Commodore Mining Co. v. Commissioner
This text of 40 B.T.A. 347 (Commodore Mining Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
[348]*348OPINION.
The petitioner contends that it is entitled to a depletion deduction computed on the discovery value or unit basis as established by the respondent on March 1, 1927.
The respondent’s position is that the petitioner is entitled to no such deduction, that it failed to state in its return for the year 1934, its first return under the prolusions of section 114 (b) (4) of the Revenue Act of 1934,1 whether it elected to have its depletion allowance [349]*349computed with, or without regard to percentage depletion, and that therefore, under the statute, such computation must be made without reference to percentage depletion. He construes the phrase “without reference to percentage depletion” as used in the 1934 Act to mean that the base must be either cost or March 1,1913, fair market value.
The allowance for depletion of mines based on discovery value, a practice long established by the taxing statutes, was continued in the Revenue Act of 1934 but it was limited to mines other than metal, coal, or sulphur. (Sec. 114 (b) (2).) That act specifically grants to the owners of metal, coal, and sulphur mines a depletion allowance on a percentage basis, but conditions such allowance on the taxpayer’s statement of its election to take advantage of the grant. If it elects not to avail itself of the privilege, obviously, no depletion is allowed on that basis. If it fails to indicate its election, it likewise forfeits its right to a percentage allowance and the allowance is computed without regard to percentage depletion.
Where the taxpayer excludes itself from the provisions of section 114 (b) (4) either by its affirmative action or by its inaction, the general rule of section 114 (b) (1) applies. Section 113 (b)2 states [350]*350that the basis for determining gain or loss shall be the basis determined in subsection (a) as adjusted in accordance with certain rules set forth hi section 113 (b). Section 113 (a) states that the basis of property shall be the cost of such property and sets forth certain exceptions, the only one material to the issue being (14) which relates to March 1,1913, fair market value.
The petitioner contends that, since it was allowed a discovery value in 1927, as of September 15, 1924, it is entitled to that advantage continuously thereafter. The deduction for depletion based on discovery value is a matter of legislative grace. By the limitation of the Revenue Act of 1932, the allowance was withdrawn as to certain types of mines. Section 114 (b) (2) (continued in the Revenue Act of 1934) emphasized that exclusion in so far as it related to metal, coal, and sulphur mines and section 114 (b) (4) established a new basis for such mines. Nowhere in the Revenue Acts of 1932 or 1934 is there any suggestion that the discovery value principle was retained for computing depletion under those acts on that type of mines.
The petitioner did not elect to obtain a depletion allowance on the percentage basis. The discovery value basis was no longer available to it. Therefore, its base must be either cost or March 1, 1913, fair market value. It is stipulated that the property had no fair market value on March 1, 1913, and that its cost has been fully recovered. Consequently, it is entitled to no depletion deduction whatsoever.
The petitioner argues that under the facts it has had no real right of election. This argument was considered by us in Dorothy Glenn Coal Mining Co., 38 B. T. A. 1154 and C. H. Mead Coal Co., 38 B. T. A. 1163. In those cases we held that the allowance of the claimed deduction from gross income was a matter of legislative grace and that the taxpayer must conform to the conditions imposed by Congress. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 435. Since the petitioner did not so conform, it can not be allowed a depletion deduction on the percentage basis, although it obtains no advantage from the other statutory methods.
The petitioner further maintains that section 23 (m) of the Revenue Act of 19343 compels the allowance of some reasonable amount for depletion. Section 114 (b) (2) withdrew from metal, coal, and sulphur mines a depletion allowance based on discovery value. Section 114 (b) (4) gave the taxpayer the right to a percentage deple[351]*351tion or a depletion based on cost or March 1,1913, fair market value. The petitioner continued to make its returns by an obsolete method and ignored its right to the benefits of the percentage basis substituted therefor by Congress. The predicament in which the petitioner finds itself is not unique. See Dorothy Glenn Coal Mining Co., and C. H. Mead Coal Co., supra. The statute does not afford petitioner the relief which it claims.
Decision will he entered for the respondent.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
40 B.T.A. 347, 1939 BTA LEXIS 867, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commodore-mining-co-v-commissioner-bta-1939.