to be in dispute, are summarized as follows. Lehman was residing at Renewal
Center located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, as a condition of his parole from a state
sentence of incarceration.5 On March 5, 2018, Renewal Center staff encountered
Lehman unresponsive on a bathroom floor from an apparent drug overdose. In the course
of rendering life-saving aid, Renewal Center staff performed a pat-down search of
Lehman’s person. During that search, Renewal Center staff discovered in the pocket of
3 18 Pa. C.S. § 5123(e).
4 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
5 The record below is wholly devoid of any facts or evidence relative to the circumstances
surrounding Lehman’s placement at Renewal Center. The parties, however, do not appear to dispute that Lehman was residing at Renewal Center as a condition of his parole.
[J-37-2023] - 2 Lehman’s pants a hypodermic needle and a bundle—i.e., ten stamp bags—of what was
later determined to be a combination of heroin, fentanyl, and cocaine.
Based on the foregoing, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth)
charged Lehman with the following: (1) a violation of Section 5123(a) of the Crimes Code
(providing a controlled substance to a confined person);6 (2) a violation of
Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act (possession of a controlled substance);
and (3) a violation of Section 13(a)(32) of the Controlled Substance Act (possession of
drug paraphernalia).7 Lehman filed a motion to dismiss all three charges pursuant to
what is commonly referred to as the Drug Overdose Response Immunity Act (DORIA),8
which, inter alia, shields a person experiencing a drug overdose event from prosecution
for certain enumerated offenses, including, but not limited to, possession of a controlled
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. In response to that motion, the
Commonwealth nolle prossed the possession of a controlled substance and possession
of drug paraphernalia charges. The Commonwealth also filed a motion to amend the
criminal information, wherein it sought to replace the charge of providing a controlled
substance to a confined person with a charge alleging a violation of Section 5123(a.2) of
the Crimes Code (possession of a controlled substance by a prisoner or inmate). The
Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, acting in its capacity as the trial court,
granted the Commonwealth’s motion to amend. Thus, the sole remaining charge filed
against Lehman was for a violation of Section 5123(a.2). While Lehman acknowledged
that a violation of Section 5123(a.2) was not an offense enumerated within DORIA, he,
nevertheless, maintained that DORIA shielded him from prosecution therefor, and, as a
6 18 Pa. C.S. § 5123(a).
7 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32).
8 Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, added by the Act of September 30, 2014,
P.L. 2487, 35 P.S. §§ 780-113.7.
[J-37-2023] - 3 result, he was entitled to a dismissal of that charge. In support, Lehman contended that,
because DORIA shielded him from prosecution for possession of a controlled substance,
that same act of possession could not form the basis for a violation of Section 5123(a.2).
The trial court disagreed and denied Lehman’s motion to dismiss.
The matter proceeded to a stipulated, nonjury trial. At the conclusion thereof, the
trial court found Lehman guilty of a violation of Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code and
sentenced him to 35 to 90 months’ incarceration. Lehman filed a direct appeal with the
Superior Court, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because
he was immune from prosecution under DORIA. Commonwealth v. Lehman, 231 A.3d
877, 880 (Pa. Super. 2020). Ultimately, the Superior Court affirmed Lehman’s judgment
of sentence, holding that DORIA did not afford him immunity because DORIA “provides
immunity for only certain, specifically[ ]enumerated offenses” and a violation of
Section 5123(a.2) was not one of those specifically enumerated offenses. Id. at 881. In
response to Lehman’s contention that he should, nevertheless, be entitled to immunity
because an element of a violation of Section 5123(a.2) “is the crime of possession of a
controlled substance, which is an enumerated offense” under DORIA, the Superior Court
explained: (1) although possession of a controlled substance may be an element of
possession of a controlled substance by a prisoner or inmate, “the crimes are
nevertheless distinct;” (2) a conviction under Section 5123(a.2) is “graded as a
second-degree felony,” and DORIA “was not intended to provide immunity for serious
offenses;” and (3) “the mere fact that the crime of possession of a controlled substance
is an element of the crime of possession of [a controlled substance by a prisoner or
inmate] is not indicative of any [l]egislative intent to provide immunity for all offenses
[J-37-2023] - 4 involving possession of drugs.”9 Id. at 882. Lehman thereafter filed a petition for
allowance of appeal with this Court, which we denied.
