Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Alexandre

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided May 14, 2024·No. 1:22-cv-03822·Unknown

Opinion

EMINIFX INVESTORS’ MOTION TO INTERVENE USDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DATE FILED: 05/14 /2024 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------------- X COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, Plaintiff, 22-CV-3822 (VEC) -v EDDY ALEXANDRE AND EMINIFX, INC., Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------------- X EMINIFX INVESTORS’ MOTION TO INTERVENE

We move this court for leave to intervene in this action as of right, pursuant to Fed. R. P. 24(a)(2). AS grounds for this motion, the EminiFx Investors states as follows: 1. The EminiFX Investors satisfied the requirements for intervention as of right. First, the EminiFX Investors‟ Motion to intervene is timely because the litigation is in its early stages. Until now the defendant has not yet or about to file his answer to the complaint and trial is not yet scheduled. The EminiFx Investors‟ intervention will not create any delay. Thus, intervention by EminiFX Investors at this venture will not prejudice the existing parties. 2. The EminiFX Investors have a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action. 3. Disposition of the action without The EminiFX Investors‟ participation may impede their interests. The outcome of this case implicates stare decisis concerns that warrants the EminiFx Investors intervention 4. The EminiFx Investors‟ interests are not adequately protected by the existing parties to the litigation. Because EminiFX Investors do not necessarily align with the interests represented by the plaintiff. 5. The EminiFX investors also satisfy the requirements for permissive intervention 6. Data that the Court overlooked MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT 0F EMINIFX INVESTORS‟ MOTION TO INTERVENE 1. INTRODUCTION

We respectfully submit this Memorandum of Law in support of our motion to intervene in this action. We move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 to intervene as of right, or alternatively, by permission to represent ourselves for the existing parties are not adequately representing our interests. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT We file this Memorandum of Law in support of our motion to intervene in the above-captioned case pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (1) that we have representation in this matter and (2) the parties don‟t speak for us nor represent the interests of Eminifx investors. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). FACTUAL BACKGROUND On or about May 11, 2022, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) filed a sealed complaint against Mr. Eddy Alexandre and EminiFX (Dkt. 5). On May 11, the CFTC moved this Court for a statutory restraining order, inter alia, freezing the assets of EminiFX and Alexandre, and appointing David Castleman as Receiver to take control of EminiFX. This Court granted the relief the same day. (Dkt. 9). II. Argument The EminiFX Investors meet the Requirements for Intervention as of Right

Under Fed. Rule Civ. P. 24(a)(2), upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action when the applicant shows: (1)his application to intervene is timely; (2) he has an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) he is so situated that disposition of the action, as a practical matter, may impede or impair his ability to protect that interest; and (4) his interest is represented inadequately by the existing parties to the suit. Fox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 519 F.3d 1298, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989)). Here, the EminiFX Investors‟ request for intervention satisfies the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) for intervention as of right. 1. The EminiFX Investors’ Motion to Intervene is Timely The Eleventh Circuit has identified several factors relevant to determining whether a request for intervention is timely (1)the length of time during which the proposed intervener knew or reasonably should have known of the interest in the case before moving to intervene; (2) the extent of prejudice to the existing parties as a result of the proposed intervener‟s failure to move for intervention as soon as it knew or reasonably should have known of its interest; (3) the extent of prejudice to the proposed intervener if the motion is denied; and (4) the existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a determination that their motion was timely. Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d 1242, 1259 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213). This Circuit has recognized that the requirement of timeliness “must have accommodating flexibility toward both the court and the litigants if it is to be successfully employed to regulate intervention in the interest of justice.” U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d at 1259 (quoting McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970)). Ample case law indicates that a motion to intervene is likely to be timely when, as here, it is filed within months of the original complaint. In Chiles, for example, a motion to intervene was held to be timely where the motion “was filed only seven months after [the plaintiff] filed his original complaint, three months after the government filed its motion to dismiss, and before any discovery had begun.” 865 F.2d at 1213; see also Diaz v. S. Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1970) (motion to intervene more than a year after the action was commenced was timely when there had been no legally significant proceedings other than the completion of discovery and intervention would not cause any delay in the process of the overall litigation);1 Anderson v. United States, No. 14-cv-1182, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167398, at *2 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (where there is no prejudice to the parties, intervention is permissible even a year after litigation has commenced, and even though discovery has closed); DeVault v. Isdale, No. 15-cv-135, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137684, at *9 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (when intervener files a Motion to Intervene in advance of the defendant‟s deadline for production, the ensuing prejudice is “minimal”); Davis v. S.Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 149 F.R.D. 666, 670 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (allowing intervention when, “[a]although the case has been pending for more than two years, discovery on the merits has not been completed and dispositive motions have not been filed. As a consequence, there is no indication that this litigation is close to conclusion.”). Applying these factors, the EminiFX Investors‟ application for intervention is timely. The complaint was filed on May 11, 2022. Mr. Alexandre have not or is about to file his Answer. There is no scheduling order, neither discovery is scheduled and trial is not schedule to begin. This litigation remains at an early stage contrary to what the CFTC wanted the Court to believe and the EminiFX investors‟ intervention will not prejudice either party. 2. The EminiFX Investors have a Substantial Interest in this Litigation For an applicant‟s interest in the subject matter of the litigation to be cognizable under Rule 24(a)(2), it must be “direct, substantial and legally protectable.” U.S.

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