Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. FITC, Inc.

52 B.R. 935, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21801
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMarch 13, 1985
DocketC-85-1555 EFL
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 52 B.R. 935 (Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. FITC, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. FITC, Inc., 52 B.R. 935, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21801 (N.D. Cal. 1985).

Opinion

ORDER FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF PERMANENT RECEIVER

LYNCH, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (“CFTC”) motion for a preliminary injunction and appointment of Frederick S. Wyle as permanent equity receiver. In addition, defendant Anthony moves for modification of the Temporary Restraining Order, and the receiver also requests several orders to clarify his authority in this matter.

On the morning of February 27, 1985, this Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order against FITC, Inc. (“FITC”) and its officers, directors and other individual defendants. The Court ordered FITC to “cooperate fully with the receiver in order to locate all of the assets, books and records of FITC.”

In direct contempt of the Order of this Court, on the afternoon of February 27, 1985, Christopher Rubenstrunk, President of FITC, initiated Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings in Las Vegas, Nevada. This action was taken by Rubenstrunk without the knowledge of FITC’s retained counsel, who had appeared before this Court in the morning. The bankruptcy petition has had its intended effect of creating a stumbling block for this Court’s receiver and in complicating further the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction over the matter.

I

Defendant FITC, now seeking to exploit the confusion it has created, moves this Court to stay its proceeding pending the bankruptcy action. The Court denies this motion. It is unequivocally the law in the Ninth Circuit that a filing of a Chapter 11 petition does not stay a continuing civil enforcement proceeding brought by a governmental agency. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. CoPetro Marketing Group, Inc., 700 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir.1983) (citing the regulatory exception to the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5)). This Court, therefore, retains full jurisdiction to proceed in this matter and to grant the government’s request for a preliminary injunction and to order appointment of a permanent receiver. See also Securities & Exchg. *937 Comm. v. First Financial Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429 (5th Cir.1981).

The Court appointed a receiver on February 27 as a necessary form of ancillary relief based on an extensive record of conversion, misappropriation and concealment of investor funds by FITC and the individual defendants. On the basis of this evidence, the Court appointed a receiver to prevent further fraudulent conduct and to protect investors at an early point in the proceedings. The Court was clearly authorized to appoint a receiver under these circumstances. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. CoPetro Marketing Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 583 (9th Cir.1983) (Section 6(1) broad enough to authorize the appointment of a receiver).

Once a court appoints a receiver, the management loses the power to run the corporation’s affairs. The receiver obtains all the corporation’s power and assets. First Savings & Loan Assoc, v. First Fed’l. Savings & Loan, 531 F.Supp. 251, 255 (D.Hawaii 1981); SEC v. Spence & Green, 612 F.2d 896, 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1082, 101 S.Ct. 866, 66 L.Ed.2d 806 (1980). Thus it was the receiver, and only the receiver, who this Court empowered with the authority to place FITC in bankruptcy. See Spence, 612 F.2d at 903.

It is apparent to this Court that FITC filed the bankruptcy petition in bad faith and with the intention of interfering with the receiver’s marshaling of the corporation’s records and assets. As evidence of these ulterior motives, the president of FITC, Christopher Rubenstrunk, appointed himself as debtor-in-possession. As noted by FITC’s new counsel at the hearing on this matter, this petition entitles Ruben-strunk to control the assets and records of FITC pending resolution of the bankruptcy petition. Such an appointment directly conflicts with the aggressive efforts of this Court to isolate the individual participants in the FITC fraud from the remaining investor funds. Given the freedom of a debt- or-in-possession and the charges which are involved in this case, to allow Rubenstrunk to control the assets without a receiver would leave the defendants free to dispose of their assets virtually at will and would defeat the entire purpose of interposing a receiver to protect the investors from the further wrongdoing. See FTC v. R.A. Walker & Assoc., Inc., 37 B.R. 608, 612 (D.D.C.1983).

The uncontroverted evidence in this case demonstrates a systematic attempt by FITC and its officers to conceal records and assets and to impede this Court and its receiver in this action. 1 This sham bankruptcy petition is yet another example. Hiding behind the shield of the bankruptcy court, Rubenstrunk and defendant Anthony refuse to surrender FITC records to the receiver. 2 In addition, Rubenstrunk refuses to surrender to the receiver over $800,-000.00 in FITC funds that he holds as “debtor-in-possession.” Both of these acts directly violate the express Order of this Court.

While not common, this Court may preclude petitions in bankruptcy where there are compelling circumstances. SEC v. Lincoln Thrift, Assn., 577 F.2d 600, 609 (9th Cir.1978); Limited States v. Royal Business Funds Corp., 724 F.2d 12, 15-16 (2d Cir.1983) (a debtor subject to a receiver has no absolute right to file a bankruptcy petition). Lincoln Thrift requires that the district court state expressly why the exercise of its authority is preferable to a liquidation in bankruptcy. Lincoln, 577 F.2d at 609. In accord, this Court notes the follow *938 ing facts. First, the uncontroverted evidence before the Court shows that FITC was merely a front for a large and elaborate commodities fraud. 3 The Court’s Order of February 27 prohibits FITC from further operations. There can be no reorganization or restructuring under the terms of this Order. Second, the evidence presented to the Court by the government and the receiver indicates a real danger that any assets released to these defendants will be dispersed, and the fraud against FITC investors will be perpetuated. 4

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
52 B.R. 935, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21801, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commodity-futures-trading-commission-v-fitc-inc-cand-1985.