Subsequent thereto, Lehman filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County, now acting in its capacity as the PCRA court,
appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition. Therein, Lehman asserted that
his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective10 for failing to challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting his conviction under Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code. In
support, Lehman contended that his sufficiency claim had arguable merit because, given
his status as a parolee who was voluntarily placed at Renewal Center as a condition of
his parole, the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was an
“inmate” or “prisoner” at the time that he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance.
See Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code. Thus, Lehman maintained that, had his
trial counsel argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction under
Section 5123(a.2), the trial court would not have found him guilty of that charge, or,
alternatively, had his appellate counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the Superior
Court would have vacated his conviction. Lehman further contended that his trial and
appellate counsel did not have a reasonable basis for their omissions in this regard and
9 Notably, in a concurring opinion, Judge Pellegrini, joined by President Judge Emeritus
Bender, questioned whether a parolee, such as Lehman, who is residing in a facility, such as Renewal Center, as a condition of his parole, is a “prisoner” or “inmate” as those terms are used and/or defined in Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code. Lehman, 231 A.3d at 883-84 (Pellegrini, J., concurring). Given, however, that Lehman’s counsel did not raise that issue on appeal, the Superior Court did not address it and, instead, left it for consideration on another day. Id. 10 To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must establish:
“(1) that there is merit to the underlying claim; (2) that counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her conduct; and (3) that the petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s performance, i.e.[,] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the act or omission challenged, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 863 A.2d 536, 543 (Pa. 2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984)).
[J-37-2023] - 5 that he was prejudiced thereby because the trial court ultimately found him guilty and
sentenced him for a crime that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt and the Superior Court thereafter affirmed that conviction.
The PCRA court, after providing the requisite notice of its intent to do so, dismissed
Lehman’s PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 907. Lehman appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the PCRA court
abused its discretion by doing so because he had established that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain his conviction under Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code insofar as
he was not a “prisoner” or “inmate” at the time that he unlawfully possessed a controlled
substance. In its opinion issued pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(a), the PCRA court concluded that Lehman’s trial and appellate counsel
were not ineffective because his underlying sufficiency claim lacked arguable merit. To
that end, the PCRA court explained that Lehman satisfied the definition of “prisoner” or
“inmate” for the purposes of Section 5123(a.2) because he was involuntarily committed
to Renewal Center as a condition of his parole and, if he left Renewal Center without
express permission, he would have violated the terms and conditions of his parole.
In a divided, published opinion, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court vacated
the PCRA court’s order and remanded the matter to the PCRA court for further
proceedings.11 Commonwealth v. Lehman, 278 A.3d 321 (Pa. Super. 2022). After noting
that the parties seemed to agree that Lehman was not a “prisoner” or “confined” at the
time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance in violation of Section 13(a)(16) of
the Controlled Substance Act and that, “[a]s a community corrections center, Renewal
11 Judge Pellegrini, who authored the concurring opinion issued in Lehman’s direct appeal, and President Judge Emeritus Bender, who joined Judge Pellegrini’s concurring opinion, were in the Superior Court majority as to the PCRA court’s error. Judge Bowes, the third member of the panel reviewing the PCRA court’s decision, issued a dissenting opinion, which is discussed in more detail infra.
[J-37-2023] - 6 [Center] indisputably qualifies as a correctional institution,” the Superior Court indicated
that the narrow issue before it was “whether a parolee may be considered an ‘inmate’ for
the purposes of Section 5123(e) by virtue of being ‘committed to’ a halfway house.”
Id. at 324-25. Observing that the phrase “committed to” is not defined in Section 5123 or
elsewhere within the Crimes Code but, rather, is “simply part of the definition of an
‘inmate,’” the Superior Court explained that, “as employed in Section 5123 and other
relevant statutes and taken in full context, ‘committed to’ necessarily refers to a class of
offenders held or incarcerated in correctional facilities against their will.” Id. at 325 & n.5
(emphasis added) (noting that “[t]he word[] ‘commit’ describes the process of sending a
person somewhere without the latter’s consent,” and citing Commit, Black’s Law
Dictionary 340 (11th ed. 2019) (“To send (a person) to prison or to a mental health facility,
esp. by court order.”)). In the Superior Court’s view, given that parolees are not similarly
situated to pre-release inmates—i.e., parolees are “at liberty on parole” and pre-release
inmates are in official detention—“parolees are not ‘inmates’ who are ‘committed to’ a
community corrections center.” Id. at 325-26. Applying these principles to the facts of the
present case, the Superior Court explained that “Lehman’s option to leave Renewal
[Center], his statutory status as a ‘parolee at liberty on parole,’ and the absence of his
right to accrue credit time against his sentence while staying there[] made it impossible
for Lehman to qualify as an ‘inmate’ for the purposes of Section 5123[(a.2)].” Id. at 326.
Accordingly, the Superior Court concluded that the PCRA court abused its discretion in
dismissing Lehman’s PCRA petition alleging ineffective assistance of his trial and
appellate counsel because, had Lehman’s trial counsel sought to have the charge
alleging a violation of Section 5123(a.2) dismissed due to the fact that Lehman was not
an “inmate” at the time that he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance or had
Lehman’s appellate counsel sought to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
[J-37-2023] - 7 supporting Lehman’s conviction under Section 5123(a.2) on direct appeal, “there is a
reasonable likelihood that [those] argument[s] would have succeeded.”12 Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Bowes opined that “proper application of the rules
of statutory construction to the language of” Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code should
have required the majority to affirm the PCRA court’s conclusion that Lehman was an
“inmate” at Renewal Center at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance
in violation of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act. Id. at 329 (Bowes, J.,
dissenting). In support, Judge Bowes noted that whether Lehman was “at liberty on
parole” for purposes of credit for his time served at Renewal Center is irrelevant to a
determination of whether Lehman was an “inmate” pursuant to Section 5123(a.2)
because “the purposes for [Section 5123(a.2)] and those [statutes] governing time credit
are distinct.” Id. at 332-33. Judge Bowes explained that, in defining the term “commit,”
the majority “blatantly ignore[d] that the common usage of [that] term . . . includes a
person’s voluntary, consensual entrustment of himself to a place or a cause.” Id. at 334
(quoting Commit, Merriam-Webster.com, https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commit
(definition 3) (last visited March 15, 2024) (setting forth five options to define “commit:”
(1) “to put into charge or trust: ENTRUST;” (2) “to place in a prison or mental institution;”
12 In a footnote, the Superior Court alternatively concluded that, even if the definition of
“inmate” as used in Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code was ambiguous, Lehman would still be entitled to relief under the rule of lenity. Lehman, 278 A.3d at 327 n.8 (citing Richards v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 20 A.3d 596, 600 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (“[A]ny ambiguity in a criminal statute will be construed in favor of the defendant. The rule of lenity requires a clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally would understand, as to what actions would expose them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be.” (quoting Yourick v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 965 A.2d 341, 347 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (Leavitt, J., dissenting), appeal denied, 981 A.2d 220 (Pa. 2009)), appeal denied, 29 A.3d 374 (Pa. 2011)). The Superior Court noted that, under the rule of lenity, it would have been required to “give Lehman the benefit of any lack of statutory clarity concerning whether he was an “inmate” who was “committed to” a community corrections center.” Id.
[J-37-2023] - 8 (3) “to consign or record for preservation;” (4) “to put into a place for disposal or
safekeeping;” and (5) “to refer (something such as a legislative bill) to a committee for
consideration and report”)). Applying this definition here, Judge Bowes noted that
Lehman was “committed to” Renewal Center because he was “placed [there] by the
[Pennsylvania Parole] Board [(Parole Board)] for safekeeping[] and entrusted to Renewal
[Center] as a condition of his parole.” Id. at 335. Stated another way, “when [Lehman]
opted to agree to the conditions of his parole, he voluntarily committed himself to
[Renewal Center,] a correctional institution.” Id. Consequently, Judge Bowes opined
that, pursuant to the plain meaning of Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code, Lehman
was an “inmate” at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance.
Id. at 335-36. For these reasons, Judge Bowes would have concluded that the evidence
was sufficient to support Lehman’s conviction for a violation of Section 5123(a.2), and,
therefore, Lehman’s claim that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing
to raise a sufficiency-based challenge lacked arguable merit. Id. As a result, Judge
Bowes would have held that the PCRA court did not err by dismissing Lehman’s PCRA
petition without a hearing. Id.
II. ISSUE
This Court granted discretionary review to consider the following issue, as stated
by the Commonwealth: Whether the Superior Court majority erred in concluding that prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to pursue on appeal a claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain [Lehman’s] conviction under [Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code], because he was not an inmate at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance, where, pursuant to the relevant statute and legislation, he was an inmate? Commonwealth v. Lehman, 289 A.3d 889 (Pa. 2022) (per curiam order). While the
Commonwealth’s issue itself is expressed in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel
and sufficiency of the evidence, resolution of the issue requires us to engage in statutory
[J-37-2023] - 9 interpretation and, therefore, presents a question of law. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps.,
Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 162 A.3d 384, 389 (Pa. 2017). Accordingly, “our
standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review plenary.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
This appeal requires us to interpret Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code, and,
therefore, we are guided in our analysis by the Statutory Construction Act of 1972
(Statutory Construction Act),13 which provides that the object of all statutory interpretation
“is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa. C.S.
§ 1921(a). Generally, the plain language of the statute “provides the best indication of
legislative intent.” Miller v. Cnty. of Centre, 173 A.3d 1162, 1168 (Pa. 2017) (citing 1 Pa.
C.S. § 1921(b)). If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous in setting forth the
intent of the General Assembly, then “we cannot disregard the letter of the statute under
the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Fletcher v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 985 A.2d
678, 684 (Pa. 2009) (citing 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b)). In this vein, “we should not insert words
into [a statute] that are plainly not there.” Frazier v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bayada
Nurses, Inc.), 52 A.3d 241, 245 (Pa. 2012). When the statutory language is ambiguous,
however, we may ascertain the General Assembly’s intent by considering the factors set
forth in Section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act14 and other rules of statutory
construction. See Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, Inc. v. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Bd., 863 A.2d 432,
436 (Pa. 2004) (observing that “other interpretive rules of statutory construction are to be
utilized only where the statute at issue is ambiguous”). Moreover, “[w]ords and phrases
shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and
approved usage,” though “technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired
13 1 Pa. C.S. §§ 1501-1991.
14 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(c).
[J-37-2023] - 10 a peculiar and appropriate meaning or are defined in [the Statutory Construction Act] shall
be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.” 1 Pa.
C.S. § 1903(a). “We also presume that ‘the General Assembly does not intend a result
that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable,’ and that ‘the General Assembly
intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.’” Berner v. Montour Twp. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 217 A.3d 238, 245 (Pa. 2019) (quoting 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(1)-(2)).
Additionally, the General Assembly, in Section 105 of the Crimes Code itself,
instructed that “[t]he provisions of [the Crimes Code] shall be construed according to the
fair import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing constructions it
shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in [the Crimes Code] and the
special purposes of the particular provision involved.” 18 Pa. C.S. § 105. This Court has
previously stated that the fair import of Section 5123(a) of the Crimes Code is that there
are certain places, such as prisons, mental hospitals, buildings appurtenant to prisons
and mental hospitals, and land granted to, owned by, or leased by the Commonwealth
for the use and benefit of prisoners or inmates, “where it is impermissible to bring certain
enumerated substances.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 579 A.2d 869, 871 (Pa. 1990)
(holding that mere possession of controlled substance by prison visitor absent intent to
deliver to persons confined therein constitutes violation of Section 5123(a) of Crimes
Code). This Court has also previously stated that “[t]he legislative purpose in enacting
[Section 5123(a)] was obviously to prevent the acquisition of contraband substances by
persons confined in prisons and mental hospitals.” Id. With respect specifically to
Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code, the Superior Court has similarly recognized that
“[t]he obvious intent of the [General Assembly] in [that section] . . . is the prevention of
inmates obtaining any controlled substance in any amount whatsoever; in other words,
[J-37-2023] - 11 [Section 5123(a.2)] seeks absolute abstinence by inmates.” Commonwealth v. Gerald,
47 A.3d 858, 862 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 55 A.3d 522 (Pa. 2012).
With these statutory construction principles in mind, we begin our analysis by
reiterating the statute that we are called upon to interpret. Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes
Code provides, in relevant part, that “[a] prisoner or inmate commits a felony of the second
degree if he unlawfully has in his possession or under his control any controlled substance
in violation of [S]ection 13(a)(16) of [the Controlled Substance Act].” The parties do not
dispute that Lehman unlawfully possessed a controlled substance in violation of
Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act. The parties also do not appear to
dispute that Lehman was not a “prisoner” for purposes of Section 5123(a.2). We,
nevertheless, note, for reasons that will become more apparent later, that Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “prisoner” as someone who: (1) “is being confined in prison;” (2) “has
been apprehended by a law-enforcement officer and is in custody, regardless of whether
the person has yet been put in prison;” or (3) “is taken by force and kept somewhere.”15
Prisoner, Black’s Law Dictionary 1447 (11th ed. 2019).
Thus, the only question that we must decide, and the question upon which we
granted review, is whether Lehman was an “inmate” at the time he unlawfully possessed
a controlled substance for purposes of Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code, such that
his trial and appellate counsel can be found to have provided ineffective assistance for
failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction under
Section 5123(a.2). Section 5123(e) of the Crimes Code defines “inmate” as “[a] male or
female offender who is committed to, under sentence to or confined in a penal or
correctional institution.” Accordingly, there are three ways that an “offender” becomes an
15 The relevant portions of the Crimes Code do not define the term “prisoner” and Section 1991 of the Statutory Construction Act does not provide a default definition therefor.
[J-37-2023] - 12 “inmate” for purposes of Section 5123(a.2): (1) the offender is committed to a penal or
correctional institution; (2) the offender is under sentence to a penal or correctional
institution; or (3) the offender is confined in a penal or correctional institution.
The relevant provisions of the Crimes Code do not define “offender,” “committed
to,” “under sentence to,” “confined in,” or “penal or correctional institution,” and
Section 1991 of the Statutory Construction Act does not provide default definitions for
those terms. We must, therefore, ascertain these words and phrases in accordance with
their common and approved usage. See 1 Pa. C.S. § 1903(a). Both the parties and the
Superior Court incorrectly assume/conclude that Renewal Center is a community
corrections center. Section 5001 of the Prisons and Parole Code (Parole Code) defines
a “community corrections center” as “[a] residential program that is supervised and
operated by the [Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC)].” 61 Pa. C.S. § 5001.
A “community corrections facility,” on the other hand, is defined as “[a] residential facility
operated by a private contractor that . . . houses offenders pursuant to a contract with
[DOC].” Id. Given that Renewal Center is not operated by DOC but, rather, a private
contractor, it meets the definition of a community corrections facility, not a community
corrections center. With that being said, the Superior Court properly concluded that
Renewal Center qualifies as a “correctional institution” for purposes of
Section 5123(a.2), (e). Pursuant to the Parole Code, DOC is authorized to enter into
contracts with private contractors to operate corrections facilities within the community for
the purpose of housing offenders who have been paroled by the Parole Board.16
See 61 Pa. C.S. §§ 5001, 5002, 5003. Renewal Center is one of those facilities.
Additionally, there is no question that Lehman qualifies as an “offender” as that term is
16 Importantly, Chapter 50 of the Parole Code, which addresses community corrections
centers and facilities, is set forth within Part III of the Parole Code, which is entitled “Inmate Confinement.”
[J-37-2023] - 13 used in Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“offender” as “[s]omeone who has committed a crime; esp., one who has been convicted
of a crime.” Offender, Black’s Law Dictionary 1299 (11th ed. 2019). More importantly,
Section 5003(a) of the Parole Code, which governs those individuals who may be housed
at, among other places, community corrections facilities, is entitled “[o]ffenders who may
be housed” and specifically uses the phrase “[a]n offender paroled by the [Parole B]oard.”
61 Pa. C.S. § 5003(a). Simply put, Lehman would not have been residing at Renewal
Center as a condition of his parole from a state sentence of incarceration unless he had
been convicted of a crime and had been subsequently released on parole by the Parole
Board, and, therefore, Lehman qualifies as an “offender” for purposes of
Section 5123(a.2), (e).
The record, however, is wholly devoid of any facts or evidence that would suggest
that Lehman was “under sentence to” or “confined in” Renewal Center at the time that he
unlawfully possessed a controlled substance. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “sentence”
as “[t]he judgment that a court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant
guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer.” Sentence, Black’s Law
Dictionary 1636 (11th ed. 2019). Although we do not know the specific facts surrounding
Lehman’s underlying conviction and subsequent incarceration, the parties agree that
Lehman was residing at Renewal Center as a condition of his parole from a state
sentence of incarceration. Hence, Lehman was “under sentence to” a state correctional
institution for a specified term as a result of his underlying conviction. Lehman’s
subsequent release to Renewal Center from a state correctional institution was not part
of that sentence but, rather, was a condition of his parole. Accordingly, Lehman was not
“under sentence to” Renewal Center at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled
substance.
[J-37-2023] - 14 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “confinement” as “[t]he act of imprisoning or
restraining someone; the quality, state, or condition of being imprisoned or restrained.”
Confinement, Black’s Law Dictionary 373 (11th ed. 2019). While not explicitly stated
therein, this definition—more precisely its incorporation of the word “restrain”17—suggests
that there is a compulsory and/or forcible aspect to confinement—i.e., to be “confined in”
a certain place requires the individual to have no choice but to remain there at all times.
There was no compulsory or forcible aspect to Lehman’s residence at Renewal Center.
Lehman had the option to serve the remainder of his state sentence of incarceration at a
state correctional institution but, instead, chose to accept the Parole Board’s terms and
conditions that resulted in his mandated residence at Renewal Center. In addition, there
is no evidence in the record to suggest that Lehman was required to remain within the
four walls of his room at Renewal Center or Renewal Center itself or that he was not able
to come and go from Renewal Center subject to certain rules and restrictions. Thus,
Lehman was not “confined in” Renewal Center for purposes of Section 5123(a.2), (e).
What we are left to determine, then, is whether Lehman was “committed to”
Renewal Center at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “commit” as “[t]o send (a person) to prison or to a mental health facility,
esp. by court order.” Commit, Black’s Law Dictionary 340 (11th ed. 2019). Arguably, the
Parole Board only agreed to parole Lehman from his state sentence of incarceration if
Lehman resided, at least initially, at Renewal Center. Stated another way, the Parole
Board sent Lehman to reside at Renewal Center as a condition of his parole—i.e., in an
official capacity. While Lehman could have refused to agree to the Parole Board’s terms
17 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “restrain” as, inter alia, “to deprive
of liberty.” Restrain, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1936 (1993). “RESTRAIN is a general term suggesting use of force, pressure, or strenuous persuasion to hold back a person or thing from a course or action or to prevent the action itself.” Id.
[J-37-2023] - 15 and conditions that resulted in his mandated residence at Renewal Center, to do so would
have resulted in his continued incarceration at a state correctional institution. Moreover,
while Lehman also could have abandoned his residence at Renewal Center at any time,
to do so would have been a violation of the terms and conditions of his parole and could
have resulted in his recommitment as a technical parole violator to serve the remainder
of his unexpired sentence of incarceration in a state correctional institution.
Consequently, the limited facts and circumstances of which we are aware relative to
Lehman’s residence at Renewal Center establish that Lehman was “committed to”
Renewal Center for purposes of Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code. For all of
these reasons, we conclude that, pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of
Section 5123(a.2), (e), Lehman was an “inmate” at the time he unlawfully possessed a
controlled substance in violation of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act.
Lehman attempts to avoid this conclusion by relying heavily, if not exclusively, on
his status as a parolee. He contends that, “as employed in Section 5123 [of the Crimes
Code] and other relevant statutes, ‘committed to’ necessarily refers to a class of offenders
mandated to be held or incarcerated in correctional facilities.” (Lehman’s Br. at 6.) In so
doing, Lehman makes a distinction between parolees, like himself, who are “at liberty” on
parole, and pre-release inmates, who are “in official detention or incarceration.”
(Id. at 10.) While he concedes that pre-release inmates may, under current law, no longer
be housed at community corrections centers such as Renewal Center,18 Lehman insists
that “the body of case[ ]law in which the courts distinguished ‘pre-release inmates’ from
parolees is significant for purposes of determining the rights and legal status of a parolee.”
(Id.) Lehman also makes a distinction between parolees in good standing and parole
18 See 61 Pa. C.S. § 5003(a)(5) (providing that “[i]nmates transferred by [DOC] under
Chapter 37 (relating to inmate pre[-]release plans)” may be housed in community corrections centers) (expired July 1, 2013).
[J-37-2023] - 16 offenders “‘detained or recommitted to’ a community corrections center as a result of a
parole violation.” (Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Section 5006 of the Parole Code,
61 Pa. C.S. § 5006 (providing that “[a]n offender detained or recommitted to a community
corrections center . . . as a result of a parole violation shall be deemed to be in official
detention under” Section 5121 of Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. § 5121 (relating to escape),
but “[a]n offender living in a community corrections center . . . while in good standing on
parole shall not”)).) In further support, Lehman directs our attention to the Parole Code’s
use of the word “recommitted,” arguing that “[f]or an offender to be ‘recommitted’
necessarily implies that[,] at some point, specifically, when placed on parole, the offender
is no longer ‘committed.’”19 (Id. at 14.) In sum, Lehman contends that, because “he was
residing at Renewal [Center] voluntarily as a parolee in compliance with an agreed-upon
condition of his parole” and he was “at liberty on parole” and, therefore, did not have the
right to accrue credit against his sentence while residing there, the Superior Court
correctly concluded that it was “impossible for [him] to qualify as an ‘inmate’ for the
purpose of Section 5123.”20 (Id. at 24 (quoting Lehman, 278 A.3d at 326).)
19 Lehman further argues that, “[a]s stated by the [Superior Court],” Judge Bowes’ reliance
on Cornelius is misplaced “because it involves completely different facts and speaks to points of law that are not now at issue.” (Lehman’s Br. at 18 (quoting Lehman, 278 A.3d at 327).) Given, however, that our decision today is not in any way based upon the Superior Court’s prior decision in Cornelius, we need not consider Lehman’s arguments in this regard. 20 Lehman additionally maintains that, “[t]o the extent that the definition of an inmate is
ambiguous under [Section] 5123(a.2) [of the Crimes Code],” the rule of lenity, nevertheless, requires this Court to construe Section 5123(a.2) in his favor. (Lehman’s Br. at 21.) “[U]nder the rule of lenity, an ambiguous penal statute must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298, 306 (Pa. 2022). “[T]his principle does not[, however,] require that our Court give the words of a statute their ‘narrowest possible meaning,’ nor does it ‘override the “general principle that the words of a statute must be construed according to their common and approved usage.”’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160, 1168 (Pa. 2009)). It (continued…)
[J-37-2023] - 17 In making these arguments, Lehman, like the Superior Court, focuses his attention,
not on the plain and unambiguous language of the statute in question—i.e.,
Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code—but on the Parole Code, the Parole Board’s
regulations, and certain case law addressing parole revocations and whether a parolee
or other offender will receive credit for time served. Quite frankly, whether Lehman was
“at liberty on parole” such that he was not entitled to receive credit against his underlying
sentence for the time he spent at Renewal Center in the event he was later recommitted
as a technical or convicted parole violator is completely irrelevant to whether Lehman was
also does not require this Court to disregard the General Assembly’s intent. Commonwealth v. Nevels, 235 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. 2020). As explained more fully above, the plain and unambiguous language of Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code establishes that Lehman was an “inmate” at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance in violation of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act—i.e., he was an offender “committed to” Renewal Center, a correctional institution. Just because the Superior Court reached a different conclusion does not automatically mean that Section 5123(a.2), (e) is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and, therefore, is ambiguous. For all the reasons stated herein, the Superior Court’s interpretation—i.e., Lehman’s interpretation—of Section 5123(a.2), (e) is not reasonable. Thus, the rule of lenity simply does not apply where, as here, the statutory language is unambiguous—i.e., not subject to two or more reasonable interpretations. See Gamby, 283 A.3d at 306; see also A.S. v. Pa. State Police, 143 A.3d 896, 905-06 (Pa. 2016) (“A statute is ambiguous when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text.”). The dissent suggests that we “want[] to have it both ways” because we “insist[] the statute is unambiguous, thus rendering the rule of lenity inapplicable,” but then “root[] around for tools of statutory construction that are only available when a statute is ambiguous.” (Dissenting Op. at 6 (Wecht, J., dissenting).) In so doing, the dissent acknowledges that we discuss the fair import and legislative purpose behind Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code “as an instrument to refute Lehman’s argument” relative to the fact that he, as a parolee who is “at liberty on parole” and in good standing, should be treated differently than other offenders residing with him at Renewal Center. (Id. at 6-7; See also infra pp. 19-20.) The dissent seemingly ignores, however, that we discuss the fair import and legislative purpose behind Section 5123(a.2) not in an effort to demonstrate that the statutory language is in fact unambiguous, but rather, to illustrate that our interpretation of Section 5123(a.2)’s plain and unambiguous language is entirely consistent with the General Assembly’s purpose to keep controlled substances and other contraband out of correctional institutions and that Lehman’s interpretation is not.
[J-37-2023] - 18 an “inmate”—i.e., “committed to” Renewal Center—for purposes of Section 5123(a.2),
(e). There is absolutely nothing within the plain and unambiguous language of
Section 5123(a.2), (e) that requires parolees to be treated differently from other offenders
or that suggests that if a parolee is “at liberty on parole” he cannot also be “committed to”
a community corrections facility, such as Renewal Center. We simply cannot and will not
insert words or phrases into Section 5123(a.2), (e) that are plainly not there. See Frazier,
52 A.3d at 245. Moreover, while we concede that the Parole Code’s use of the phrase
“recommitment” in the context of a parole violation may necessarily imply that the parolee
was previously “committed,” the parolee’s commitment to a state correctional institution
to serve his state sentence of incarceration in connection with his underlying conviction
is wholly unrelated to his subsequent commitment to a correctional institution as a
condition of his parole or any recommitment to a state correctional institution for a parole
violation. In other words, Lehman blindly ignores that an offender may, over the course
of his incarceration and parole, be subject to multiple commitments.
Additionally, by suggesting that he, as a parolee who is “at liberty on parole” and
in good standing, should be treated differently from other offenders, such as parole
violators, residing with him at Renewal Center, Lehman blatantly ignores the fair import
and legislative purpose behind Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code. Although this
Court has not previously spoken to the fair import of or legislative purposes behind
Section 5123(a.2), the fair import of and legislative purpose behind Section 5123(a) rightly
extends to Section 5123(a.2). That is, there are certain places—e.g., prisons and mental
hospitals—where controlled substances should just not be and where absolute
abstinence is required. See Williams, 579 A.2d at 871; see also Gerald, 47 A.3d at 862.
It is also entirely reasonable to include community corrections facilities, such as Renewal
Center, as one of those places. To conclude that different types of offenders residing in
[J-37-2023] - 19 the same community corrections facility should be treated differently based on their
individual status and circumstances would undermine the General Assembly’s purpose
to keep controlled substances and other contraband out of correctional institutions.
Furthermore, if we were to adopt Lehman’s interpretation of the word “inmate”—
and, more specifically, the phrase “committed to”—we would render Section 5123(a.2) of
the Crimes Code’s use of the term “prisoner” in addition to the term “inmate” and,
arguably, the remainder of Section 5123(e)’s definition of “inmate,” superfluous. In other
words, the only offenders who would likely meet Lehman’s definition of “inmate” would be
those offenders confined within a state correctional institution, prison, or jail. Indeed, had
the General Assembly intended to limit Section 5123(a.2) in such a fashion, it would not
have chosen the rather expansive language set forth in Section 5123(a.2), (e). “Prisoner”
has to mean something different than “inmate” or the General Assembly would not have
chosen to employ both words in Section 5123(a.2). In addition, as detailed above,
“committed to,” “under sentence to,” and “confined in” have separate and distinct
meanings: (1) an offender is “under sentence to” a correctional institution when he is
placed there following a conviction as a means of punishment; (2) an offender is “confined
in” a correctional institution when he is restrained there and has no choice but to remain;
and (3) an offender is “committed to” a correctional institution when he is sent there to
reside in an official capacity—e.g., as a condition of his parole. While there is some
overlap between “under sentence to” and “confined in” and “confined in” and “committed
to,” each definition has at least some distinguishing feature—i.e., a confinement, unlike a
sentence, can occur before an offender is convicted of a crime and a confinement, unlike
a commitment, requires some form of restraint. If we were to ignore the General
Assembly’s use of this rather expansive language, we would not, as we are required to
[J-37-2023] - 20 do, give effect to the entirety of Section 5123(a.2). See Berner, 217 A.3d at 245 (quoting
1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(2)).
In sum, we conclude that Lehman was an “inmate” as that term is used and defined
in Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code at the time he unlawfully possessed a
controlled substance in violation of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act,
and, therefore, Lehman’s trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective for failing to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction under
Section 5123(a.2). Stated another way, Lehman failed to demonstrate that his counsel
provided ineffective assistance because his underlying sufficiency-based claim lacked
arguable merit. Accordingly, we reverse the Superior Court’s order.
Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue and McCaffery join the opinion.
Justice Mundy files a concurring opinion in which Justice Dougherty joins.
Justice Wecht files a dissenting opinion.
[J-37-2023] - 21